Searching for Cracks in Iran's Core: Michael Doran

There's no way this heinous regime, which is causing us an enormous amount of difficulty all around the region, comes out of this strength. The question is, are they permanently weakened or are they going to be in a position to come back? I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today I'm joined by Mr. Michael Durant. He's the senior fellow and director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at the Hudson Institute. He also served as a senior director for the Middle East in President George W. Bush's National Security Council. Mr. Durant joins us for a discussion today on the rapidly developing conflict in Iran and the broader implications for the region. Stay with us as we speak with Michael Durant. Michael Durant, welcome to NETSecMatters. Great to be here. Well, Mike, we're old colleagues. We work together in the Bush NSC and it's great to be reunited with you today. Yeah, you are always a pleasure to work with in the NSC. I say that with, I'm not being diplomatic. You are always a highly professional, well-informed, unruffable, unflappable. All right, well, we're going to keep that in the podcast. That's not going to be edited out. No, that's good. Absolutely. Well, you were always kind. You always had a lot of time for everybody and that's why I'm so glad to have you on the podcast today. You are out there crushing it on X. Your commentary is, must read. So I'd encourage our listeners to make sure they're paying attention to what you write and what's your, all of your commentary. But let's start with this, Mike. You know, it is really difficult to get any reports, much less reliable reports on what is going on inside of Iran. If anybody has contacts and insights, it's you. How are they reacting to the bombing campaign? They are, they have one goal in mind right now and that is to survive. And when I say they were talking about the IRGC, the state is now run by the IRGC. And that's in a way, it's, it's an old story. Back when you and I were working in the White House, that that process was well underway under the presidency of, of Ahmadinejad, the IRGC was taking over. So you know, we used to always say, we used to always say this was the regime of the mullahs and the, but the IRGC, the Praetorian Guard, the Revolutionary Guard, they were increasingly becoming the dominant element in, in the regime and moving everybody else aside. So kind of a, sort of a military dictatorship, this is not the normal military though the IRGC is different than the Artej, which is the normal military. Normal military was built up by the Shah and it had a reputation for being pro-monarchy and for being pro-American because it had such close relationship with the United States. So the IRGC has always neglected, the Islamic Republic has always neglected the Artej. There's no serious ground forces, the Air Force, the Navy, they're all weak, the regular Navy and regular Air Force and the, they are under the very close supervision of the IRGC. The, so this process was already well underway when we were in the White House 20 years ago, but now we've had during the war. This is the strengthening of the IRGC, not just as a regime guardian, but a power center in and of itself. A power center in and of itself, the dominant element in the, in the country in every respect, they politically, diplomatically and economically, they, they run the industries that they control the amount to somewhere between 30 and 50% of the GDP. And they're, they're really deeply entrenched in everything. So they've carried out what I've been calling perhaps a little bit mis-ironiously a coup d'etat in the midst of the war. I say erroneously because we've seen this process of them being the major element for some time, but they're not, they're not pretending otherwise now when they're under this existential threat from the United States and, and, and Israel over the weekend, the president, Pesashkin, apologized to the neighbors for the attacks against them and, and promised that it wouldn't happen anymore. And the IRGC commander came out and, and said, don't, don't, publicly, I mean, said, don't listen to Pesashkin. He doesn't represent anything. So you can't, I mean, that's, that's the kind of split that you can't hide. I mean, that's pretty obvious that people say we're mean to our state department. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. The, you know, the, the back when the, the, the, um, debate here in Washington was about the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal with Obama. Uh, I never bought the line that the Obama administration was pushing and the Europeans were also pushing, namely that we are through this deal strengthening the moderates against the hardliners. I never believe that because the moderates I always saw, I used to call them infidel handlers, people like Zarif, the foreign minister at the time, um, Rohani, he was the president. There they are. They are elements that the, uh, that the Iranian, that the IRGC likes to put in the front when dealing with the Westerners, because it's a good way to manipulate the Westerners, make them feel, make the Westerners feel like they're having some kind of influence over the calculus of, of the Iranian state. But the real calculus of the Iranian state is, is, is the calculus of the IRGC. And if there was ever, you know, a debate going on between the presidency