Can middle powers build a new world order as PM Carney says?

Welcome to State of Play. I'm Will Todman, Chief of Staff of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. In this podcast, we bring together our leading experts to unpack the latest geopolitical developments from around the world and what it all means. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's speech at Davos last week has caused quite a stir. He talked about a rupture in the world order, and he said, the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality, where geopolitics, where the large main power, geopolitics, is submitted to no limits, no constraints. He also charted a new pathway forward. He said, middle powers have the capacity to build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the various states. And there was a bit of a call to action as well. He said middle powers must act together because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu. But do middle powers really have the ability to chart a new path in this ruptured world that he's talking about? And can key US allies do this? Today, I am joined by Christy Govella, who is the Japan Chair and Senior Advisor, and Chris Hernandez-Roy, who is Deputy Director and Senior Fellow of our Americas Program. And we're going to be looking at how Japan and Canada in particular are thinking about this speech. What range of options do they have? And how easy would it be for them to actually act on this? And so I'm sorry that we're not in the studio together, Christy and Chris. The snow has kept us apart, but great to see you on the screen. Thank you so much for joining me. I think my first question for you is what stood out from the speech to you? I just said a few quotes. We used a few quotes from it. But were there any messages that you found really striking? And maybe, Chris, since you focus on Canada, can I ask you to start? What struck you? I mean, the first thing I'd say, rather than what struck me about the speech, is how he got to the speech. And this is a sort of a natural progression from the posture that Carney took vis-a-vis the United States when it was initially under Trump's tariff threats and actually implementation of tariffs. And shortly after the election, he said that the relationship between Canada and the United States was irrevocably changed. He said there was this movement towards progressive integration was over and a new relationship would need to be developed. And so the Davos speech is really taking that from a bilateral context to a global context, where he's not just now saying that the relationship between two very close trading partners has broken, but that subsequent actions by the US and other hegemons, China and Russia, have really broken the international rules-based order. and that countries like Canada and other middle powers need to stop thinking that we can just go back to this at some point and really need to look forward and move forward into trying to construct something that suits their interests in a world order that's definitely changed. So that's what struck me about his speech, this movement from a domestic issue to now presenting it on the world stage, realizing that it's a much graver problem. It's not just a problem between Canada and the US. It's now a problem between middle powers and the three hegemons. Yeah. And going back, it's funny. In some ways, it feels like a lifetime ago, but Carney won in part because of Trump, right? So their sort of fates have been intertwined from the beginning of his premiership. Christy, what stood out to you? Well, thanks for having me, Will. You know, in many ways, what Carney said wouldn't be very surprising to many people in Japan. He talked about gaps between rhetoric and reality in the international order. And, you know, a lot of countries have known about that. It was more that he said the quiet part out loud, right? There have always been these aspects of hypocrisy and, you know, power underwriting these institutions, but they did provide important public goods and benefits to other states. And so, you know, they were seen as in their interests. I think also, you know, he talked a lot about building coalitions with partners who share common ground to act together. And that's also not really new for middle powers. They've been doing this for ages. And if you are somebody who thinks about middle powers, they're generally known for preferring multilateralism and being good international citizens, etc. And Japan's been taking that kind of approach, you know, for decades. So I think the things that were new and that would stick out are this aspect of calling on middle powers to band together and apply the same standards to allies and rivals, which means that they would be banding together possibly vis-a-vis the U.S., which, of course, is a very provocative idea to people in Japan, for example. and this idea that we're in the midst of a rupture, not a transition. So he seems indeed, as Chris was saying, to be suggesting that, you know, what we had before may not be repairable. And so I think that would come as also very jarring to many countries that have invested a lot in this order. And as much as the Trump administration and other actors like China and Russia have disrupted this order, I think that investment tends to make them want to stick with it. So those were the things that stuck out to me. A lot of continuity in some ways, but then Also, the tone and this idea of a crisis that you can't go back from is definitely new. Can I just add something real quick, Will? And one other thing that stood out, I think, but maybe more from the perspective of an observer of Canadian politics is Carney's talk about