Venezuela After Maduro - U.S. Intervention, Cartels, and the Road Ahead: Dr. Ryan Berg

This is NatSek Matters. I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today I'm joined by Dr. Ryan Berg, Director of the America's program, and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, Ryan was a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where he helped lead its Latin America Studies program. Ryan Berg joins us today to discuss recent developments in Venezuela and the outlook for the region in coming months. Stay with us as we speak with Dr. Ryan Berg. Ryan, welcome to NatSek Matters. It's so great to be here. Thanks for having me. Well, Ryan, you're one of the best people in town that we can talk to about Latin American issues in Venezuela in particular. You're well known from your post over at CSIS and you're an active commentator. So, you know, there were a lot of people saying that the United States had to use force beyond just the boat strikes in Venezuela because they had put an aircraft carrier there. And if you just pulled them out, that would have sent a message of weakness. And so I had gradually signed up to that idea, but I have to admit that I did not have on my list of possible contingencies a Delta Force raid that rendered Maduro out of his palace into a Navy ship and later to New York for trial. Did you see this coming? Indeed, Mike. It wasn't on my bingo card either, but as you mentioned, frequently out there commentating and writing and narrative shaping on this, I think, you know, in the lead up to this, I had argued in multiple pieces that US credibility was on the line. You can't simply bring the USS Gerald R. Ford to the region as part of this historic naval buildup and not use it to have it sail off and do another AOR, I think, would have been a massive hit to US credibility. This is not something that was necessarily needed for strikes against suspected narco-laden vessels. So something had to be done there. And then in a subsequent piece in the Wall Street Journal in early December, I wrote about the theory of change. And I thought it was going to be a traditional sort of shock and awe kind of operation where the US would take out, as is traditionally done, air defenses, I'm an adversarial nation, and then have some kind of limited objectives after the message had been sent to the Venezuelan armed forces that it was time to leave Maduro's side. It was time to open up a space for the opposition. And it was time to move this guy out and start a transition that would essentially have been the message. So neither on your Bingo card nor on mine was a Delta Force raid, and one that was conducted as cleanly and precisely as this one. Forever War, this was not. We were in the country for about two hours. We had complete supremacy over the air. We had layered effects as Dan Cain tells us from cyber and space. And the Chinese and the Russian weapons systems that Venezuela has spent lavishly on over the past several decades, they didn't work. And there's a major message there about US military supremacy and planning and the ability to do operations like this jointly. Yeah, I like that too. I mean, that's sort of a subsidiary benefit of the raid, which is, you know, the Russians aren't going to come over and service the service to air missiles that they sold to you. And at the end of the day, they're not really going to be there with you, even if they're members of this axis of people. But let's get back to as a setup to the raid. Let's talk generally about Venezuela. It's been on everyone's list. I think of among rogue states for a long time. Sometimes down the list a little bit. You've heard a lot of criticism, which is, well, you know, what Venezuela is involved in the drug trade, but nothing like Mexico, nothing like Colombia, a little bit about, is this really about migration, because migration or at least illegal immigration is stopped. I mean, did you think that this was appropriately ranked as not only the biggest threat of the hemisphere, but among the biggest nationals, the security threats that the United States has? I think that it's warranted within an administration that is keen on focusing once again on the foundations of US power, which is to say the Western hemisphere. They feel very firmly, as it's clear in their NSS that they've released in December, that the US has lost a lot of ground in the Western hemisphere. If you look at the country where this administration's top three or four issues intersects most directly, it's Venezuela. It's the migration issue mentioned, Michael. It's drugs. And it's the problematic geopolitical adversaries. And really, the beachhead that is represented by Venezuela for Russia, for Iran, for China in the hemisphere, China has other partners in the region, China has other presence, of course, in the region. But Venezuela was really its entree into Latin America and the Caribbean in the late 90s and early 2000s when Hugo Chavez came to power. So there's all sorts of reasons to care about Venezuela. And I saw these debates about how much tonnage is actually moved of Colombian cocaine through Venezuela as kind of a side show, because the point is Colombian cocaine and large quantities is being moved through Venezuela, among other reasons to care about the country. So I think in the short term, if you understand that this administration is keen on reasserting US dominance