4/13/26: Trump Blockades Hormuz Strait, Negotiations Break Down, Gas Prices Spike

This is an I Heart podcast. Guaranteed human. Hey guys, Sagar and Crystal here. Independent media just played a truly massive role in this election and we are so excited about what that means for the future of this show. This is the only place where you can find honest perspectives from the left and the right that simply does not exist anywhere else. So if that is something that's important to you, please go to breakingpoints.com, become a member today and you'll get access to our full shows, unedited, ad free, and all put together for you every morning in your inbox. We need your help to build the future of independent news media and we hope to see you at breakingpoints.com. Good morning everybody, happy Monday. I have an amazing show for everybody today. Will we have Crystal? We have all the latest details in terms of the failed negotiations thus far, including Trump's decision to blockade the blockade. We'll try to dig into how much sense that makes and how successful it will be. Trudeau-Parsie is also gonna join to break down his view of where we are in the negotiations and the American red lines that made this whole thing fall apart. Oil prices this morning are up for understandable reasons. Rory's gonna join us to talk about what he expects in the near future. South Korea is aggressively fighting with Israel as Israel continues their mass slaughter in Lebanon. Eric Swalwell has suspended his campaign for governor after serious allegations of sexual assault and just generally very creepy behavior. And Norm Finkelstein is gonna join us. It's been a while since we've had Norm on. He has a lot of thoughts as you can imagine about Iran and the role Israel played in getting us into this war. So very much looking forward to speaking with him. There you go. Thank you to everybody who's been subscribing, supporting the showbreakingpoints.com. If you're able to become a premium subscriber, this week we will have a coveted Emily and Sager AMA. All right, so for all of those who've ever wanted that, you can keep all your hostile questions in the chat. Get them ready and get ready to go. Stop it, the people love you guys. No, no, I know that they love you. You guys get two Emily and Sager shows this week. Actually, that's my daughter in college. It's gonna be quite an interesting show this week. And thank you to everybody also who has been hitting the subscribe button. We are now at 2.02 million. I think, what did we agree on? 2.5? Yeah. 2.5. They can just stop after that. 2.5, zero is a much cleaner number than 2.5. One, I'm sure I'll change my tune if we do eventually hit that. So thank you. And if you're listening to this podcast, please share an episode with a friend. We really appreciate it whenever you do so. It helps other people find the show. Let's go ahead and start with the blockade of the blockade. Let's put this up here on the screen after the failed negotiations in Islamabad. So there you have it. The meeting went well. Most points were agreed to, but the only point that really mattered, nuclear was not effective. Immediately, the United States Navy, the finest in the world, would begin the process of blockading any and all ships, trying to enter or leave the Straits of Hormuz. At some point, we will reach an all being allowed to go in all being allowed to go out basis, but Iran was not allowed that to happen. This is incomprehensible. I'm merely saying there may be a mine out there somewhere. The bottom line is that there will be a US Navy blockade, which is going to be implemented as of 10 a.m. Eastern time here in the United States. Donald Trump also phoned into Fox News to elaborate on this blockade. Let's take a listen. Tell us what you're trying to accomplish with this blockade, sir. All out, yep. It's called all in and all out. There'll be a time when we'll have them all come in and all come out, but it won't be a percentage. It won't be a friend of yours, like a country that's your ally or a country that's your friend. It's all or nothing. And that won't be in too long a distance. Now, we're just bringing the ships up. We got a lot of ships that we're bringing them up. We think that numerous countries are going to be helping us with this also, but we're putting on a complete blockade. We're not going to let Iran make money on selling oil to people that they like and not people that they don't like or whatever it is. It's going to be all or none, and that's the way it is. And it'll be, you saw what we did with Venezuela. It'll be something very similar to that, but at a higher level. All or none, although, you know, even the United States Central Command as a very late last night, they put out an explanation that actually this will just be a blockade of Iranian ships only, the Persian Gulf ships, all the other types of ships would be allowed through. However, Iran is going to blockade those ships. So that does actually mean an all out blockade. Outside of close allies. Outside of very close allies. Yeah, well, this is the big question. So 40% of the oil that moves through the Straits of Hormuz is Chinese. Are we going to just be blowing up Chinese tank or something makes me think that's not going to happen. That's a really bad idea. Oh, it's going to be horrible. Every sort of level, including the fact, listen, we already know with the Chinese that they have