variable geometry and pragmatic engagement. So leaving behind Canada's traditional foreign policy of engaging with like-minded partners and upholding sort of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and thinking about more pragmatic relationships with countries that might not share all of the interests that Canada has, but can work together on specific issues. So that is also a departure, I think. And for middle powers, I think in general, a realization that we need to engage with the world as it is, not as we want it, to sort of paraphrase something that Carney often repeats. Yeah. And I want to just make sure I've understood. So is he saying that there was such a thing as the rules-based order and that that has now been ruptured? Or was he saying a piece of this was always a myth and that countries were, you know, that we weren't open about the degree to which hegemons, I guess the US in particular, was never fully integrated itself into this rules-based order or adherent to it? I'd say that he was saying both things. He acknowledges that there was a rules-based order that worked most of the time, but everybody in that order understood that from time to time, hegemons would do what they wanted to do, whether it was in accordance with the order or not. and this is why he talks about the fiction, that when it worked, it worked great, but everybody had to accept that from time to time there would be exceptions to that. And again, I just want to make sure for anyone who hasn't listened to the speech, the rupture that we're talking about, the thing that caused this, he's talking about tariffs, he's talking about a transactional foreign policy. Of course, this was coming in the context of the threats against European countries with tariffs if they didn't, or if they blocked his efforts to acquire or otherwise seize Greenland. So are there other things that I've just missed from that list that we're talking about here, like drivers that have ruptured this order? Well, I mean, certainly President Trump's use of lethal force to go after drug boats in the Caribbean is viewed as contrary to international law. And in fact, some of the US's closest intelligence partners, including France, Britain, I believe the Netherlands, I may be wrong about the last one, have stopped sharing intelligence on drug shipments in the Caribbean because they don't want their intelligence to be used for what they perceived are unlawful uses of force. And then of course, right after that, there's the removal of president, well, I shouldn't call him president de facto President Nicol Maduro of Venezuela in a snatching grab that nobody will miss Maduro He was a brutal dictator that ruined what should be one of the most prosperous countries on earth But the way it was done also clearly contravenes international law So those are a couple other examples that must have been front of mind for Prime Minister Carney Yeah, yeah. So I want to better understand the reaction to this speech, because I have seen quite a lot about it from the US perspective. But looking at the two countries that you both focus on, or at least for the purposes of this podcast that I'm saying you focus on, so Canada, Chris, what was the domestic Canadian response to or reaction to this speech? Was it a feeling of like, you know, go Prime Minister Carney, we've all wanted you to finally stand up and speak truth to power and whatnot? Or is there real fear? I think both of those emotions ran through Canadian society. Carney, after all, as you mentioned at the beginning, Will, he benefited from President Trump's meddling in Canadian politics. And he benefited by having what was called, using a hockey term, elbows up. It's kind of a fighting back, basically. And he won an election on that. And this speech, frankly, in some quarters was seen as the same, but now on the global stage, standing up against the things that we mentioned, the U.S. using its economic and hard power in ways that Carney felt didn't follow the rules based international order. But also, obviously, in response to even greater transgressions by the Russians in Ukraine or by the Chinese, for instance, using their near monopoly on rare earths to coerce or to attempt to coerce the United States, European countries, etc. So there was this group that said, you know, that cheered Carney for his courage, frankly. But then at the same time, there's obviously a deep realization that Canada is right next to the United States and Canada exports 75% of its economy depends on exports to the US. and we're months away from the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the USMCA. And so a lot of people were also saying, wait a minute, this was courageous, yes, but potentially very damaging for Canada ahead of these trade negotiations. And just before we move to Japan, I mean, we already saw President Trump uninvite Canada from the Board of Peace. Maybe that's not something that Prime Minister Kani is devastated about. But, you know, is there, I suppose, how real are these economic threats? Is there a feeling, is there a real fear that President Trump might seek to impose real costs on Canada because of the messages in this speech? Well, President Trump is already causing real economic damage in Canada with his tariffs on autos and auto parts and the tariffs on steel and aluminum and to a lesser extent cover. But for instance, the United States imports 50% of its aluminum from Canada. So there are real economic consequences despite the carve-outs under USMCA, something like 90% of goods coming from Canada to the US are still exempt. But the auto sector in particular is suffering. And those are tariffs that are in place today. He also threatened