The Commanders: Eisenhower

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From the eradication of smallpox to the discovery of penicillin, we have faced down the most devastating threats to our species, through one thing and one thing only. The relentless power of human ingenuity. And right now we are standing at another historic turning point. I'm talking about dementia, the UK's biggest killer. Thanks to rigorous, world-leading research, huge advances are being made in our lifetime. We are seeing the first drugs capable of slowing the decline of memory and thinking in Alzheimer's. And blood tests are being trialled in the NHS to diagnose the diseases that cause dementia. It's not going to be easy and it won't happen overnight. But the more research we do, the more lives will change. This isn't just hope. It's scientific progress unfolding in real time. But history teaches us that breakthroughs don't happen in a vacuum. They require momentum. Science is the solution, but support fuels the speed. Alzheimer's Research UK's sole focus is delivering a cure as fast as humanly possible. By supporting their work, you are quite literally accelerating the pace of history. To find out more about the amazing work they're doing, head to Alzheimer'sResearchUK.org. It's early morning on the 5th of June 1944. At his advance headquarters near Portsmouth, Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower wakes for first light. Across Britain, the largest invasion force in history stands ready. Thousands of ships and aircraft, more than two million Allied soldiers, waiting for a single order. But that order relies on something no commander can control. The weather. The British weather. Conditions in the channel are foul. Gray waves heave in the pre-dawn darkness, slashed out by winds that tear up the channel. It's been this way for days. The invasion has already been postponed once. Eisenhower makes his way to the map room. Inside, the walls are covered with charts in northern France. Topographic maps of Normandy's beaches. There are tide tables there. The airborne drop zones. Time tables measured down to the minute. Meteorologists cluster around their charts, debating over barometric pressures and weather fronts. Searching for the faintest promise of a break in the bad weather. Eisenhower is painfully aware that every hour of delay risks giving German forces more time to prepare. And they can't just keep delaying it by a day or two here and there. The tides mean that the next opportunity for the invasion is not for weeks. That will give the Germans more time to build up their defences and lessen the Allies' chances of success. At 4am that day, he finally gets the break he needs. His chief meteorologist delivers his forecast. There will be, in his opinion, a brief break in the storm, he says. A narrow window of tolerable weather. Tomorrow, on June the 6th. Not ideal conditions but possible ones. The generals and the admirals around the room give their opinions. But only one man can decide. It's not Franklin Roosevelt. It's not Winston Churchill. Eisenhower alone can make this call. The room falls silent as he reaches that decision. Three simple words that will set his so-called great crusade in motion. Okay, let's go. Some witnesses had other recollections with a slightly more colourful phrasing. This had to be one of the most important of the greatest gambles the second one. Eisenhower knows that if the landings fail, it will be a disaster of unparalleled proportions. People will want someone to blame. And he begins to plan accordingly. In the afternoon of the 5th, as thousands of troops are moving into their final positions. Eisenhower scribbles down a note. It's meant for release only if this ends in catastrophe. The astiff determines scrawl. He claims ultimate responsibility for the invasion. But if it fails, the blame should fall on his shoulders alone. In those final hours before D-Day, the weight of that responsibility must have been crushing. The fate of millions rest on his shoulders. His had been the strategy, the negotiations, the wrangling together of a cohesive coalition. He'd put what he thought was the right people in charge of each cog of the machine. Victory can never be guaranteed. And although Eisenhower must have hoped with every breath that it would come, that act of bravery ensured that in the event of failure, he would take the fall. When people debate the great commanders of the Second World War, the names usually come out thick and fast only Zhukov Romul, Montgomery, MacArthur, Slim, Halsey, that they're men associated with battlefields, with maneuvers, with moments where the outcomes of a campaign can hinge of moments of personal brilliance. Men who seize command, sometimes under fire. Dwight David Eisenhower doesn't really fit into that mould. He never once commanded troops in combat. Before 1942, he never personally led a charge in the heat of battle. He never devised a battlefield tactical approach that would later be studied alongside battles like Cannae or Austerlitz. And yet, by the middle of the war, Eisenhower was the supreme commander of the most potent military coalition in history, overseeing millions of men, vast industrial resources, and a complex alliance structure that encompassed some of the biggest and most difficult personalities of the 20th century. To understand Eisenhower's rise to command, we need to look not only at the victories, but the man himself, how he learned to command without ever fighting, at the decisions he made and the ones he avoided, and whether he possessed some kind of military genius or something else entirely. This is the third episode in our Commanders series, where we dig into the lives and decisions of five legendary World War II commanders. We cut through the myth to examine what really shaped their styles of command. From daring gambles to meticulous planning, we're going to find out whether their victories were earned through some sort of innate brilliance or luck or ruthless calculation. We're also going to ask, frankly, whether their reputations hold up to scrutiny at all. We've already covered Rommel and Montgomery, so please go back and have a listen to those. But today we are going to turn our attention to the supreme commander himself, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Joining us for this, I'm very pleased to say, is John C. McManus, a great friend of the podcast, professor of military history at the Missouri University of Science and Technology, the host of the podcast, Someone Talked and World War II Live. He's just the man for the job. Enjoy. MUSIC Dwight D. Eisenhower was born in 1890 and raised on a small farm near Abilene, Kansas, a small Midwestern town steeped in the ethos of Protestant discipline. The Eisenhower household was poor but strict. His father, David, worked some mechanic. His mother, Ida, was a religious pacifist. She often found herself frustrated by her son's growing fascination with military history. Ike was the third of seven sons. He reveled in exploring the great outdoors. He loved hunting and fishing and playing football. Here's John to explain more. Abilene, Kansas is a very small town, like about two and a half hours west of Kansas City. So kind of out there on its own, basically a railroad town. So for someone like Eisenhower, it's a place to go and knock about and play outside and get into trouble and just kind of make your own way. I mean, it was a very self-entertaining kind of place. And I think it kind of still is. It's nice little railroad town. And so the Eisenhower family, they're not real well-off, but they don't necessarily know that they're not so well-off because they don't really want for much that's really important. And I think too, when you look at the Eisenhower boys, they're an example of their kind of upward mobility you could have, especially as a white man in that era, because you would have some opportunities. And Eisenhower is a classic example of it. He goes to public school. And so that's another trend that you see in most of the country by the