and the IRGC, uh, and so on, that's, that's now ended. The IRGC is in the driver's seat. They had to do this. They had to present themselves to the world as in the driver's seat because of the, the elimination of Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader. Another element in, uh, in Iranian politics is the household of the supreme leader. Because he, he created a kind of umbrella over the whole regime that, uh, that, uh, that, that, uh, was the, the really the dominant element. And he defined, he personally defined the left and right boundaries of listed political speech and, um, and a policy, but he was very much, um, he was very much in line with the hard line of the, of the IRGC. Right. Once he was eliminated, uh, and Donald Trump started talking about the possibility of choosing the next supreme leader or having a say in it. Right. And clearly that he was, Donald Trump had a Maduro option in mind. It was very important for them to show the world that that option doesn't, that option doesn't exist. Right. So that's the, that's mainly what's going on. And we can talk a little bit if you want about Mojtaba, the, the sun and how. Oh, definitely. I want to get to that. Um, okay. So that's fascinating. The IRGC, the regime number one priority is to survive at all costs, maybe raise, you've written raise the costs on the United States by regionalizing the conflict, uh, you know, doing what they're doing in the streets of Formos, but tell me, tell me a little bit more about what the Iranian people might be doing. How are they reacting? Is it conceivable? They'll go back out on the streets at the conclusion of the bombing. Conceivable. Uh, but, um, I mean, it can't be guaranteed that we've lost in the last round of protest and 30,000 people, perhaps more. Yeah. They were just mowed down by the IRGC basically. So, uh, it's an existential fight for the IRGC and the, the U S and Israel have made clear that they regard the protesters as one of the elements in their, um, you know, in their arsenal. Uh, so, uh, are these people going to go out and just get mowed down again or is the regime going to be so weakened that, that, uh, it will start to collapse? Um, uh, I'm, I'm more inclined as, as an, as an outside analyst, I'm more inclined to focus on those things that you can actually, um, you know, you can actually, uh, like, like a military analyst in a sense, that things that you can actually touch and count, um, and so on. So I'm much more focused on missile launches and drone launches and, and the continued ability of the regime to pull those off. It's quite resilient in that regard. Um, then I am to be thinking about the protesters. Well, I was hoping you would say that there's a chance they would come out, but it, it, does that ever, I asked for it seemed to agree that you need a schism within the regime. Yes. And so you, you endorse that I, that idea. Yeah. I mean, that's, and that's what I'm looking for. Any sign of a crack in the regime, they've, and the IRGC circled the wagons. That's what I was saying before. Uh, and there's no sign. This, this, that we should not see the disagreement between possession and the IRGC as a crack in the regime. Uh, because I mean, it, this is, uh, um, the possession at this point is window dressing. These, the, the places run by the IRGC and we see no sign of a, of disagreement there. And as I said, that there's no sign that, uh, that they have, that the key element in the IRGC that is going to determine whether the, they take this to a ceasefire or whether they're forced to surrender is cracking. And that key element is the, the, the missile, the, the, the missile units and the drone units of the IRGC, they're still operating and operating at a high level. Uh, we're there, their number of launches is way down, but the, uh, which is a very good thing. Um, the number of launchers has been severely, um, uh, degraded. The Israelis and the Americans have destroyed a lot of the launchers, uh, but they still have them. They're still using them and they are using them to a significant effect. Their accuracy is growing. Not in that, not, not diminishing. They're gaining data during this and they seem to be getting targeting data from, uh, they seem to getting targeting data from the, the Russians is what we've heard. I strongly suspect they're getting it from the Chinese as well. Yeah. I think they probably are. So you haven't been able to detect any signs of a schism within the regime, but if there were cleavages, what, I, here's a few I've heard. You mentioned the Artege, the regular army, maybe, and it feels like one of Netanyahu's speeches tried to appeal to regular army versus IRGC. Maybe it's people who are taking advantage of the spoils system within the IRGC and those who haven't or currently aren't. So haves versus have nots, or maybe it's a generational split. Are those the cleavages to look for? Or, or is there, there are more to it than that? I, you know, I, these are, it's very unscientific all of this, but the people who, uh, you know, who really know Iran, they tell us that, uh, you know, know it from the inside. They tell us that, uh, there, there's only 15%, 20% of the population that supports the regime and that's because their livelihood is totally bound up with, with the regime. But that's, that's a significant number when you realize that they have the guns and the other, the others don't. When they, uh, understand that