EMERGENCY EPISODE: WAR WITH IRAN - with Mark Dubowitz and Nadav Eyal

I want to take this opportunity to thank all of our Inside Call Me Back subscribers. It's your support that allows us to do what we do, including covering and analyzing historic moments like the one we are living through right now. If you are not yet an Inside Call Me Back subscriber, please consider supporting our work by following the link in the show notes or visiting arcmedia.org to subscribe and support our mission. you are listening to an art media podcast israeli sources senior sources are telling me that the supreme leader is out of touch with the entire iranian state apparatus that they will be surprised if the was not hit is that inspections are made with the Israeli Air Force as to the success of the operation to strike him down, but indications are that the Supreme Leader is gone. So I think from a U.S. perspective, it can go a variety of ways. I mean, if I'm President Trump, I think from his perspective, it's about eliminating this very dangerous nuclear and missile capability. So once the U.S. Air Force with Israeli support has done that, then President Trump could stop and he could say to the Iranians once again, listen, I've done it three times now. I killed Soleimani. I dropped massive oars penetrators on Fordow. And now I just launched a major combat operation to eliminate your missile and nuclear capabilities. Are you getting the message? Are you ready for serious negotiations? Because every time we sit down with you guys, you're not getting the message. It's 8.30 a.m. on Saturday, February 28th here in New York City. It is 5.30 p.m. on Saturday, February 28th in Tehran. And it is 3.30 p.m. on Saturday, February 28th in Israel as Israelis are hunkered down in their safe rooms hours after war broke out between Iran and the United States and Israel. And now joining me, ARK Media contributor Nadav Ayel from Yedir Akhranot and Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Gentlemen, thank you for being here on this historic day. Thank you, Dan. Thank you. Mark, I'll start with you. What can you tell us about the initial strike? Tell me what we know so far. So, Dan, it was a joint U.S.-Israeli operation launched early Saturday morning. Obviously, months of joint planning, nothing improvised here. Israeli jets hit preemptively dozens of targets in Tehran, in Isfahan, in Qom. So Israeli jets came in first before the U.S. That's right. Yeah. And they hit locations in Kermansha, in Karaj, in Elam, as I said, in Tehran, Isfahan, in Qom. I think seven missiles hit the Tehran district housing the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's residence and presidential palace of the Iranian president and the National Security Council. And then the U.S. followed striking by air and sea, certainly not small strikes, dozens of attack planes from carriers and regional bases. Israeli airspace was closed, hospitals moved underground, civilian defense activated, and Iran has launched multiple ballistic missiles at Israel. Obviously, the Iron Dome has been engaged, and you've seen ballistic trails over Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. And then Iran has retaliated hitting U.S. bases across the Gulf, Al-Udeid and Qatar. the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, and targets in Kuwait and the UAE. We've seen Kuwaitian and Emirati reports that their defenses repelled the attacks, though one Emirati civilian died from debris. And now Iran is saying all U.S. and Israeli assets in the region are legitimate targets. There are no red lines. I'll just say a couple of things that haven't been confirmed yet, but we're watching closely, and that is Israel reportedly targeted the Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Pazeshkian, the Armed Forces Chief. We have some assessments, but they haven't been confirmed that Israel may have killed the RGC commander, the defense minister, senior intelligence chief, but we haven't gotten any confirmation from Iran nor the IDF as we record this podcast. Nadav, there has been, again, we're just trying to sequence this. So you had the initial strikes that Mark walked us through. And then can you tell us about Iran's counterattack, both on Israel and other targets in the region, and also how Israelis are experiencing this moment? But first, just what has been Iran's response? So first of all, when we're recording this, as we are recording this, there are sirens in the northern parts of Israel. And this is a massive siren sounding across the north. And that probably means that Hezbollah is shooting towards Israel. And that's a significant development they have not shot towards Israel. And as we go along with this episode, Dan, I'll be updating. I know that people will be hearing this afterwards, but I think some of the things that are happening right now are very current and will carry weight as we go further. So the Iranians have basically responded by shooting everything they can. The attempt by both the U.S. Air Force and Navy and the Israeli Air Force was to take out as much of their retaliatory capabilities immediately at the first strike. So if we look at priorities of the first strike, it's hitting the leadership, both military leadership, decapitating military leadership, doing something on a broader scale than Israel did during the 12-day war. I remind us that one of the reasons that the Iranians were unable to respond was because their entire chain of command and control was decapitated, or most of it was decapitated. So now the United States army, the abilities there, and the Israelis tried to do something much broader than that. And taking them out was a first priority. And together