time Eisenhower comes along. He's born in 1890. So really he's reared in the early 20th century. And yeah, so the kind of formal public educational system, he comes up through that. And I think that's a really good interesting point because it's what really kind of creates his background of literacy, of self-education in terms of reading, you know, what interests him and learning math and learning a lot about the world. Because there's a library and he's a voracious reader. He's a lot of military history. So that showed you a little bit what he was interested in the long haul. But yeah, he goes through public schooling. In the case of most people, they were lucky to have a high school diploma in that era. So he's a little bit ahead of game in that. And then of course he gets the opportunity for a college education at West Point. It's a pretty big achievement. Yeah. And so the way they did it back then, and this doesn't change too much, is that there were competitive examinations for those who are interested. Now it's a little bit of a kind of Byzantine system in that anybody in Congress, like a representative or a senator, has the opportunity to appoint local people to the academies, to the service academies. And then you also have a presidential appointment and so on and so forth. So there's always that hoop to jump through. The way this usually had resolved, like in Eisenhower's time, is locally there'd be like 10 boys, and it was all boys in that era. West Point was not open to women in that era. You would basically have a competitive examination of all the different subjects. So it could be algebra, history, English, you know, so on and so forth. And then usually the top two then would be eligible for the appointment. Now the way it sometimes went out too, is that Congressman X, Y or Z had their own, the son of their buddy, and would appoint that person regardless of what happened. But the competitive examinations tended to be fairly above board. And I think Eisenhower finished second. So that made him eligible for the appointment. He's very much a high flyer in that he's had schooling that really is not quite up to his level of intellect. In other words, he needs a bigger kind of room. He's certainly gone as far as he can go in Abilene. He's not quite sure what he wants to do. He loves sports at that point. He loves being outside. He's adventurous and he's fun loving and he's a prankster. He's not necessarily thinking, gosh, I have this lifelong wish to be a great general, right? To be a soldier. He's thinking, I want to go somewhere beyond this town and find new vistas and I want a free education. And this is going to be my kind of entry point. Eisenhower, when he gets to West Point, there's a little bit of an eye opener because he tests the military discipline. All that side of it and he's constantly getting demerits and having to walk the yard and he's constantly pushing back against the kind of authoritarian side of West Point. But I think it's fair to say like the intellectual side really appeals to him. Not that he's like the ultimate algebra student or something, but he likes that idea of the sort of intellectual buffet. I'm going to take something from here and here and here and I'm going to develop myself. He's very interested, of course, I mentioned in sports and he's on the football team. He's a very good player. He's a half-back. Then he is a terrible knee injury, which of course later on will flare up during World War II. He gets involved in sports and he's very well liked and he finds his command voice. One thing that's interesting about Eisenhower is he more or less refuses to haze the Clebes when he's an upperclassman. He has one incident where he had started to dress down a guy and had said disparagingly, you look like you were a barber or something and the guy actually was a barber in civilian life. So Eisenhower felt terrible about that because he thought, I just made someone feel badly about what they do for a living. That isn't okay. He's just like, I'm not going to haze people. I think that's a little interesting kind of insight into his character, his sensitivity for others. There'll be quite famous later on. I think you're seeing a little bit of the Eisenhower that you're going to have later and he's extremely well liked at West Point. Eisenhower was full of potential, but he was not a standout student as the way we might imagine that the future great commanders might be. Powsky spent so much time on the football field or messing about with his buddies. He had average grades. He graduated in the middle of his class in 1915. The famous class the stars fell on, which produced an extraordinary number of generals. Eisenhower was thought of as dependable, highly sociable, but not especially brilliant. His teachers thought he'd make a good officer, never a great one. After graduating, he spent the next few years moving from one disappointing peacetime station to another. While at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas, the young second lieutenant met and married the love of his life, Mary Mamie Dowd. And then came the opportunity that young officers dream of. War. The First World War. One of the largest conflicts in history to that point. And one in which, surprisingly, Eisenhower never saw a shot fired in anger. That's the most amazing thing. Some of the most impactful American commanders in World War Two actually did not deploy into combat in World War One, Bradley being another course prime example. So Eisenhower graduates West Point as an infantry officer, which generally meant you were like middle of the pack in your class, but he's also kind of interested in armor. And so as the war goes on, he's going to have these training commands where he's so good at training and preparing people. It's so well organized. It's so well run that his superiors just don't want to let him go. And I mentioned the armor side because he's basically running an armor school at what was Camp Mead, or that should be Fort Mead. And then famously, of course, at Gettysburg near the old battlefield, there's a military reservation there where he's going to spend a good bit of the war and a training command, really commanding thousands of people at that point. And it creates in him a love of that little cow. And of course, later on when he retires, he's going to have a house on the edges of the Gettysburg battlefield, which is still there today as a national historic site. So yeah, Eisenhower, of course, was devastated that he didn't get overseas. He had orders to go, I think late fall of 1918. And of course, the armistice happens. And unlike most people who are celebrating worldwide, he's a little bit bummed out in that he says, oh my gosh, this was the greatest war in human history. I'm a military professional and I didn't get in it. So that's going to be a dead end for me. And of course, Bradley bought the same thing. So did Matthew Ridgeway, too, by the way. He also had not deployed. There's a lot of examples of that. And central paradox of Eisenhower, I think, that Eisenhower loves soldiers. He loved serving with soldiers and being down in the dirt with them. And of course, he has this ability to connect with people and to really be liked from a private soldier on up and respected more importantly. And then he never really has the opportunity to lead people in combat where the bullets are flying and he would have loved to. But at the same time, that kind of distance from the battlefield allows him to develop a kind of larger strategic domain to his thinking that I think is going to serve him in really good stead. He's often sometimes derided as a quote, political general. I think that's a little unfair. I think he's somebody who really understands the larger strategic dimension of whatever enterprise he's involved in. And I think that's going to be one of his great strengths going forward. So in World War One, his ability to train people, he understood a lot about human nature and about how to have rapport with people and how to motivate them. I think that served him well. But