if the regime goes down, they may lose their lives, their families may lose their lives, so their backs are really to the wall. So that's a really, um, it's, it's, it's a, it's a minority of a minority, um, but, but it's a very motivated and unified minority is the way, is the way I would think about it. And also it's a minority that is concentrated in the cities, in the major cities. I mean, this is where politics takes place, really. Um, and, and Iranian society has lots of, of ethnic cleavages and, uh, ultimately those ethnic cleavages are working to the advantage of the, um, of the, of the regime. Oh really? I thought you were going to say that the Persians are either a plurality or a bare majority in the Kurds and other rest of ethnic groups might see this as their opportunity to pounce, but it's, it's the opposite, huh? Well, what, it's a bit more complex than that. Um, there, there's an element that there are, there are two areas where you could get an insurgency going pretty easily. And that's among the Kurds and among the Baluch. The, the, so there are, Iran has lots of different ethnic groups. Uh, uh, uh, it's a many, many, many, many different ethnic groups, but the main ones to be thinking about are the, there are five and that's the Azerbaijanis, the Kurds, the Arabs or the Akhvazis, but the Arabs, the, the Baluch and the Turkmen. But the, the Kurds, there's been talk about, uh, about arming the Kurds. Uh, and I, um, I'm not, uh, I'm not a big supporter of that idea. Okay. Uh, because I don't think it really helps you in the end. One the Kurdish areas are very far away from Tehran, from the cities. So you're geographically, you're, you're not the, the rebellion you're starting isn't helping you in the cities. Uh, secondly, uh, it alienates, it, it, it, it alienates the Turks and we want to keep the Turks on the sidelines in, in, in this, the Turks don't like this war, they're not opposing it in any way. And this, this entangles us with the Turks in ways that, um, that, that, that are, that are unnecessary because the, the Turks are afraid that there's going to be a vacuum created and the PKK, which is their Kurdish enemy will, will get a stronghold in the, in the Iranian Kurdish areas. And this will become a big problem for them and there'll be refugee flows. It probably alienates the Azerbaijanis as well, the Azerbaijani government because West Azerbaijan province in, in, in Iran has mixed Azerbaijanis and Kurds. And you're, you're, you, by fomenting a, um, by fomenting a Kurdish rebellion, you are almost guaranteeing ethnic, um, clashes between Azerbaijanis and Kurds. I'd say. And then, and then finally the, there's the Persians and you mentioned there are plurality. I don't think there are a majority. I think they're like, they're, I think there's somewhere 40 some odd percent. Uh, but, um, the, the, the, if, if the effect it has on Persian, the, the, the, the, the effect it has on Persian opinion, if the U S starts arming Kurds and makes that the, that's like, imagine a foreign power armed, armed, um, Guatemalans or Mexicans and started streaming them across the Texas border and then called on, uh, uh, uh, on Americans to, uh, to rise up, you know, and, and was calling on other, you know, Hispanics in America to rise up. What effect does that going to have on Anglo opinion in the United States? Are, are, are people like you and me going to say, Oh, that's fantastic. I want to, you know, align with those people. That's, that's basically what we're, we'd be doing. So what do you, I mean, we saw reports on confirm that the CIA was arming the Kurds. I mean, they're obviously very, very bright. They know what's going on. What do you think they were after? You think they were just trying to start up some trouble to put pressure on the regime and, and didn't think it completely through, but that seems unlike them. Tell us what you think was in their head. What's the best case scenario for what we were apparently doing? I think they, I think they, they want to discombobulate the regime. They want to put, um, they want to make the regime fear that it, that it, that it is being attacked from all sides. And they want to make it, uh, put resources, move resources away from Tehran over to, um, to, uh, the Kurdish areas. Just stress the system. And I, and I'm sure, uh, that there's also a little bit of, you know, like throw everything at the, at the wall and see what sticks, you know, where, because what we want to do is create cracks in the regime. And, uh, um, that's the, that's the, that's the goal. That's the goal. So if you were there in the national security council working around policy like you were, what would you do at this point to try and stir up a regime change movement? Would it be arming certain factions within the IRGC, assuming we were even able to find a disaffected group? Is there any ethnic group play that we haven't thought about or discussed? I think the most interesting one, and I don't know that it's a play, but the, the, the ethnic group that we need to be thinking the most about is the Azerbaijanis. For two reasons, actually three reasons I would say. Number one, they are the, uh, largest, uh, minority. They're, they, they're somewhere between 25% and one third of the entire population of Iran is Azerbaijani. They, they are, um, they are, uh, concentrated right next to Azerbaijan and Turkey. Now the Azerbaijanis call these people Southern Azerbaijanis, but