over the Western hemisphere, and in fact, they have a Trump corollary to the Monroe doctrine as well as the Western hemisphere section for the National Security Strategy document, I think you quickly understand that Venezuela is the first and foremost challenge. And then I think the long term challenge is actually getting Mexico to be a more stable secure environment with some of the criminal organizations and insecurity challenges that operate there. So Venezuela in the short term and probably in the medium term, but Mexico very much in the long term when it comes to hemispheric stability challenges. Well, great points. I think of all the rationals evicting Russia and China from the hemisphere might be my favorite. Let's talk a little bit about what's going on now. I'll tell you I was also a little surprised that we did the raid, deposed Maduro, but then we elected to sort of promote Maduro's vice president. Delsey Rodriguez, I took it a bit is, you know, instead of in other words, the democratically elected Maria, Karina, Machata. And I took it a little bit of as an implicit criticism of the Bush administration and Paul Bremer for taking out the whole bath party and decapitating the entire regime. As the Trump people saying, well, listen, we're not going to make the same mistake. We're worried about a democratically elected person just kind of coming in here and assuming that she could cart blanche control these very strong security services. And otherwise uproop these kleptocratic officials. And so, well, why don't we try to keep a powerful person in office and over time trying, I don't know what, wrestled, wrestled power from her or have an election. Do I have that right and were you surprised and sort of just sort of update is here. I think you do have the right reading, Michael, I was surprised at the at the raid and the operation as we mentioned that wasn't on my bingo card. But once you get to the idea that, okay, that is on the bingo card. That's what president Trump elected to do and very successfully at that. Then I think if you've been paying attention to this administration, you've listened to the president's own words. It makes sense that he wanted to answer the question of political stability first. Over the question of political legitimacy. So the administration has made no excuses here that they've essentially said that this could be a potentially awkward dance with with the remnants of a regime that we think and we have firm reason to believe is illegitimate has no democratic mandate has engaged in a gross human rights violations. They're in the international criminal court now for crimes against humanity and I could go down the list. But what they do provide is a chance for short term stability where we use the economic leverage at our disposal to try to get more pro-US policies from them. And then eventually if you listen to the three-pronged approach that the secretary of state laid out, we will get to that third phase after a stabilization and recovery phase will get to a phase called transition. And I think that's very clearly where the opposition comes in, right? They should get to run in a free and fair election and they should get to be able to contest political power in Venezuela as they weren't able to do in so many elections previously. So what is happening of late we've heard a lot of assertions at least as late as last Friday that we're United States is running the country that we're going to try and put more US oil companies in charge that will set up a bank account if you will to help the Venezuelan people from oil proceeds. So I mean, what exactly do you think is going on right now or we just trying to stabilize and get things moving or is Rubio the vice Roy of Venezuela? What's your sense of what's happening? I think that's an important question Michael. So Steven Miller provided some useful context in an interview with CNN. He said, running Venezuela for us doesn't mean that President Trump sets the bus schedule on the bus fares and caracas. That's not the level of granularity we're going to get to but what they are concerned about or what they think is the main tool here is the ongoing quarantine in the southern Caribbean using this large naval presence we've talked about as a way of deciding what goes in and what goes out and the lifeblood of Venezuela's economy is oil right. 90% or so 85 to 90% of the revenues generated by the regime are due to oil export. And so the administration is right and understanding that that's their main leverage and they've said that they plan to use it to extract pro US policies and furthermore they've said that the United States is going to market Venezuelan oil and it's going to sell Venezuelan oil and the proceeds of those sales which will be higher than the proceeds of the sanctioned oil that Venezuelan had been selling previously. They will be kept in a foreign foreign asset bank account in the United States for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. Now that part is clear to me. What's still I think unclear what I haven't seen enough clarification on and we're recording this on the 13th of January is that how that money is going to be spent. It's simply going to be handed back to the regime as the United States going to decide how it's spent for the benefit of the Venezuelan people is the key here in the president's words. And we know this regime has