Ceasefire at the 11th hour - with Nadav Eyal and Mark Dubowitz

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Learn more at jcfny.org. That's jcfny.org. You're listening to an Art Media podcast. If the Iranian regime believes that they can trap Trump in endless negotiations where Trump is going to surrender on those 15 points and provide Iran with enrichment and the ability to build long-range ballistic missiles, etc., then they clearly misjudge the president and have been misjudging the president for many years now. There's a good chance we're going to return to major military operations. I think there's a fairly low chance that there could be a comprehensive agreement negotiated in the next two weeks. We may get another pause and we may get another extension, but I think this is very much an indication that the Islamic Republic decided to go back to the negotiating table, which, by the way, is the only place where they've ever beaten American presidents. I think they're going to have a hard time beating this one, but they certainly think that that is the battlefield where they have the best chance of success. The main risk to Israel from this war is not having a bad agreement with Iran. The main risk is Israel's position in the United States. And the fact that Israel very on the record said that this is a much needed war for the safety of the world, the region, the United States, and of course, of Israel, this puts Israel in a very difficult spot. And since Israel's most important strategic element is its alliance with the United States, this is no small matter. And it's really a question of how will this war be looked upon within the Republican Party or within the general American public or within the pendants? And I still don't know. It's 7.30 a.m. on Wednesday, April 8th in New York City. It is 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday, April 8th in Israel, as Israelis continue to process the implications of this new ceasefire. Last night, just hours before a major escalation and after a series of frantic diplomatic efforts by Pakistan, which stepped in as a mediator, the U.S. and Iran agreed to step back from the brink for a two-week ceasefire. Under that plan, Iran would allow oil, gas, and other commercial vessels to move freely through one of the world's most critical shipping areas, the Strait of Hormuz. The deal came after President Trump had warned that, quote, a whole civilization will die tonight if Iran didn't ensure safe passage for commercial ships through the Strait. Shortly after the ceasefire was announced, a U.S. official confirmed that American military strikes against Iran had come to a halt. Israel has also agreed to the ceasefire and will suspend its strikes on Iran during that same two-week period. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Aragachi announced that Iran would stop what he called its, quote, defensive operations, but missile attacks on Israel and Gulf states continued after the ceasefire came into effect. The deal was initially reported to also include Israel's second front with Hezbollah, but this was later revoked by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Israel strikes in Lebanon continued today. Two issues that directly concern Israel and Iran's nuclear project, including the highly enriched uranium and Iran's ballistic missile program, remain open at this stage, although we will be getting into that. And with me to unpack these eventful 24 hours are our media contributor and senior analyst for Yiddio Akronot, Nadav Ayel, and Mark Dubowitz, who is the CEO of the Foundation for Defensive Democracies, FDD, and the host of his own very excellent podcast on Iran that we will link to in the show notes. Nadav, Mark, thank you for being with me early this morning. Thank you, Dan. Thank you, Dan. Nadav, I want to start with you just to level set here on the terms that the U.S. and Iran have appeared to agree to in this ceasefire. So before we get to analysis, can you just walk us through what we know was agreed to? Well, you basically just named the main issues that have been agreed. Beyond that, we don't know much, Dan. We know that there is an agreement for a ceasefire. We know that the Iranians are confirming that there would be movement through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians are saying that this movement would be coordinated with the Islamic Republic. And I don't know exactly what that means. The president of the United States is saying that this would be a complete opening of the Strait of Hormuz. They will be meeting in Islamabad. Pakistan is going to moderate between the sides, to mediate between the sides, to try and reach according to President Trump. Peace between the Islamic Republic and the United States. The president tweeted this morning, U.S. Eastern time, that Iran would not be able to enrich uranium and that the U.S. will extract in coordination with the Islamic Republic. The enriched uranium that is now buried, he called that enriched uranium dust in his Truth Social Post. And that's extremely meaningful if indeed there was an agreement to that. Although the president, as far as I remember, did not say literally that this was agreed by Iran. He said that this is what's going to happen. Now, in terms of the future of the region, limitations on ballistic missile program, indeed the end of enrichment, or other issues, Iran's support for proxies of terror across the region, that were definitely presented by Israel and by the United States at the beginning of this war, we don't