with that, hitting the rocket launchers, the inventories of ballistic missiles and all the rest. So the response by the Iranians against the U.S. assets across the region, as well as Israeli Population Center, as well as Gulf countries, would be as subdued as possible. Now, what we know is that the Iranians have been shooting and they have been shooting with everything they have. They have promised to do that. They hit at least seven countries across the region, only one of which is Israel. Most of the missiles were launched towards Israel and towards population centers and bases in Israel. We're talking about at least 40 ballistic missiles, but missiles were shot against Bahrain. We saw a video of an Iranian missile hitting what was described to be as the American base in Bahrain. missiles were were shot to the uae to qatar and other countries in the region missiles hit in syria in southern parts of syria so they are basically answering with drones ballistic missiles and other means now if you look at what you could have expected with this kind of strike definitely the iranians are not as impressive with their response as of yet but we need to be extremely careful about that. And I want to underline this. These are really early hours. The Iranians have been preparing for months for this war, and they are going to answer with a form of a constant attrition. The Houthis have promised they're going to join the fight. As we are speaking, it's very possible that Hezbollah is joining this war, at least trying to give the impression that it's doing something. We don't know what kind of intent and what kind of ambition and commitment there is to that. Now, Mark mentioned earlier the hits that were made by the Israelis. Now I can say stuff I couldn't say on this program before. And Mark mentioned, for instance, the visit of the Mossad head in Washington a few weeks back. But basically, it was the Israelis that said to the U.S., look, this is how we managed during the 12-day war to hit their leadership. We believe that we can hit their leadership again, maybe also the supreme leader. And an attempt was made during the early hours of the morning Israel time on the supreme leader's life. Now, the Iranians in the last few minutes are saying they're going to air some sort of a speech made by the Supreme Leader. If indeed they're going to do that, and that speech was not pre-recorded, which we do not know, maybe that attempt has failed. But Israeli sources are saying that an attempt was made against the Supreme Leader himself, against the Iranian president, against the leader of the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, and they also believe, as Mark said, that he's dead, against Ali Samkhani, who's the most important senior advisor to the leader as to all nuclear issues and maybe other figures within the regime. Now, the attempt here, a senior source that is not Israeli, has told me, is not only take out the leadership, but also take out anyone who might replace this leadership. So this is a wide ranging attempt. And the notion of a regime change is absolutely there. So, Mark, why don't you speak to that? Because the language that the president used was clearly very carefully constructed. as it relates to this question about whether or not the pursuit here is regime change or not. So why don't you elaborate on what Nadav just said? So President Trump gave an eight-minute speech announcing that major combat operations in Iran had begun. He made it clear that Iran has refused every nuclear deal. And he also talked about how Iran is reconstituting its nuclear and missile programs. And I think it's important for us to dig into that because there are a lot of critics of the president out there in social media and in the media saying that Iran was not doing anything like that. Of course, the evidence suggests otherwise. The president told the IRGC, you know, lay down your arms or you'll face certain death. And he called on Iranians to take over your government. The hour of freedom is at hand. And he warned US lives may be lost because wars can go really wrong. But I thought what was interesting is that, I mean, the president, I think, framed most of his remarks not around regime change, but around destroying Iran's missile program. And he said, you know, that we're going to raise their missile industry to the ground. Netanyahu was a little more clear on removing Iran's, quote, existential threat. And I think in terms of the military operations, and I think it may be too early to get a lot of detail on this, but it seems that the United States is focusing on nuclear targets, missile targets, and the IRGC Navy. And it seems like The Israelis are the ones that are going after the leadership apparatus, as Nadav talked about, in trying to strike the IRGC and senior army and intelligence officials in Tehran and going after Khamenei. So I think they've obviously divided targets. And I think Trump is happy to let the Israelis take a kind of regime change approach while he's really focusing on these deadly nuclear and missile capabilities that have been reconstituted. Let me just say a few words about the reconstitution, because again, it's not getting a fair hearing out there in the media. So, you know, Trump had said that he had obliterated Iran's nuclear program back in June. He didn't obliterate it. He severely damaged it and set it back by a couple of years at least And the Iranians have been hard at work in rebuilding it They have started to rebuild tunnels at Isfahan Doing all this Mark immediately after June I mean it's not a lot of time. Not a lot of time has passed since June of 2025. So you're saying they were doing all this, must have been right