he also, I think, began to study at a higher level warfare. And of course, later on in his career, he's going to go to the command and general staff college and the army war college and absolutely excel in those spheres, which tells you a lot about his strategic acumen. The people of the United States came out of the first world war. I think it's fair to say deeply disillusioned with their nation's involvement in the conflicts. Over a hundred thousand American soldiers had died in the 19 months of fighting and some 200,000 had been wounded. The USA turned its back on the world. The armed forces were cut to the bone under the premise that their existence would provoke more war, not deter it. Men like Eisenhower entered a long period of career stagnation. He spent 16 years as a major. Many officers left the military to get better paying more illustrious careers in the civilian world. But Ike stuck it out through the interwar years. He was still a fair way off from being recognized as a potential high flyer. But in retrospect, we can see that Ike was clearly building the foundations for later success. In the 1920s and 30s, he served under some of the most influential military minds of the era, including Douglas MacArthur and George Marshall. He saw what good leadership looked like up close and learned how personality and public opinion could shape military decision making. These lessons would sharpen his instinct for command and diplomacy in later years. And perhaps the most formative experience for Ike was serving with General Fox Connor in the Panama Canal Zone. That is like the key relationship at that phase of his career. And this is sort of the field grade phase of Eisenhower's career. He's no longer a junior officer, of course. He's well into his 30s. Now, this is the mid-1920s. He does that at Simon and Panama. And Fox Connor is his main influence and his sponsor. Fox Connor kind of develops him as a soldier and through reading a lot of readings to Connor's credit. He told his officers, you know, if you don't read, you're going nowhere. I think that's a good thing 100 years later too. I mean, I think the better officers tend to operate that way. And so Eisenhower's eyes are opened up to so much more than he ever knew. He begins to develop views about what is good command and bad command. What is the proper way to operate and not? Connor absolutely is a key influence in getting Eisenhower appointed to the command of General Staff College. Those were tough billets to get. And generally it was maybe about one hundred every six or seven who wanted to go could go. So not only does he go, he absolutely excels. And it's a real pressure cooker of a course, typically two years. And they are just like evaluating people. And it's like, okay, my career is hinging on this. How I do here. That was the sort of mentality. He completely throws himself into it and he finishes first in his class. And certainly that raised some eyebrows as you might imagine. And so you're seeing him get some of these assignments when like there's the unanimity of opinion. This dude is really competent and he's got a lot to recommend him. But it's always then just a matter of getting the right people to notice you too. He's emblematic of many, many dozens of others who are going to have a really major impact on World War Two and beyond. Who have something of the same kind of professional road that he does. Just not a lot of opportunity in that interwar period who are willing to hang in and are very dedicated military professionals. Something is clearly working there that you're able to keep these guys and develop them. And of course it's obvious what they do in World War Two that they many of them end up as excellent commanders. Eisenhower though takes these opportunities and absolutely runs with them whenever he can. And he never really compromises his kind of ethical base too. That's the other thing. I mean, he doesn't, you know, you learn that at West Point Duty, Honor Country, you know, all these kinds of things that can go out the window when you're too ambitious. And Eisenhower always has this kind of central core to his character, which I think is really also, every bit is important in what happens with him as well. But at the same time too, you know, if we're looking at it compared with a lot of countries in the world at that point in the 20s and the 30s, many countries had a kind of aristocratic officer tradition and certainly I don't think that leads any really good place in my opinion. The U.S. is ahead of that. And they are creating opportunities for people like Eisenhower and Bradley who really would have had no advantage and no opportunity. I think at another time in another kind of social system, especially if you go farther back, you know, the medieval period of before they would have been simple peasants and discarded like nothing, you know. So this is ahead of the game in that respect. By the mid 1930s, Eisenhower was an immensely competent staff officer working under men like Connor. He'd learnt core lessons of military strategy and politics. And perhaps most importantly, how those two intersect with one eye in the future. Eisenhower spent all the time as well thinking about the next war. How might it be fought? And most importantly, how might it be won? He's constantly thinking about the next war. And he's constantly planning about what future war is going to be. And one of the key people he's constantly bouncing ideas off is George Patton, who of course had served in combat in World War One as an armoured commander and really was kind of ahead of the game in that respect to most of his colleagues. So he and Eisenhower talk a lot about future warfare and about future tactics and weaponry and really they kind of hash out like, well, how big a role are tanks going to have versus infantry? What's going to be the future? And both of them are really military intellectuals. So Eisenhower has a peer there who is really intellectually stimulating for him. He's got a sponsor in Fox Connor. He eventually of course is going to be stationed in France with the American Battle Monuments Commission and create a handbook documenting the American battles in World War One. And of course the burial grounds have become cemeteries to this day. Eisenhower is deeply involved in that. He's a really good writer. That's the other side of Eisenhower is he's an excellent writer. He writes that handbook and then later, unlike most generals, he's going to write his own memoirs. And by the way, this is what's so interesting to me. He's like a latter year Ulysses S. Grant, who also was an excellent writer and communicator who wrote his own memoirs. Eisenhower consciously modeled himself after Grant, both in his command style. You know, obviously they're different in terms of personality somewhat. But in the command style and in the communication style, Eisenhower kind of consciously did that. So Eisenhower is having this mindset. And I think later we see this payoff in World War Two of a guy who really has his eye on the strategic fall as Grant did in the Civil War. In the mid 1930s, Eisenhower served under another towering figure that would shape his views on leadership. Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur. For four years in the Philippines, Eisenhower worked as MacArthur's senior assistant. Unlike his time under General Fox Connor, this period taught him largely what not to do as a commander. MacArthur was brilliant, but also domineering, self-absorbed and extremely sensitive. He didn't like dissent. He had a flair for drama, which contrasted sharply with Eisenhower's calm judgment and tact. Ike later joked that he'd studied dramatics under MacArthur. The two eventually parted ways when Eisenhower returned to the United States in December 1939 to command an infantry battalion, just as war had erupted in Europe. From there, his rise was meteoric. Within two years, he'd moved from regimental command to Chief of Staff for General Walter Kruger. After Pearl Harbor, he joined the General Staff in Washington drafting plans to defeat Germany and Japan. Recognized by General George C. Marshall, he was promoted rapidly and became Supreme Allied Commander in North Africa in November 1942. It's an extraordinary chain of promotions. It had been a truly unprecedented rise from almost complete obscurity to one of the most prominent positions in the Allied Military Coalition. And it created some friction with his colleagues. The Ben Leers of the world, the Hugh Drums, who definitely had more seniority, and that meant something in an army where promotions came slowly and you had served your time and you had paid your dues, all that kind of thing. All of a sudden, have this guy vault over you. That can't happen without significant resentment, but I think Marshall felt it was worth it to have the best person in there. But that also puts Marshall on the line to make sure that this guy doesn't fail and make him look bad, you know? So obviously, he and many others have vetted Eisenhower for a long period of time. There's a fair amount of sympathy in the army for Eisenhower of having endured MacArthur for years and years, endured life under him and to come out of it unscathed on the other side. I think we tend to overlook that. There was a lot of respect for Eisenhower throughout the army. From those in the know, like Marshall, we understood what it meant to deal with MacArthur all those years so successfully that he had somehow survived that. North Africa was Eisenhower's first combat command. He was in charge of Operation Torch, which were the Allied landings in French North Africa. So that's Northwest Africa. The plan was they would then advance east along the Mediterranean coast and all remaining Axis forces would be crushed between them and British and Allied army advancing from Egypt. It was not an easy assignment. Torch was fraught. It was controversial. The problem was the British had wanted to fight in the Mediterranean theater. While the Americans couldn't understand why they didn't do a cross-channel invasion and march on Berlin. So Torch was a compromise and compromises rarely make for keeping everybody in the coalition happy. Leading it would be a tough job, especially when you gave command to a man who'd never been tested in combat. It is a risk, yeah, I mean for sure. And of course, as they would have thought of at the time, this is summer 1942. This is the most important Allied or American command at this stage. That's the way they would have thought of it in Washington. Well, obviously in the grand scheme. But still, this is the main game. And to put this guy in charge who has no combat experience at all, who doesn't have much command experience in his army career, you'd be forgiven to think of him as a career staff officer at that point. He kind of was that he could somehow succeed. But he had shown enough in the schools, command and general staff college, the Army War College, the way he had worked so effectively for so many people over many years, the relationships he had forged. Eisenhower had pretty wide respect in the army at that point. And then now the question is whether he can forge productive relationships with our allies. That's what they didn't know at the time, because he had never done that either, really. And his initial encounter with Montgomery, I think famously represents that. He stands in on a briefing that Montgomery gives when Montgomery is, I think, a two star in a division commander. Eisenhower lights up a cigarette and Montgomery, of course, didn't like that and stopped his whole briefing and said, who's doing that? And kind of dresses him down right there. You know, you can see, how's he going to react to this guy? And Eisenhower, he's angry. That's the other thing we tend to forget about Eisenhower. He had a volcanic temper as a kid. And he had to learn how to control that. And I think that's even true when he's middle aged in World War II. There's a lot of things that come up that are really going to anger him, especially a lot of things Montgomery does that are going to anger him over the time they know each other. And that begins it. But you start to see him make pretty good inroads with a lot of the British and Canadians. Of course, in Operation Torch, dealing with G-Rod and the French is a major challenge for him. It's so complicated politically because, of course, it reflects an ongoing civil war in France created by World War II in the German occupation. The Vichy French government technically is the legitimate French government, but one that sued for an armistice with the Germans and is often thought about the Allies as a puppet government. They control those colonies in Tunisia and Morocco and Algeria. But remember, too, the local dynamic. This is an imperialist structure here of the French imposing themselves on local people. Many of them didn't really want them there. So when we come as American invaders and British invaders, how are they going to react to us? Weird deal to be fighting your ostensible allies from a French point of view. But what about the locals, too? And then what about the divide between the French themselves? And so when I mentioned dealing with G-Rod, he is conflicted with Charles de Gaulle, who obviously is the main free French leader, over who really controls those anti-Vichy forces. And G-Rod feels he ought to be in control of the whole operation. From his point of view, we're going under French soil. Why would it be anything otherwise? From the American point of view, it's, wait a minute, we're sending about two, three divisions ashore and we're about to take over this whole thing in hundreds of ships. So no, we're going to be in charge and Eisenhower is going to be our lever man for that. So he has to figure that whole dynamic out, much less not wanting the bloodshed fighting the Vichy forces. Because, you know, obviously we've got to fight the Germans and Italians. So how do you handle all that? In other ways, we'd say there's a lot of balls in the air. And I think it's a classic example of that. You listen to Dan Snow's history hit, the best is yet to come. Stick with us. Well, today's revolution is cleaner. With EDF, you can take part. They're generating more British zero carbon electricity than anyone else, helping customers save cash and carbon. With their Sunday Saver Challenge, when you shift your weekday peak electricity usage, you can earn free electricity to use the following Sunday. So fire up a full Sunday fryer, batch cook for the week, or tackle the laundry guilt free. To find out how EDF are helping their customers save cash and carbon, visit edfenergy.com forward slash r-power. EDF change is in our power. UK FuelMix Disclosure Information, published by the Government Department, DESNEZ, recognises electricity from wind, solar and nuclear fuel, produces zero carbon dioxide emissions at the point of generation. Verification, visit edfenergy.com forward slash zero dash carbon. This podcast is sponsored by Alzheimer's Research UK, the charity that exists to find a cure for dementia. Throughout history, humanity has been defined by its battles against the unknown. From the eradication of smallpox to the discovery of penicillin, we have faced down the most devastating threats to our species through one thing and one thing only, the relentless power of human ingenuity. And right now we are standing at another historic turning point. I'm talking about dementia, the UK's biggest killer. Thanks to rigorous, world-leading research, huge advances are being made in our lifetime. We are seeing the first drugs capable of slowing the decline of memory and thinking in Alzheimer's, and blood tests are being trialled in the NHS to diagnose the diseases that cause dementia. It's not going to be easy and it won't happen overnight. But the more research we do, the more lives will change. This isn't just hope. It's scientific progress unfolding in real time. But history teaches us that breakthroughs don't happen in a vacuum. They require momentum. Science is the solution, but support fuels the speed. Alzheimer's Research UK's sole focus is delivering a