know if there are secret understandings between the side that have not been exposed as of yet. What we do know from my Israeli sources is that they did not want to have a ceasefire without an agreement, indeed, on these specific issues. It was the recommendation of Israel to not agree for a ceasefire or for a limited ceasefire unless you can get the main objectives. Or in other words, to do this under fire, to continue the pressure on Iran while you negotiate and not stop to negotiate. But this is Israel's position. Before I bring in Mark here, so how do you interpret these terms? Well, if indeed there are secret understandings that say that Iran is not going to enrich uranium to a high degree, would be extracted out of Iran, that's a success, or at least a partial impressive success of sorts. But I don't know. Right now, the way that it is looked upon from the Israeli viewpoint, the sources I'm speaking with, people who have definitely supported this war, people who were part of the war effort within the defense establishment, they're extremely worried because of this agreement. They are, of course, saying, and they have said in the last few weeks, we understand the president can stop this at any given point. We are hearing what the president has been saying, that Iran already doesn't have these capabilities because of the strikes of the United States and of Israel. But what they are also saying is we didn't want to see this kind of a ceasefire mediated by the Pakistanis. I should also say, just in terms of facts, that the Prime Minister of Pakistan in his post said that this ceasefire includes Lebanon and that that was a demand by the Islamic Republic, that if this war reaches a ceasefire, it includes its proxies. And that's what the Prime Minister of Pakistan said. Now, immediately after the Prime Minister of Israel issued a statement in English, when we're recording this, he has not issued any statement in Hebrew to the Israelis. The government has been silent since this has happened. This also tells you a lot, Dan. But in his statement in English, he supports the president. He supports this agreement. But he also says that operations in Lebanon are going to continue. Contradictory to what was said by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. And I have not heard any statement coming from the White House as to this subject of Lebanon, which is material for the Israelis, but also material for the agreement, because it goes as to the question whether or not Iran managed to have an achievement as to its proxies across the region. Okay, Mark, Iran published a list of 10 conditions to end the war. Among them, quote, continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, acceptance of enrichment, and lifting of all sanctions. Those were among the Iranian conditions. The White House called that list, quote, a workable basis to negotiate. So what do you think should be red lines for a long term agreement? And do you think those are President Trump's red lines? So Dan, President Trump put out 15 demands to Iran. It was a proposal that was reported on about a week or two ago with pretty strict demands. I mean, dismantling all of Iran's nuclear facilities, ending all enrichment on Iranian soil, transferring those stockpiles that Nandav was talking about out of Iran, the uranium stockpiles and truce of inspections and renouncing any nuclear weapons pathway. And the 15 demands also included the ballistic missile issue, stopping production of long-range missiles, suspending ballistic missile development, ending drone transfers, military exports, and then also a number of demands on ending support for Iran's terror proxies, his Bala Hamas, Iraqi Shiite militias, Houthis, and also fully reopening and securing Hormuz, stop threatening regional shipping and accept a broader de-escalation framework, including their attacks on Israel. So Dan, I think there's like a planetary distance between Trump's 15 demands and Iran's 10 demands. So clearly, if we're entering a ceasefire and negotiations, it's going to be a tough negotiation to try and narrow the gaps between the 15 demands that Trump has and the 10 demands that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard have. Mark, to hear Nandav lay out his description of the terms and obviously his interpretation of them and obviously Israeli security establishments interpretation, you would think that this outcome, at least right now, is a big setback from Israel's perspective and even from the US perspective, even though it's not officially said. And the reason hearing Nandav speak is that many of the objectives of the war have not been met, but hearing you speak over the last number of weeks and I've had this view, systematically degrading Iran's capabilities was the single most important objective. And there was a question about whether or not regime change would occur. There was a question about, you know, a whole range of other issues, but if Iran didn't have its offensive and defensive capabilities operating the same strength at the same optimization that they were before this war began, that would be a win. And Israel certainly understood everyone I spoke to in Jerusalem would say, look, at some point this war is just going to stop. You know, President Trump is going to stop door. We don't know when, but it's going to stop. And the most important thing between now and then is as many of those capabilities degraded as possible. So where do you stand? What I just laid out or what Nandav is expressing, which is the view of many in Israel