away. Yeah, Trump warned them, you know, don't do it. And they started to do it, clearing debris, starting to build, you know, fortifications over key sites. They started to rebuild two weaponization sites at Parchin that the Israelis destroyed in June. And also, Dan, one thing that didn't get targeted last year and hasn't gotten a lot of attention is this site called Pickaxe Mountain, which is near Natanz, which is the enrichment facility that Israel and America bombed in June. And this is a site, it's underneath a mountain, hence the name. It's going to go deeper than Fordow, probably hundreds of feet underground. And there's a lot of evidence that Iran intends to use this as an additional enrichment facility for centrifuge manufacturing, for weaponization. So the Iranians are hard at work at rebuilding these nuclear capabilities. And Trump also obviously spent a lot of time talking about their missile program and his goal to raise this industry to the ground because he's seen reconstitution of their ballistic missile program with Chinese help. The Chinese have been sending precursor chemicals for solid fuel missiles. And there's also a deal that's been recently reached between Beijing and Tehran for anti-naval missiles that would threaten US naval forces. So the president is really focused on these dangerous capabilities and the regime's rebuilding. And the Israelis are focused for sure on that as well. But they're going after this whole target set, including individuals who they didn't have time to hit last June, or people like Khamenei, as Nadav said, who Trump last year waved the Israelis away and said, you can't take Khamenei. It seems like he's green-lighted that strike this time around. I don't disagree with Mark. Obviously, the president has made a very careful pronouncement of the intentions as to a regime change in Iran. But I don't think that there is any daylight between Israel and the United States. I don't think Mark thinks that too. I want to say this very clearly. I think this is an attempt for a regime change. I just don't think that the US would want to commit right now. I think it's exactly like Vice President Vance has put it weeks ago. He said it's up to the Iranian people. Just plainly, I don't think this is an analysis. Just reading what the president has said and what the prime minister has said, we are going to give you this opportunity. This is what the president said. This is an opportunity for Iranians to rise up. He was also very clear, President Trump, that right now it's going to be dangerous. So the expectancy is that this is not going to happen when bombs are falling. Now, there is a key question. We have raised this on your episode. I've written about this several times. Were the last few months spent on having negotiations with either factions within the regime or outside forces that are opposition forces on the ground in Iran, that if this actually goes through, they will try to seize control? And were these conversations, if they were held, or these inspections, were these successful? Is there an expectation that this would happen? Now, I don't have a clear answer to that. I would guess, I would assume that these avenues were checked by the West, including by Israel. And I would also presume, judging from Venezuela, for instance, that if there could be a reform and not a complete change of regime, that would mean, for instance, that this country is not obligated to terrorism, to developing nuclear weapons, that could signify a change that would be accepted, if not by Israel, maybe by the United States. But these are my own assumptions. And by decapitating not only the attempt to decapitate the leader and the president, but we do not know if that has succeeded or will succeed. And also the layer beneath that, there is an attempt here to say to the number three or number four in the chain of command, hey, you might be able to take control and you might be able to change course for the republic. Nadav, as we're speaking, there are news reports coming across that the Supreme Leader Khamenei has been killed. Is there anything, I know you're, while we're speaking, for those who are listening and not watching, Nadav is fast at work here, messaging back and forth with his sources in Israel. So what do you know, Nadav, about this news? Let's say, first of all, what we know for sure, and this is now reported by news agencies, not Israeli sources, not American sources, but news agencies. This is formal that the Iranian defense minister and the commander of the Revolutionary Guard have both been killed in the early hours of the morning by the joint American-Israeli strikes. So this is very substantial as of itself. As to the Supreme Leader, my colleague Amit Segal is reporting that the assessment in Israel is strengthening that the Supreme Leader has been killed. Now, I have no verification, neither does he, according to his report, that this is indeed the case. It took us a few hours with Nasrallah to reach that conclusion. But people who are hearing us now need to appreciate that this happened in the very early mornings in the United States, about 1.30 a.m., right? So these hours have passed. And now the Israeli Air Force is determining whether or not he's dead. there is a satellite photo, Dan, across American press, I think, showing the compound of the Supreme Leader that has been completely destroyed. I am not sure that the Supreme Leader was in that compound. I'm sure that the compound was destroyed. But if the Supreme Leader is dead, I'm not sure that he was killed in that compound. He was taken to another secret location. And this exactly, again, is what the Israelis promised Washington. We know that we have enough