shortly after the Davos speech, after saying that the deal that Carney inked with China to lower Canadian tariffs on Chinese EVs in return for the Chinese lowering their reciprocal tariffs on Canadian canola oil, despite saying that was a great deal initially, in the days after Davos turned around and threatened 100% tariff, which of course is completely unrealistic given the very tight intertwining of the two economies. But there remains clearly tariffs that are damaging the economy now and more damage could be done depending on how his relationship with Carney involves. Yeah, yeah. Christy, let's move to Japan then. So I think, as you said, Japan is a country that is quite a fan of the rules-based order, has depended on the US quite a lot in various ways. Did this speech cause a ripple in Japan? Was it more than a ripple? Is it a big subject of discussion there in the media or not so much? So this didn't get much play in the general public in Japan. There were some editorials here and there, but overall, I would say it didn't create a big stir. Of course, among elite circles, people were talking about it. We had a dialogue last week, hosted a number of colleagues from Japan, and it was interesting to hear what they had to say. My overall impression is that it didn't resonate as much as some would think even amongst elite circles. Why? Again, I think many of the elements in Carney's speech do reflect Japan's concerns. Japan, like Chris was saying, has been hurt by tariffs. We see this impact reflected in business surveys, for example. Japan also has been concerned about these ruptures in the international order and has been trying to broaden economic and security partnerships for some time. But the key thing that makes it different for Japan is that Japan faces a security threat in their neighborhood. They face this existential threat, as many believe, from China. And that puts them in a fundamentally different situation than Canada. So I think, you know, what we hear from many colleagues is that a middle power coalition offers many benefits, but it really doesn't address the problem of traditional security. So in that sense, Japan's alliance with the U.S. is essential. And Japan, unjust as it may be, is prepared to swallow some indignities in order to preserve that. You often hear with Japanese colleagues that there's no plan B for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Sometimes these days you hear a little bit of a talk of like a plan A-2 or something like this. It remains true. Despite everything that's happened, despite the tariffs, despite all of these unprecedented actions in Venezuela and elsewhere, Japan does not see itself as interested as deliberately antagonizing the U.S. or trying to build coalitions that do so because it really isn't an option in terms of security. That doesn't mean that they aren't willing to work with other like-minded countries like Canada. They definitely are. We've seen Japan build relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific and Europe, around the world. We've seen Japan, you know, push WTO reform and try to fix institutions. But, you know, there is this hesitance to do so at the expense of its relationship and its alliance with the U.S., you know, major trading partner, key security ally. So that's really a difference. I'd love to talk some more about that because I want to better understand to what extent is this new pathway forward that Carney described possible for US allies? And maybe, Christy, we can start with Japan. You just said Japan has been building different kinds of alliances or different kinds of coalitions to tackle certain topics. What does that look like? And do they ever not include the US? Are they ever against the US? or without? So if we look at the Japanese government's approach to date, you know, there is certainly a lot of relationship building, but it is seen as consistent with its relationships with the U.S. and the U.S.-Japan alliance, which really is the basis of the security policy for Japan. But the world is complicated. There are many issues, you know, trade, environment, all of these things. And so, you know, Japan, where it can, builds relationships with its regional partners There's increasingly insecurity. We see that it has reciprocal access agreements with Australia, the Philippines, the UK. It's engaging in defense industrial based cooperation. So, you know, Japan is not putting all of its eggs in the U.S. basket, so to speak. But I don't think it sees these actions as contrary to that strong relationship with the U.S. So I think that's a question that will come up for many Japanese listeners with Carney speech is just that, you know, to what extent is it necessary to really discard the old U.S. led order or to antagonize the U.S.? Like, can't we just do this, you know, in the same way that we have been doing, which is, you know, kind of you could think of it as, you know, U.S. plus or these kinds of things where you're you're kind of going around it. So I would say that's more of the preferred Japanese approach at this point. Chris, does that sound like Canada's approach as well? I mean, it sounded like the speech was a bit more explicitly anti-US to me, or maybe anti-US is wrong to say, but sort of working around the global hegemons rather than with them just creating new kinds of partnerships. How do you think Prime Minister Carney actually views the pathway forward for Canada and acting on what he laid out Well I wouldn say that it was explicitly anti What it was was explicitly against hegemons using their position as hegemons outside of the rules international. That's what it was really about. And there were certain sentences in the speech