that no, no, no, no, the war stopping now, the way it's stopping is a problem. I think that one has to remember that it was only a couple of weeks ago that IDF Chief of Staff, Yelzimir, said that he thought this war would end or major military operations would end on April 9th. Well, today's April 8th. So basically, Zemir predicted when this would be at least temporarily suspended. And the IDF has gone through, from my understanding, most of its military targets. I think it started to hit economic targets in a very profound way going after Iran's petrochemical facilities and steel facilities and really hitting the economic engine that sustains the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And President Trump obviously had threatened to go after power plants and speaking in rather aggressive terms about going after the economic and industrial infrastructure of the Islamic Republic. So that still remains to be degraded. But in terms of the actual military capabilities of this regime, the United States and Israel have done severe damage to the war-making capabilities, and Israel has done significant damage to the repression apparatus. So that was always seen as phase one of this war. And I think a two-week pause is a good thing if President Trump can kind of jawbone the markets down. Oil has all futures significantly declined after the ceasefire announcement stock market futures went up. That's good. He's bought himself some time, reduced the panic in the markets. And now it's a two-week ceasefire. And I think if the Iranian regime believes that they can trap Trump in endless negotiations where Trump is going to surrender on those 15 points and provide Iran with enrichment and the ability to build long-range ballistic missiles, etc., then they clearly misjudged the president and have been misjudging the president for many years now. There's a good chance we're going to return to major military operations. I think there is a fairly low chance that there could be a comprehensive agreement negotiated in the next two weeks. We may get another pause and we may get another extension. But I think this is very much an indication that the Islamic Republic had decided to go back to the negotiating table, which by the way is the only place where they've ever beaten American presidents. I think they're going to have a hard time beating this one, but they certainly think that that is the battlefield where they have the best chance of success. Okay, so Mark, on the point of red lines, what do you think should be red lines for a long-term agreement? Well, I think the red lines are all the President Trump's 15 demands. But I think the most important are clearly dismantling the nuclear facilities, ending all uranium enrichment, getting those stockpiles back. And I think very importantly is severe restrictions on Iran's ability to rebuild its ballistic missile program. Because after all, that was really why the Israelis wanted to go back into major military operations, was to ensure that the ballistic missile program cannot represent a conventional threat to Israel if Iran was able to have thousands, if not tens of thousands of missiles that it could hold. And do you think those are President Trump's red lines will endure? Do you feel reasonably confident? I mean, you've been following the President's behavior and thinking and actions as close as anyone I know. You know, the President's hard to predict where he'll go. But do you feel reasonably confident that these will be his red lines going forward and kind of hang through what will be perhaps a very, let's just say, foggy process of negotiation? Dan, certainly on the nuclear demands, I'm very confident the President will stick to those. I think at this point, there's no way the President can surrender and give Iran nuclear enrichment on its soil. I mean, I think the nuclear demands are clearly his red line. I'm a little less confident on the missile side. The President has been sort of all over the place on giving Iran a quote, low rate missile program. As he said, talking about suspending the program, you know, what kind of defensive missiles, quote unquote, will he allow the Iranians to retain? So little less confident that he's going to hold the line on a severe degradation through negotiations of Iran's missile program and severe restrictions on that program. But very confident the President is going to stick to his nuclear red lines. I think politically to surrender them at this point would be embarrassing for President Trump. I tend to agree that in terms of the degradation of the military capabilities of Iran, it's just a fact that if you listen to what the President has been saying, basically in the last, I don't want to say even three weeks, four weeks of this war, he has basically almost immediately said, look, we have degraded their abilities. They will never be able to do this again. We have reported on your show, just quoting the President. And it was also my analysis that the United States wants to end the war and to get to an agreement with Iran because it sees the war as something that has achieved its goals. And by the way, none of these goals set by the administration was to reach an agreement with the Iranians. They never said we're going to stop this war only when we reach an agreement. By the way, the Israelis didn't say that either. I can quote the goals. I should quote the goals that were set by Prime Minister Netanyahu to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, to prevent Iran from developing ballistic missiles