Is the war going well? - a debate between Dan Shapiro and Mark Dubowitz

War has returned to Israel. Israelis have spent the last days in their safe rooms and in public bomb shelters. Buildings have been hit and tragically civilians have been killed. As Israel and the United States continue their military offensive, Israelis brace for sustained rocket fire. And at the scene of these attacks, United Hatsala volunteers, EMTs, medics, and doctors are working to save lives, often showing up in the first minutes to evacuate people stuck in buildings, supply medical care to the wounded, and provide first aid to many others impacted. Their volunteers are often in the critical first minutes after rocket impact. Their services, which are always free, are a vital lifeline to the people of Israel. You can make sure that they have the life-saving equipment and supplies they need right now, bulletproof vests and helmets, tactical stretchers for evacuations, oxygen kits, and whatever else they need to meet this moment in Israel. Visit israelrescue.org forward slash call me back. That's israelrescue.org forward slash call me back. Or go to the link in my show notes to learn more and support United Hatsala's critical efforts. You are listening to an ARC Media podcast. It's kind of three clocks that are ticking. The nuclear clock, how quickly could Iran reconstitute its nuclear program and potentially get a bomb through some kind of covert breakout or sneak out? How long will the regime survive? And then the third clock is American will. And the goal of this campaign, as I see it, is we've got to break the regime before it breaks American political will, waits out Trump, rebuilds, rearms, represses Iranians, develops nuclear weapons, and comes back deadlier. So the strategy is, I think, straightforward and I think it's been going fairly well. If you had wanted to prepare the American people for withstanding the pressures that we're going to be under, economic pressures, resource strains, diplomatic pressures that this will require, Mark talks about the American will factor here. Would you have gone into this war the way we did? Sort of tumbling backwards into it and only then trying to fumble around and make a case for why it was necessary? Almost from the beginning, something like 60% of the American people, that's what most polls are showing, oppose this war. It's 4 p.m. on Sunday, April 12th here in New York City. It is 11 p.m. on Sunday, April 12th in Israel. The question of whether the war is going well has become a defining fault line in the American public debate, one that even cuts within traditionally aligned communities. According to a recent CBS YouGov poll, to cite one of many, 41% of Americans, according to this poll, think that the war with Iran is going well while 59% believe it is going badly. One side of the debate includes many who argue that progress should be measured in strategic and military terms, degrading enemy capabilities, restoring deterrence, and signaling resolve to adversaries. From this perspective, even a prolonged and possibly costly military campaign can be going well if it strengthens long-term security and reshapes the regional balance. On the other side of this debate includes voices that are increasingly centered on questions of legitimacy and competence, both at home and abroad, whether the strategy reflects clear leadership, credible goals, and effective execution. Internationally, some of these critics question whether the conduct of the war is strengthening alliances or eroding support and isolating the United States. We've been hearing from both perspectives of this debate from many of you in the call me back community who've reached out with comments and feedback to our various episodes. So we decided to have a good faith debate here between two people who care deeply about these issues but have very different viewpoints, both of whom I've known for decades. Dan Shapiro is a former U.S. ambassador to Israel under President Obama. He served in the Obama and Biden administrations. In addition to being ambassador to Israel under President Obama, Dan Shapiro served at the National Security Council and the Biden administration. He served in the Pentagon and he brings decades of diplomatic experience and a focus on alliances and regional stability. And his work goes all the way back to the 1990s on Capitol Hill when I first got to know him. And Mark Dubowitz, who is the CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and for 23 years, has been one of the architects and most energetic advocates for the maximum pressure campaign on Iran and who in return has been sanctioned by Iran since 2019. Dan, Mark, welcome to the podcast. Honored to be here. Thanks, Dan. Thanks, Dan. Good to be on call me back. I want to begin with where we are right now, which can be confusing to many of our listeners, which is understandable. Vice President Vance has just returned from Islamabad where he led what appears to be the now failed negotiations with Iran and which led President Trump to announce this morning that the United States will blockade the Strait of Hormuz. So, Dan, I want to start with you. What is your assessment of the current situation? Thanks for having me here, Dan. And it's great to be with Mark as well. The current situation is confused and that's in part because the whole effort, the whole strategic objective of this war has been confused really from the beginning. Just to state from the moment where we are, you've mentioned these talks happened in Islamabad. It appears from reporting, Vice President Vance gave a brief statement afterwards, but there's some other reporting, that the Americans put on the table in these talks. Most of the main issues that we have been struggling with the Iranians about for years, even for decades, trying to end all their enrichment of uranium, remove their enriched uranium, dismantle remaining nuclear facilities, and their support for proxy terrorist groups as part of a broader regional security effort, perhaps commitments on limiting their ballistic missile program. And some struggle with the Iranians and what they'd be getting in return if they were to take all those steps about sanctions relief, from freezing their assets and the like. But of course, in real time, something that has to be dealt with that was really never on the table before is getting the straight of Hormuz reopened to international shipping. When the war began, of course, President Trump talked about a lot of