cure as fast as humanly possible. By supporting their work, you are quite literally accelerating the pace of history. To find out more about the amazing work they're doing, head to Alzheimer'sResearchUK.org I am breaking up with you to be with Backmarket. Backmarket, where the world's shops refurbish tech. From the get-go, torch was fraught with difficulties. American troops were untested in battle. And the British, who'd already been fighting in North Africa for two years, were wary of American inexperience. The Vichy French, for their part, were unpredictable, well, to say the least. No one knew which way they were going to jump when Allied forces landed. And meanwhile, the Axis forces under Rommel were known to be aggressive and capable. The Allied invasion was not going to be easy. So there's two points of crisis that I and I are going to have to deal with. The first is not wanting to expend a lot of blood to fight the Vichy French. So he has to broker a settlement to try and create that strategic end. And that means holding your nose and cutting a deal with a guy named Admiral Darlaan, who is the key French power broker there, and is basically a fascist. He's a Vichy, I eat in a fascist. He's rabidly anti-British. But he's the guy who can stand down all those armed forces for you. So Eisenhower makes that deal, and it leads to a lot of political blowback, both Britain, but especially the U.S. And we wonder, Eisenhower ever in danger of really losing his job? That's the point where it could have happened. And he has enough people in Washington standing up for him, but that just didn't look good. It's total pragmatism. And then later, of course, the Germans and Italians counterattack at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943, leading to a significant reversal primarily for the Americans in the capture of about 2,500 Americans. Eisenhower has to salvage that situation and turn it around. That, I think, is another major point of crisis. Here's where his old friend Patton comes to his rescue a little bit. Eisenhower feels that he must replace the core commander who was in charge of that battle, getting Lloyd Friedendahl, who had performed miserably. And so Patton becomes the core commander there and certainly helps turn the tactical situation around. Eisenhower then weathers those crises. By the time we get to the end of the rainbow here in May 1943, where we capture about a quarter of a million Axis soldiers, Eisenhower by then had really forged a reputation as a kind of effective alliance multinational leader, putting together a team. He basically said, it's okay to curse someone out and say, you, SOB, just don't say you, British SOB, you American SOB, you Canadian SOB. I think there's a great insight there. After setbacks in the Casserine Pass that approached Tunisia, the Allies found their stride. By May 1943, the last of Hitler's Africa Corps had surrendered in Tunisia. The nearly three year long campaign in North Africa was finally over. Eisenhower had helped to bring it home. For him, this had been a trial by fire. He now had a better handle on how this vast complicated alliance worked. Everything from logistics, supplies through intelligence gathering and dealing with your allies. As those allies turned their attention to mainland Europe, he would put all these insights to good use. So he's overseen training, future operations and plans, intel, because you've got Ultra in play now, and obviously he's utilizing that, having to deal with air resources, sea resources, like the Battle of Atlantic, his supply lines, logistics, strategy, alliance, diplomacy. I mean, ah, no, no, he's dealing with all this kind of stuff. By the time Operation Husky happens, the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, that's the biggest invasion in human history up to that point in time. So he's in command of that. That is just an enormous battle to manage. So again, this isn't the guy who's on the ground, leading troops or anything, and he's seldom really at the front. That's not his thing. He's a theater commander, and he's most effective in managing other people and forging these relationships that prove productive, and also while being sensitive to soldiers and sailors and airmen and circulating around and being seen among them and liked by them. So he's the face of the Allied war effort. Famously, somebody had said that the Eisenhower grin was worth X number of divisions. I think we tend to forget. This is like a hypermedia age, you know, a visual media. It's pre-television in the sense that very few people have television, but you might as well be in that kind of visual medium with the way things are at that point in time. It's rapid electronic communication. It's perception. It's propaganda. He understands information operations. I mean, so Eisenhower is just a great practitioner of warfare at those various levels, even if he's not like the ultimate strax soldier at every point, the way we might want him to be. I mean, it doesn't mean he doesn't make mistakes, but I think he understands modern warfare pretty well by that point. After the successful invasion of Sicily and southern Italy, Eisenhower, already armed with the experience of two successful campaigns, was appointed supreme commander of Operation Overlord, the long anticipated invasion of Northwest Europe. Now, if you listened to our last episode on the British Field Marshal, Bernard Montgomery, you'll know that this rubbed Montgomery up the wrong way to put it mildly. This was the prize position. It was coveted, and there were plenty of ambitious, competent commanders vying for the job. While Eisenhower's selection, well, it just, no, obviously seems like a given in retrospect, at the time it was entirely possible that someone else might have taken the reins. I mean, it's possible. But of course, there's a lot of talk at the time and study by historians that Franklin Roosevelt had considered George Marshall for the job. I always thought that's a little odd because George Marshall is the chief of staff. He's the head of the whole army. Technically, that'd be a step down for him, and he had no experience in that kind of command and amphibious operations. And I think that would have been very awkward. He didn't have the relationships with our allies the way that Eisenhower did. Now, of course, Alan Brooke felt that that command should be his, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, which also would have been a step down for him too, by the way. But he said that Churchill promised him twice, and he figured that he should have that, and Brooke had always a very, very high opinion of Brooke and felt he should have that. But in reality, the truth was there was going to be a US commander, and we'd already seen that as the laboratory was the Mediterranean, where at that point, the US still doesn't have supremacy of military forces, the majority of them just yet. We will by the end of Sicily, but that's for the future. Well, by the time we're in Normandy, there is just no question. The American people would not have been on board with being under a foreign commander for that, not just for the invasion, but the campaign that's going to follow, that's going to be predominantly American, the point about two-thirds of the financial power and manpower by the end of the war, not during D-Day. So all that considered, I don't think there was any question had to be Eisenhower, given what had already taken place in the Mediterranean, and the fact that it just wasn't going to make sense to put Marshall in that billet. So supposedly, FDR asked Marshall, what do you want, and Marshall doesn't let him out the hook, and says, I'll serve at your privilege and your pleasure, Mr. President. But I don't think that would have made a lick of sense to have him in that job. That's just my opinion. Let's take through the controversial figures. If you had Montgomery in command or Patten in command, I think they would have had a lot of internal fighting and a lot of people being rubbed the wrong way, a lot of time and energy wasted on