a history of not spending or doing anything for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. So there's a key question here. How do you get around an authoritarian, a still authoritarian regime and use proceeds from oil sales to benefit the Venezuelan people when they want to be seen as the ones controlling the price. So that's great. If if number one on our list is trying to make sure that the people benefit from the oil revenue when so much of it has been misappropriated and wasted and et cetera, et cetera. What give us a flavor. What else do you think we're asking of the regime right now to move the ball forward? So I haven't seen any firm metrics, Michael, but I've seen buckets. I would call them buckets of different issues that we want them to work on. So we want fewer drugs coming out of Venezuela. We want fewer outbound migrants and we want migration flights to continue returning at a pace of about two a week at present back to Venezuela. We want obviously the oil sector to be opened to greater US participation. So we're actively asking for changes to the hydrocarbons law that currently exists in the country and makes it of course very difficult for foreign companies operate. And then I think we're we have a series of asks when it comes to Venezuela's problematic to a political alliances. And so broadly speaking, we want to see less Russia, we want to see less China, we want to see less Iran, we want to see less Cuba in Venezuela. How exactly that is managed. I think will be one key question moving forward, Michael, is do we have a firm set of metrics or do we keep optionality and flexibility open? Do we push for rapid ruptures into some of these relationships, or do we ask for a more managed decline in some of these relationships? Those are all important questions. And to a certain extent, we're going to run into some red lines for the regime as well. Like if we're trying to push this regime, basically as far as we can push it before they say, stability questions are in play, can we ask for a rupture with China? Can we ask for a rupture with Russia, or are they going to say we can't do a rupture? We need to do a slow sort of managed steady step back from this from this relationship. Those are the kinds of questions that remain unanswered and some of the things that I'm looking at and thinking about at this point in time. Alright, well let's go to Cuba in a minute, but let me just ask you one last thing. That's a great list. What do you think it was about Delsey Rodriguez that told the administration, you know what? I think we can deal with her. I mean, I've read she speaks English, she was educated in California. She's a reasonable person behind closed doors. Her brother has good relations with the US government. I'm like, where did this come from that all of us? I mean, the whole world's focusing on Maria, um, Carina Machado, because she's the Nobel Peace Prize winner. And then I saw here comes Delsey Rodriguez. Tell us how that all went down. Well, like I said before, the calculation certainly wasn't political legitimacy because she suffers from the political legitimacy question, same political legitimacy questions, Maduro does. I think the calculation was very real, Politek, very realist. If we push for a kind of overnight express regime change from Maduro to Maria Carina, that is a push too far, perhaps in the thinking of the administration. We could get into a situation where political stability is then the major issue to have to resolve. We'd much rather resolve that first. And so the obvious answer is to look to Delsey as the vice president. We should not be under any illusions. She is a self-described Marxist guerrilla. In her portfolio, when she was vice president, she oversaw parts of the intelligence apparatus, which included Jail's torture centers, other problematic things. I mean, she, according to some reports, is a pragmatist and a technocrat, maybe, maybe she's capable of getting greater oil production in Venezuela. We should not see this through roasted-dit glasses that she's a small D-democrat and Maduro was a tyrant. She's part of the same system that ultimately needs to be pushed out of power for there to be real change in Venezuela. And for none of this to have been in vain to use President Trump's own terms, his own words from the Saturday press conference. But I think this is going to be a slow process of regime management as opposed to the kind of overnight express regime change that would be involved in the kind of change that you mentioned from Maduro to Maria Carina. Okay, so before we get to Cuba one more, I mean, eventually they want to get to what? New elections? I mean, they wouldn't just say in two years, but you've already been elected. It's just time to install you. It would be, let's have new elections in a year or two. Do you think that's the plan? It's too early to say. I think that's generally the plan, Michael. I think that the administration wants to keep their flexibility in terms of when those elections might take place because we already know it's incredibly difficult to push Chavismo to allow anything resembling free and fair elections. The opposition pulled off a marvelous victory in July of 2024 against all odds basically taking the tally sheets out of the country to prove that in fact they won. We can't expect them to do that again, right? The key for this, for a new election would