different things that this was about. Sometimes he said it was about regime change. Sometimes he said it was about the nuclear program. Sometimes he was demanding unconditional surrender. Then when the straight was closed about a week or two in, he started saying they have to open the fucking straight, you crazy bastards. And then saying a civilization will die if they don't do that. I mean, it's been hard to know what he really thinks the goal of this is. But I think that an absolute requirement for going forward is to make sure the straight of Hormuz is open. That's a fundamental aspect of freedom of navigation. It's been an international principle that the United States Navy was essentially established for and we've upheld forever. Getting all of those other things that I mentioned on the nuclear program, the missile programs, and the proxies that we have wanted out of the Iranians for years out of one meeting in Islamabad was never realistic. So it's not surprising that those talks did not produce that outcome. And then, of course, because the straight really hasn't been opened as it was supposed to be as part of this two-week ceasefire, or about five or six days into the two weeks, President Trump then followed it by what sounded to me like another very improvisational, a little bit desperate, maybe a little bit panicky announcement saying, okay, well, we'll blockade in return. Chuck Clear exactly what that means. That's an excellent to do that properly is a massive naval force project that will take time. But it still seems disconnected from any clear and consistent strategic objective, as I mentioned, which has bedeviled this whole effort from the beginning. Mark, what is your assessment of the current situation? So first of all, it's wonderful to be back on the show, and especially with an old friend, Dan Shapiro. We've been working together, I think on this issue for over two decades, when Dan was a young staffer in the Senate and I was at FDD. I'm more optimistic, as I'm sure you'd expect. I think we're far ahead of where I would have anticipated when the war began, though, as Dan says, with much more to do before we can define this as a significant victory for the United States and Israel. I have to say, as somebody who has been a bit of a nervous nally through five years of President Trump and the Iran issue, I have been surprised by how resolute he's been in so far seeing this through. I've not been surprised by Iran's stubborn resistance, and yes, I am still concerned about what comes next. But I think to step out from where we are in the moment and just sort of look at where we've been and where we're going, I think it's helpful, at least for me, to understand this is kind of six stages of pressure and three clocks that are ticking. And the stage one is Iran's nuclear program, where I think we've done significant degradation both in the 12-day war and the 40-day war. Stage two is the missile program. It was relatively untouched during the 12-day war, and I think there's been some severe degradation done to the missile program. Stage three is really leadership and repression, and that's really been the Israeli military campaign to take out Iran's leadership and repression apparatus and taking out 250 senior IRGC intelligence and besieged commanders. Stage four is Iran's economy. It was in very rough shape going into the 40-day war, and by our estimates, Iran has sustained about $300 billion in direct and indirect damage in the past 40 days. Stage five is Hormuz and the global economy, and Dan referenced this, and I think there's obviously significant concerns, and we can dig deeper into that. Stage six is regime survival. How long this regime will survive? I think that's really the race. It's three clocks that are ticking. The nuclear clock, how quickly could Iran reconstitute its nuclear program and potentially get a bomb through some kind of covert breakout or sneak out? How long will the regime survive? Then the third clock is American will, and the goal of this campaign, as I see it, is we've got to break the regime before it breaks American political will, waits out Trump, rebuilds, rearms, represses Iranians, develops nuclear weapons, and comes back deadlier. The strategy is, I think, straightforward, and I think it's been going fairly well, and that is severely degrade the regime's capabilities. Then over time, we've got to create the conditions for its end. The 12-day war and the 40-day war have really focused heavily on those first four stages, nuclear, missile, military leadership, repression, and economic. I think reasonable people can disagree over the extent of the damage, and I think Dan and I probably will. I think it's a reasonable assessment that it's been serious, more than people expected, but not terminal or permanent. Now we're moving into stage five, and that's Iran's remaining leverage, its economic leverage, which means Hormuz. That's why I think Trump is right to break the blockade and narrow Iran's military options. It's now falling back on the one lever it still has to impose global pain and threaten energy flows and shipping. Sancom is moving through methodically, patiently, and carefully their Hormuz plan, and I think we'll see how that works out. I'm a lot less pessimistic than many about their ability to actually open up the street. Before I bring Dan back in, let me just push back on one point, Mark. In terms of what you're surprised, and you're saying it's going well, but I'm curious about what you've been surprised about, and I want to focus on two areas. Are you surprised about what so far appears like so far, the limits and our ability to get to that 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium? A, and B, have you been surprised about the scale of Iran's missile and drone capacity to keep hitting Israel and our Gulf allies? Did they have more than we thought, more capacity than we thought? I don't think so. I'm not surprised that we haven't yet gone for the 440 kilograms. It's very deeply under the rubble in two major nuclear sites, perhaps a third. It's a very complicated special forces operation. I don't think it's as important as many people think it is to go in there and take it. I think it's much more important that we continue to watch it and surveil it, and that President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu use military force anytime they see the Iranians moving on that enrichment. I'm much more concerned about hidden centrifuges, covert facilities, and pickaxe