This is NatSek Matters. I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today I'm joined by Mr. Jeffrey Feldman, the John C. Whitehead visiting fellow and international diplomacy at the Brookings Institution. Previously Mr. Feldman served at the State Department as the assisted secretary of State for near Eastern affairs. Mr. Feldman joined us last week on January 16th to discuss the developments in Iran and their broader geopolitical implications. Stay with us as we speak with Jeffrey Feldman. Jeff, thank you so much for joining. Michael, thank you very much for having me. I look forward to the conversation today. Jeff, I mean, let me just start off very simply what is the current situation and have the protesters lost momentum at least on the streets? Michael, it's it's it's hard to get current accurate information because the of the Internet blackout the communications cut off to the Iranians imposed on January 8th. But yes, it does seem as though that the protests have crested. It seems as though that for the fifth times in 2009 that the Iranian regime has has has used brutality, coercion, violence, fear to quiet to quiet the streets. But if I'm right and the regime has survived this, it doesn't mean that the regime is successful. You know, the the Mullahs, the security thugs that that are running the Islamic Republic of Iran really have no easy way to alleviate the economic catastrophe that sparked the protests in the first place. So there, there's a dilemma there. What are they going to do now? Even if the protests have ended through the violence. And the regime also has absolutely no idea what the Trump administration may have in mind beyond the sanctions that were that were just announced of 18 individuals and entities. You know, in the USS Abraham Lincoln and sailing into Pacific toward the Gulf, the Israeli Mossad chief, David Barnea is meeting with President Trump's all around envoy Steve Whitcoff in Washington. So the Iranians are the Iranian regime has no idea what's what's coming from Washington at this point, nor what they'll do in terms of the the basic grievances that led to these protests. So the story isn't over. I like to quote Cream Sacha Puer from the Carnegie Endowment, who's one of those countries foremost Iran, Iran experts. He said that the breakdown may belay the Islamic Republic's funeral, but it's not going to restore its pulse. He calls it the zombie regime, but it is safe to say this was the most significant demonstration in the Islamic Republic's history. There were demonstrations in all 31 of Iran's provinces, including in conservative clerical cities like Kome and Mashaad. Mashaad is the hometown of a Supreme Leader Ali Kramanay. It was most significant in terms of the broad representation of the country, the geographic, the social, the ethnic diversity of Iran was all represented. I mean, they started out in desperation because of the economic conditions. They started out demanding help on the economy, but it quickly evolved into demand for regime change, not simply reform regime change. So basically these protests, even if they're over, underscores what is an unbridgeable gap between the regime and the people. That's fascinating. So let's review for a second. We've all read and heard that of course what you said that these were protests, the most serious of which they've ever seen. But tell us why they were the most broad based. Is it because they got the conservative bizarre salesman? Is it because different parts and different classes if people turned out it wasn't just students that you know, talk a little bit about why this was unique and why it still might be a coalition that can come back. I mean, I would say all the above. You just mentioned Michael, but yeah, this was started by the merchants from Iran's Bazaars. And if you remember, those of us who rolled up to remember 1979, it was when the Shah lost the merchants of the Bazaars that the end was nine for the Shah back in the 70s. And so this starts off as being an economic story. And the economy is far worse than it's been under any other period in the Islamic Republic's 47-year history. Take the currency. The Iranian real was trading at 42,000 reels to the dollar a year ago, January 2025. That's the official rate. By the end of the year, it was over 1 million reels at the official rate and 1.4 million reels on the black market. How do you deal with that if you are a merchant or even just an average citizen? The inflation rate was over 50% food had risen over 70% just in the course of last year. People were desperate. And at the same time, because of the fiscal constraints, fiscal collapse of the currency, the government cut back the subsidies on the essential commodities like rice and cooking one. So this was what provoked the initial part of this demonstration since September 18th. But it quickly rage manifested itself. Rage over mismanagement. That we're leading to the severe water crisis that probably you've heard about in Tehran and elsewhere. Rage over corruption about the regime's elite. The revolutionary guards and others in the regime elite basically have become a predatory militarized mafia that are repatiously controlling key economic sectors. And protesters were basically saying that it was impossible for the average Iranian to survive. But yet the regime's elite were thriving. This was like an existential issue for the people on the street that the Islamic Republic was doing nothing to address. And then there was also interesting. There was a sense of Iranian nationalism. It's worth keeping in mind that Iran has what they always talk about the 2500 year history. It was once an empire. Iran is not a post-colonial construct like Iraq or Jordan, some of the other