that would threaten Israel, the United States and the entire world. And at the same time, to advance creating conditions for the Iranian people to be able to remove the brutal regime. So if we look at these goals and if we look at the goals that were set by the president and by the United States, those do not include Iran admitting in an agreement that they're willing to do A, B or C. As far as the Israelis were concerned, the recommendation that was made to the United States is not to agree to a limited temporary ceasefire. Because that the Israelis argued that could basically let them off the hook for that time and they would probably strengthen their positions in a negotiation. By the way, interestingly, this was also the same position by the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic until a few days ago said, we will never agree to a temporary ceasefire. And suddenly they are agreeing to a temporary ceasefire in which they open Hormuz. So in some regard, it's very interesting, both the Israelis and the Iranians were saying, don't go for a temporary ceasefire because they wanted to achieve what they set as the ultimate goals of the war. And the United States decided that it's going to take this pose and try to get an agreement. Now, again, to judge the war is to judge the final agreement, which we do not have. There is a possibility that no such agreement will ever be reached. There is a possibility that an agreement would be reached, but it will be much below the goals that were set by the president 15 point plan. And there is also a chance that will be somewhere in the middle. And for instance, uranium and rich uranium would be extracted from Iran and they will not begin again enriching uranium. That's meaningful. And together with the degradation of their military capabilities, but the defense officials I'm speaking with are concerned that this ceasefire would give them the impression that the threat of force is off the table. And even if as far as the United States is concerned, it is not off the table. We talked about that the inner perception of the Iranians is different. As events accelerate in the Middle East, the team here at Ark Media is increasing our coverage, more conversations, more context, more time spent trying to help make sense of what's happening. Our inside call me back subscribers help make this expanded coverage possible. It helps us be here when it matters most. If you're not yet an inside call me back subscriber. This is an important time to join us to subscribe. You can follow the link in our show notes or visit Ark Media.org and to our insiders. Thank you. Mark, since the start of this conflict, Israel, as you know, in the U.S. has faced criticism from both the left and the extreme right and some even accusing it of pulling the U.S. deeper into the war. How do you see those political pressures shaping President Trump's decision making going forward, especially if negotiations break down and the fighting must resume? Look, Dan, I think Israel took an enormous risk in deciding to with the United States launch this war, not just a military risk, of course, but I think even a more profound political risk. I mean, I think the gamble was that we were going to join forces with President Trump. We were going to attack Iran's military capabilities. We were going to continue to severely degrade their nuclear capabilities. Maybe we get lucky. The regime would come down, but certainly doing major military operations. I don't think anybody on the Israeli side thought that hundreds of thousands of Iranians would take to the streets and bring down the regime. Israel was going to do this alone, Dan, as we know. When Prime Minister Netanyahu met with President Trump in December last year in Mar-a-Lago and then a couple months later at the White House, I think the assumption was that Israel was going to attack alone with President Trump's political support and go after the missile program, which for the Israeli security establishment was a significant and remaining concern. And then President Trump joined them. And the fact that he joined them opened up a significant risk for the Israelis because now the narrative would be, and the narrative is, and the narrative will continue to be that the Israelis drag President Trump into a war that is only being fought to satisfy Israel's objectives. I think that has very little impact on the president. I think the president knows exactly the truth. He knows that he made the decision to go to war. He made the decision because he's deeply concerned about Iran reconstituting its nuclear missile programs. He understood that if Iran has thousands and tens of thousands of missiles, that that is the shield that will allow them to then build a nuclear program. And then we'll be at a lethal end state where Iran will have nuclear-tipped ICBMs targeting the American homeland, tens of thousands of missiles, the Chinese and Russian-built military, hundreds of thousands of drones, and hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief. And at that point, they could control the Strait of Hormuz, not temporarily, but permanently. And we would have no ability to go after this regime. That's what President Trump understood, and he understood that he was going to be the only president prepared to prevent that kind of lethal end state, which is why he decided to launch this war on February 28th and bring the Israelis in with him. But that's not the narrative, Dan. And if this war goes badly, the narrative will be both on the left and the right, that