mountain near a ton, which is buried even deeper than Fordo, and could give Iran a nuclear pathway immunized against our ability to destroy it if Tehran decides to sprint quietly and quickly towards a weapon. What I am surprised by is that we're finally able to actually address the ballistic missile program in ways that we've never been in the past. I would say I'm a little worried that the red lines that we laid out in Islamabad actually didn't include ballistic missiles that wasn't on the table. That worries me, that we're not insisting on severe restrictions on their ability to reconstitute that deadly program. Okay, Dan, in terms of what surprised you in a positive direction or an alarming direction, have there been any surprises? I think Iran has demonstrated impressive capability, and I say that with obviously all the unhappiness that comes with that, to target quite accurately U.S. bases, including key U.S. air defense capabilities in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region. And then of course, the Strait of Hormuz, which was something that of course has been studied and planned for for decades as a possible scenario, but really is a lever they have never used, is something that has been proven to be a way that they can play as even though they're the much weaker party in this war, they still have cards to play that can impose very significant global economic pain, which has frankly, I think, brought President Trump to be the one who was more desperate to get to the ceasefire even than they were when we got into it. So Dan, if I could just jump in there. Yeah, please. First of all, I think I don't know if President Trump was desperate for the ceasefire. He certainly, everybody was expecting him to fold in Islamabad and to chicken out. And clearly, that was the exact opposite of what happened. He held to the red lines, negotiated for 16 hours with J.D. Vance and Whitcoff and Kushner, and was unwilling to yield on those red lines. So he's, you know, there's all these predictions. I made some of them in the past too, that Trump always chickens out. Well, he didn't chicken out. He didn't seem desperate for a ceasefire. And he seems perfectly prepared to go back to major military operations. I'd say one other final thing. I mean, Dan Shapiro mentioned that Hormuz is not a surprise in the sense that Senkoms have been planning for it for many years, but it has been a surprise because Iran has shown some deadly capabilities. I just want us to imagine what Iran would have looked like if we'd proceeded along the path that we were on, both under the JCPOA and before President Trump decided to impose maximum pressure. And that was Iran was on a patient pathway to develop nuclear-tipped ICBMs, 10,000 missiles, a Chinese and Russian-built military, hundreds of thousands of drones, have about a trillion dollars in sanctions relief. And at that point, when Iran was in that lethal end state, they could have permanently, not temporarily, but permanently had a stranglehold over Hormuz and the global economy. And by the way, we would be much weaker. They would be much stronger. And we wouldn't be even talking about the battle of Hormuz because there'd be no battle over Hormuz. They would have a permanent stranglehold and they would control that key shipping lane and they would control the global economy. So it's always worth remembering where we could have gone had we not actually acted. So I could do a whole debate with both of you or have a whole conversation with the two of you on kind of how we got here. And maybe we should do that at some point. I do, to the extent we can, want to keep the conversation focused on where we go from here. That said, Dan, without too much of a digression from the focus, I do want to give you an opportunity to respond to what Mark just said, which is, we can debate whether or not the JCPOA was sufficient to deal with the nuclear program. And that's, again, it can get very technical. But do you think the JCPOA underestimated or didn't sufficiently consider or prioritize some of these other areas that Mark has focused on, which is their quote unquote conventional capabilities, their ballistic missile program, their support for proxies, which is so much of what has given them incredible leverage in the region to wreak havoc and intimidate others in the hope of pursuing some kind of hegemonic position in the region. And when President Trump withdrew from JCPOA, among other things, it enabled the United States to focus on those areas, which the JCPOA did not do. Well, I really don't want to have a debate, Mark, and I have had many debates. I know. I know. I know. Look, the JCPOA, which let's be clear has been dead since 2018. So it's not really very relevant to the current situation. Yeah. Was intended to do one thing, to buy as much time as possible on the nuclear issue. It didn't mean the word still needs to address with regards to the ballistic missile programs and the proxies. Obviously, that was true. Obviously, it was even true, and certainly I said it as the Ambassador to Israel at the time, that in the later years of the JCPOA, if it had survived, we would have to come back and revisit the nuclear issue because it was not a permanent solution to that. It bought time, which would then need to be redressed to and including with military action if necessary to prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon. But all of these behaviors that we all object to rightly have been tried to be addressed with a JCPOA and without a JCPOA, with a maximum pressure campaign and without a maximum pressure campaign, with 12-day war and Operation Midnight Hammer, which did significantly and importantly set back the nuclear program. And by the way, I was a supporter of that effort, both the Israeli and the U.S. strikes in that period, which obviously did not address the ballistic missile and proxy threat. Now, Israel, after October 7th, took it upon itself, of course, to address to a significant degree the proxy threat for Shema's, then Hisbola, and then late last year when Prime Minister, this is after the 12-day war, when Prime Minister Netanyahu came to Mar-a-Lago and he spoke with President Trump and he explained, look, there is still a very significant problem with the ballistic missile threat, which could increase to numbers, let's say up to 10,000 medium-range ballistic missiles that could reach Israel, like the ones that did penetrate in the 12-day war and cause significant damage, killed 30 Israelis, injured