be trying to get better, freer, fairer conditions on the ground as best as we can get under this regime. Well, that's going to take a lot of leverage, it's going to take a lot of plotting and strategy, and it's not going to happen quickly. And I think on top of that, the administration wants to keep their flexibility. And so the tightrope here is, how do you keep the opposition relevant? How do you keep someone as talented and as legitimate as Maria Corina Machado? How do you keep her relevant and in the mix while at the same time dealing with the exigencies of the moment, which are basically handled by Delci Rodriguez? And the ruling coup, that's still in power in Venezuela for questions of stability. That's a really difficult tightrope to walk. But just to put it in the president's own terms, he said, we want to make sure that we didn't do this in vain. We want to make sure that we have a chance to make Venezuela great again. And although he didn't use the word democracy in the press conference, there's a means ends kind of connection here, right? You can easily make the argument that Venezuela doesn't get the oil sector fully roaring again. It doesn't become great again until contractual obligations can be met. Human rights, private property, all the things that we know democracies are better at protecting than authoritarian regimes. There is that means ends connection there that I would make and say, Venezuela can't be great again unless it returns to its very long and important democratic history prior to 1998. Okay, so Cuba has been a fellow of the United States for decades for all kinds of different reasons. But in the last 10 years or more, it's been the relationship with Cuba that often is cited in national security circles as some as a reason to be particularly concerned about Venezuela. And it usually breaks down to just the pernicious effect that Cuba has on the hemisphere. And it also has to do with this, you know, so-called, wanted intelligence services and security services that were supposedly so fierce, United States could never pick the lock and get into Venezuela or Cuba for that matter. 32 of them perished in the operation absolute resolve. I mean, I don't want to say I'm like cocky, but I mean, I thought these guys have been described as 10 feet tall for a long time. But what do you talk a little bit about Cuba? Is it still a big foe of the United States? Is it just sort of outdated thinking that we need to worry so much about Cuba that we don't we have bigger fish to fry? Yeah, I would put Cuba in context. I mean, it's an irritant. It's a major, you know, annoyance for the United States. But Venezuela, I think, played far more of a geopolitical role, lubricating China, Russia, and Iran's access and play within the hemisphere than Cuba. With one possible exception, Michael, and something that CSIS and my program has worked on a lot, and we've released multiple reports looking at some satellite imagery that actually is tracking the building of several signals intelligence sites by the PRC in Cuba. I don't think they could resist. It's simply so close to the United States. You and I both know Florida is a super important state for the US Armed Forces. There's a bunch of bases all over that state. Things that the Chinese could be super interested in looking at from Cuba, right, including Southcom right the head of the of the Southern Command. So what we think that Chinese are doing in Cuba is actually building a significant signals intelligence platform. The economy there is more about right. Nothing, nothing works. Cubans have lost a lot of weight. There's a caloric deficit, basically nationwide. And the repressive apparatus remains as repressive as ever. And yet the Cubans refuse to change anything about the economic model on the island. In fact, we have stories, Michael, of Chinese emissaries, Chinese officials coming to Cuba. And their message is you need to become more capitalist to have success. And the Cubans are very resistant to the ironic thing. And so, you know, there is some geopolitical play there and some factors. But the Cuban regime, as the president said, could fall of its own accord at any moment. And I don't suspect at this point in time that we're going to see a kind of spectacular military operation the same way we did an operation, absolute resolve with Venezuela. Well, what what what are the big factor? We're all sitting around talking about what needs to happen in Iran for the protest to succeed. And it's usually something along the lines of you need a broad paced revolt. There needs to be economic problems. There needs to be a leader, you know, guys like you that track Cuba regularly. Do you have a list of factors that would need to be in play for Cuba to finally collapse? Is that even practical? Because I feel like I've been hearing about Cuba's imminent collapse from my entire career. Yeah, and a number of those those factors just aren't in place. Michael, I mean, you don't have a growing insurgency, right? There's no there's no hint somehow of an armed opposition. And in fact, when we talk about the opposition in Cuba, it's largely sub-rosa. It has to if it's able to organize it all, it has to do so very carefully, right? Again, the Cuban intelligence services failed in the case of protecting my ludo, but they haven't necessarily fallen away. They're still capable of protecting the Cuban regime. And