intelligence infiltration into Tehran to bring those assets down, the main assets, human assets of this regime. Now, if this has happened, this is extremely substantive and history in the making, we will wait and our listeners will be able to go through us with this process in which I'm texting, while listening to Mark and yourself with my intelligence sources back home. Okay, Mark, the response internationally so far from these two operations, how have key important capitals both to the United States and Israel been responding? Yeah, Dan, surprisingly supportive. I mean, you've gotten pretty strong statements from the EU officials out of Brussels, from the Canadian prime minister, from the Australian prime minister. I mean, two left-wing prime ministers who have come out in strong support of the American-Israeli action. The Gulf countries, as we've talked about, the Saudis had a statement condemning Iranian strikes on the UAE and Bahrain and Kuwait, as did the Kuwaitis. And then, of course, you've had, you know, the usual suspects like the Russians calling it an unprovoked armed aggression against the sovereign state. So not surprising. So all this concern we had about this cold war between Saudi and the UAE in the Gulf, while there was actually a lot to it, the reality is when push came to shove, the Saudis are clearly on the side of the Emiratis, the Israelis, and obviously the Americans. Yeah, Dan, I think as we discussed in a previous episode, what the Saudis were messaging publicly and privately was very different. Publicly, they were saying that they oppose strikes and they would not allow America to use their airspace and their bases. And privately, the Minister of Defense, Khali bin Salman, was in Washington telling people that he thought that if America didn't strike, Iran would emerge out of this much stronger and that would be a big mistake. So, a bit of a delta between their public and private messaging, I think understandable because they're trying to minimize the risk of Iranian retaliation. But now that the Iranians are retaliating against the Gulf states, they're pretty clear in their condemnation of Tehran. So, I think Iran is increasingly isolated. Internationally, we'll see what other countries say. I think the German chancellor is supposed to be in Washington early next week. We'll see if he comes. But he has actually been quite steadfast in his support for Israel and strongly critical of the regime in Iran. So it may be surprising that of all presidents, President Trump ends up getting quite a lot of international support for this action. Nadav, in terms of the trajectory of this war, where it goes from here, and I know there's going to be a lot of twists and turns, as there always are, so we won't hold you to it. But just generally speaking, based on those in the security system, the military and intelligence leadership you're in touch with, where does this go in the days and weeks ahead? So first of all, there are a lot of targets. One of the things that both sides have been doing, the American and the Israeli, is collecting a list of targets, high quality targets that are really essential to take out. And whether or not there is a regime change, there is a new leader in Iran, the Islamic Republic says we're going to go to an attrition, you need to take out these targets in order to make sure that their ballistic ability is much reduced. And as you said earlier, Dan, the president was focused very much on this ballistic ability. And you could hear that in the State of the Union, right? The president already began his pitch as to how Iran is trying to develop missiles that can reach the continental United States. I praise his approach because what I thought the president did in the State of the Union, which was very important, is he framed the threat from Iran as a threat to the United States. And he talked about ballistic missiles. He talked about ballistic missiles reaching our bases in Europe. He talked about ballistic missiles that could reach the United States. He talked about how much American blood Iran has, the regime has on its hands. So I think he knew exactly what he was doing. He knew the exact audience he needed to speak to. What he all but said is, defeating and taking down the Iranian threat is an America first priority. That was his message. I think that the implications for America's standing in the world, I'm fascinated to hear what you guys have to say as Americans, as people who have dealt with American foreign policy. But it seems to me that looking ahead, this is a sea change. This is a moment like no other for American power around the world. And it's also a moment of tests. So we need to see how this develops. At any rate, to your question, Dan, what we're going to see is more bombings of high quality targets across Iran, whatever is going to happen, even if the Supreme Leader is gone. I'm hearing now that the Iranian chief of staff is also probably dead and others, even if that is the case, there are still these targets that you need to take out. So Iran is not a threat. I remember the speech that Steve Witkoff had a day before the 12-day war in June of 2025. He gave a speech in a United Hatzalah fundraiser in New York, and he said something that I found to be important and prophetic. He talked about Iran's nuclear capabilities as an existential threat to Israel. But then he said that the ballistic missile threat is also existential to Israel. When I heard him in that speech I first came to the conclusion that the White House has green an Israeli strike against Iran And one thing that I should also note because you noted this as to the State of the Union there was very little Israel in the president