hundreds, sent thousands away from their homes. It could increase to be a really strategic threat to the country that Israeli air defenses wouldn't be able to absorb. And so that was a reasonable thing to work toward this year, 2026, and Israeli operation supported and facilitated perhaps by the United States, by SENTCOM, the way we did even during the Biden administration when Israel responded to the Iranian attacks on Israel. And that was where I thought we were sort of headed in the middle of 2026. Then came the protests in January. Obviously, everybody hoped that that would be a pivotal moment when the regime would fall at the hands of the Iranian people, the best way, maybe the only really way for regime change to occur. President Trump made his very forward-leaning statements, go to the streets, we've got your back, there will be a price to pay. Of course, 30,000 Iranians were slaughtered by the regime. And then there was this kind of jumble of what was the most pressing matter, what tools to use, a small force, a short, sharp strike against the regime in response to the repression, versus the big buildup of force that occurred in February, which then leads to a tool that you use for something much bigger than just that kind of short, sharp strike, something that potentially tries to address all of these other issues, the nuclear program, the missile program, the proxies, the regime itself. And so we ended up launching a war without having thought through, what was the strategy, what were we trying to achieve, why were we doing it now, what was so urgent. And of course, President Trump didn't explain any of that to the American people, didn't explain any of that to Congress. Most Americans woke up on the morning of February 28th and were surprised to discover we were at war in the Middle East. Why is that happening? No one has told us why. Congress has not had its say on it. So again, I think there are gains that have been already achieved, surely have been achieved because Sencombe and Israel have successfully degraded many of these Iranian capabilities. But just like the JCPOA didn't solve for all of them, just like match from pressure didn't solve for all of them, just like the 12-day war didn't solve for any all of them, this war also is not fully solving for all of them. If I could just jump in quickly there, because I think Dan Schpirer and I are in agreement a lot of things. Dan and I agree that the JCPOA didn't solve for everything and that had sunset provisions that gave potentially patient path to nuclear weapons and we'd have to renegotiate it in the later years. Dan and I both agree that you need to put significant pressure on the regime. Dan and I both supported the 12-day war. Dan and I both supported a U.S. military strike when the regime was massacring tens of thousands of Iranians. Dan called it a short one, a symbolic one, but he certainly backed strikes as I did. Dan also backed the Israelis going after Iran's deadly missile program with U.S. support. I think where Dan and I differ is my belief has always been that Israel cannot take care of Iran's missile program on its own, that it needed the United States in the same way that it needed the United States to destroy the Fordo facility during the 12-day war, because like Fordo, the missile infrastructure is deeply buried and therefore we need the United States, we need B2 bombers, we need massive ordinance penetrators, and that the Israeli Air Force, as competent as it is, couldn't do sufficient damage to degrade this deadly missile program that threatens not only Israel, but threatens U.S. allies, U.S. bases, U.S. embassies, and an intercontinental ballistic missile program that one day threatened the United States homeland. So I think where Dan and I differ is my belief is that President Trump needed to join the Israelis in this war in order to destroy as much as possible that deeply buried missile infrastructure. Dan and I also agree, President Trump could have done a better job of explaining it. He could be a more disciplined speaker. He could have done a better job of alliance management. I mean, all of that is certainly in agreement, but I think the real question on the 40-day war is, is it justified? Was it necessary? And where are we today given the achievements and some of the risks and costs? And so then the question is, where do we go from here? Okay, so that's where I want to take this conversation. I'll go to you, Dan, in terms of the best course of action or strategy going forward. I know as you've established that you weren't supportive of this war, you're supportive of the 12-day war in June, but you are where you are and if you're advising the President of the United States, regardless of how you feel about how we got to this moment, what is your advice to the administration and where to go from here? Right, so that's right. I mean, I was not for this war this way. Right. There are other times when I think military force by the United States against Iran was and could be appropriate, but not this war this way, but we are where we are. So now we're into a ceasefire and a ceasefire does have value. Again, I think President Trump was the one who was more in need of that ceasefire as he was watching oil prices continue to creep up. I think we got to about $116 per barrel for Brent Crude. We were seeing him every Sunday night, try to talk down the markets before they would open in Asia. Some weeks a little more successful than others, so he got into the ceasefire. Now that we're in the ceasefire, the question is, what would be the cost of going back into full-scale military actions? We'll get back to the cost, maybe a little touch later, but what I think would make sense would be to try to stay in that ceasefire, but be clear in our own minds that those bigger goals, the ones that were on the table in Islamabad and did not reach agreement, not surprisingly, reach agreement in one meeting, that's going to take longer. And the costs of continuing this war to try to achieve those objectives, which essentially means a regime change objective, are astronomical. And there are really costs that we are probably not going to be able to bear. So let's focus on what's essential. One of the things that's puzzling about the administration's approach is how they really tried to do everything themselves. Of course, there was no effort to recruit allies into the war before by briefing them, by making the case that they should participate. There was a belated effort