neighboring countries. Iran has a very strong sense of nationalism. This is not Iranian Islamic Republic nationalism. This is Iranian nationalism. And there was a sense of the protesters of humiliation. Humiliation over the June war when they saw how weak Iran actually is after all the posturing with its proxies etc. There was humiliation that of the Israeli penetration that led to the assassination of so many Iranian revolutionary guards, scientists etc. It wasn't the protesters' remorning the losses. They were mourning the lack of the government's ability to protect the country. You remember back in 2022 and 2023 there was the woman life and freedom movement, protest movement that took place after Makhsa Amini, the young woman was beaten to death for not wearing hijab. She was beaten to death in prison. There was the protest movement then. And there was this protest slogan that evolved that was neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran, neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran. It was used much more frequently in these particular protests. And that's a demonstration of the population's anger against the government that prioritized support to Arab militias over supporting their own population. And there was frustration over the same thing on the nuclear program, prioritizing a nuclear program that did nothing to deter Israel's attack in June over the welfare of the people. So the protestors I think saw their living conditions as posing an existential threat to their survival and the regime was doing nothing about it. But if they saw it as an existential threat, the regime saw as an existential threat as well. There was a more sophisticated communication blackout this time. It was more sophisticated than during previous demonstrations. Even if the casually figures are at the low end of what we're hearing, which is what's the low end is about 3000. That's more than twice the number that were killed under any of the previous protests. And I think most disturbing for those of us who would like to see the end of the Islamic regime was the fact that there was no splintering of the regime itself. You didn't see you didn't see any hesitation on the part of the revolutionary guards or that voluntary voluntary paramilitary group to besiege. There was no hesitation in shooting it on our protesters from the information that we have. Can I ask you that Jeff you and others have mentioned that there's certain factors that you need to see to know that the collapse is near. And one of course always hears defections of military regime officials sometimes I hear related to that, you know, gangs of people with guns that can fight back. And on other occasions, it's all of the above plus they need a real leader. What are we miss what what's missing right now and what factors might we want to see that would indicate that a collapse is near. Well, I would I would use the the five criteria that Jack Goldstone who's a professor at George Mason who studied revolutions for decades that he uses one is fiscal. He has five factors. One, fiscal collapse. Check that box with Iran to compelling opposition narrative. Iran's got that check that box. Three is broad based opposition. Boy, Iran sure we sure saw that since December 20th, Iran's got that number number four. It's sort of conducive or friendly in an actual environment that wouldn't be trying to oppose a change. That's checked. You got that. But the fifth is the problem, which is the defection issue you mentioned. It's the splintering of the elite. That's the fifth of the five of the five Jack Goldstone criteria and you don't have a splinter of the elite. And I think this is sort of an example of the what that that it's the Islamic Republic's version of that Ben Franklin quote, whether he said about about you know that we all have we all need to hang together or will most assuredly hang separately. I think it's the regime recognizes that if they that they have no choice but to stick together because otherwise they're going to they're all going to be hung anyway. But, but even if the regime has proven again that brutality can quiet the streets. It is not it is not out of the woods. It isn't a bind. You know regime survival is not regime success. They've got they have no solution to address the underlying grievances that sparked the the protest to begin left. All those economic conditions. Okay. So they've got you know they're sitting on lots of on lots of oil. Because of sanctions and other things the 80 more than 90% of their oil is sold at steep discounts to China. They're only producing about half as much oil per day 3.2 billion barrels of oil a day compared to what was being produced in the 70s under under the Shaw. They have really no way to increase their revenues at this point in the direct to to meet the needs of the population to try to address the economic grievances. And here's the catch 22. I see the only way that they can that they can address these grievances and reverse the catastrophic economic collapse is by re integrating into the world economy. That's the only solution. But to re integrate into the world economy. We require such fundamental changes in Iran that they would essentially they would essentially be extinguishing their own regime. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, they think about it. The Iranian. The. To give up the nuclear program. They have to run down the terrorism. Right. Renounce terrorism. Give up. Give up the whole identity. The death to America. Death to Israel. And they would have to go after the revolution at guards. They would have to they would have to take away the economic privilege is that the revolution at guards have a mass for themselves over the past past decade or so. I mean, it would change the Islamic Republic. Beyond anything that resembles it now, but you're of course would be great. But as you mentioned at the start of this, I think I do have the dubious distinction to be in the only former US officials ever been in the meeting with the Supreme Leader. Iran. I went to Iran several times, so I was at the UN and one time I was with Banky Moon, then my boss, who we had a small meeting, two on two meeting, meeting with the Supreme Leader. Well, obviously would interpret to us as the Banky Moon, nor I speak speak farcy, but it was clear to me what I've what I had read about as a US official studying Iran, which is harmony is a true believer. He's a true believer in the death to America, death to Israel is a true believer in the revolution as principles. He's not one to compromise. And in fact, he looks at reform and compromise as a sign of weakness. He talks about the Shah of Iran having lost his reign because he was too soft because he started at the end of the reign to try to address some of the some of the demands of the protesters. He has blamed Gorbachev's reforms for the collapse of this closed-servient union. So he is not going to offer concessions that would lead Iran on the path to reform and the reintegration to the global economy, which is the only solution that they that they really that they have. The take the hijab law, for example, and you know, one of the Prince, one of the sort of fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic was that women had to wear the hijab. Well, ever since that women, women life and freedom movement of 2022 and 2023, women have just ignored it in such numbers that the regime has more or less given up trying to enforce it except for a few performative enforcements here and there. But how many has refused all proposals to take the hijab law off the books? So it's still on the books because he sees anything that would lead to reform as a as a weakening of the regime and regime survival is his is his number one goal. I mean, yeah. Yeah. Well, let me ask you this. Let's go back a little bit. I mean, I'm you're reassuring, but I'm still alarmed about the protests have waned and there's not a lot out there on the street. And so let's talk to what US military action might have done or might still be done. If we hit hit at the apex of the protestor, maybe when they began to wane. Would that have given a big shot in the arm to the protesters increased their morale? And I hear you the economy is so bad that the regime is not out of the woods. But if we bomb in a week and we'll get in a second to who we might bomb and is at the IRGC or the procedure, whoever, but is that enough to boost the protesters to get them out and and make progress. I don't know. I mean, it seems as though that it would have been great had we had a way to disrupt the regime's ability, the regime security services ability to coordinate responses to the demonstrators. I don't think there's anything that we have in our arsenal that could have stood between the protesters and the bullets that they were fired upon. I think that that was that that just wasn't possible. We don't have that kind of that kind of of presence. But we certainly present Trump certainly got the Iranian regime's attention, which I think is extremely useful. And I'm sure he still has their attention. Take, for example, the Iranians offer direct talks on the nuclear program. They have not they have refused direct talks ever since 2019, 2018 when President Trump in the first administration pulled out of the Iran Iran deal. So there's a sense of desperation that I sort of I have well, but I enjoyed seeing where where the foreign minister saying, well, well, now, now we'll have direct talks. Surely that was that was kind of a Hail Mary in hoping to stay off military tax, even though the indirect talks back in June did not stay off the the military, the military attacks and the the fact that the announced planned execution of of the first demonstrators to be executed. The guiding or fun, so tiny it's 26 year old was then hastily dropped and all these statements about well, we're not really going to execute demonstrators was also I think an example of the routing the routing regime paying attention to what President Trump might do. I don't know what his options are. I don't think a Maduro type operation, even even if it's possible, perhaps it's possible, it's a pretty impressive operation in in Caracas. I don't think it will transform the country because there are too many people in the IRGC and the and the elite that would quickly fill the gap in the same way that how I used to purchase would lead. All right, well, let me let me let me pressure you. I agree. There's no way to get in the middle of the protesters and I like your point about trying to prevent the regime from coordinating among themselves. But let's assume that we said, all right, we don't know if this will be completely determinative, but we're expressing our support for you. And let's say we hit significant posts of the besiege the IRGC, maybe even some police stations, maybe intelligence facilities. I've heard and read for years that air campaigns alone don't don't make a regime change, but are you do you think that would work? Do you think that would just increase the morale so much that people would really go out and maybe start taking government buildings? I don't know, Michael, or would they react and say, we're Iranians, we have 200, 500 years, who are these people attacking? I don't know. But I think that if that happens, the Iranian regime would definitely see it as an existential threat as they should. They already do that right? They already are already massacring