that when I was listening to it immediately, I'm like, oh, he's talking about China. And then, oh, he's talking about the US. So, oh, he's talking about Russia. But it wasn't universally against any one of them in particular. It was just hegemonic power means we need as middle powers to do something differently. Another thing I just mentioned real quickly about the resonance that you were asking about, the speech I think resonated a lot in the global South because they've often said that they were excluded from the rules-based international order. They were forgotten by it. And this is sort of the way Kearney frames it is something I think that they could really relate to. Whether that leads to any greater cooperation between the global south and middle powers, which should not be viewed exclusively as Western industrialized countries, Europe, Japan, Australia, Korea, but also the Brazils, the Indias, the South Africans of the world, not necessarily the BRICS countries, although I just mentioned three of them. But that could be an opening for more cooperation between middle powers of the West and middle powers of the global South. Now that they've kind of taken off the veil, they've taken the sign out of the shop. And if I could interject there, I mean, we do see Japan being really interested and, you know, enthusiastic about engaging the global South to the extent that they can. This is something that they are thinking about. I mean, to get back to the question you asked me, well, you know, how does Japan's approach kind of mesh with the US? I think a key difference is really that we don't see Japan trying to build, you know, fundamentally stronger relationships with China. Actually, you know, Japan right now has pretty tense relations with China due to China's reaction to some statements by the current prime minister, Sanai Takeuchi, over Taiwan. So, you know, I think when we think about Carney's visit to China or things like that, that's, you know, something we probably won't see from Japan because of that. So when we think about, you know, hegemons disrupting the international order, I think that for Japan, you know, that's still more of a China-Russia problem for them. And the benefits of the U.S. portion still outweigh the disruptions that the U.S. is causing. But I think that, you know, just has to be said, you know, Japan's all for building partnerships everywhere in the world. But with China, you notice that there's not really a big appetite there. And there's no sense that that could shift, that that calculation is likely to shift in the near term, at least. that something could rupture the US-Japan relationship to a degree that Japanese leaders do start looking to China. I know we're talking hypotheticals here, but I just wonder if that's even part of the conversation or if that's completely unrealistic in your mind, Christy. At this point, it doesn't seem like it's very realistic. I mean, it's interesting to note that Prime Minister Takeuchi, after making the statement about Taiwan, her approval ratings actually did not suffer. Some would even say that they were strengthened by the strong stance she took vis-a-vis China. You know, Japan has a constrained approach to defense due to its history and its constitution, but we've actually seen the Japanese public become much more concerned about security threats from China and North Korea and Russia, particularly after the war in Ukraine. And we've seen them become more favorable in terms of supporting defense spending, etc. So, I think that that consciousness is awakened in Japan to an extent we haven't seen previously and doesn't seem likely. I'll just mention briefly that Japan is in the midst of campaigning for an upcoming snap election that has been called. And so it's interesting to note that opposition parties are doing some interesting coalition building and trying to, you know, see if they can win a share of the vote. But even they have converged on sort of a consensus that the more assertive security and defense posture of Japan is something that they can support. So for a long time, they were actually opposed to legislative changes that allowed Japan to engage in limited collective self-defense, which were made back in 2015 by former Prime Minister Abe. So actually, they've just flipped their positions for the first time in over a decade. So if anything, even if this election turns out differently, it doesn't seem like we're looking for a big rupture in US-Japan relations. Rather, there is more and more convergence about concern over China, North Korea, Russia, and other security issues. Yeah. And I want to talk a little bit about the challenges to Prime Minister Carney for adopting this kind of approach. I mean, Chris, you've talked a little bit about how there could be more of an outreach to the global south, particularly to middle powers in the global south. But also you've talked about some of the risks involved of provoking the ire of President Trump and what that could look like. How risky do you think it is for someone like Prime Minister Carney to be making this kind of speech? I mean, is he really, it seems on one level he's kind of taken on a global leadership role and it's resonating, but what are the risks and the challenges associated with it, do you think? I mean, it was certainly very courageous. I'm not sure, apart from a lot of applause in Davos and a lot of people talking about the speech, what the practical positives will be, other than people will want to hear Carney say other interesting things in the future and invite him. And yes, it may provide him some measure of leadership that he might not otherwise have had. Canada is a G7 country, but within the G7, it's