We talk about nuclear war as if it starts with a missile. But what if it doesn't? What if the threat is something messier and easier to miss? How real is the risk of a dirty bomb? And what's the thing we're least prepared for that's actually most likely? Hi, everyone. I'm Lynne Toman and this is Three Takeaways. On Three Takeaways, I talk with some of the world's best thinkers, business leaders, writers, politicians, newsmakers, and scientists. Each episode ends with three key takeaways to help us understand the world and maybe even ourselves a little better. Today I'm excited to be with Christine Warmouth. She served as US Secretary of the Army and now leads the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Before that, she was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director for Defense Policy and Strategy at the National Security Council. So she's been at the center of how the US plans for war and how it tries to prevent it. Christine, welcome to Three Takeaways. Thank you. I'm so glad to be here. And thank you for your service and government as well. Thanks. It's been a privilege. Let me start with something very basic but also a little unsettling. When people hear nuclear threat, they think bombs. But how real is the risk from radioactive material just falling into the wrong hands? Well, we've been worried about the possibility of a dirty bomb for a long time, particularly since the 9-11 attacks, you know, well over 25 years ago. And the reason we've been worried is because there is radioactive material in all kinds of places you wouldn't think. It's in hospitals, it's in laboratories, it's in university settings. So there's a lot of it out there in the world. But interestingly, for all these years, there has not ever been an exploded dirty bomb. And there's been a lot of work done to try to better secure all of those sources of radioactive material to make sure it doesn't fall into the wrong hands. That is horrifying that radioactive materials are in hospitals and labs and elsewhere. How easy would it be to use those radioactive materials to create a dirty bomb? Well, building a dirty bomb is certainly much easier than making a full-up nuclear weapon. But it is not a trivial exercise. Essentially, what a dirty bomb is, is a conventional explosive that has some nuclear radioactive material packed inside it so that when the bomb blows up, it sprays that radioactive material around and it would contaminate the environment. Unlike a nuclear weapon, it would not kill people through radiation poisoning, but it could contaminate real estate, property, things like that. So the difficult part about building a dirty bomb is first getting your hands on the radioactive material, which isn't easy, thankfully, which is why we haven't seen it happen yet. And then two, whoever's trying to build that dirty bomb is going to want to make sure they don't expose themselves to the radioactive material. So they need to know how to handle it properly. Turning to Iran. How close do you think Iran is really to a nuclear weapon? Iran is not close today to building a nuclear weapon. And here's why. You know, yes, they have almost a thousand pounds of highly enriched uranium, but it is buried deep, deep, deep beneath the earth in Isfahan, Iran. Because of the 12-day war last summer, much of their other nuclear facilities, their centrifuges, have been destroyed. Many of their weapons scientists have been assassinated or killed in the bombings. So just to even get their hands on that highly enriched uranium, which is the key component, would take a long time. So they're not imminently close to building a nuclear weapon, but they still do have many of the key components to rebuild their nuclear program. That's reassuring. As I understand it, the US spends about a hundred times what Iran spends on its military. How prepared do you think the US is for a war with a near-peer like China? We're not as prepared as I would like us to be, Lynn. We have an extraordinary military, and I've been lucky to work closely with people in uniform from all of our services. And I think you see today, and what's happening in Iran, you know, they are extremely proficient. We know how to target, we know how to destroy missile sites, drone production facilities. But while the United States was in Iraq and Afghanistan, China spent those 20 years massively modernizing their military across the board and investing in missiles, very sophisticated missiles of short, medium, and long range. They have massively expanded their nuclear program. So they are a fairly proficient military at this point. And we, in the meantime, particularly in the last several weeks, have used up a lot of our key munitions that would be needed for a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific. We're not particularly well positioned in the Indo-Pacific theater. You know, we have a lot of forces in Japan and South Korea, but we don't have forces positioned in places like the Philippines or closer to China where they would be most effective. And if you've ever been anywhere in Asia, you know it takes forever to get anywhere. And so moving destroyers, aircraft carriers within the right ranges takes a long time. And so there are a few things where the United States really needs to make progress to be better prepared. What would worry you most in those first critical couple of days? I think one thing that would worry me most in those critical days would be, did