that kind of stuff. I think Eisenhower as the kind of CEO of this operation already has these very good productive relationships across the board. Universal respect as a kind of larger commander, if not necessarily a combat commander. What he does is basically refine the planning, which Frederick Morgan deserves a lot of credit, I think, for devising the original plans for the original thinking that they have for the invasion of Normandy. He takes Morgan's original ideas and expands them into a five-division, five-beach invasion plan. And Montgomery deserves a lot of credit for that too. So all of this is to say that Eisenhower is getting a lot of resources now that the Allied world has made available. And particularly now that the United States is approaching its potential and capacity as a kind of military superpower, Eisenhower is drawing on that and having to coordinate this vast operation on which he and I think many others feel that the outcome of the war will probably hinge. And so the pressure that's building in those months in England in early 1944 is kind of unimaginable, I think to us all these years later. The pressure that he's under, lifestyle-wise, it's an incredibly unhealthy lifestyle. He doesn't sleep all that much. He smokes five packs of cigarettes a day. I don't know if anyone could even live doing that, but somehow he does. He guzzles coffee seemingly by the gallon. He's out and about a lot and he's seen by the soldiers a lot. I think that's really good. But he's just under stress constantly day after day. It's kind of amazing to think of. Eisenhower wasn't just chosen because he understood the military dynamics of what would be D-Day. He was chosen because he could manage all the people involved. Just think about the personality he's got a juggle. He's got Montgomery chafing under his command. He's dealing with French General de Gaulle insisting that the glorious sons of France have a bigger role. Back in London, Churchill is bombarding him with brilliant ideas like invasions through the Balkans into southeast Europe or alternative strategies or strange bits of kit that he'd deploy on the battlefield. At times, Eisenhower must have felt like he was really the only adult in the room. It was a hugely complicated political and military balancing act. Churchill is one of the key players, of course. Eisenhower, he'd already forged a pretty good relationship with Churchill. It's in these months, I think, though, when you really see a strong bond established that's going to last the rest of their lives, which is very significant too, because I could be president later and Churchill will come back as prime minister later too in the 50s. How often does that happen that a theater commander deals with a foreign head of government in such a tangible daily one-on-one way? It might almost be thought of as inappropriate in terms of the chain of command, but FDR is totally good with this because he understands a larger productive purpose. You kind of see MacArthur do this with Prime Minister Curtin in Australia a little bit in the earlier stages of World War II, but nowhere near as warm and close a relationship as Ike and Churchill are going to have. And yes, of course, Eisenhower has this always difficult subordinate in Montgomery. He doesn't want to be a subordinate and kind of looks down upon Ike in terms of combat experience. Monti has a lot of combat experience from World War I. I mean, he's seen a lot of action and he's commanded a lot of troops, so you can understand his viewpoint. But I think he also doesn't get some of the bigger picture and the purpose of this too. And he doesn't quite grasp Eisenhower's values sometimes. And yes, De Gaulle is his own guy. And if we think about it from De Gaulle's point of view, we can kind of understand the whole point is his country, liberating his country, and the French must be part of this. And he's constantly trying to make the point, we're still a great power here, which is hard to do when other guys are helping to liberate you, but that's the reality of it. De Gaulle matters on a lot of levels, so Eisenhower has to deal with him. And I think when you talk about these relationships, that's the one he has the toughest time with, in a weird sort of way, because he can't control him. I mean, he can control Monti in the end because Monti is his subordinate, technically. De Gaulle, not really, and yet he must know that FDR detests De Gaulle. So I think as I understand, he can push back because of that, maybe. He's fighting the war at a completely different level of diplomacy and keeping this intact coalition, this team together, towards this unifying purpose, which, I mean, a dozen nations contribute to the Normandy invasion. And really, this is the kernel of what becomes NATO. So Eisenhower is dealing with these personalities, and he has to think of the larger alliance, but he also has to deal with the nuts and bolts, because he has to make decisions, almost by the day, about how they're going to proceed in relation to the invasion. Eisenhower's leadership in the Ronald Tadde day was a masterclass. He was pragmatic. He tolerated ego-fit produced results. He routinely chose coalition unity over personal pride. Now, some critics have said it maybe perhaps he was too soft, and he allowed men like Montgaulle to dominate the planning for D-Day, but without Ike's patience, without his ability to constantly keep the greater mission in mind, the Anglo-American alliance could have fractured. And if that had fractured, there would have been no D-Day at all. And so, by the 5th of June 1944, Eisenhower had managed to coax and coerce this enormous, complex, multinational invasion force into a state of readiness. All they needed now was the green light. And that depended on something as unpredictable as a weather forecast. I mean, most of us have a tough time deciding what to have for dinner. We temperize over that. Let's think about this a second. You have the greatest invasion in human history on edge now. You have to make the decision whether to go ahead with it. It could be a weather disaster. You know all about the Spanish Armada from deeper into history. And the outcome of the war could hinge on this, and then you have to decide. I believe in that moment at Southick House. Eisenhower is arguably the most powerful person in the history of the planet. And then the moment he makes that decision, weirdly, the power kind of slips away. It now goes to everybody else to implement it. But to make that decision, can you imagine the stress? And here's an insight into his character, of course. He prepares that failure note saying, you know, our landings have failed. You know, something I'm paraphrasing. I made the decision, the best information I had at the time, and basically says the responsibility is mine alone. Think about that compared to a lot of leaders we have today or at any other epic who are eager to deflect any responsibility or blame on themselves. This is a guy who's going to attract blame on himself if there's failure. I think that tells you a lot about Eisenhower. We all know it turned out great. He doesn't know when he writes that note. Okay, so I think that's important to step back and think about too. This is Dance Knows History here. More after this. Hi, we're Backmarket. We sell expertly refurbished tech, like phones for talking to your friends or your AI girlfriend. Wow, you have such strong muscles. Either way, this expertly refurbished tech costs way less than you, guaranteed by the Backmarket promise, one-year warranty, and 30-day free returns on every purchase. I am breaking up with you to be with Backmarket. Backmarket with the world's shops' refurbished tech. Now, in store or see 3.co.uk. As we know, in the end, Eisenhower did make the right call because D-Day was an extraordinary success. Much of the planning was done by others, of course, Montgomery, Bradley, etc. but Eisenhower created the structure that allowed them to work together to function. And with Allied boots now on the ground in France, Eisenhower continued in this