they themselves, the Azerbaijanis of Iran call themselves Turks. Uh, and the Azerbaijani, um, language is mutually intelligible with Turkish. So this is a Turkic people. They're consuming, increasingly consuming media from the country of Azerbaijan and from Turkey. Uh, and they, they are, um, uh, the largest minority, as I mentioned, they're also the best integrated into the state, which makes them, uh, which, which makes them, uh, you know, whenever I raise this ethnic question of the Azerbaijanis, I get accused falsely of saying that I'm in favor of fomenting a rebellion against the regime. I don't know that that's possible because of this integration issue. I don't know, uh, what the, um, what, what is possible to do with them. I do know really clearly though that the question of the Azerbaijani allegiance to the state is the question that scares the IRGC more than anything else. Fascinating. So the, to give you an example, um, after the Azerbaijanis defeated the Armenians in 2020 in the war, uh, President Erdogan of Turkey went to Baku about six months afterwards to have a victory celebration with the president, Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Erdogan stood at the podium and he read a poem, which is a lament and it's a, it's an Azerbaijani folk poem, which, which, uh, it talks about the RS river, which is the river that divides Azerbaijan proper from, from Iran, from the Azerbaijanis of Iran. And it laments the fact that, that we, that these two peoples are divided by this river. Right. Yeah. So, so it longs for unit, for unity of these two people who've been apart for 200 years. I mean, there's no, uh, so, uh, the, um, this, this caused a huge, uh, diplomatic, uh, crisis in relations between, uh, Turkey and, um, and, uh, Iran, the Iranians, law, the, the foreign ministers, a reef launched a, a formal protest. There were, there was a whole day of speeches in the Iranian parliament and you know, the United States, if you think we're Donald Trump and in the first Trump administration, uh, took their oil exports down to about zero. Right. And they said, yeah, we don't care. We don't care. We live on jihad and air. We don't need an economy. We don't care. They're very, they're very good at putting us, uh, uh, at putting us a tough face to the, out to the world, the Iranians and pretending that they're never ruffled by, uh, by anything. But then they, they squealed like, uh, like little girls, you know, when, when, when Erdogan did what he read a poem, right? So they, they signaled their sensitivity on this issue. Um, and it's one that I think that we should be talking a lot to the Azerbaijanis and Turks about now the Turks do not want to play this card. I, I, they, they, they do not want to play it. They are, they, the last thing they want to talk to an American about whether that's an American official or an American like me is regime change in Iran. They're a, it, it, for them, it looks like another opportunity to get huge refugee flows. As I said, create a vacuum in which the PKK could move into the, but if President Trump were to president Erdogan and say, listen, um, we've got to do something about this and you have the ability to put pressure on that regime like nobody else. And he talked to President Ali of about that and, and got some ideas from them and said to them, look, this is going to happen. But in order to have this conversation, President Trump has to say, I'm not looking for a ceasefire right now. I need to get what I need to get. Here are my absolute, um, uh, war aims. I'm going to get these. We can get it the hard way or the easy way. Help me out with this. That would be interesting. That's what I would, on the ethnic question, that's what I'd be saying. That's fascinating. If I was in the White House, I would be, um, I would be focused on right now. Oh, good. Well, I want to get to those two. Um, but Mike, tell me this. I mean, the Israelis support regime change, right? And they're acting accordingly. The, the Israelis want regime change. There's, there's no doubt about it, but they're working in a military plan together that was adopted together with the Americans and they can't color outside the lines. There the, and the plan is to bring the regime to the point of regime collapse. And, and, and then, and then, and then we'll see what will happen with the Iranian people. But if we look at this from an American point of view, Donald Trump has issued, uh, for basic goals or stated for basic goals, no nukes, no nuclear program, severe curtailment on the ballistic missiles, uh, if not elimination of the ballistic missile program, uh, number three, end to support for proxies around the region and number four, freedom for the Iranian people. But at the same time, he's also clearly indicated that he thinks this war should be shorter rather than longer and that he doesn't want, uh, he doesn't want a power vacuum. So the freedom for the Iranian people means revolution, but he is not in favor of revolution. He wants in his heart of hearts, and I think he's made it pretty clear. He wants a kind of Maduro option. He wants to, he wants to have some element of the regime that he can work with. He's basically stated this, we're going to take out the three top layers and we're going to work our way down until we get to the, to the pragmatic element that will do a deal with us. So the minute you start negotiating with the, with the pragmatic, with