one of the smaller, if not the smallest economy. And maybe Carney sees himself as a sort of an Angela Merkel or, you know, punching above his weight and being a voice for the West in a moment where the U.S. is pulling back and is unreliable. But, frankly, I was, you know, I love the speech just like many other people, but I thought it was really timed very poorly given that in, you know, in just a few months, the renegotiation of Canada's essential trading relationship with the United States is going to kick off. And, you know, there's the old saying that Canada's best friend is the United States, whether Canada likes it or not, because Canada is next door and has to deal with the hegemon right next door and has integrated so closely with the U.S. to give a speech where the president certainly saw himself reflected as one of the negative hegemons in the speech was very risky, even as it was very courageous. Christy, how about the risks for Japan? So just briefly, I have to say there's a lot to like in Carney's call for middle powers to be ambitious and to take a more proactive role. So, you know, when we think about Japan and what it's doing, we've heard a lot of calls or wishes for Japan to step up and take a leadership role, like it did when it helped to shepherd the Trans-Pacific Partnership into the revised CPTPP. So that's all good. But the risks, I would say, are number one, tactically, retaliation from the U.S. in the form of tariffs, which Japan is not eager to see. And then number two, strategically, I think there are some questions about how middle powers and smaller powers want to use their limited time and resource in order to build new coalitions. So I think some in Japan might be wondering if they shouldn't be trying to save the existing order instead of branching out too much. Interesting. So maybe then to bring us towards a close here, I can ask the three questions that I typically ask to end these episodes. So firstly, in one word or phrase, how is Japan or Canada feeling about this new world order that Carney laid out? Christy, how's Japan feeling about it? Skeptical. Oh, skeptical. So not even as in not even believing that it's there or you're worried about its consequences? I think all of the above. I think Japan has been very open about the fact that it thinks that the rules-based international order is in crisis for various reasons and looking for ways to shore it up. So I think that, you know, I think the speech in many ways, as I said, you know, reflected concerns. But I think Japan is going to probably try to stay the course of what it's been doing for some time. Yep. Okay. And Chris, in Canada? With trepidation, I think. Yeah. Okay. I think it's two words, but with trepidation, but at the same time with eyes wide open. Carney is clearly not standing still because his speech as I said at the very beginning is an extension of what Canada feels in the bilateral relationship extended to how he now viewing it in the global arena And so in the bilateral relationship, Canada is doing everything it can to reduce its dependence on the United States by striking trade deals left, right, and center. so trepidation but eyes wide open and not standing still and so then if we think about those hegemons and the great powers that we often talk about China, Russia and the US which of them do you think has had the best week which has had the worst week well can I just say something real quick I know we're wrapping up but I think the two hegemons are the United States and China I don't put Russia in the same league Yeah, yeah, that's fine. Yeah, yeah. Creating problems for Europe and beyond Europe in terms of just the principles of territorial integrity, which then, you know, this is one of the reasons that Carney made his speech. But I don't see them in the same league. I mean, in a different world in 20 or 30 years, a revived Germany, a Japan with a different posture, these are great powers as well. They're not hegemons. And I would put Russia in that category as a great power, but not a hegemon. Yeah. And I saw some people talking about the spheres of influence in the national security strategy and say China considers Russia to be in its sphere of influence. Yeah. The difference in the economy of Russia and China is orders of magnitude. Yeah, yeah. And, you know, if Russia can't even take over Ukraine, the combined heft of Europe, without going into all its vulnerabilities, of course, is daunting. So I don't think Europe is Russia's sphere of influence. But to answer your question super quickly, I think China is definitely up here because it's seeing Europe and the United States fracture over Greenland. And it wants to pull Europe closer into its orbit. Europe and China are important trading partners. China is seeing the United States and Canada have a falling out and perhaps a deeper falling out, which may affect the North American economy, which of course is also good for China. And China globally, and certainly in the area of the world that I look at, Latin America, it's now seen as a more reliable trading partner than the United States. So I'd say China is on the up here. Okay. Christy? They think China's down, as I was mentioning, at least from the Japan perspective. Actually, Japan-China relations are probably at one of their lowest points in the last 15 years or so. And the most recent development in their tensions is that China is withdrawing the pandas from the Ueno Zoo in Tokyo. Oh, I saw that. No pandas. For the first time since 1972. So I think that's definitely got to put them in the down category for this week. But in relative terms, you know, that U.S.