everyone. That's right. They already do. So what we would have to be prepared for is an all assault from their remaining ballistic missile and launch sites, which, which, so that we always just need to prepare for that. My preference would be go after the communications within the within the regime. The Israelis clearly have penetrated the system to an almost unimaginable degree. Use, continue the assassinations that the Israelis have proven so good at go after the go ships that are getting that taking that oil to China. Now cutting cutting off Iranian revenue will of course also hurt the population even more than they're already hurting, but I think that there's ways that you can go after the economic underpinnings of the regime and after their communications. In ways that might not lead to the same type of retaliation that a direct the director of military strikes would do. Okay. So let's talk about Israel. First, the 12-day war, there were dozens of accounts that came out that said Netanyahu wanted to target the Supreme Leader and the United States talked about it. Does that mean and I'm sure they're better. I guess I think they're better on op-seq now than they were in June, but do you think Israel or the United States could would target the Supreme Leader? And I have to just go ahead and also ask at this point because it's relevant. David Sanger in the New York Times reports that Israel, maybe because there aren't two carrier strike groups in the region to help shoot down missiles, but it says Israel was uncomfortable with the United States going, let's call it this week or last week. They want these carriers to be back. They're not saying don't do it. They're just saying not now. Do you credit that and would Israel get involved? Do you think that they want to go ahead and pull the trigger on a decapitation strike of the Supreme Leader? That's a bunch of stuff. Let's see if you can unpack it. Well, I think it's quite interesting to see the distinction between December 29th when when Prime Minister Netanyahu met with President Trump in Mar-a-Lago and the David Sanger New York Times article that you mentioned that says that the Israelis have to have said, hey wait, not now in terms of trying to strike Iran because I think back into December Netanyahu is trying to warm Trump up for further attacks on Iran's nuclear, and the remnants of Iran's nuclear power. The first program and then if David Sangers, we believe he's a credible journalist, now they're saying not now. My reading of that is that because the Israelis, as I said, have so deeply penetrated the Iranian system in terms of intelligence and both signals and human intelligence that they must have an idea of what the Iranians would do in retaliation. The Israelis do not want that retaliation right now. Is my conclusion? Just as long as I'm throwing hypotheticals at you, if let's say the United States is bombing in a week, does Israel get involved in the bombing as well, or is that the bridge too far that might backfire and the Iranian states? One thing to get support from the United States, it's quite another to get it from the Zionist regime. So let's say they don't, is it more likely they participate or don't? They're more likely they'll participate in some way, and we're going to be accused of doing Israel's business by the regime anyway. So I don't, I can overanalyze this and say, oh, yes, the Israeli should stay out because that makes it too easy for the Iranian regime to blame to blame the Zionists, but they're going to blame us anyway. They're going to say that we're working in commercial Israeli's anyway. If they, they accuse the protesters of being agents of the Zionists and the Americans and the protesters clearly weren't agents of the Zionists, the Israelis and the Americans. So I'm less worried about that. In fact, the fact that Israel does have such good intelligence on Iran, I would hope that they would be involved in some way if there's any kind of kinetic action. And I think that yes, we, I'm sure we have the capacity to, to take out the Supreme Leader. I just don't know what different sets that is going to make except the one that you coin out, which is psychological on the protesters with, with that reignite mass demonstrations against the regime because they would, they would, they would have an enormous morale boost if the Supreme Leader would suddenly disappear. We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Jeffrey Feldman. Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm. Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage founded in 2013. Beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk drive growth and navigate a complex geopolitical environment with a bipartisan team in decades of experience. Beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. Let's talk about other regional positions. First, the articles this week have said that some of the Gulf States don't want regime change in Iran because they're opposed to any populist movement that forces political change. That's just not let's call it what the Saudis or the UAE or anyone want. And Iran's weak after the 10, 12-day war and that's a good place for them to be. First of all, or are they just saying that for their own populations and they like everything else would love it if Iran collapsed. So what's true of the so-called Gulf Arabs in this conflict? You and I are both generalizing here because there's obviously distinctions between them with better relations of some Gulf countries with Iran than others. But in general, I think that there are four elements that the Gulf leaders would be looking at. One is the one you mentioned, which is, huh, we don't really like the idea of popular revolt over throwing, over