by brawl-beating allies why they weren't participating. That wasn't very effective, not surprisingly, although there is some effort by the UK and France and perhaps some others to pull together some naval assets that over time could be deployed to help keep the strait open. But on the diplomatic side, it shouldn't just be the United States sitting in that room, at least metaphorically, with Iranians. There are a lot of countries who desperately need to have the strait open so that their own energy supplies, fertilizer supplies, other commodity supplies are reliable. So why are the Chinese even not used as a lever here? Why do we not engage India, Malaysia, Indonesia, European countries as well, to put their own pressure on the Iranians? It would be possible, it should be possible, to use the time of the ceasefire and an extended ceasefire to put that pressure on Iran to get the strait open. And then to use that time for SENTCOM to clear the minds, to actually do the work in the water to make it safe for shippers and insurers to know that they could send their crews and tankers through there and come out the other side. That would be how you'd capitalize on the ceasefire to get the most pressing need met. And then we're going to have a longer slog, not militarily, to continue to monitor those nuclear highly-reached uranium in any attempt to reconstitute the mostly destroyed nuclear sites, just as we were doing after the 12-day war. And I really don't think there's a very convincing case that Iran in February of 2026 was any closer to breaking out toward a nuclear weapon than they were in July of 2025 after the 12-day war. So we were in a place that we could deal with that problem while continued work went on to try to negotiate toward an end to that program for the good. And then look, Israel has a long-standing practice, it's sometimes derided, but I think it has some value called mowing the grass. When a threat is present, you can't necessarily be able to prevent it from periodically reconstituting, but you hit it as you need to hit it to make sure it doesn't become a strategic threat. So that might be an approach on the missile program. And then we should be always focused on supporting the Iranian people toward consolidating an opposition that actually can pose a threat to the regime from within. Because I'm very much in favor of regime change in Iran. I'm not in favor of regime change wars in the Middle East. But I want the regime to change, we need to help the Iranian people do that. That's a long process, you've probably spoken about it on other episodes. And of course, it's been set back by the massacre of the protesters in January. But if we think we're going to solve all of this in a military conflict after six weeks, and if it kicks up again, if the ceasefire ends over how many more weeks, I don't know, maybe it's months, the cost will be astronomical, the ability to achieve all those objectives is very suspect. So I'm for using this time to consolidate the ceasefire, the opening of the straight, and then shift to those other means to address those longer-term threats. Mark? Yeah, I agree with most of that. We're dancing around this a bit, but I think we've gotten to this on the Hormuz conversation is the American will clock. How long is the United States and its allies prepared to absorb economic, political, and human costs? And I think Tehran is betting that the American will clock runs out before the regime's survival clock does. And that's why Hormuz, which is sort of the stage five, has become so central now. They know they're weaker militarily. They know their nuclear program has been severely degraded. By the way, they wanted to ceasefire desperately because they were losing senior commanders and senior leadership daily. I mean, they were getting killed by the Israelis. So they were quite desperate to survive. And the negotiators who showed up in Islamabad were given immunity by President Trump for as long as they were willing to negotiate. All of those men could be eliminated by Israel at any time. So what is Iran trying to do? They're trying to accelerate pressure on American political will. They're trying to inflict a severe economic and political costs on the president. They're trying to make the president lose the midterms. And they're trying to create a wounded president who limps to January 2029 and then gets replaced by either a Republican or Democrat who, having seen that, is not willing to confront the Iranians because they've seen the political price that President Trump has paid. And then they can go and reconstitute all of these deadly capabilities. And so the right response is we've got to deny them leverage. And we've got to keep every element of pressure available to us on nuclear military leadership pressure and economic pressure. And again, I think we've got to make sure the regime knows that we are prepared to return to major military operations. And we're starting to build an international coalition. I think Dan is exactly right. I mean, I think Trump's hamfisted diplomacy and his unnecessary threats to NATO allies, including over Greenland, were completely unnecessary and have undermined support for us that we otherwise would have. But the reality remains that all of these countries are much more dependent on Hormuz and on Middle Eastern oil and natural gas than the United States is. So they have every incentive to participate. And I'll say one final thing on the Chinese. I mean, I haven't negotiated with the Chinese Communist Party. Maybe Dan has. My sense of them is they're not exactly the most flexible players in the world. And is that we're engaged in serious strategic competition with them. And as they eye the straight of Taiwan to take over Taiwan's semiconductor industry, the only way we can get the Chinese to move is to play hardball. And right now, by blockading Hormuz and making sure that Iranian oil cannot flow to Beijing the way it has been, that's going to put significant pressure on them to put pressure on the Iranians to start to play ball. One of the things I most admire about United Hatsala of Israel is their culture, their volunteer medics come from every walk of life. And they respond to anyone in need, Christian, Muslim or Jew. Here's Lenore Atias, a veteran United Hatsala medic who responded on October 7th. We treated so many casualties, so many soldiers and civilians, kids, women, men, everyone. We did our best. Every life that I found, someone still have a pulse. I fight to bring him