-Japan relations have been relatively quiet lately. So we'll take the moment of relative calm as a win for the U.S. this time. And didn't we just have Secretary Hegseth and the Japanese defense minister doing rowing together or something? They worked out. It was pretty intense for Defense Minister Koizumi, but he made it through with some dehydration and was, you know, rescued by the medics or whatever. But I think it was, you know, things are relatively calm, although that's always a risky thing to say in these days. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, are there any words or phrases that either of you would like to ban people from saying in general about Kani's speech, about a new world order? Should we stop saying rules-based order? or, um, you know, I would just say, I appreciate the term middle powers, but some people really hate that term and they don't know what it means. And in Japan, there's always a group of people that will, uh, you know, interject very quickly and say that Japan is not a middle power. Japan is a great power, et cetera. So, um, I would just say that when we're talking about middle powers, it's perhaps worth thinking about it a little more. And Chris already alluded to the fact that, you know, people make certain assumptions about who we're talking about and who we're not, You know, if we're really serious about thinking about these countries and their role in the world, maybe we should think a little more deeply about what that means and where those shared interests or where that shared future could lie. That makes sense. Okay. And I have a word, but it's very, it's in my parochial vision of the broader geographic area that I studied and speaking about just Canada, U.S., bilateral relationships. It had been put to bed for quite some time, but the president used this word again last week, governor, calling the prime minister governor. That is something that I find deeply offensive. Yeah. Okay. All right. So, okay, this has been really interesting because I think in our think tank bubble, foreign policy focused bubble, this speech made big waves. I've heard so many people talking about it. People at parties have been talking about it and things. Maybe I need to get slightly less nerdy friends. But I think it sounds like from both, or at least, Christy, from Japan's perspective, you said this didn't make that bigger stir, that Japan doesn't think that we're on the verge of something completely new here. Maybe that's partly because it has somewhat limited options, because it ultimately is not going to turn away from the US, given the huge looming threat of China right there over the sea. And the U.S. Security Alliance remains really critical. But also, I think you've said that this is, you know, this idea of building new partnerships, this is something that Japan has been working on for a long time. Can I just say one last thing there, Will? Sure. I think when Carney describes different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests, like that is what Japan has been doing. But I think also it sounds more like a coping strategy than a new world order in a lot of ways. So I think that there are some big questions about whether middle powers can create a new international order. That's never been the case historically. It's always needed a big hegemon to underwrite it. So I think with Japan and some others, it's not that they don't agree with a lot of the frustrations and sentiments. It's just a question of pragmatism and where that leadership can really come from. Yeah. And our listeners, of course, can't see the fact that all three of us are nodding and I think agreeing. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. We are. Yeah. Yeah. And Chris, talking about Canada, you've said there's been a mixed reaction. Of course, lots of Canadians and people around the world viewed this as a courageous speech to give, and I think an impressive one as well. But ultimately, there are real risks. There are real questions about the timing that Carney chose to do it with the renegotiation of the USMCA just coming up. And of course, there's the risk that President Trump could retaliate. And given Canada's economic dependence on the US, it is having costs and it could have even greater costs to Canadians. I think you made a really interesting point about how this has resonated in the global south and that we could start seeing more relationships forming between some of those major powers, or sorry, major powers, middle powers, I guess. Brazil, South Africa, Japan, perhaps. Although I guess Japan is not the global South. But we could start seeing new relationships forming there. But ultimately, the words you both used were trepidation, that there's trepidation in Canada about this, and then skepticism, Christy. So I think the answer to the question that we started, do middle powers really have the ability to chart a new world order? In some ways, they have been charting a new path to some degree, but that probably won't lead to a new world order. And Christy, you just said, historically, it's the hegemons that create that. So I think this is probably a speech that's going to be studied going forward. Maybe we'll come to view this as something of a turning point, but it is still going to take quite some time for middle powers, if it's still allowed to use that term, to actually create a new world order and one that doesn't rely on hegemons to the same degree. So there is so much more to discuss here. We've done this quite succinctly today, but would love to have you both back on to see how this continues to play out. Thank you so much for joining me. Sorry, we're not there in person, but great to see you on the screen. Thank you again. Thank you, Will. Great discussion, Christy.