speech this evening I think there was none. Well, you talked about getting the hostages back and ending the war. So it was purely about, as it related to Iran, there was none. Which I find very meaningful. I agree. Very meaningful. This is not a joint war. The Israelis are participating. This is going to be with the briefings coming from the Pentagon and the State Department and maybe the White House. But this wasn't the message that was delivered by President Trump to the American people. And I would love to hear your analysis as to that. Dan, if I could just jump in. I mean, I think the ICBM issue is a really, really important issue. And President Trump has emphasized this. It's caused a lot of controversy where he made it very clear that Iran has got an active intercontinental ballistic missile program with only one address for those ICBMs, which are nuclear-tipped, and that's the American homeland. And he made a big deal of foot stomping this. And I think that's really important because there's a lot of discussion about the ballistic missile program, the threat to Israel, the threat to Gulf allies, U.S. forces, certainly Europe. I mean, there are dozens of these missiles that can reach the European heartland. But it's really important that Americans understand, and President Trump took great pains to say this, that Iran is building an ICBM program. They've got a space vehicle launch program. They're putting satellites into space. Those aren't for weather satellites. That's an essential element of that ICBM program. And there's a lot of discussion. President Trump said it's going to happen soon. The U.S. intelligence community has said 10 years from now, there's a big debate. But I mean, I think President Trump has made it clear he's not going to wait for Iran to develop ICBMs. He's not going to punt that to the next president. He's going to take care of this threat. And I think this is President Trump's view about the Iranian threat in general. He is not going to kick the can down the road, which is the typical Washington game, and kick it to his predecessor. because I think he doesn't think his predecessor is going to deal with this issue with the same clarity and the same force that he will. And so for that reason, I think he's been very much embraced going after this missile program, going after this nuclear program, and really doing things that I think are still surprising his base and certainly surprising many experts in Washington. What is the exit plan here? And I know we're early, not just early days, we're early hours, But Mark, from your understanding, how does this wind down from a U.S. perspective? So I think from a U.S. perspective, it can go a variety of ways. I mean, if I'm President Trump, even though I've signaled regime change and I've asked Iranians to come back to the streets and this is their last chance, quote, for a generation. I think from his perspective, it's about eliminating this very dangerous nuclear and missile capability. So once the U.S. Air Force with Israeli support has done that, then President Trump could stop and he could say to the Iranians once again, listen, I've done it three times now. I killed Soleimani. I dropped massive oars penetrators on Fordow. And now I just launched a major combat operation to eliminate your missile and nuclear capabilities. Are you getting the message? Are you ready for serious negotiations? Because every time we sit down with you guys, you're not getting the message. You're a calcitrant to the negotiating table. You refuse President Trump's demands of full dismantlement, zero enrichment, zero plutonium or processing. They won't even talk about missiles, never mind terror, never mind repression. So I think one way it ends is for President Trump to say, okay, let's go back to negotiations and hopefully you've gotten the message clear. The second way it ends, and that is you severely weakened the regime. And then there's joint US-Israel cooperation to bring down the regime by providing maximum support to the people and maximum pressure on the regime and targeting maximum fragmentation of the elite base. Now, Dan, I don't know if you and Nadav saw what I thought was really interesting. The CIA put out an ex post a few days ago in Farsi calling on Iranians to call the CIA through secure links that they provided. Yeah, I saw that. And when I popped, I thought, oh, that's really, really interesting. It's not a coincidence. I think what's happened now is that the Israelis came to the agency and came to the president and his senior officials and said, we would like to show you what we've done. And without getting into detail on a public podcast, I think the Israelis have done some impressive things that they've shared with the Americans. And I can imagine the CIA director or even President Trump himself saying, oh, well, that's interesting. Well, what's the agency done? We got to get to work. And the combination of American technical capabilities and American resources and Israel's ability to penetrate the Iranian security establishment and also operate in support of the Iranian people could be a really powerful combination. And that is a regime change policy. It's a Reagan policy. That's what Reagan did against the Soviet Union. Maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for anti-regime dissidents, maximum fragmentation. And this is a potential other exit option, which is working closely together with the Israelis to support Iranians to wear away at this regime and bring it down. I see those are two potential pathways. A third is less favorable, and this thing ends up stuck in some kind of quagmire, and it goes really badly. I think we should always be conscious of