the element that you have designated as the pragmatic element. But then on the, on the, on those first three items, uh, the nukes, ballistic missiles and, and proxies, you're no longer carrying out revolution. Then you're trying to reach a deal. And, and Donald Trump wants a deal. I, I was going to say this before when you said, if I was in the White House, well, would I be, what would I be doing to get regime change? And if I was in the White House, nobody in the White House is talking about regime change. They, they want to, they want those first three items. They, they're, they're, they're emotionally they're drawn, they're, you know, their hearts go out to the Iranian people. Uh, and they don't want to set them up for slaughter. They want to help them. But Donald Trump also said the other day, and I think he was speaking very honestly here. He said, I, you know, I want to help them, but they have to exist within a framework in which I can help them. Right. And he doesn't want to be the guy to go create that framework. So that's where the, the tension is. And the, the, the, the, um, the Israelis and Americans also want to use the power of public opinion in Iran to work against the, the, the regime. Uh, but that, that's a very unreliable, um, it's a very unreliable tool. Public opinion in Iran is overwhelmingly hostile to the regime. Yeah. Well, you can see the videos are coming out and you hear, you know, young girls watching the bombing, which is, you know, going on a few thousand yards away from them and they're giggling. They're giggling because they, they hate these, they hate these guys. Um, I mean, there are probably also terribly afraid of possible civil war or what could happen, you know, disruption, but the heinous regime, it's a parasitical regime on the, on the society, but it is, it's levers on all of the hard power. We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Michael Durand. Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm. Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage founded in 2013. Beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk, drive growth and navigate a complex geopolitical environment with a bipartisan team in decades of experience. Beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. So the Israelis won't regime change. I assume they're going to target the new supreme leader. Do they just keep going until they and the United States find someone they can deal with? Well, that, that's their idea. I mean, the key thing that they want to, that they want to do is, um, is take out the nuclear sites, uh, the, the ballistic missile sites. They want to end all the ballistic missile launches. Um, and the Israelis also want to weaken his will out to the extent that they can during this. Um, during, during this period, but they, there, there's to the extent that there's tension between the Americans and the Israelis. Um, it, it, it isn't apparent at this point. It becomes apparent when that moment comes and Donald Trump says, okay, I want to, I want to shut it down now, uh, because I want a negotiation with the, with the regime. And the Israelis don't like what Donald Trump is negotiating about. That's because Trump might accept Trump might, that the Iranians are going to through the negotiations if, if, if we get to that point, which we probably will. The Iranians are going to try to split the Israelis and the Americans, and they're going to do that by, um, offering the Americans some kind of concessions on the nukes, but, um, but not on ballistic missiles, which, and the ballistic missiles are as important to the Israelis as they are, as the nukes are. Uh, I don't know if they'll succeed in that. They may not split the Americans and the, and, uh, uh, and the Israelis on that, but then they'll also try to split them on the issue of proxies. Yeah. Cause the minute you start giving, uh, economic, what, what are the Iranians going to demand? They're going to say, okay, we'll, we'll let, let's say we, they agree to zero enrichment and they agree to get, let the IAEA take out all of the enriched uranium. Right. From Iran. In return for that, they'll want sanctions relief. But the minute you start letting the money go, then they can use the money to build up their proxies again. And that's also an Israeli concern. The, something that the Israelis may feel a little bit more strongly about than the Americans. So the tension will emerge then. The, the, okay. Tensions later, but if we're totally on the same page, working from the same script, was it untrue that the United States was surprised that the Israelis hit the IRGC refineries over the weekend? And while you're at it, what about the targeting of the police stations? Uh, no, I, I, uh, I don't have any direct information on that. I, I, I would be surprised if the, if the Americans were all that surprised by the hitting of the, these were storage depots. Um, I think that the targeting, the Sintkamp and Israel, they're sitting there looking at the same computer screens and the, the targeting, the, the target acquisition is a joint project. Uh, I believe. Okay. So if I could summarize where you are, the Israelis in the United States, especially the Israelis, well, let's see. The Israelis definitely won't regime change. The Americans want to weaken the regime to a point at least where we can find someone that Donald Trump can work with to ultimately get a deal. But for now we're