this was Bebe's war, this was Israel's war, and I think it will continue to damage American public support for Israel, which, as you see, the poll numbers recently has been in decline. So I think for that reason, I understand the concerns of the Israeli security establishment, and I'm sympathetic to those. But I think it's very important that the president show that he's willing to use diplomacy to achieve his objectives. And if he's using coercive diplomacy, which he is right now, I mean, I'm offering to talk, but in two weeks' time, I could resume bombing you. And when I bomb you, I could destroy your civilization. It doesn't sound like that's the president of the United States who's looking to concede on major red lines. It sounds like that's the president of the United States who understands after almost five weeks of major military operations, he'd like to give the chance to see if he can achieve his objectives and strip around of those war-making and nuclear capabilities through coercive diplomacy. And if not, he will resume the war. And I think that's important for the president politically, and I think it's important for the Israelis politically that the president continue to exhaust all non-military and peaceful alternatives to achieve his objective. I don't think that's going to neutralize this dangerous narrative for Israel, but I think in some ways it will diminish it. Nadev, in terms of the political risks playing out in Jerusalem, if on the one hand, Israel's red lines are not met in an agreement, I'm just being speculative here. They may or may not be, but if they are not. And at the same time, there is a risk along the lines that Mark is describing to Israel's relationship with the U.S. Can you talk about that in terms of the implications from inside Israel's perspective? In terms of political risk, I agree basically with everything Mark has said, including the need to stop for diplomacy and not double down. I said this on your showdown. The recommendation by the Israelis was to actually escalate, escalate against energy, escalate against infrastructure, escalate dramatically. And what I can add now is that the recommendation to escalate wasn't in the last two weeks. They thought this should begin in a much harsher strike against infrastructure. A month ago, now many people listening to us will immediately say these Israelis, they always are hot-tempered and they are the most extreme in their approach towards the Islamic Republic. But this was presented to me as a tactical leverage. They said this is the way the Islamic Republic is a very tough cookie. And if you want to break it, by breaking it, they didn't mean regime change, breaking it in the means of agreeing to your terms, you need to use a lot of force and even more force. And this was their point. And they wanted to see an escalation here, which they didn't get. What they got is a ceasefire. I agree that in terms of political risk, I agree completely with Mark. I think that the main risk to Israel from this war is not having a bad agreement with Iran. The main risk is Israel's position in the United States. Israel decided to do something it never did before. It tried to explain and convince. So there's Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan's new book and new story about the way that Israel presented to the president, the avenue in which the war could be conducted in Iran. And at least parts of these stories that they tell are being confirmed to me by Israeli sources. And the fact that Israel very on the record said that this is a much needed war for the safety of the world, the region, the United States and of course of Israel. This puts Israel, as Mark said, in a very difficult spot. And I think that this was a concern that we raised on this show, by the way, in the same forum on March 2nd, the same day that Ali Hamid Nair was assassinated by Israel in a military strike. In this show, we spoke about how this war could lead to something detrimental as far as public opinion is concerned in the United States towards Israel. And since Israel's most important strategic element is its alliance with the United States, this is no small matter. And it's really a question of how will this war be looked upon within the Republican Party and you guys would know better than me or within the general American public or within the pendants. And I still don't know, even if there would be an excellent agreement, an excellent, all the 15 point plan that we just mentioned would be accepted. What would it mean? How would it be remembered is crucial also for Israel's position? One could argue or I can present the other view because it lasted less than two months. This too shall pass. I wonder, or is this going to be a moment in the relationship as Mark basically said? I still don't know. And by the way, you know better than me because you're Americans. Well, a couple things in response to that. First of all, virtually absent from the reporting is the reality that the Gulf States were pushing for as an aggressive posture, particularly Saudi Arabia as Israel, if not at times even more aggressive. There's a whole other party. There's this whole other stakeholder that was very, very involved. And I think all three of us know the degree to which some of the Gulf States, particularly UAE, particularly Saudi were pushing the president. So it's not just a two-party bilateral story, the U.S. and Israel for what it's worth. Secondly, as it relates to Maggie and Haberman and Jonathan Swan's reporting, what is in that article is the