much of the opposition has been forced into exile. The Cuban regime has been been able over the years to find themselves international allies, right? They find those in short supply at the moment right now, but they still have some international support that may step in in a moment of existential regime crisis repression is still the name of the game in Cuba. It's not like the guys with the guns have stopped firing on on citizens. The army, the armed forces there is very happy. It has billions of dollars sitting in bank accounts. They own much of the the economy is amazing. I mean, Harold has done some excellent reporting on what those bank accounts look like and all the industries in which the armed forces as an institution are involved. So I failed to see as an analyst right now where the spark comes from, it comes from, right? Like what's the thing that gets this ignited and how what is the theory of change here? Is it a revolt somehow unarmed that overruns the Cuban state? Is it finally there's some trigger on power blackouts or hunger or crappy education or infrastructure that gets enough people to come out and get the money? It's enough people organized. We just don't know. And so when these probabilities are less than a couple percent year in and year out that the Cuban regime is going to fall, you generally tend to predict that it's going to persist. And then only retrospectively when it does fall and it will fall eventually, you look back and you say, oh, that's the trigger we should have looked at. It should have been obvious to us all along, but it never usually is that obvious to do us when we're analyzing in the moment. That's going to be the spark that sets it all off. Yeah. Okay. I think you're right. I don't see the theory of change right now either. That said, Michael, for listeners, if you're interested, I'm not. I never have done this before. But if you're interested in the betting markets, I was just mourning at some of the betting market sites. And you'll see odds that are better than any to predict whether the Cuban regime will fall this year. I think it's 25% by December. I think that's probably the highest I've ever seen it. I think I saw somebody's going to be investigated for predicting Maduro's fall. I bet a lot of money, like six hours before the raid. So I don't think we've heard the end of that story. We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Dr. Ryan Berg. Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm. Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage founded in 2013. Beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk, drive growth and navigate a complex trade. A complex geopolitical environment with a bipartisan team in decades of experience. Beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. All right, let's let's talk a little bit about further ramifications of this raid. Everyone likes to say, all right, well, you know, Venezuela, they were involved in the, you know, maybe cartel trade a little bit and they cite some of the cartels that were active. But most people then say, well, the big enchilada is Mexico. That is where the cartels are most active. They dominate more than half the country. Colombia also, despite some success we've had there through the years is still at the top of the list. But first, Mexico, I think we're already saying can the US military come in and help you? And she's saying no, Claudia Shimbong saying no, tell us where do things stand with the security relationship between the United States and Mexico? Well, the administration continues to say that the Mexicans are cooperating that they've been secretary Rubio said that they've brought levels of cooperation to two points where they've never been before. I believe them, Michael, in the sense that if I had told you at the beginning of 2025 that this administration would move the over 10 window with Mexico on security cooperation such that the US would be able to run between four and six UAVs over Mexico for ISR purposes. On a daily basis, you would have said that's crazy. You would have said the Mexicans will see that as they historically would see it as a sovereignty violation and they wouldn't consider it as a policy option. They've not only considered it, but they've greenlighted it and the modern party, which has a hard time defending to its base a firm set of policies to cooperate with the United States. They have defended the use of UAVs from the United States in Mexico before. They've said we get useful intelligence from it from the Americans and we use it to interdict drugs. So I think the administration has moved the over 10 window on the possible a lot. When I talk to them in my sense of what they're trying to achieve, they're trying to go even higher. So I give them a very high score for ambition. I wonder how much of it is possible. So they do recognize how much they've moved over 10 window. However, they will usually ask, but have we structurally or systemically changed the way that the cartels operate in Mexico, which is to say, with a lot of collusion from the state. And in some parts of Mexico, probably best described as a narco state. And the answer there is, of course, no. In one year's time, you can't do that. You can't unwind all of these relationships that have been developed over the years. So again, very high marks on ambition. I do wonder how much of this the Mexicans