that risk. Nadav, over the last couple of months, we've been having this on and off conversation on this podcast about what actually has been happening over the last six to eight weeks, which is to say, were these negotiations that Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff were having with the Iranians and other tracks really just a distraction while the U.S. and Israel were building up their capabilities, moving assets to the region, working on coordination not only between Israel and the U.S., but between Israel, the U.S. and other allies in the region and around the world to tighten this up. and we knew it would take time. I mean, it was always the sense, the advice we were getting, it was gonna take six to eight weeks. So it makes sense that they needed some activity while that six to eight weeks, while all that activity was taking place for that six to eight weeks. So let there be the shiny object, which are negotiations that everyone is focused on. Are they on? Are they off? Are they happening? Are they making progress? They're not making progress. It became its own show. Or was it real? And was the US really giving it a shot, trying to negotiate and using the movement of assets to the region and all this activity is a way to put pressure on the regime to negotiate. And the reason I asked that question, one could argue that none of it matters now because we're in a war on the one hand. On the other hand, it does, depending on one's answer to that question, it does to some degree inform where the U.S. goes from here. So I'll start with you, Nadav, and then ask Mark to respond. I think it was both, Dan. I think that if the Islamic Republic would have really understood what the U.S. was saying and would have come to this without their general approach, which is basically, we are going to negotiate, we're going to mitigate, we're going to buy time. Oh, enrichment, we want symbolic enrichment. And Mark wrote about this extensively. And we will enrich less than we did with Obama. They really thought that and that was a gross mistake by them. All we need to supply the Trump administration is an excuse that they'll be able to say that this agreement is better than the JCPOA. If we give them this small benefit in comparison with the JCPOA, the president will probably present this as a huge achievement. And by the way, I'll say that many people in Washington, D.C. thought the same. Nobody knew that the president is going to go through with this. This was a decision. It was an executive decision by the president. Now, again, if the Iranians would have understood what the U.S. was saying, if they would have not been, as usual, lost in translation, and extremely arrogant as they are, they would have come and said, you know what, we're willing to let go of our entire nuclear capability. We are willing to speak about our ballistic missile program and we might talk about political reform. They would have given the administration the way to present this as a really historic change, a shift of sorts in the region. I do think this could have been prevented, but nobody really thought that this is plausible. I spoke with experts for Iran, and you have spoken with them on this show, and the supreme leader is simply not built. It's simply impossible for him. And let me tell you something about the Israeli intelligence thinking. One of the key questions that was asked before the decision was made to pitch for the elimination of the Supreme Leader is, could it be that better the devil we know that whoever replaces him might be worse or might be more effective? It's not about him being more extreme, but being more effective. And the conclusion was that right now he has lost every sort of pros, for instance, stability or him being more careful and strategically balanced in the region, and that he launched this balance during the October 7 war. He has become a loose cannon and taking him out outweighs the possibility of him staying in power, although he is so old and rather less effective than he was. The Islamic Republic began the October 7 war surprised by the Hamas attack, but not that surprised. Looking at this moment and saying this is the beginning of the end. Well, surprised by the operational activation, but not surprised given that Iran had played such an important role in building up the proxy for the regime that was Hamas. Absolutely. That Iran and Hamas, or the regime and Hamas had the ambition to do October 7th-like events. Yeah, absolutely. So this is what I meant by saying, but not that surprised. They were surprised by the timing. They were not surprised by the intent. And they began this war with October 7, looking at the raid, the incursion, the invasion to Israel, and saying this is the beginning of the end for the Israeli state, for the Zionist entity. And now it looks like this is not only might be the beginning of the end for the regime, it's definitely the end physically for many of these leaders. And this opens an avenue of change across the region. This is how Israelis see it. Now, I'm not downplaying the dangers and the risks involved with this and how complex the situation is specifically for the United States or that the United States has different interests than Israel in that sense. But for Israelis, this is a moment of reckoning for the Iranian regime. They have killed more Israelis than any other regime in history, done that with a cloak of immunity for many years. I remember conversations with Iranians telling me, what do you want from us? We have no war with you. And they were either ignorant or they were playing dumb as to what Hezbollah was doing, as to the way that Jewish targets were attacked around the world, Buenos