vein, retaining overall command but delegating roles to the people best place to do them and all the while mediating disagreements between all the big personalities beneath him. He's the ultimate decision maker in terms of what's possible and what's not. So a lot of times he's having to kind of broker disputes among his major commanders, his army commanders, Montgomery, Hodges, eventually Patton, once third armies activated in August. He's having to figure out, okay, I can give you these resources or not, I can give you the authorization to go ahead for this or that and not. So he's sometimes like the bad guy having to tell you, sorry, no can do. And so there's a lot of tension there that's happening. There's been the tension, of course, of this grinded-out battle in Normandy in the summer of 1944, which was just a horrifying experience and incredibly costly for the Allies and much less the Germans. But there's all these moments of stress, of course, when it seems as though we're going to be bogged down there and we're in the middle of another World War I now. What's happening, we know, is that we're kind of at trading the Germans down and wearing them down in addition to what the Soviets are doing to them on the Eastern Front, quite meaningfully there, too. So Eisenhower is having to kind of deal with that daily and weekly stress, much less the casualty roles, which matters. A great deal in two countries like Britain in the U.S. and of course, Canada, that are suffering most of the casualties. I mean, remember, 1944 is a presidential election year in the United States. So if this thing gets worse and worse and worse, FDR may not be a viable candidate. Who knows? And then what does that mean for our war effort? Maybe it intrudes upon the viability of Churchill's war cabinet. But Eisenhower has to think that way. So he's constantly concerned about that, much less dealing with some pretty rest of subordinates in Montee and Patton, the most famous, but they're not the only ones, of course. After the breakout from Normandy, Allied commanders debated how to end the war. There were hopes it would be over by Christmas. Montgomery proposed a narrow, concentrated, needle-like thrust into Germany, commanded by, guess who? Eisenhower instead favoured a broad front approach, advancing across a wide line to steadily push the Germans back. Eisenhower did, though, ultimately concede to a version of Montgomery's plan. It was called Operation Market Garden. Airborne troops would seize key bridges in the Netherlands, while an armoured column would smash its way up the road to relieve all these small, scattered, isolated groups of airborne troops, link up all of them and create a corridor into Germany. The gamble failed. The paratroopers met fierce resistance, especially at the Dutch town of Arnhem, and the armoured advance stalled. It was slower than expected. Isolated and outnumbered, the airborne troops in Arnhem were eventually overwhelmed with heavy casualties, and they surrendered. This was a setback. It was a defeat. And it raises the important question about whether Montgomery or Eisenhower bear ultimate responsibility. I've laid the ultimate responsibility at Eisenhower's feet because it is his call, and he is the supreme commander. I think personally, the decision to go ahead with Market Garden was his worst in the entire war, but certainly in the campaign in northwest Europe. So what happens is that he meets with Montgomery at the Brussels Airport aboard Eisenhower's plan on September 10th, 1944. By then, of course, the Allies are broken out of Normandy. They're moving east, but they're running into serious logistical problems. So the momentum is slowing down. The Germans are recovering a bit. There had been a great deal of hope in the aftermath of the victory in Normandy that the war was about over, and there's still a belief in some quarters that Germany is on the verge of collapse. Because remember, this generation of senior officers had experienced the fall in 1918 as younger people, and had seen the Kaiser Germany just collapse seemingly overnight. And so it seemed like it was going to be a redo of that in 1944. There didn't attempt on Hitler's life in July. And so there's a hope that maybe we can get this thing over with without having to have this major conquering type campaign in Germany. And in the meantime, the airborne units that had played such a key role in Normandy had been on the sidelines for weeks and weeks and weeks with a lot of operations canceled. And these are some of your best troops. You invested a lot of resources in them. So Monte sells IECA on this idea that we can have this kind of coup-demain operation of dropping paratroopers to capture bridges over the key river systems in the Netherlands, and then link up with armor and then go in a North German plane and somehow live happily ever after and win the war. I think it's a high in the sky thing, in my opinion. But the way Eisenhower sees it, he's like, you know, you got a good point there in that maybe we can develop a bridgehead that will be very useful later. Here's where I have criticism, though. Monte, of course, is advocating for that famous single thrust to win the war. You put everything into one single thrust and you knock out the Germans that way. Eisenhower and many of the Americans have more of this kind of broad front view of how to go into Germany. And I think ultimately that's what makes the most sense because it maximizes your advantages. It's what the North did to the South in the Civil War, by the way. And Eisenhower would have known that. I think he doesn't understand when he gives Monte to go ahead for market garden, he's basically giving up the idea of the broad front in favor of that single thrust. And by the time he realizes that's what's happened, it's too late. And of course, market garden is a zero defect operation that if anything goes wrong, everything goes wrong. So when it goes sideways, you end up really in this terrible circumstance, unfortunately. So I think that was a bad call on Eisenhower's part, much less, of course, what it means for the wonderful fighting formation, the British First Airborne Division, that is more or less destroyed at Arnhem, fights really, really hard. I think it's incredibly tragic what happens there. And then to a lesser extent, for the two U.S. Airborne divisions, the 82nd and 101st, which fight their guts out in the Netherlands over that fall in 1944, for unfortunately no great strategic purpose in the bigger picture of it. If we're Dutch living in those areas and liberated, that is meaningful. But the bigger picture of what this whole thing is supposed to be for, unfortunately, we don't get those results. By the late autumn of 1944, with the failure of market garden, the Allied advance had stalled a bit. Supply lines were stretched, the front had lengthened, the German army battered, it just wasn't finished yet. There was still fight left in it. In fact, in December, Hitler launched a surprise counter-offensive through the Ardennes, became known as the Battle of the Bulge. It was an attack that aimed to split the Allied armies in half and capture Antwerp. The attack initially caught the Allies off guard, but Eisenhower responded quickly. He shifted reserves, he reorganized, command along the front. The American forces held key positions like Bastoin, while Allied air power and reinforcements gradually ground down the German advance. By January 1945, the offensive had collapsed, and Germany had sacrificed the last of its strategic reserves. Within weeks, Allied forces crossed the Rhine River, pushing into Germany itself. After the shock of market garden and the crisis of the Bulge, the path to final victory now looked finally open. He basically concludes the war within a year of D-Day, which is about what the planners expected, conservatively speaking. He does it with some level of conservation of resources and overwhelming military power by the end. It's a military force of such incredible power and proficiency that I think humanity had hardly ever seen that. He had