degree to which President Trump wanted two things to decapitate the regime and to deal with their ballistic missile program. And there was a sense that you get from the reporting that the president wanted to deal with those, both of those issues, whether or not Israel was aggressively pushing, whether or not the Gulf States were directly pushing. Now, what I'm saying is I believe to be factually accurate, whether or not it gets lost in the swirl of the characterization and the framing that you just laid out is, and the political implications of that, that I can't account for. But I just think factually, whoever's out there, me included, that wants to get an accurate characterization, accurate analysis of what actually happened. Those are the facts. Israel was not the only player on this, despite what this current round of reporting is indicating. And the president had his own priorities. It's not like these priorities were imposed on him. These are priorities that he's been talking about going back, I think, to the early 80s, certainly going back when the Iranian Revolution occurred. Mark, I don't know if you have anything to add to that. Well, Dan, I think that's exactly right. I mean, people just seem to forget that President Trump's had an obsession with Iran since he was a young man in his early 30s. For him, the Islamic Republic of Iran has embarrassed America, threatened America. I mean, I think his formative moment was the hostage crisis in 1979 when the Islamic Republic took our hostages for 444 days. And he talked about the feckless response of Jimmy Carter. So this has always been about Trump. Everybody wants to make this about Netanyahu for, I think, pretty obvious reasons. But I think what's most important is, will this be seen as a success? If it is successful, then the right will give Trump all the credit and Israel zero credit. If it's a failure, then the right and the left will give Israel all the blame. The left will also blame Trump and the right will try to at least exonerate him because he was pulled into a war that he didn't want to fight by the nefarious Israelis. Mark, as we saw during the Gaza War in Israel, resuming war fighting after a ceasefire requires significant political support because what generally happens is any population to population in that situation kind of breathes a sigh of relief. They've resumed some return to normalcy to the extent that's possible in their lives. And cranking back up for war fighting is obviously a major endeavor, a major sacrifice. Now, in Israel, it's sort of comparing apples and oranges Israel and the U.S. because in Israel, in order to resume fighting, you are then calling up large numbers of reserves. And it's a huge pull, a huge sacrifice by Israeli society at large versus the kind of war fighting the U.S. has been doing in Iran is different in that sense in terms of its relationship with American society, at least as we've seen it over the last few weeks. That said, if the president makes a decision that negotiations don't manage to bridge what you call the quote, planetary sized gaps between Iran and the U.S. and they fall apart, do you imagine there being resonance for President Trump's possible case for resuming military operations just among the American public? Well, certainly not amongst Democrats who have not supported this war at all and never would. I think amongst Republicans, non-Magar Republicans potentially, I certainly think amongst Magor Republicans, the president's base that have really stuck with him. I mean, we've seen polls in the 90s and that's pretty remarkable that this base has stuck with him. But I think the base has also stuck with him because they trust the president to pursue war in a decisive and powerful but limited way. I think if we are now in day, whatever it is, 45, day 47 of this war, at the end of the day, the president can say, I fought a 12-day war and I fought a 50-day war. And the results of it is that I have severely degraded, he would use the word obliterated, I wouldn't, but severely degraded, Iran's war-making capabilities and their nuclear program. And they were no longer a threat to the United States that they were on January the 20th, 2025, when he took office. Then I think he can rightly say that he has been victorious and I think the base will support him, more independence may support him and clearly no Democrats will. So I think that's why the president is pausing, that's why the ceasefire is important. I understand the Israeli frustration and concern and the Israelis have been concerned, rightly so, all the way through that President Trump was going to do a fatally flawed agreement that he was not going to use force, that he was going to fall into the Iranian negotiating trap. And so far, President Trump has demonstrated that those fears were unfounded. They may not be unfounded going forward and one always has to worry, as I said, because the only place we ever lose to the Iranians is at the negotiating table. But so far, President Trump has not lost on the battlefield and he has not lost at the negotiating table. So I think he's earned himself at least some credit with Israelis that he's going to do the right thing. And I think he's earned himself a lot of credit with a MAGA base that he is not going to trap America in some endless war. And as a result, I think this was a good strategic decision to pause for two weeks as the president continues to zig and zag as the president likes to do. Final question for both of you. I'll start with you, Mark. If the war were to end today, so