Aires and others. And that cloak of immunity is not only gone, but now the game is for the regime's survival itself. So for Israelis, I'm slowly speaking for Israelis right now. For Israelis, this is really a moment of an opening for a different future for the region. And again, I recognize that the interests are not exactly identical between the United States and Israel. There is a conjoining of interests, but it's not exactly identical as to the interests themselves. Mark, anything to add to that? Yeah, Dan, I'm interested in answering your question just very briefly. I think there was a rational path for Khamenei, which was to do a three-year deal with Trump, accept his terms on zero enrichment, pocket tens of billions of dollars. And then the ultimate sunset provision would kick in which was the Trump sunset provision on January 20th 2029 When President Trump goes away there a new president in office And given the field maybe with the exception of Marco Rubio hard to imagine a president sitting in the Oval Office in 2029 is going to be as forceful as President Trump. The Reigns could have just violated the agreement, expand their enrichment capability that they were able to retain, and there'd be game, set, match, Ali Khamenei. That would have been the rational play. That's what you and I would have advised Khamenev. We were sitting in Tehran with him in sort of understanding American politics and his smart play. But unfortunately, from a logical perspective, and this is what Nadav is alluding to, is that his logical set of assumptions is resistance above all. And the last thing he wants is a deal with the orange man where he gives up this nuclear infrastructure that he has spent decades building half a trillion dollars in direct and indirect costs, paid an enormous price. And how humiliating that would be for Khamenei. So Khamenei would rather die a martyr. It turns out maybe he has. We'll wait to find out the confirmation than give in to the United States. But in doing so, he's put the Islamic Republic at risk. I want to just take a moment here because we're very caught up in the minute to minute and hour to hour. I have felt for some time, and I especially feel this today, but I felt for some time, if you would have said to Yehia Sinwar on October 6th, 2023, the night before the operation, the war that Hamas launched against Israel, let me tell you what the world is going to look like in two and a half, three years. You'll be dead and all the leadership of Hamas will be dead. your your brothers up in the north on israel's northern border hezbollah nasa rallah they'll be wiped out their arsenal of missiles and rockets will be wiped out their their army will be terror army will be wiped out the nasa rallah himself will be dead the assad regime a satellite of uh klein state of iran's in power for 53 years gone bashar assad will be somewhere in moscow playing video games and we can keep going on and on and on about how the degree to which the regime has been transformed. And oh, by the way, the regime in Iran, if it does survive, will be a shadow of itself. And we're now even having a serious conversation about whether or not it'll actually survive and whether or not the Supreme Leader will actually make it. And you just have to take a step back and think. I cannot think a bigger singular mistake by a series of actors than October 7th, 2023. I can't think of maybe how World War I started. I don't know. I can't think of it. I mean, we could be watching the beginning of the transformation of the Middle East right now, and it will be traced back to that attack on Israel on October 7th, 2023. I'm actually going to say something totally counterintuitive, and I think maybe Nadav would disagree. I think if you told Sinwar that, all of that, Sinwar would still have gone on October 7th, because from Sinwar's perspective, he doesn't care about the Islamic Republic, about Hezbollah, about the Houthis. For him, he would ask you, well, Dan, have I been successful in fundamentally changing public opinion with respect to the Palestinian cause? How are people seeing the Palestinians today in America? Have I undermined bipartisan support for Israel? Am I intensifying the fractures and fissures within the US political establishment on Palestinian and Israeli issues? You're showing poll numbers, Dan, and you'd say, wow, that's pretty impressive. The majority of Americans today actually support the Palestinians over the Israelis. And that's been a fundamental shift. And then he would say, Dan, I have a question for you. I know I'm dead and my brother's dead and the entire top echelon of Hamas is dead, but do we still have weapons? Are we still embedded in Gaza? Are we going to play a role in the future of Gaza? Are we going to be the Hezbollah of Gaza where we'll play a political role, we'll keep our weapons, and we'll just be planning and plotting for the future? And you would refer him to the peace board and what's going on there. And you would say, well, maybe Senwar, maybe you still have a role. So I know that's counterintuitive, but I think Senwar, with everything that you've said, would still go for it. Before I let Nadav jump in, I just want to say, you do recall that we all believe, and there's now conventional wisdom, one of the reasons that Hamas went forward with October 7th, when it did, why it did, was in part to head off normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which is we've chronicled on this podcast many times, Marcus, you've chronicled in the weeks before October 7th, it looked like things were moving, if not full steam ahead. We're definitely like progressing at a healthy clip. Today, Riyadh and Jerusalem and Washington are