sorry, no pun intended, a Trump card, which is, you know, when we went to war with them, economic war through the tariffs, they were like, that's great. You don't get access to our where earth minerals. And very quickly, Trump caved intelligently and was like, you know, the stupid part was the threat to begin with, not realizing the sort of cards that they held in his sort of parlance. And very quickly, they forced him to realize that they had a much stronger position. And that central leverage point obviously still remains. The other thing that's very interesting here is, you know, Trump apparently didn't contemplate at all that they would be able to close the Strait of Hormuz or control the Strait of Hormuz. He thought this thing would be wrapped in 3Ds, that the regime would collapse and he'd be victorious, blah, blah, blah. Like I think he genuinely believed that. So he didn't think through this part at all. Now military strategists obviously did. This is something that's been contemplated for a long time. It's not clear that they contemplated the situation where Iran wouldn't close the Strait of Hormuz, they would just control it and get to pick and choose. Now from the US perspective, the good part of that is it means that oil is still flowing into the global markets in some significant quantities. So what eases some of the price pressure on global oil, and it are gas pumps here in the US, the bad part of that is it means that Iran continues to do what they want and make money, hand over fist. So if you're serious about actually completely choking this off, well yeah, that's gonna damage Iran some in terms of the revenue that they're bringing in, but it's also going to ratchet up the economic pressure on the US and obviously our landscape is we have a population that doesn't support this at all, that doesn't want to be fighting this war, that doesn't want to be paying more money at the gas pumps. So it's a very confusing move and then you add to that the question, okay, well what if an Indian ship comes, what if a Chinese ship comes, are you really going to make this a world war by attacking the ships from these nations, you know, powerful nations? In terms of the implementation, he's saying that we're not gonna allow any Iranian ships through. Well if Iran allows an Indian ship through and they charge them a toll and then the US doesn't blockade them, then the net effect is actually still the same. There's also a breaking update this morning, Iran has just countered saying a US blockade with a warning on ports and it is saying that if its ports are threatened, that that means that any port in an allied nation will also be threatened, effectively saying, okay, you blockade our ports and we will destroy all of the ports in the Persian Gulf, which has been their trump card as well. And they've also directly threatened as a result of this, the Babel Mandab Strait, which is on the other side and the Houthis could restart their operations here. It's a mess and let's just talk high level, like what is this about? The president ultimately failed in the negotiations with Islamabad and let's be very clear here, JD Vance had to call Trump some six to seven times while he was in Islamabad, effectively he was dispatched with no real ability to have some sort of a mandate or ability to make a deal, he has to constantly call Donald Trump. The Iranians have come out and put out multiple statements, they were close to some sort of memorandum of understanding until Trump shifted the goalpost at the last minute. This is a red line that Donald Trump has drawn, which is entirely ridiculous, which says no enrichment of any kind, which would be surrender for the nation of Iran and they could never maintain even sort of latent nuclear deterrent, they do not want to end up like Gaddafi, would you? And so they see very clearly, they're like this is worth going to war over because giving this up is actually the end of our regime after we've been attacked twice by this nation under the cover of diplomacy. You also have Trump who has moved the goalpost so many different times, he could sign this, they could give up their enrichment and they could bomb and destroy them, not to mention the Israelis. Remember, zero enrichment is an Israeli demand which was adopted by the president of the United States. It was never, never a real demand from the president even going back into June. So whenever they say no nuclear weapon, what they mean is no enrichment again of any kind, which is genuinely vital to their security deterrents. I'm not endorsing it, I'm saying this is reality at this point. And the Iranians from their perspective, they believe that their position will only be strengthened over time because the economic pain will ratchet up on the US, the political pressure will increase, especially as we get closer to the midterms. So they look at this and they're like, okay, you are demanding things that are not acceptable and that don't make sense given the strength of the Iranian position here and the relative weakness of the American position. So Trump was not willing to accept the demands from the Iranians and that would reflect the actual reality of what's been demonstrated in terms of the power balance in this war because he finds it too humiliating. Okay, well then what are you gonna do? Ending the war is too humiliating for him. The status quo is too painful. So it's very