this is it, it's over. There's not going to be a resumption. There's going to be some kind of formal agreement put in place. I guess many would argue that Iran has been set back in a significant way, both in terms of its nuclear program based on June and then what's occurred over the last few weeks. And also its missile capabilities, which were obviously both of those were two priorities. How much time, if that is true, how much time has this war bought in terms of Iran's ability to rebuild and its will to rebuild? In other words, you have to ask yourself, left unchecked, how long will it take Iran to rebuild? So, and I know this is hard to assess right now in this moment today after this in term ceasefire is announced, but let's try. Yeah. So after the 12 day war, the Israeli atomic commission, I think, which has got some of the best technical nuclear experts had assessed that that 12 day war had set back Iran's nuclear program by about two and a half years. That the program hadn't been obliterated, but it had been significantly set back after the 12 day war. So we would have to see after this war how much more damage has been done to the nuclear facilities that have been struck. I'm still concerned, Dan, I think I mentioned this on the show before, even more so than the retrieval of the highly enriched uranium, which I think we can still surveil and strike without retrieving. And I'm still very concerned about Pickax Mountain, this deeply buried site that the Iranians have been building near Natanz, where they're going hundreds of feet underground and trying to immunize the site against our ability to bomb it from the air. It's in that site when complete that Iran can build a full nuclear program of enrichment, centrifuge, manufacturing, weaponization. If that site is allowed to continue to be constructed and at the end of all of this, Trump leaves office and Pickax Mountain is now a immunized nuclear weapons facility. Then he has failed on his primary mission, which is to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. However, it's through negotiations or through the resumption of bombing, we can neutralize that site. Then we have set back the nuclear program even more than two and a half years, not obliterated it, but significantly set it back. The missile program, Dan, I never in 23 years of working on this issue could ever come up with a way through negotiations to strip Iran of its ballistic missile program. And the Iranians had refused doing every negotiation, even discuss missiles. So I'm really watching the missile issue very closely in these negotiations. If we can get severe, meaningful, real restrictions on what's left of Iran's missile program, that's a normal's victory. It's a normal's victory in the United States for our Gulf allies who are threatened by those missiles and even more so for Israel, which I've always believed that Ali Khamenei's entire strategy was not to drop nuclear weapons, God forbid, on Tel Aviv, but to use the nuclear umbrella to build up a massive missile program so that he could hold Tel Aviv hostage in the same way that the North Koreans hold Seoul hostage. That was his strategy. I think that strategy has been significantly set back. And if we can do that through negotiations and or the resumption of strikes, I think that's a huge success for the president and sending back the missile program by years would be significant. I'll just end with this. There's a lot of talk about how when it comes to Iranian will that the Iranians are now even more committed to building nuclear weapons and missiles and drones and terror proxy networks. I think that's nonsense. I don't think they're even more committed. I think they're as committed as they always were. I think they will remain committed as long as the Islamic Republic in the current form survives, which is why I've always believed the only way to break the will, the nuclear missile and terror will of this regime is to replace this regime. And I think that's been my last comment. And that is that I really hope no matter what happens militarily or diplomatically that the United States and Israel continue to commit to pressure on the regime and maximum support for the Iranian people to take back their country. I think we can do that in ways that don't necessarily involve large scale bombings. But there are many ways and the Israeli Mossad has been working on this and I hope we the United States provide that support that after major military operations, we degrade the regime, we undermine the regime and we provide real support to the millions of Iranians who despise this regime and want to take back their country. That's ultimately how you really set back Iran in a material way and ensure that it doesn't reconstitute and regenerate. Nadev, your response to my question. Yeah, first of all, the Mossad has not received a stand down order as to attempts to have created the conditions in which you can have a regime change in Iran. And I think that it's important to note that the president has said clearly right in the beginning of the war that this could happen after the bombs stopped dropping. The question is what's going to happen afterwards. And I think we talked a lot during this episode about what the Israelis are saying, how it looks from America, but from an Iranian perspective, something has happened that is substantial in this war. For the first time, Iran paid a price not only for its nuclear program, but also for the way that it emboldened itself and took an aggressive position towards the region, towards