prosecuting the same, the same target lists and there's no real divergence yet between the two. No, yeah. The divergence is about the, the dreams of the aftermath, I think. Dreams of the aftermath. Okay. All right. Tell us about the new Supreme leader. He, he might be dead actually. That's the one of the funny things they, uh, um, the, uh, this is the Joe Biden strategy. You know, when fighting Donald Trump, you, uh, you, you, you elect, you elect the least, the leader with the least capacity to keep him buried underground. The, uh, the, the, there's, there's a bunch of rumors going around. One rumor is that he's dead. Another rumor is that, uh, that he's crippled or, you know, his legs were, were, were hurt. Um, uh, he's unconscious. He's in a coma. Uh, all could be true. Uh, all, all could be false too. Uh, but there's a, but there's a, even if these are false, there's a kind of underlying truth to all of it, which is that, um, he would have been in, if they weren't under this existential threat from the Americans and the Israelis, most of a, how many would have been the compromise would have been a controversial candidate, uh, for this because he doesn't have the, any of the credibility that his father had. He's as a, as a religious cleric, uh, he's, he's not distinguished. So he doesn't, he hasn't distinguished him in the, in the, in, in, in, as an Ayatollah, you know, as a, as a, as a scholar of Islamic law. He has never really run anything. He is, you know, he's working in his father's, in his father's shadow. He's totally corrupt. They're all corrupt, but, uh, uh, but, uh, you know, he has a little economic empire. He, he is the nepotism choice. Uh, but, and, and that would have been, I think pre war, that would have made him a little bit controversial. But because of what I was saying, the pressure that the system is, is under, they wanted to elect the IRGC, wanted somebody that would guarantee all of the current lords of the system that their, that their position is secure. And that means everybody in the, um, in the Supreme Leader's household, remember I said, they created this, uh, this, uh, this organization on top of the whole system. That really, that is really pulling all of the strings of the, the system, or at least keeping all the different elements of the system in line. Uh, that, that organization itself is a very serious organization that has huge economic assets. Right. And you do the, the, the fear of everyone who works in that organization is that the new Supreme Leader will move them out. So you want to assure them at this hour of crisis that they're okay. You want the IRGC to know that it, that it is, that it is secure, both politically, but also all of its economic assets. And the mullahs, uh, the religious establishment, there's, they're, they're not important in terms of ruling the system like they used to be, but they still matter. And you want to reassure all of them, uh, as, uh, as well. So he is the, the consensus compromise candidate. And that's why they have a, they have elected him. And he, he may not be alive. I mean, they, at his, at the ceremony where they announced him, they brought out a cardboard cutout like you have in the movie theaters of him. And everybody wanted it. Oh my God. I didn't see that. Yeah. It was like a, like a, you know, it was like a comedy movie where there's like, here's much to the cardboard cutout and everybody, everybody cheered for the cardboard cutout. I, I, well, that's a great symbol of, of, of, of his purpose in the regime right now. His purpose is just to be the cardboard cutout, assuring everyone who, who was in power the day before the war began, that their, their, their position is secure. So who is in charge, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard is in charge, but is it Ali, Laren, Johnny? Who, who's the power? Well, I was singing, uh, uh, before the, before the weekend, I was saying that Ali, Laren, Johnny is the top guy. Uh, and, uh, if there's one guy who's more important than anybody else in this system right now, I was saying Ali, Laren, Johnny. Mm hmm. Uh, and I, and I'm sure that he is very important because the Supreme Leader moved a lot of the executive functions of his office to Laren, Johnny before he was killed. They, they, I mean, they, the, the system is not totally dysfunctional. Uh, they, they recognize that, you know, if only because of age that Ali, how many might may disappear, uh, is sometime soon. And they had to have, uh, processes in place to deal with that. So a lot of his executive duties were moved to Lara, Johnny. And in that regard, I think he's very important, but it looks like to the extent that I can understand it from the outside. It looks like Lara, Johnny did not play a major role in the selection of Mojtaba, which is, which if true is very interesting. But look, this is a very opaque regime. We know, Michael, even when I was in the White House and, and, and had all of the top secret, the clearances and saw all of the intel on this regime, I often didn't understand exactly what they were up to. You know, I used to say about, uh, about, uh, Haman-Ee back then that, that when it came to any of the big questions about what he was thinking, what he was planning, that there were two answers and that's, I don't know, and it depends. Yeah. And I learned to distrust a lot of the Iran expertise in the country, uh, because he's got people would go out on the