hard to see what ends up happening. We're gonna talk to Trita Parsey in a little bit. He believes that what's most likely, or at least what I heard in his last interview, maybe he's changed his assessment, he believes what's most likely is that we don't return to a full war. There's a non-negotiated settlement that includes a new status quo with basically Iran continuing to control the Strait of Hormuz and Israel doing effectively whatever Israel wants to do. That's the direction that he thinks things are going in. But let's be clear, if that is what happens here and you end up in this sort of like low level conflict with a new status quo with the Strait of Hormuz, that's a disaster for the US and it's certainly not going to return oil prices to what they were before this disastrous war started. And then this is also a return to the quote, maximum pressure strategy, maximum pressure. The idea is just a return to normal. Trump both doesn't want to have to continue the war, but he doesn't want to surrender and show the world that he got absolutely humiliated. So he's trying to do a blockade, but maximum pressure already failed. We already threw every sanction in the world at Iran. Now this is just even more of a sanction with a naval blockade. Also, let's just say this, naval blockade is an act of war, just so we're all very aware of that. Remember when President Kennedy tried to blockade or blockaded Cuba, they had to call it a quarantine because blockade literally is an act of war. So Congress, by the way, you're still allowed to get involved here if you want to. All of this just means that they're flailing about, they have really no idea what to do. This is almost certainly, it's gonna shock the world oil markets, but beyond even the market, because at this point I think they're delusional, the global supply of oil is radically shrinking, radically shrinking every single week that this continues. This is still a closure, even in those couple of days where this quote straight was open, it was barely open at all, a couple of ships, return to normalcy was vital as of three or four weeks ago. We are already in demand destruction territory, massive damage to US allies in Asia, and $4 gas is now going to be ever present in our lives, at least for the next couple of months, absent a serious and shocking event. So let's go then to A3, here is Trump saying he predicts that they'll come back to the negotiating table, let's take a listen. Death to this, death to, and I make one statement, they say, oh, such a big deal, let me tell you that statement got them to the bargaining table and they haven't left, they haven't left the bargaining table. I predict they come back and they give us everything we want, and I told my people, I want everything, I don't want 90%, I don't want 95%, I told them, I want everything. Well, and what they want- They have no cards, Maria, Maria. Yep. They have no cards, their Navy is gone, their Air Force is gone, totally gone, they have nothing, they have no ships. 158 ships are at the bottom of the sea, good ones, good ones, new, the Salamani, they had one called the Salamani, it was taken out by one of our Tiger Sharks, by one of our rapidly moving submarines. It's amazing, our military is so good. You know our military is at 94% approval rating now? Well, Congress has a 14%, the media has a 12%. When I started, the media had a 92% approval rating, now they're down to 14%, and I'm very proud of it because they're very dishonest. Okay, so that's where we're at right now. I mean, look, this is literally delusional, and let's continue then to seize the damage that we took in this war, a genuinely stunning image, let's put this one up here on the screen from A4. This was reported by the guys over at the war zone, they do incredible military reporting, and they're showing here a KC-135 tanker that is covered in shrapnel patches, seen landing in the UK. So you could actually see all of those different holes that were patched all over the planet. If you've ever seen that meme about World War II, fires actually is kind of reminiscent of that, but the amount of shrapnel, clearly, that this has taken shows that Iran very much had the capability to inflict damage on very strategic assets, so they played their asymmetric hand really, really well. I was talking this weekend with a friend who, long-time military experience, and I was asking the straight support moves question, I'm like, he guys had 40 years to plan with us, how is this possible? He's like, dude, it was the drones. Like, at the end of the day, we just didn't pay enough attention to the Ukraine and Russia conflict, we did not realize how much the drone threat was going to radically change the equation. They really believed, in the old days, that all they had to do is they could use those planes to take out those small boats, the IRGC, and that they could, shock and awe, in the beginning, take out the ballistic missile and anti-ship missile capacity, and they'd probably be good to go. They'd have that ability, but the carriers and all the other stuff was never able to get in range because of the drone threat, and on top of that, you're taking all these strategic damage to the US oil assets of all of the Gulf. The drone threat has radically shifted warfare in a four to five different, in a four to five year period, to the point where these aircraft carriers, they may just be obsolete. Like, a