we have warning? Because if there was a conflict that seemed to be building, we would have time to steam our aircraft carriers and to move our fighter jets and to move our tankers that refuel our aircraft into position. But if something happened suddenly, chances are we would be in other places, the Middle East for example, or even the Western Hemisphere, you know, where we've had an aircraft carrier in the last several months. So one issue would be, was there warning and did we have time to get our forces where they needed to be? The other thing I would worry about quite a bit would be, what's the inventory of munitions? You know, how are we doing in terms of Tomahawks, precision strike missiles, jazm extended range, all of the things that we've been using to target Iran's military? While the United States has spent the last couple of years investing in those inventories, those missiles take a lot of time to manufacture. And between giving a lot of them to Ukraine to fight back against Russia and expending them ourselves against Iran, our stocks are very low. You mentioned Ukraine. How much has the war in Ukraine changed the way you think about the future of warfare? Quite a bit. I mean, I think there are some things that are sort of eternal constants. You know, for example, you still need boots on the ground. It's interesting that the fight there has been a strange combination of almost trench warfare from like World War One, combined with very high tech drones overhead, dropping payloads and destroying tanks. But to hold territory and to gain territory, you still need soldiers on the ground. And so that's something that I think remains rather constant. But it has very much changed how I've thought about the ubiquity of drones, to be able to see the battlefield, to see where people are, to collect intelligence, to drop explosive payloads and, you know, have kinetic effects, the importance of electronic warfare, to try to jam those drones and keep them from being able to see and communicate. And I think also seeing the role that artificial intelligence is going to be playing in targeting and collecting intelligence. And frankly, even I think we're starting to see some human machine teaming in Ukraine and more of use of robotics. Those are all things that felt pretty much like science fiction 10 years ago. And now I think our realities of the current battlefield. And what's one lesson from Ukraine that Americans still don't fully understand? I think a lesson that Americans don't understand is the fragility of the American defense industrial base. I said it takes quite a while to manufacture some of these very important missiles. And I know from my time as Secretary of the Army, you know, it was a full court press with our factories to be able to build 155 millimeter artillery shells that the Ukrainian military has really relied on. We got very much into a mode of just in time delivery of weapon systems and support material during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We really need to move towards stockpiling a lot of the key equipment that we need. Back in World War II, where it was the arsenal of democracy and every plant that built automobiles was turned into a plant that built boats and army trucks. We're a long, long ways from that. And we need to get some of that back. Are drones and artificial intelligence making traditional military power such as the very, very expensive hardware like fighter planes, battleships and missile systems obsolete? I don't think so. There's still going to be a need for soldiers on the ground, for tanks on the ground, for fighter jets and submarines to be able to deliver long range missiles. Again, I think we've seen quite a bit of that use in Iran recently. I think it's not so much artificial intelligence that is threatening our aircraft carriers, for example. What's really calling people to question the utility of aircraft carriers is the long range missiles that countries like China have, for example. Because if you can sink an aircraft carrier from hundreds of miles away, you could argue that aircraft carriers are sort of sitting targets with dozens of fighter jets on them. But certainly, I think artificial intelligence and drones has dramatically shifted the nature of the current fight. And there's a lot of adjusting that the U.S. military is having to do in real time. Has it made war more asymmetric, if you will, with countries producing drones that cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars against this massively multi-million dollar equipment? Absolutely. I mean, you saw that with the Houthis in the Red Sea, for example. The U.S. Navy was having to shoot down those drones with million dollar missiles when the drones themselves cost maybe $40,000. So that's a big shift. And we've seen Iran, they're using drones very effectively to hit energy infrastructure in and around the Gulf states. And the missiles that we're using to defend against that cost a lot more money. So the United States right now is a little bit on the wrong side of the cost curve. And that's why the U.S. military is really trying to move towards a treatable weapon systems we can produce on a mass scale. And that are much less expensive because that's going to be necessary. There's still going to be a role for our very exquisite systems like the F-35. But we need to augment those traditional, very exquisite, precision-oriented weapon systems with a lot of cheaper, large