television cameras and say that they know exactly what Haman-Ee is thinking. And I, and I thought, no, you don't. So I'm told that the intel has gotten better since then. Um, but it still remains a very opaque regime. And when you're sitting from the outside like this and events are moving very quickly, I'm a bit reluctant to say that I know exactly what the relationship is between the, between the, uh, the, the leaders of the IRGC and, uh, and Lara Johnny. But it looks like they're not a hundred percent on the same page right now. Yeah. Okay. So let's talk a little bit about, let's sum up regime change and then talk about scenarios. Um, it sounds like you're at a very low percentage that will have a clean regime change here. Uh, I would, I would put it, it's, it's, it's, it's a scenario. Uh, and, and it's, it's a serious one. And, and we need to, um, when thinking, when thinking in our minds about how this might unfold, we should have that scenario. We should be aware of it, but it's not the most likely one. Okay. So here's a few scenarios. You, you score these for me or, or come up with your own on the far left. Let's call it. We're greeted with flowers. Democracy breaks out soon. Let's say a different variation of that is, you know, it takes a year. Americans are always impatient. It's going to take a little while. It'll be more protests, more things will happen, more regime weakening. The center is some sort of civil war either based on ethnic conflict or other trouble that we're able to stir up. Getting more towards the hard line side of things. Let's imagine that the, let's imagine that the, the regime, the IRGC is in charge. It's somebody that Trump can work with. And then at the very far extreme, it's same, the new boss, same as the old boss, same old IRGC, same old Supreme leader type. Um, is that a plausible series of scenarios or what would you? Add I let me run, run through quickly how I think of the scenarios. I should have started with that. You go ahead. The scenario one is Saddam after 1992. Okay. So roundly defeated militarily, uh, significantly weakened, but still defiant and, and not working, not like you, not working in partnership with us in any way. So no Maduro option there, uh, but weakened. The sec, the second option is, uh, Putin after the fall of the wall or, you know, they, they, they, the Soviet Union as it becomes Russia. So the, you, the new Russia and then it is still run by the KGB in one way or another. But the KGB officers take off their, uh, they take off their uniforms and they put on suits and they take over the oil company and the gas company and they become they and their cronies become the, the, the new regime. And it possibly opens up in some ways this, this, this way or that way, but it is really the, if you check the DNA, it's still the IRGC. And, and that, uh, that new, uh, you know, uh, post 1990, uh, 92, uh, Russia is, um, is in the case of Iran, the IRGC will, will, will take off its IRGC uniforms and they'll put on the, the uniform of Persian nationalism. And they'll say, we are the new Persia. Uh, and they will, uh, pretend to speak in terms of, of the people. Maybe they'll make some reforms here or there cosmetic, um, in, in, in order to cut the deal with Trump that allows them to get some, uh, lifting of the sanctions. But they're going to try to, they're going to, they're going to still be, uh, they're not going to be as defiant as the scenario one. They'll be less defiant, but they'll still be problematic and they'll still be under sanctions of, of one sort or another, but there'll be a constant negotiation with the West about, uh, about it. Uh, the third scenario is, uh, I think civil war. Uh, and, and this is Bashar al-Assad after 2011. So you have a Rump regime, um, uh, and, uh, probably in the process of going from Shiite radical regime to Persian nationalist regime. Um, and you have, um, ethnic militias around the, around the country, which are supported and opposed in varying degrees by surrounding, you know, by outside countries. I think those are the, I think those are the basic scenarios. It's possible that the, um, it's possible that the IRGC changing its suit and becoming Persian nationalist could be, um, the beginning of a political transformation that would move toward, you know, they would have some semblance of election that would bring in new blood, new candidates who would actually, uh, you know, who would actually carrying out some kind of meaningful reform. I would put that as very low odds, but, uh, but all of these scenarios we should think about as points along a process. But what I'm, what I'm avoiding here is the idea that there's some clear option where we get democracy. I mean, this is not realistic because of what I said before about the IRGC owning 50% of the economy. Mm hmm. Okay. Well, so honestly, I thought you were going to be more bullish, but, um, but, uh, let me, let me be careful here. Cause, um, I'm, I'm pretty bullish. I mean, from an American interest point of view, uh, and I could even possibly say from the interest of the Iranian people, but I, I'm, I'm a bit, uh, um, reluctant to say that cause I don't know. But, uh, there's no way this heinous regime, which is causing us an enormous amount of difficulty all around the region, comes out of this strength. The question is the question is, are they permanently weakened or are they going to be in a position to come back with the help of