throwing regime. If we don't like the regime, we didn't like it when it happened in Egypt and Tunisia. And we don't like that example. So that is part of the story. Part of it is the idea of chaos and war next door. And then Salman, the crown prince and de facto leader of Saudi Arabia has his vision 2030 where he has to bring in, he wants to bring in investors and capital on tourists. Is that any we're going to come if there's chaos and war next door in Iran, if there's outflows or refugees, et cetera. So part of it is the idea of stability in order to meet the economic diversification plans of Saudi Arabia and others. Part of it is the kind of like Iran being weak. Yeah. You know, as it is. And then there's the Israeli factor. The, I would put the UAE in a different category when I talk about the, when I talk about Israel, because Israel and the UAE continue to work quite closely together in a whole, in a number of, in a number of geographic areas and thematic issues. But ever since the September 8th, Israeli attack on the Hamas building in Doha cutter. So a US ally, a US ally Israel attacking Doha that most of the Gulf countries have seen a reckless Israel as being a bigger threat to the region than a weak Iran. And that's not that significant. That's a significant change. So September 8th and the combined with the, with the revelation in the June war, how weak Iran actually is has given the rest of the region some pause about Israel, meaning that having some kind of counterway. The week is this isn't, isn't so bad. So I would say that there are, that those are all, those are the four elements that the Gulf Arabs are looking at. It's worth noting that, that they've been very quiet about what's happening in Iran that we've seen the reports of, of Gulf Arabs approaching the Trump administration to say, hey, don't do us a military attack. They're clearly afraid of retaliation. They saw it and they saw it in June. But publicly with the exception of Oman, I'm not aware of any public statement from any of the Gulf countries. Yeah, I think that they, I think they realize that they're going to, that the regime is going to survive. They're going to have to deal with an even weaker Iran next door. And they're not going to say anything to make that relationship more complicated. As you know, from 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran had developed a sort of rapprochement. You know, they're, they're sort of living that, living with each other in the region. Jeff, let's talk a little bit about the Shah's son, Reza Pablavi. Talk a little bit about him. He is seemingly charismatic. There are reports that the protesters on the streets have at least mentioned his name or shouted his name a few times. Is he, is he going to be somebody that the regime could, he could take over for the regime? Is it a serious possibility or is it just because there's no one else that has name identification? Yeah, I think it's, I think it's more the latter, Michael Betis. But it certainly is true that his name was used, um, chance of a lot more in this demonstration than in the last one, the 2020, 2023 demonstrations. You know, his name came up, but nothing like it came up this time. It's again, because this internet blackout, it's still not, I can't say for sure how often or how, how, how much of the protesters were chanting his name. But it is worth remembering that something like two thirds of the population of Iran was born after the Shah had fallen. And so that, you know, if you're a young, if you're a younger Iranians, I guess, several nights, like even that, but. And you look at the pictures of Iran from the Shah's time, you're not looking at pictures of the repression, you're looking at that social freedom. You're looking at a country that was where the income levels were on the increase. You can see whether there be a certain romance looking at that history, compared to what they're going through now. So I, I think that he's important as a symbol of what the Iranians, but the repression that the Shah also had that they, they, they want to leave behind. And I find it interesting that the, the White House is being very careful on the question of, of, raise a quality without, you know, they're, they're not promoting him anymore than they were promoting, you know, Maria Karina, a machado for Venezuela. So the White House certainly still has, has not seen him as the, as the answer. Yeah, I've taken that, especially in Venezuela, but also here is an implicit criticism of the Bush administrations, you know, reliance on the bathification and a complete chopping off of the military officers and top bureaucrats in Iraq. Because that led to pandemonium and health or shelter and it's obvious that they would rather not deal with that kind of strife at the outset. Let, let's talk a little bit about domestic politics. I know you're a national security foreign policy expert and can speak about things all over the world. But part of this undeniably, I think for President Trump is American credibility. It's, he's the president that follows through on what he says and mocked President Obama for not enforcing the red line in Syria when Syria used chemical weapons. And of course, President Obama seems a little bit embarrassed that he didn't speak out on behalf of the Green Movement in 2009 because he said repeatedly, you know, I got bad advice from staff. I thought it might backfire. I didn't do it. I regret it. I should have been more positive. But what do you, what do you think that domestic political angle here is and how did that impact our decision making? I think that the Obama examples are very, is a very good one that, and I was a Secretary of State at the time. So I'm, I'm culpable in this in