safely to the hospital and to save his life. What greater mission, what greater impact than saving lives. Join Lenore's mission. Donate today at israelrescue.org forward slash call me back. Mark, before I bring Dan back in, you have your different clocks and your different tracks, and you have cracks in the regime as one of those tracks or one of those clocks. My question is, can we really gain progress without the regime cracking? Meaning at some point, does all of this hinge on real regime change, real collapse of the existing power structure in Iran? An absent that is it just going to be this endless, you know, to go back to the term Dan Shapiro invoked, which is mowing the lawn, because absent regime change, you don't get a fundamental resetting of Iran's role in the region and threat to the region. Short answer is yes. The longer answer is that I grew with Dan. The way to get regime change is ultimately to support the Iranian people. Dan and I wrote this piece together. Dan, I think it was in Politico. I remember when it was a few years ago, where Dan and I came together. We disagree on JCPOA. We disagree on this. We disagree on that. What we agree on is the United States of America should support the Iranian people to take back their country. The only way the Iranian people are going to take back their country is if we have done severe damage to the regime and its repression apparatus. Otherwise, what will happen is what happened on January 8th and 9th of this year when 32,000 Iranians were slaughtered. So it is absolutely both immoral and impractical of us to believe these people can take back their country unless we give them the means to do so and we've severely weakened the regime that will brutalize them again. I think we can get limited victory without regime change, but total victory depends ultimately on regime change. And regime change depends on boots on the ground, but it depends on millions of Iranian boots on the ground with the United States supporting that by arming them, by providing the communication devices with financing and a coordinated effort so that the next time they're on the streets, there are Israeli drones in the air picking off IRGC and BASIS or checkpoints. Maybe Israeli, maybe American fighter jets in the skies, bombing those key supply lines, cyber attacks to blind the security forces. I mean, we need a comprehensive policy that's not just rhetorical, but actually is material to provide maximum support to the Iranian people because without regime change, yeah, we'll be mowing the grass, but you know what? We'll be mowing the grass with the president of the United States in 2029 or 2030 or later who is not committed to using instruments of American power against this regime. And then this regime will reconstitute and it'll be as deadly as a regime as it's been for 47 years. Dan, if I could just jump in. I mean, just a couple of points, Marks, may look. If you had wanted to prepare the American people for withstanding the pressures that we're going to be under, economic pressures, resource strains, diplomatic pressures that this will require, Mark talks about the American will factor here, would you have gone into this war the way we did, sort of tumbling backwards into it and only then trying to fumble around and make a case for why it was necessary, almost from the beginning, something like 60% of the American people, that's what most polls are showing, oppose this war. And that's going to go down if we go back into major operations. So it goes to, again, having a strategy and knowing how to communicate that strategy. If you were serious about a regime change strategy for Iran and I want the regime in Iran to change, you would do all of those things that Mark and I have written about and Mark just laid out to support the Iranian people. Some of that has gone on, some of it will be laterally, some of it when the protest started. But instead, what we've ended up with is a military campaign that is cut across multiple objectives, but many of them, to your question, can't really be achieved without regime change. And that's sort of what we encountered in Islamabad when we got the big no on most of the big questions we've gotten the big no on for 15 or more years. I think all of us need to be honest about why President Trump didn't give the big speech, because I think Dan's right, he should have. He gave the small speech, an eight minute speech on February 28th, after major military operations had begun. But if you remember, what was the first thing that happened in this war? And that is that the Israelis took out Khamenei and he's top 40 IRGC and political advisors. And that was because an element of surprise. That was an element of quote, exquisite intelligence that the Israelis and or the Americans were both obtained that showed that Khamenei was going to be meeting with his top 40 senior military and political advisors above ground in his compound. And we were going to strike to eliminate that. And to be clear, it was a fleeting moment. The Israelis had intelligence that this meeting was occurring in the center of Tehran, as you said, above ground. If the strategy was at least partially to decapitate the regime, this was an opportunity that would probably not avail itself again, just to set the context. Yes, true. But if you're then going to go into a campaign that is going to put American service members' lives at risk, we've lost 13. If you're going to have to deploy two aircraft carrier strike groups for extended periods of time, leaving none in the Indo-Pacific to attend to our security interests there, basically China. If you're going to encounter a global economic crisis potentially leading as far as a recession, if we end up in months, which we could, of military conflict, you have to make a decision at the beginning. Are you committed to the American will that's required to sustain that? And if that's intentioned with the needs of one opening strike that requires an element of surprise, that's a pretty big trade off, which I think helps explain why six weeks in, 60% of the American public says, we don't want to be doing this. Should Trump have given the speech that he gave a week ago or whenever it was on February 28th? Absolutely. Should it have been more than an eight-minute quick speech with a MAGA hat on? Absolutely. But we're not talking just about process. And the other thing is, do I believe that Democrats would have supported Trump if he had given that speech and laid out the clear objectives? I