can can deliver on because what essentially the US is asking for, let me translate this for the audience. The US is asking for the Mexican ruling party, more and less, to essentially deliver members, mostly of their parties since they're politically dominant in the country to US justice, whom they feel have been involved in deals with, with, with FTO groups. And that is going to incur a massive cost for Claudio Shainbaum domestically. And it might be a red line for her. So I do fear we're coming to this, this kind of collision moment where the US is going to continue pushing. And we may firmly come up against Mexico's red lines in terms of the limits of cooperation. So let's just lay aside for now the Mexico's historic concerns about the United States intervening in their land and trying to dictate things inside of their country. I mean, if you just were the ZAR here and you could design an effective counter cartel strategy in Mexico and it's so much more complex than it is anywhere else. What would you do? It just seems like an intractable problem. One of the roots of the problem, Michael, is that Mexico spends precious little on security. It spends a very little percentage of its GDP on security and especially relative to the scale of the problem in Mexico. So the first thing is, is just, yeah, Mexico needs to spend more tackling this problem. Second, I think that there, we need to give back to the idea that we're going to work with only certain vetted units. We've had a number of indications over the last year that corruption has spread even to elite units within Mexico to the point where we probably have some significant questions about who can we work with in that country if everyone is on the take and information is going to leak very quickly. And then the thing that really gives me the most concern and I could talk about, you know, where groups are operating in the expansion of their territory and so on. But what really gives me the most concern, Michael, is like, how much of the legal economy is becoming it or is being taken over by criminal organizations. Even things that are sacred in Mexico, tortilla industry, right, is being taken over by criminal organizations. The simple like produce that Mexico sends to the United States has in many cases touched the hands of cartel members, right, your lines, your avocados, these kinds of things that are grown in mutual con state, for example. That's probably touched the hands of some kind of criminal organization or it's touched the hands of an agricultural worker who's had to pay an extortion fee to a criminal organization. So there's even a term now that we have for the increase that this has on grocery store shelves, Narco inflation. Well, Mexicans are talking about Narco inflation and soon Americans will probably be talking about it as well. So it's one thing if the criminal organizations are just operating in the shadows and they're doing drugs or they're doing drugs and migrants or they're doing drugs, migrants and, and, you know, wildlife or something like that. But it's another thing I would argue, Michael, if they're not just doing the illicit stuff, but they're also spreading their tentacles within the illicit economy, right. This is trade that's protected by the US, Mexico, Canada agreement. This is trade that is is under international law and and the most modern free trade agreement that the United States has. And for Mexico to allow many of its sectors to be penetrated significantly by organized crime, I think risks that entire relationship that has made Mexico in a middle income country. Yeah, itching its wagons to the North American economic project and growing as a result. So that honestly, my biggest concern and there are many, but like the biggest one that I have is just how much they're penetrating the legal economy and how we can't really isolate it to the illicit side anymore. So this is as we begin to wrap up, let me ask one more on Mexico and then we'll go back to where we started with Venezuela. But you know, I heard so much about the Colombian president, Uribe, who was a halted in some circles as Colombia's George Washington, he worked with the United States. He largely changed the balance of power between the Colombian government and the and the Narcos. Now there's been a lot of black backsliding and and we could talk about that another time, but is that the basic playbook that we would like to see in Mexico? Maybe it's unachievable, maybe they don't want as much US help, maybe they, but is that the basic playbook where you have a very strong leader who as you say spins more on security begins to take more seriously than any other, you know, am low and everyone else. The penetration of Narcos across the government, you know, what what do we need to see is it so it's not too far gone right because we spreefully and mostly saved Colombia, I think right. Yeah, the model is there and there are a lot of comparisons between Colombia and Mexico across a number of spheres, but especially on security. So, since we had a plan Colombia that was bipartisan, we had a plan Colombia that achieved results for Colombia and at the same time we had security cooperation with Mexico in the form of the Marita agreement, which achieved rather highly mixed results. And so the question is what could we do differently, what could, what could we bring from the Colombian context to the Mexican