part of this, which is that we sort of collectively thought, let's not make it, let's not make this about us. This is about the Iranians. So let's, let's publicly be bystanders. And I think that was, I agree with President Obama. That was a mistake. Now we did do things to help on the communications. We did, it was more rudimentary than there's nothing like star like at the time. But we did, we did work hard to find ways to try to keep communications open to support the protestors. But, but in terms of our public position, it was very much being a bystander. I think that that President Trump is not a bystander and that no one expects President Trump to be a bystander. And it's one of the reasons why I think that I said at the beginning, the story's not over because I think that there will be some kind of US reaction to what's happening in Iran that goes beyond the 18 sanctions that were announced, you know, announced recently that that's not going to be sufficient to scratch that it's either in the White House or with those people who are the constituency for trying to do something. And it's going to be for trying to get regime change in Iran. Now, at the same time, you know, you, you mentioned the, the debauchification efforts in, in Iraq, which led to such chaos and of course led to led to the eventually the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic, the Islamic State, the Sunni backlash. And if there's a problem in Iran, then we had in Iraq in terms of the regime. If there's a change in Iran, if there's a, if there, if this regime collapses, what do you do with 150,000 revolutionary guard forces? What do you do with the, with the besiege, the paramilitary volunteers who are true believers? These are not, you know, the trouble we had in Iraq was, we say, okay, anyone who has been in Iran, we're going to be in Iran. We say, okay, anyone who was ever a bathist and people had to be bathists because that was, that was the only way they could get people to keep their job as a schoolteacher or a doctor. A lot of people who lost their job because of a bag U.S. policy that that condemned everybody, but in Iran, the people with power are true believers. These are not people who just said, oh, well, we'll be in IRGC, we'll be, we'll be a revolution in a regard because that's how we can advance in our company. No, these are, these are thugs who have fired on protesters. And so how do you replace that level of control? I'm not sure, I'm not sure we have the answer. And, and President Trump certainly is not going to want to get into a place where we are suddenly responsible for a country of 92 million people that the economies in free fall. And I think that the, that that would, that the American public is happy as we'd all be to see the Iranian reput, the, the Islamic Republic disappear. We aren't going to be very patient. If we are left in the sort of Colin, Colin Powell pottery barn scenario that we broke it, we own it. I could also see it's not releasing sanctions immediately if the IRGC is still a force. All right, well, let's talk about things the United States could do short up military action. You mentioned in the Obama administration, you, well, you should mention the, I think it was Google and how they may have been helpful. And you also mentioned earlier on this call that there's an opportunity for maybe trying to prevent the regime from coordinating so closely and their repressive activities, you know, should everybody go back out on the streets. But everyone's talking about Starlink and the blit digital blackout. Many reports say the Chinese are jamming Starlink. What's in the category of things that could help the protesters coordinate among themselves or prevent the regime from repressing the protesters. What else is in all these other categories short of the use of force? Well, I would say communications are key. How do you promote communications among the opposition and between the opposition and the outside world. So that's key. How do you how do you provide alternative sources other than Islamic or public news to, you know, to the Iranian public keep keep the momentum up that way. I, you know, here I am a former, former diplomat saying, I think the assassinations are useful. That if, if some of these IRGC leaders start seeing their colleagues being being bumped off. And the, and the bumping off is linked to protest repression rather than just the nuclear program has happened in, happened in June. Maybe you'll start seeing an erosion of that solidarity that I think is, is the glue that still holds the Islamic Republic, Republic together. I think it's time for us to be much harder with our allies, assuming there's assuming there's still allies, Greenland, etc. On their relations with Iran. You know, there's been the Europeans in particular have, you know, they'll, they'll do the statement equivalent of a handslapped. But it's time to really break off break off the relationships. This is not a normal country or a normal regime. And a country of 92 million people with this sort of hydrocarbon wealth should be in the G, you know, should be in the G 20. It's not it's, it's on the threshold of being a failed state. And the Europeans and others will still pretend that it's more or less a normal, a normal country that doesn't, has an unfortunate human right situation. Let's really build some solidarity with, with other countries again, to wake up to the reality of what this, what this country really is. Okay, so let's talk about some other ethnic groups inside of Iran. I think that the Israeli intelligence success, the covert action success of assassinations, being able to steal documents of all the things that they've been able to do inside the country. Are probably