do not believe that. I don't care how good a speech it would have been, how clear those objectives would have been. Democrats would not support Trump at all. By the way, most of them opposed Trump in the 12-day war that Dan supported. The irony is, many of them were calling for Trump to bomb Iran during the January protests. And then when one month later, Trump bombed Iran, now they're all opposing Trump for having bombed Iran. So again, I think, unfortunately, in our country, politics plays a major role in how we analyze these things and what we advocate for. And the Iranians know that, which is why they are so adept at intensifying the political fractures and fissures between Americans. Because what they've lost on the battlefield, they're winning in the information operation space. And you can see so many examples of that. Which is why you need administration to take that into account. Okay. But Dan, I want to ask you at a very practical level, because you've been obviously been on the inside of major war and peace decisions. They've gone through a more conventional process, interagency process, and also external process, briefing allies and some of the areas you had wished had been pursued more in a more traditional way with this war. But back to the element of surprise, don't you think that pursuit of the opportunity would have been jeopardized if you had been in close communication with all these various allies throughout Europe and Congress? Well, it could have been. It could have been harder to conduct that particular strike. Now, let's not forget, throughout the month of February, we were building up our force in the Middle East in very visible ways, bringing a second aircraft carrier strike group into the region, bringing massive amounts of air power fighter jets and jammers and tankers. So it was very clear that we were positioning ourselves for potential military action, at least to give President Trump the option to engage in major military operations. That was no mystery. There was no surprise element about that. Then if it's been described in the days leading up to February 28, specific intelligence about that specific meeting and location and who was participating, created an opportunity, if you were engaged in a full on debate at that point with the American people, with the Congress, with allies to try to build the coalition, then it's possible the Iranians would have been more careful and that opportunity would not have presented itself. It's certainly possible. But look what the costs are on the other end. The costs are that you don't have what Mark is looking for, American will, at least at the level of a public and Congress, that never had their say, never were briefed, never had this explained to them. You don't have a coalition who feel that they have buy-in to this and then they are brow-beated and criticized by the President for, well, why didn't you come? But I don't really need you, but now I do need you. And I'll even threaten to withdraw from NATO because I'm not getting the cooperation I want from NATO allies. Actually, there is cooperation coming from NATO allies that's fairly below the surface, but there are a lot of costs here. So it's a legitimate question. Could that particular strike, which as you've pointed out, didn't actually, did decapitate the regime, but didn't actually lead to the downfall of the regime, not at all, would that have been an opportunity that would have been missed? It's possible, but we're paying very high costs on the back end for not doing the more conventional, which you were part of before the Iraq War, which other presidents have done before major military engagements of building political support, getting Congress's buy-in, making clear what the strategic objectives are, making sure allies are briefed and on board and possible participating. And then when you don't have that and you get in a messy situation, you really wish you did have that. Yeah, but again, Dan, I mean, let's be fair here. If President Trump had done all that and given the speech, pulled the allies in early, gone to Congress, at the end of the day, you still oppose the United States bombing Iran. Doing a regime change war in the Middle East, I do. Yes. Well, President Trump never, again, to be fair, when President Trump does speak about this and he gave that said speech that you talked about belatedly as you are rightly pointing out, but he made it very clear the US objective is not regime change. I mean, when I talk about regime change being important, that's Mark Dubowitz's objective. I would argue that's also the Israeli objective, but I don't believe that's President Trump's objective because the only thing President Trump has ever said, even hinting in that direction is on February 28th when he said after laying clearly out our military objectives, which are to destroy the war-making capabilities of this regime, he said, and then at some point, Iranians will hopefully once in a generation opportunity take back their country, but he has not operated as if the regime change is the United States objective. And he's been very clear if you've been following the White House and his speeches on the White House press secretary over and over and over again, they've made it clear, military, missile, nuclear, Navy, Air Force. They haven't even signed on to an economic warfare campaign, which the Israelis have been running. So I agree that President Trump should have done all those process things. I disagree that anything would have made any difference because it wouldn't have convinced Andrew Pirro. It wouldn't have convinced you as a reasonable Democrat. It wouldn't have convinced any Democrat. It's hard pressed to believe it would have convinced many of our NATO allies to have joined the United States. I think the reality is President Trump, by his own doing, but also because of the nature of who he is and the fact that let's face it, he's a Republican and our politics is so toxic, that there's nothing President Trump could have done that would have brought at least 50% of this country with him and that would have brought the majority of our NATO allies with him. I think that's just the reality of where we are today. Let's face that, let's acknowledge that and then let's try to design a strategy going forward that compensates for that. Okay. I want to just wrap here with one question, same question for both of you, which is, we don't know what's going to happen next. We really don't know. When this episode