lot of our multi-trillion dollar investments over the years, sometimes you just have to give up and be like, okay, we were wrong, it's over. It's over, back to the drawing board. Yeah, well, and that raises another question too, which is, there's a reason why we pulled our aircraft carriers back further away from Iran because we couldn't be in range. So now we're going to bring them closer in for this blockade that creates tremendous risks as well. That is not a risk-free decision. So I think that's extraordinary analysis. And at the same time, you have to ask a question of how serious they even were going into these negotiations while the thing was falling apart. Rubio and Trump were at a UFC event. But these images up on the screen, Trump apparently got booed there by the way, it was a sign of his fall in popularity previously was treated like a king when he would go to these events. And so here you have the president of the United States and the secretary of state. Like the one guy in the administration, there's Marco doing his whatever that Miami area code. Real five. Yeah, gang sign or whatever that is. Gang sign, send him to Seacot. All right, Seacot. Check his tattoos. Anyway, they're out there having a good old time. And meanwhile, these negotiations are falling apart. And so you have to ask, like, did they ever even intend for this to get anywhere? And then the other question is, possible that this is all negotiating tactic and they went in very blasé and really with the plan of, okay, we're gonna blow up the first round and then we're gonna apply this additional pressure and then maybe then we'll soften them up and we'll have a better chance of striking some sort of a deal that's less than utterly humiliating. But the basic military landscape is still the same. It's still the same reality. You don't have a military option that's acceptable to you to open the Strait of Formuse. Your one attempt at going in on the ground at all, whether it was for just a pilot rescue or whether there was something else going on there. Yeah, you got your guy allegedly, but you did not, but you also had to blow up a whole bunch of aircraft on the ground and it was not a success from that perspective. So you realize that you've got a real problem there, you're gonna put boots on the ground in mainland Iran or any of these islands, none of that reality has changed. So Trump thinks he can bluster and threaten and cajole his way into getting a better deal, but the Iranians, I think, have long since stopped really listening to him and they pay attention to the things that he does, not the nonsense that he says. Let's think about the UFC thing as a perfect example. This is why I genuinely believe that the talks works kind of set to fail, is if you dispatch a negotiator to the talks who has to then call you 10, you know, at the minimum what we know of is six plus times, and then Trump can constantly weigh in on this detail or that detail, and then you're at a fucking UFC of fight with the Secretary of State, the literal chief diplomat of the country. How real was this talk in the first place? In my opinion, look, this is pure speculation, this is my idea, Trump and Rubio were like, here's what we need to do, we need to show any of the internal dissenters in our cabinet and to the world that actual diplomacy, we tried it, but it totally failed, and then when it fails, we can go back to what we wanted to do in the first place. He's some sort of naval blockade, I don't know. At the very least, he's flailing. If he really wanted negotiation, he would drop the Israeli line of zero enrichment, but he seems to believe it. And look, Beebe's up in his ear telling him about how we gotta be doing this. Also, Mark Levin, the entire Neocon industrial complex, as you know, they're loyal to Trump when he's doing their bidding. This is the irony of it. With the moment he departs, as we showed everybody on our show when he announced ceasefire, they're furious and they're calling him, they're making all this propaganda, oh, you still should nuke them, you should invade them, you can't let them humiliate you. So they're playing the game, they're pressing him very, very hard. Again, the man has agency. I believe that this was basically set up to fail from the very beginning. Real peace talks don't happen this way. Here was the vice president in Islamabad shortly after some 21 hours of talks, basically announced they totally failed. Let's take a listen. We have been at it now for 21 hours and we've had a number of substantive discussions with the Iranians, that's the good news. The bad news is that we have not reached an agreement. And I think that's bad news for Iran, much more than it's bad news for the United States of America. So we go back to the United States having not come to an agreement. We've made very clear what our red lines are, what things we're willing to accommodate them on and what things we're not willing to accommodate them on. And we've made that as clear as we possibly could and they have chosen not to accept our terms. They have chosen not to accept our terms. It's not even our terms, it's Trump's terms. Let's go to the next one. This is from Golubov, the chief negotiator on the Iranian side. He says, before the negotiations, I emphasize, we have the necessary good faith and will, but due to the experiences of the two previous wars, we have no trust in the opposing