context. I think one of the biggest things is leadership. You've had two presidents in a row now where the credentials on security are a little bit suspect. You're always kind of wondering are they in bed with the Narcos, are they really going as hard as they can, or are they protecting certain individuals. Certainly, shame bomb has been presented plenty more incentive by the administration to go harder after criminal organizations than the previous government. But there's always questions as well of capability and then I think that's where we really helped Colombia a lot. We helped them build their capability both in the intelligence space, but also in the actual policing space so much so that we have a program now for Colombians to go across the rest of the Latin American region and teach other militaries and police how to how to battle gangs and criminal organizations. So the same kind of thing needs to happen in Mexico. We need to see some important kind of top levels signaling by the administration there that they're willing to go further. And then the way I read the National Security Strategy document, if you make it past the Trump corollary to the Monroe doctrine, the second thing that the Western hemisphere section says is on the question of security, we need to expand the number of partners we have and we need to enlist them and helping us. And that to me is a recognition that the US can't do everything. We need a version of burden sharing in our own hemisphere and we need important signaling as we got say with the Revega government in Colombia that the partner is secure firm and committed to the same path as we are. And right now we're cajoling, we're coaxing, we're asking nicely, we're asking not so nicely, we're doing whatever we need to to try to get Mexico to where we think we want it. But it's not the same as a Colombian partner that comes in says, I want to be the best friend of the Americans. Let's see how we can truly defeat some of these these criminal groups that are operating on our soil. Right, that was a terrific tour through some of the top security issues that we have in the hemisphere. Just last topic here and then we can wrap up what what are you as an astute observer of Venezuela. What are you looking for over the coming weeks? I mean, you mentioned a lot of points of leverage that the United States has and you mentioned some things were looking for cooperation on. But what are you looking for? Are there going to be particular things that you want to see that will be signs of success or like what's on your list? Yeah, this will my answer will be in a way a bit of a recap of some of the things that I've said already. I mean, first is this issue of metrics, right? Does the administration want to be very flexible in terms of how they judge the regime there or does it want to have a specific set of metrics or maybe it wants to have metrics on some of the issues but not on on others. Secondly would be this question about do we want significant ruptures in some of these relationships or do we want to see a slow decline and walk away from Venezuela's relationship with China, Russia or Iran? What is the regime there capable of delivering? And then of course there are questions further. What is the stability of the regime there? We only talked about this briefly, but the administration concluded that Delcy would be the best answer strictly on the question of stability but never on the question of legitimacy. Is that actually the right bet? Is she in the long run able to consolidate control her and her brother over the executive and legislative functions there? Is she able to box out some of these other regime heavyweights who control important institutions in authoritarian regimes like the armed forces, like paramilitary groups that roam the streets and rough up opposition members? Like parts of the intelligence apparatus those will be major questions moving forward. And then the last bucket of questions I would outline for listeners is when it comes to the president and his choices, how is it that the scheme or the arrangement that Secretary Wright has outlined of the US marketing and selling Venezuelan oil and then putting the proceeds in the US bank account for the benefit of the American and Venezuelan people? How does that work? How does that mechanically how does that work? It sounds good when you talk about it for the oil benefit both the US and the Venezuelan people. But how is it spent and how is it actually drawn down to ensure that those goals are met? That's kind of the meat on the bones that I think the administration needs to provide now. And as an observer that's what I'll be watching. Ryan, thank you so much. That was a terrific explanation of what's going down in Venezuela and and the other states in the region that are important to US security. So thanks so much for coming on Natsack Matters. Thanks very much for having me. It's been a pleasure. That was Ryan Berg. I'm Michael Allen. If you enjoy listening to Natsack Matters, please leave us a rating and review. We'd love to hear from you. If you're interested in becoming a sponsor, please email our team at bgs at bgsdc.com. You can also find this email in the show notes. Please join us next week for another episode of Natsack Matters. Natsack Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry. Natsack Matters is a production of Beacon Global Strategies.