developed a lot of great commanders. He had liberated untold millions of people. I think there was a satisfaction in that with all the warts that came along with it. The Hurtgen Forest, of course, had happened in the meantime too in the fall of 1944. That was a debacle. The Bulge led to some pretty serious days from about December 16th to about Christmas time, in which we were struggling to stop the German advance. Once we do, of course, then it ends up as a pretty major victory. We're all take up for Eisenhower. I think he still gets, I think, unwarranted criticism this day is his decision not to press on for Berlin. I think it makes great sense. Here's why I believe this. I know some disagree with me, and that's the fun of history, I guess. At Yalta, the Allied leaders had decided on joint occupation zones in Berlin. Anyway, you slice it. We were going to have to give up half of Berlin to the Soviets. This was going to be deep within the Soviet zone of occupation in Eastern Germany. If we're to press, say, 9th Army and elements of 1st Army and maybe some of Montes' 21st Army group into Berlin, we're going to be fighting for ground we're going to be giving up. We're going to be doing it in a shattered urban landscape of a place that's been bombed to smithereens, which is ideal defensive terrain for the defenders who are fighting fanatically. The casualty numbers are going to probably be at a minimum in mid-5 figures of some sort. We all know who's going to pay most of that blood debt. It's probably going to be the US troops. Is this worth it for a perceived objective, parts of which we're going to have to give up? I don't think so at all. I know Eisenhower didn't at the time and didn't for the rest of his life. This could be an apocryphal story, but supposedly this happened. When he later ran for president, of course, the whole Berlin thing was raging that controversy in the Cold War. Oh, we lost that part of the Cold War. We never should have done it. Eisenhower really screwed up. He supposedly asked a room of people, well, here's my casualty estimate for what this would have cost if we would have gone and taken Berlin. Who here tonight wants to volunteer to sacrifice a loved one to be part of that casualty list when we were going to have to give up a lot of the city? Supposedly it was like crickets. To me, that encompasses the entire span of this argument. That's why I think you probably did make the right call. By the end of the war in Europe, Eisenhower had become one of the most famous soldiers in the world. What set him apart wasn't the battlefield flamboyance of George S. Patton, or the meticulous methodical planning of Bernard Montgomery. His real talent was just leadership, managing personalities, keeping a multinational alliance working towards a common goal. And those skills were transferable. They carried naturally into the post-war world. Eisenhower would lead NATO in 1952. He'd win an election and become president of the United States. He brought the coalition instincts of wartime commander into the politics of the Cold War. He's been the face of this Western Allied war effort, of this new alliance that eventually becomes NATO. It's no accident that later when NATO comes into being, he's the first NATO commander. Eisenhower has made that happen on so many levels. And so he comes out of the war with enormous prestige, and not just in the US, globally. And he becomes a political figure in a way that would have been unimaginable, of course, 10 years earlier, but does have its precedence in American history, as we said, like with Grant, like with Jackson, Washington, and Zachary Taylor is another one we tend to forget. I mean, James Garfield, we've seen this time and time again. And by this point already, in the aftermath of World War II, remember FDR has died by this point, and Truman has become president, not elected. He has succeeded FDR. Both parties are already courting Eisenhower for 1948. And there's even a conversation, supposedly, between Truman and Eisenhower sometime around this time. Truman offers to bow out if Eisenhower will take the Democratic nomination in 1948, and Eisenhower says he doesn't have any interest in politics. So he plays coy with that for years, of course, finally committing in 1952. But we can't fail to see the kind of political dimensions of Eisenhower, even in that seven-year period. He's become that kind of figure by the end of World War II, not because he's lobbying to become president and plotting and consummating alliances to help him with this voting block or that, just because of who he is and the kind of level he operates on and the kind of decisions that he's made. These are arguably the most consequential events in human history, and I think he's acquitted himself pretty well. And I think there's a lot of gratitude for that and a lot of trust in his leadership, I guess. Eisenhower is a quintessential example of the involved internationalist American who understood where the United States fits in in relation to the rest of the world. What alliances mean? I mean, I think he would have been the first to tell us because he understood history. Last time this country fought a war without any allies was the Spanish-American War in 1898, you know? So I think that tells us something. I think Eisenhower understood that, and he also understood, too, kind of what made America tick. I think he understood a lot about his countrymen and women and what they valued and what they didn't. I think he understood that they demanded as a republic that the individual soldier, sailor, airman mattered and that any commander needed to be mindful of that. He kind of led from the bottom in a way, too. I think Eisenhower understood that kind of two-way leadership, but we nowadays call servant leadership. Eisenhower got that really, really well. So how should we judge Eisenhower as a commander? He wasn't the most aggressive general of the war. He was not a battlefield genius or an audacious frontline commander. Instead, he excelled at something less glamorous, but probably more important, true command. Through the twists and turns of the Second World War, he balanced egos, he resolved disputes, he compromised constantly, he responded to political leadership, he kept the vital alliance together, always with the end goal of victory at the front of his mind. Without his guidance, the alliance, well, it may have fractured or it certainly may have been a lot more choppy. Who exactly knows how history would have played out? In the end, Eisenhower was exactly the commander that the Allied coalition needed to win. The amazing thing about him is his impact didn't end with the surrender of Germany. The coalition he'd done so much to forge and shape during the war became a blueprint for the post-war world, visible in institutions like NATO. Victory in World War II was not just about armies and industry, it was about that cooperation. And Eisenhower's calm diplomatic leadership allowed countries with different interests to function as a single strategic entity. And in doing so, he helped to lay down the foundations for the alliances and the multinational partnerships that still shape global politics, mostly to this day. Thanks for listening, folks. Next week we're going to span the globe. We're heading all the way to the Pacific. We're going to be looking at Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and Japan's war against the United States, well, against everyone in the Pacific. Make sure you follow the podcast and your podcast players. You don't miss that one. Bye-bye for now. This is your business. This is your business. Supercharged with the help of zero accounting software. This is managing cash flow. This is the way you're going to run. This is the way you're going to run. This is the way you're going to run. This is the way you're going to run. This is the way you're going to run. This is the way you're going to run. This is managing cash flow. This is managing your cash flow with the help of zero accounting software. 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