the Russians and the, and, and, and the Chinese? What are we not thinking about? The Iranians, I think, regionalized the conflict more or less as they said they would do. They struck the other Gulf Arabs. They're of course taking shots at us and as Israel. They're even doing the straights and four moves, which we expected. Well, what, what other cards do they have left to play? What we're doing, um, I'll, I'll hear a number of issues that were, that, that we're not thinking about, but it, it's not that we're not thinking about the issues, but we don't think about in the right frame. What we always do is we are always impressed by our own military superiority and our, uh, and our military achievements, which are amazing. I mean, our military is fantastic. It's everything that we say about it and, and it, and it is conducting an absolutely exemplary campaign. There's no two ways about it. But the problem in the Middle East always is translating military success into lasting political achievement. And this, and this is hard. And it's hard because our adversaries have more control over the political landscape on the ground than we do. They understand, they, they're, they're the guy on the spot with the levers of repression in their hands. And they understand their political environment politically better than we understand it. And we, we tend to get carried away with our, our military success and just assume that it's going to lead to political success. So I always feel like my job here in these situations is to be the accountant and to come in and say, you know, you've got these, you've got this great new, I'm the company accountant, accountant, and you've got this, these great new products that are, that are, that are selling well. But you know, you've, you've, you've gone and you're, you're spending a lot of money and you're actually spending more money than you're bringing in at the moment. They, I have to say, look, there's gravity, there's reality, and we have to stay focused on that. It's a hard thing for me to get right because I, the, the kinds of things that I'm emphasizing are also being emphasized by the president's opponents. And they're using it to say, he doesn't have a plan, this will never work. It was a mistake. There was no reason to do it. And I'm not saying any of those things at all. I think he needed to do it. He had to do it. He's doing it well. And we're going to come out better in the end. But there is all, there are all these challenges, which are going to be there no matter what. Now the, the, the key issue is the drones, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that they have. And these are, these are disruptive military capabilities that can overwhelm the defenses of anyone, including us. And we're seeing that right now. Yeah. And they are resilient. These guys firing them are resilient. We're almost two weeks into this thing now and they're still getting it off. Despite our, the fact that we have, we have the superior air superiority and, and, and we're hunting them down. It's, we have to say, this is very impressive. Then they understood that this is their, that this is their great capability. Now we say, because we take out targets that we're going to end their program. And it's not true. We have to think of this. This is the thing that we need to focus on. This is a ballistic missile program. The, the, the, uh, and, and just destroying the factories, blowing up the stockpiles. It doesn't make the program go away. And the, the making the program go away is the work of years. And it's not just military work. It's also diplomatic work, economic work and, uh, and, and otherwise. So, I mean, a Shahid drone, an Iranian Shahid drone has an antenna on it. That is made in Ireland. Well, they have a procurement. They have a global procurement network, um, that is extremely difficult to, uh, to shut down. What we were talking about before, target acquisition, they hit a, they hit a, um, a radar, uh, facility, a relay facility in Israel, um, yesterday or the day before in the midst of this war with great accuracy. Um, which shows that in the midst of the war, despite decapitating them, all of the disruption, they're still engaging in serious target acquisition. Uh, and, and, and hitting these targets doesn't mean, uh, you know, that, uh, that, that they, that they did any great, huge damage to Israel. But this capability remains and they are using it. They have a strategy. The strategy is to hit the, to hit us economically. Uh, the razor, the price of oil, uh, prolonged the war, uh, cause Donald Trump difficulties in his domestic politics, uh, through the war, um, cause the allies, the Gulf allies to cry uncle. And, and closing the straits of hormones, which they've done, uh, they've, they've closed it. And we're, it's very hard to open this up because the, the, you have to open it up commercially and the commercial, the companies, no, no company, no matter what Donald Trump offers in terms of insurance or escorts or, or whatever, no company is going to put their, um, their ships in harm's way at this time. Yeah. Mike Durand, that was terrific and valuable insights. Thank you so much for joining NatSec Matters. Thank you. That was Michael Durand. I'm Michael Allen. Please join us next week for another episode of NatSec Matters. NatSec Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry. NatSec Matters is a production of Beacon Global Strategies.