drops, we have, there are scenarios we're speculating, but we don't really know where things are going. If the war were to stop basically now, some version of now, if we're just kind of frozen now, with the gains and the costs absorbed or advanced, depending on how you look at it, along the way, what would that mean for the US and Israel? Just in terms of geopolitical terms, because there's a number of measures and metrics we could use, but just in terms of the geopolitics of the region, US foreign policy, what would it mean to stop now? I'll start with you, Dan, and then go to Mark. Well, we have achieved significant operational successes and any weakening of Iran's ability to project power, there's goodness in that, and that's to be welcomed. And so credit to CENTCOM, credit to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, credit to the Israeli military for successful operations that have made it much harder for Iran to project power with its missile program, its drone program, its proxy network, its navy, its air force, and to defend itself with its air defenses. And those are positives. It will not have settled the core issues that have bedeviled the US-Iranian relationship and maybe in some ways the Israeli-Iranian relationship for decades. The nuclear program, which was addressed but not satisfied in Islamabad, the missile program which may not have even been addressed in Islamabad. It does show that the United States and Israel are very effective as a combined military alliance that has value, that has deterrent value. The fact that Gulf states who have been attacked by Iran, who were non-combatants in this war, have made clear that they stand with the United States and they stand with Israel, that has the makings of strengthening that regional coalition that we've been trying to build from the Abraham Accords and in the hopes that other countries will normalize the relations with Israel and under CENTCOM's leadership. My fear, and I won't belabor the point, is that if we go much further and we get back into a much longer military operation, we will, first of all, seeing fraying of that regional alliance. Second of all, we will see probably even more fraying of the US NATO alliance. We will see Russia benefit from the higher energy prices that will come and Ukraine have access to fewer interceptors, means a longer war in Ukraine. We will see less US military capability currently and in the future available for the Indo-Pacific, really weakening our ability to deter China. So we have a lot that we put at risk if we go much further into this war as well as all of the global economic fallout and American economic fallout if we're dealing with $150-$175 per barrel oil. So it's what you gain and what you can consolidate by what you've achieved now, but also what risks you don't bear by pushing further into a really unsustainable and astronomically expensive further campaign. Mark, same question to you. Well, that's interesting. I think Dan and I completely agree about the remarkable successes of the 40-day war. I mean, if Dan's definition of a viable strategy is to mow the grass, then Dan laid out how well the United States and Israel did mow the grass and actually ripped out the weeds and have done severe damage to Iran's war-making capabilities. I think Dan and I agree. Let's take advantage of the ceasefire. I think there's more opportunity for coercive diplomacy beyond just one meeting in Islamabad. But the question is we need to test the Iranians and to see whether they are prepared to give on their red lines. We cannot let Iran retain enrichment capability, which is what they retained in the 2015 deal. But the only way we're ever going to get additional diplomatic wins on Hormuz or in missiles or in nukes or anything else is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has got to know that an American president is prepared to use overwhelming military force. Otherwise, we're left negotiating with the Iranians who time and time again have beat American presidents at the negotiating table. I think that Dan and I are in full agreement on this regime change issue. I think no matter what happens after major military operations are over, it is incumbent on the United States to support Israel and together to support the Iranian people to bring about the end of this regime. Because otherwise, we're going to be mowing the grass for years to come and my fear is going to be mowing the grass with a president who's not bringing a lawn mower to the fight but is instead bringing a pair of scissors to cut one blade of grass at a time. And that's not how you address the significant threat from a theocratic genocidal regime that has been killing and maiming, kidnapping and torturing thousands of Americans for 47 years. If you want to talk about geopolitical consequence, I think we need to distinguish between what it means to end the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. I think we finally are fighting a war against Iran after 47 years. But if we don't do that and we walk away from the fight, we're going to leave our Gulf allies in Israel vulnerable to a reconstituted Islamic Republic. And that is just going to be down to the advantage of the regime of China, of Russia, and ultimately would be throwing the Iranian people under the bus to face what will become severe, severe repression from this Islamist regime. So let's continue the war, but that doesn't necessarily mean we have to continue fighting major military operations for the next months and years to come. All right, gentlemen, Dan Shapiro, Mark Dubowitz. Thank you both for doing this, for this spirited but very civil conversation. I look forward to having you both back on together. In the meantime, I encourage our listeners to be sure to look out for the most recent episode on Inside Call Me Back of our series with Ronan Bergman on Mossad's Shadow War with Iran. We just released episode three and the final and fourth episode will be released later this week. And you can find that on the Inside Call Me Back feed. Or if you're not a subscriber, you can find a sneak peek of it on the main Call Me Back feed. Again, Dan, Mark, thanks for doing this. Thanks so much, Dan. Thank you, Dan. That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly, members-only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadaveyaal, Amit Segel and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arcmedia.org. That's a-r-k-media.org. 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