recruited from ethnic groups that have ancient beaves with a regime. Where are they in all of this? It doesn't seem like they are trying to exploit the opportunity that's been going on over the last two weeks. And I may have even seen a statement from one. I don't know if it was the Kurds or another that said, we can't wait for this to happen, but it's not going to happen now. What role are all these other groups going to play in this? And why didn't they seize the opportunity recently? As I understand it again, once again, the communications blackout has made getting accurate information. Are as I understand that there were, that these protests did have from a cross ethnic dimension to them that you had Kurds, you had definitely had Azarees as well as Persians who were out in these protests. So the protest movements did reflect the diversity of Iran, at least to some extent. And you've also got that sense of Iranian nationalism that the Azarees in Iran, they're not as numerous as the Persians, but they feel Iranian. They don't have a loyal view to Azerbaijan, even if they're linguistically or ethnically linked to Azerbaijan. You know, it's this, in fact, Hamine himself, the Supreme Leader is of Azari background. So that there's more cohesion than you would, than you might see in other places that are so multi-ethnic. That's not to say that everyone's happy. That's not to say that there hasn't been suppression of the Arab minority on the peripheries or the Kurds along the Iraqi border. But I, at least as I understand Iran, I would be less concerned that I've seen some analysis that if the regime would collapse, you have a splintering of Iran in the same way that you see splinterings of other countries. I think that there's more cohesion there because there's more of a sense of being Iran and because of that, that long history. Yeah. Maybe the gangs with guns, they're on the ground. They probably understand the regime better than we do. Maybe they just didn't think that timing was propitious for this, but it feels like they're going to play some sort of role down the road. All right. Here's another factor that it may come into play any week now. The Supreme Leader is almost 9, I think. Yeah, 86. 86. And even before this, of course, there's the occasional article about the dilemma of succession in Iran, no obvious candidate. What happens? If short of this hold is this disaster for them of legitimacy and economic collapse, it was going to be difficult anyway. Walk us all through this. Who selects the Supreme Leader? Are there dark horse candidates or their favorites or is this just like a papal concave and we're not going to know until we know? The favorite candidate that would have been probably selected when Kamin A dies would have been Ibrahim Raece, the last president of Iran. He was the front runner, but he was killed in a helicopter accident, but I think two years ago, wherever Iran is, can't even protect their own president. So that put the succession into question. People talk about Moucetaba, Kamin A, who is the son of the current Supreme Leader. But when Kamin A, the original, the first IOTO, the first Supreme Leader, came to power, he said that hereditary rule was not Islamic. So there's a problem there with Moucetaba, that different Fomin A's dictate about no hereditary rule. I think that we can predict who the Supreme Leader is going to be, but I think we can say that the assembly that comes together of clerics to elect the new Supreme Leader will be heavily influenced by the IRGC. That the IRGC has become a much, much stronger political player than it was, say, 15 years ago. And so you're going to have the military clerical understanding about who the next Supreme Leader would be, and it would be somebody who would keep let the IRGC maintain its privileges and its controls over large segments of the economy. One of the things that struck me when I was in that meeting with Kamin A that I mentioned was just how uncharismatic he is. He doesn't have the sort of presence that you would expect of the Supreme Leader. I was Vastric Lebanon, and I used to watch the speeches of passing Nusrala, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, to try to glean whatever information we could about what Hezbollah had up at sleeves. Nusrala was very good about previewing if you understood what to look for, what Hezbollah was about to do. And Nusrala had real charisma. He really could, he was entertaining, he kept audience attention, wrapped attention. So I kind of expect Kamin A to be along those lines. He's not. He's just, he's very unimpressive speaker, wouldn't know charisma. So I don't think, I think that he's there because of inertia in the system. I don't think he's there because, because people, even there as you see, find him particularly impressive, because they find him useful. So you said earlier that of all the factors that influence whether a regime like this would collapse, one would be elite fracture. And that doesn't obtain at the moment. But I think what this question is about is what would signal elite fracture? Would it be IRGC factions breaking off? Maybe besiege factions going their own way or, you know, we used to ask the intelligence community of this. What should we look for to know that something's about to happen? People's children being sent out of the country. People's people's children finding finding other ways. And there was a rumor. The foreign minister, Arachi Abbas Arachi was in Beirut last week, beginning last week. And there was a rumor that he was there with his family. And this, and this caused all sorts of stir on among the Ryan watches was he the first civilian defection. Well, now he was there on the official visit. But where his