working together to defeat Iran. It's not technically diplomatic normalization in an official sense, but it's as normal as you can get. When we think of normalization, what does normalization look like at a security level, it looks like what we're watching right now. Yeah. It's military and intelligence integration. I think that's right. I mean, I would say it's been set back and Sinwar might say, hey, I stopped it in his tracks. It's much more difficult for MBS now to do it. But I agree with you from a military and security point of view, tighter integration than we've seen ever between the Saudis, Israelis, and Americans, and perhaps an opportunity to put it back on track. So yeah, no, for Sinwar, listen, in some respects, this has been a big mistake, but I think from his narrow perspective, this is actually redounded to his advantage from a Palestinian perspective. And Sinwar doesn't care. I mean, dying a Shahid, a martyr, is what Sinwar is all about. He's like Khamenei. These are true believers who want to die in a blaze of glory. So losing his life, I don't think was in his plans, but I don't think it's something that he wouldn't embrace if he had it all over again. Nadav, we'll give you the last word. Yeah. So I allowed you to discuss all these things while I was talking with people about the face of the Supreme Leader. And my update to you is that Israeli sources, senior sources are telling me that the Supreme Leader is out of touch with the entire Iranian state apparatus, that they will be surprised if he was not hit, that inspections are made with the Israeli Air Force as to the success of the operation to strike him down, but indications are good that the Supreme Leader is gone. Now, again, these are initial reports, but they are still checking these indications and they might change. now i i want to say something about your remarks to sinwar on the one hand i i agree with you mark by the way that for sinwar what's important is the message of legacy and history but i do agree with dan i don't think that he understood that this would lead to the axis the so-called axis of resistance the axis of terror looking the way that it it does look today with his balance so decapitated. Even Sinoir thought that Hezbollah is more than that, or Iran is more than that. But I want to draw your attention to something in which he was indeed successful, and I don't think he anticipated. And that is the way that Israel is internationally isolated. The legitimization to Israel is at peak. And this is a question, Mark, that I'm just putting into this operation right now, one of the key elements there, the key dangers there, is that if it doesn't go as planned, that Israel will be blamed. Now, I have written extensively about the lie as to Israel pushing for the Iraq war or lobbying for the Iraq war at the time. That's just a blood libel. Israel never thought that it needs to push for the Iraq war. Neither did it push for the Iraq war at the time. But Israel did think and said on the record that there should be a global attempt against the Iranian regime. So it's a detrimental moment. If this goes the wrong way, and it's not only dependent on what Israel does or the United States does, Israel could very well be blamed. And together with the campaign of delegitimization and together with an organized campaign of anti-Semitism, I think it's a dangerous moment. I think we should definitely talk about that and recognize that. And after saying all that, I'm saying something again as an Israeli. I saw the videos coming from Tehran as the bombing were there. People were already starting to celebrate in the streets, thinking that the leadership is gone. And one that hears only the international media or the news or even some high-end faculties across the west campuses will never understand why people are celebrating this is an oppressive dark regime that has dominated the region and the fact that they've been hit so hard and now i hear that abbas argachji the iranian foreign minister is telling uh cnn i think that they are willing to speak with the u.s so this gives you an impression of what Iran and how Iran is responding to the way that President Trump laid out his message tonight. I saw this, and as a person who lives in the Middle East, I was so impressed by the clarity of the president's message. He talked about the history, about the Americans that were killed, murdered by the Iranians, about the threat. He opened the door for regime change. He didn't commit to a regime change. this was a declaration of an american superpower leader it wasn't a declaration of someone who's redrawing from the region we're drawing from global decision making it was a decision that had the american interest in mind nothing else didn't speak about israel didn't even speak too much about demonstrators in iran i thought it was a very impressive moment that adds a lot to my feeling of security living in the middle east in general i think not only for me but also for saudis also for my UAE friends that I talked with this morning and many others in the region. Gentlemen, thank you both. I'm sure I'll be speaking to you both a lot in the hours and days ahead. So until then, be sure when I call to call me back because there's a lot going on. That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members-only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadav Eyal, Amit Segel, and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes, or you can go to arkmedia.org. That's A-R-K-Media.org. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Alon Benatar. ARC Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin-Aretti. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. Thank you.