Israel in ways that are not related to the nuclear issue. What happened in the region is that for the first time, Gulf countries understood the Iranian threat. This might be the most strategic important change during this war, the fact that the UAE maybe also cut our definitely Saudi Arabia. See the Islamic Republic for what it is from within Iran. The fact that the Supreme Leader has been eliminated and has been replaced has basically moved the needle towards the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. Iran today is more a military dictatorship than it is a dictatorship of a theocracy. That's a really important change. This change could also lead to pragmatism. And I'm quoting again the intelligence official that told me don't wait for a George Washington in Iran. You can absolutely expect that at a certain point and Mikhail Gorbachev will rise through the ranks by saying don't wait. He didn't say I don't believe in an Iranian Revolution. He said it could happen. It might not happen. But since the state right now is defunct, is bankrupt, the model isn't working because of that, they will need to reform in order to survive. And if pressure is leveled on them, that the only way to reform the only way to get more injections of cash, the only way for the regime to survive is by addressing the concerns that were put forward by the US president and the entire international community as to their missile program, their nuclear program and their supportive proxies. If that is the only way that the regime will survive, it might be pragmatic as to these issues. So there are a few avenues there. One of them is actually a regime change. Another one is a change within the regime that will be sufficient to change the face of the region. Another one is a sort of an isolation out there that has already begun because of the way that the Iranians have conducted themselves during this war. They have used their main strategic threat. They have seized Hormuz. Now we know what they can do. The region understands the risk. They have attacked aggressively and brutally, not only countries like the UAE but also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. I would definitely address you to Kuwait. I think there are interesting perceptions that are changing in that small country. We don't talk about Kuwait enough. And at the end of the day, that could be more meaningful for the future of the region than another missile base that has been bombed on another degradation of their military capability. Dan, look, I think the biggest risk on this entire issue is not what happens in the next two weeks, the next two months or the next two and a half years, where President Trump is still in office. The date that I'm very focused on is January 20, 2029, when a new president is sitting in the White House. Because there's a pretty good chance, unless it's Marco Rubio, that that president, Democratic or Republican, is not going to be as committed to this issue and to using American power to prevent the Iranians from reconstituting, regenerating, and rebuilding all of these dangerous capabilities. That's why I think it's really important for the United States of America and Israel and our Gulf allies to fundamentally change this equation in the next two and a half years where Trump is in office. And one of the most strategic ways is exactly what Nandab said, which is that the Gulf allies that we have have now woken up to a reality that I think they tried to dismiss for too long. And that is that the Islamic Republic of Iran is an existential threat to what they are trying to build prosperity, peace, stability in their countries, and that the only two countries in the world that can defend them from that existential threat are the United States of America and Israel. And that the United States of America may not be there in 2029, but Israel still will be. And I think with that, there's a real opportunity for much greater normalization to expand Abraham Accords and to put Israel in a much stronger strategic position to face a new president and new political vicissitudes. Yeah, I agree, Mark. And I do think Nandab has alluded to this too on previous episodes of the podcast. The story on what was already in the works, but really this war has done to bring Jerusalem closer with the capitals of Gulf states that are currently not normalized, formerly normalized with Israel has not fully been written yet. There's a lot of interesting things, I think, in the works already. We will leave it there, gentlemen, before we go for our inside call me back subscribers. Our third episode on Mossad's Shadow War with Iran with Ronan Bergman will be released on Friday. This in this episode will have some pretty riveting reporting on how the Mossad stole Iran's nuclear archive packed into trucks and evaded a chase by 12,000 Iranians and exposed the weapons capability that they intended to build. So that again will drop on Friday for subscribers to inside call me back. So look out for that. And until then, again, Mark and Nandab, thanks for today's conversation. We'll be coming back to you soon. Thank you, Dan. Thank you so much. After the cameras stop rolling to subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to Ark media.org. That's a RK media.org. Call me back is produced and edited by one Benatar. Arc media's executive producers, Adam James Levin are ready. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Eva Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semmo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.