baggage, by the way, was set back to the plane because the Lebanese said it could not contain diplomatic content. Interesting. And so, but anyway, so I would say civilian defections of high rank. And children out of the country will probably take place before the IRGC splitting. And then there's the question of at some point, will the IRGC in the besiege not fire on. On our protestors, you know, we haven't seen that yet either. By the way, just on the IRGC. I mean, I never hear much about factions or. IRGC people who want to reform, but are they a monolith or not. It seems to be a pretty much a remodeling. The Israelis assassinated the IRGC commander in June during the during the June war. And the structures were such that that didn't cause any kind of real break. And there's not been the sort of singular figure that Soleimani was before before President Trump had his assassinated in what January 2020. I think that's a murder. So there seems to be enough of a bench and enough of a structure enough confusion that you didn't start seeing fizzers within the IRGC even when they're even when their leader was killed in june. OK, let's talk a little bit as we begin to wrap up about if the regime collapsed. And I'm sure there would be a huge tumultuous year or so. But some are already saying this would be a new Middle East. It would be a glorious Middle East. It would finally be unburdened by the. The sense of the past and could grow and all sorts of new and wonderful things could happen. You know, do you think this would be a. Such a new flowering across the Middle East. I think Iran has incredible potential. But what about across the whole region like would it would have this salutary effect. I think that the yeah, so I think it would have a salutary effect. I mean, we would we would not have we would not be seeing attempts to rebuild proxy networks things like that. So yes, I think it would have a salutary effect across the across the region over the long term, even if there's some chaos in the in the short term. And you know, the Iranian. You often hear people talk about Iran is as isolated as North Korea. I've been to North Korea too as part of my you are my UN duties. And there's a huge difference not only in just the size of population with the wrong 19, many people. It's at these Iranian people, despite everything have maintained international cries. They have they have a sophisticated understanding of the international landscape. They're you know, they're merchants there. They're they're educated. Whereas the North Koreans are really completely cut off from the world. And so I think that you would find the Iranian society would quickly adjust to being back as part of the normal normal world where they believe that they deserve to be all along. Yeah. Okay. Good. All right. Last question. Let's look to the future. We have at least one carrier strike group steaming towards the Mediterranean. And of course, we're going to look for US military action. Even maybe short of the carrier arriving, depending on whether the president is trying to faint give a faint here. We're going to look towards bank for you know, economic factors or any other banks going to collapse in the Wall Street Journal and has mentioned that Scott Bessons talked a little bit about the way the money is moving and how that might indicate regime. And the regime members fleeing if they're putting their US dollars abroad or their own money in places that they could access it maybe in Europe. What do you see? What are we going to look at in the future in the next week to month? There will be more US action and just simply the sanctions that we put in place. I'm convinced of that. President Trump is not going to stop with 18 sanctions. I don't think that what we do will bring down the regime. I think that it will further weaken the regime, which in itself should embolden the population. But I don't know if when the protesters are going to come back out on the street in such numbers to really mark the fact that we are now at the end that we've now reached the point of the female that the Korean such a part talked about. But I think what we're at what we're going to see is a continuing weakening of the regime that's already lost its you know whatever legitimacy it had in terms of the popularity. And at some point it's going to collapse of its own contradictions. Yeah, that's the other big picture that I've heard a lot of commentators say recently, which is if they don't collapse is now assured it may not be in this month, but it's coming and even some say this year. Yeah, I think you're either going to have the regime will continue the week until it collapses or the regime will and probably try to take the decisions that we talked about earlier to reintegrate in the world economy, which in itself would in the Islamic regime. Jeff, thank you so much for doing this. Those of us over here at beacon are going to be tracking every part of this and let us know if you have any additional follow up questions. But Jeff, we hope to have you back really soon because this story's not going away. Look forward to coming in touch, Michael. Thank you very much for having me. It's an important topic. That was Jeffrey Feldman. I'm Michael Allen. If you enjoyed listening to Natsack batters, please leave us a rating and review. We'd love to hear from you. If you're interested in becoming a sponsor, please email our team at bgs at bgsdc.com. You can also find the email in the show notes. Please join us next week for another episode of Natsack Matters. Natsack Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry. Natsack Matters is a production of beacon global strategies. Natsack Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry.