quantities of material so that we can bring some asymmetry ourselves to the battlefield. What do you think the wars of the future will look like? And is the U.S. military ready for future wars? I think wars in the future are going to be much more of a blend of human and machine. I saw in the news today that the Chinese just had a half marathon with robots. And the robot that won the marathon or the half marathon beat the human record, ran it I think four minutes faster than a human being did. And frankly, that really surprised me because a lot of gross movements are hard for robots. So the fact that it could run and run faster than an elite athlete really tells you something. So I think in the future, you're going to see fewer soldiers working with compatriots or wingmen. You know, we're going to have, I think, artificial robots and soldiers on the battlefield at the same time. And one very positive thing about that is I think some of the things that endanger our future, those tasks can now be taken over or soon by robots so that we're not putting men and women in danger to do basic tasks that we can use machines to do. So I think the future is going to be a lot more human machine teaming, a lot more autonomous and unmanned vehicles, much more AI, which is going to speed up the pace of warfare and the decision making cycle. So I think there's a lot of changes ahead. And what's going on behind the scenes, such as ongoing cyber surveillance and other activities? We have made great strides in offensive cyber operations. The United States military is extremely proficient in the cyber domain, but frankly, so are many of our adversaries. So I think going out and defending our networks forward is something that U.S. cyber command is out there doing every single day. Again, I think when it comes to surveillance and cyber operations, you're really going to see artificial intelligence as an enabler for those kinds of activities. I have been surprised at how quickly the Department of Defense is beginning to integrate AI into its activities. And I think you're only going to see that expand exponentially in the next couple of years. What worries you most? Woo, so much to choose from. One of the things that worries me a lot is the fact that I think there's a huge strain on the United States nuclear umbrella. I mentioned that China is extensively modernizing its nuclear arsenal. And I think some of our allies, countries like Germany, Japan, South Korea, are starting to get concerned about whether they can rely on the United States to work with them. And I think they're also looking at a situation like Ukraine and saying, maybe if Ukraine had held onto its nuclear weapons years ago, Russia might not have invaded it in 2014 and then again in 2022. So I worry that countries that up until now have been content to live under the nuclear umbrella of the United States may start thinking about whether they need to get a nuclear weapon of their own. Even if it's so-called friendly proliferation, it's friends of the United States who might be building nuclear weapons, that's going to make the world much more complicated, much more dangerous. The possibilities of an accident or an unauthorized use just expand if you have more members of the nuclear club. So that's something lately that's been keeping me up at night. Christine, what are your three takeaways? My first takeaway is that I think it's quite likely that Iran is still going to have the components of a nuclear program at the end of this war when the shooting stops. Because you can't bomb the program out of existence and trying to take it out by force would be extremely high risk. So the goal I think should be to end the program through a negotiated agreement. My second takeaway is reminding everyone that for the first time since 1972, we no longer have an arms control treaty with Russia limiting the number of nuclear weapons that each side has. And at the same time, China is building up its nuclear arsenal very significantly. While the Cold War ended 35 years ago, nuclear weapons are still with us and the world has only gotten more complicated and dangerous. So we really need our best and brightest policymakers and scientists to be thinking about how do we navigate this new nuclear age. My third takeaway is that the United States has shouldered a tremendous amount of global responsibility over the years. But the benefits of that arrangement have far outweighed the cost. And I worry now that if the United States walks away from our allies and partners and treats our friends a little better than our adversaries, they're not going to trust us or want to work with us. And the United States is going to be less safe no matter how much money we spend on our military. There's so much risk and uncertainty in the world today. Indeed. Christine, thank you for our conversation today, for your service in government and now your work as the head of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. This has been a pleasure. My pleasure. Thanks a lot, Lynn. If you're enjoying the podcast and I really hope you are, please review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. It really helps get the word out. If you're interested, you can also sign up for the Three Takeaways newsletter at threetakeaways.com where you can also listen to previous episodes. You can also follow us on LinkedIn, X, Instagram and Facebook. I'm Lynn Toman and this is Three Takeaways. Thanks for listening.