side. My colleagues on the Iranian delegation, the Minab 168, raised forward-looking initiatives, but the opposing side ultimately failed to gain the trust of the Iranian delegation in this round of negotiations. Some people are taking note of that in this round of negotiations, keeping the door open to the future. He says, America has understood our logic and principles. Now it's time for it to decide whether it can earn our trust or not. We consider every mirror to be another method of authority diplomacy alongside military struggle for upholding the rights of the Iranian nation and we will not for a moment cease our efforts to consolidate the achievements of the 40 days of Iran's national defense. He continues that he is grateful for the efforts of our friendly and liberally country, Pakistan, which continues to try and to push some sort of negotiations in the future. The foreign minister of Iran, Arachi, also spoke out, let's put his tweet up there on the screen. He says, in intensive talks at the highest level in 47 years, Iran engaged with the US in good faith to end the war. But when just inches away from an Islamabad member of memorandum of understanding, we encountered maximalism, shifting goalposts and blockade. Zero lessons learned, goodwill begets goodwill, enmity begets enmity. And I do think that this confirms that Trump, eventually they would try and work out something, which they thought was relatively reasonable. They call Trump, he's like, no, absolutely not. He decides to do some sort of a naval blockade. So that's where we are as of right now. Things could change, the oil markets are not responding in a way which is, I think gonna force his hand entirely. Let me take a look at the stock futures. Stock futures are down 0.67% and terrible, right? Not great, but not like catastrophic. Yeah, it's not phenomenal, but nothing catastrophic by any means, everybody still seems to think some sort of inevitable taco is going to happen. But I mean, from all the oil analysts and others that we've spoken to and all of the other, the amount of store, like the storage has dried up in the Gulf, they already had to cut production. Damage has been done to multiple different oil and gas facilities. The hold up on fertilizer and natural gas and on what else, what the helium is already, you're going to show up in the global supply chain. We will live with this for months. Even with the Naval Blockade, Centcom announcing this morning, I was just taking a look that every ship in and out will be subject to US inspection. So that's, I mean, this could be like Iraq in the 90s. We had a no fly zone over Iraq in the 90s. This was a precursor to the war with Iraq because they would always say, oh, Saddam violated the no fly zone, whatever. But my point is just like that took billions of dollars. It actually cost lives. It ended up being just some sort of permanent empire mission over Iraq for nothing really, you know, after the original Gulf War. And this very much could be where Trump doesn't want to restart the war, but we just had this multi-billion dollar boondoggle, Straits of Hormuz situation. Iran can continue to suffer. It just seems like a nightmare all the way around for us, for them, for the Persian Gulf countries as well. So that's where we are. I mean, I think he really doesn't want to restart the war because it was such a disaster. He doesn't really want to surrender either. Something's got to break. Maybe Iran will just start firing again and then we'll go back to a hot war. It's very possible. But if that happens, then it's nuke or ground troops. I don't see another way out. Yeah, there's a Wall Street Journal report that Trump's considering limited military strikes. There's no such thing. I mean, what is that? Yeah, exactly. And it's not like, he's still under the illusion that he gets to completely control the escalation. That's not the way that works. I mean, Iran has already demonstrated like, you go after our oil and gas infrastructure. We're gonna hit the Gulf States. They have that capacity. Or you go after our businesses. We're gonna hit your data centers in the region. They've already demonstrated that they're able to do that. There was another report this morning. So Trump had said in that Maria Bartiromo interview that he thought other countries were gonna come and help with our blockade of the blockade. And so far, everyone's like, you're on your own on this one. Britain has said no. Australia has said no. Obviously, Spain said no. There's no other country that's been like, us, we're on our way. We're gonna come and help you out. So, I mean, that's the other piece here in terms of the pressure is we really don't have, outside of Israel, we really don't have any allies that are rushing to our defense. I guess you could put UAE in that camp as well now because the situation is so catastrophic that they're like barely a country anyway. And then I think the original idea probably of this blockade of the blockade is to put pressure on China so that China puts pressure on Iran. But if you're now saying, well, we're just going to block Iranian ships, well, that's not really gonna put any pressure on China whatsoever. This is where the confusion is. So let me read you verbatim. This just came out like six minutes ago. US Central Command issues notice to see fairs about the blockade. Warning, any vessel going to or from Iran is subject to interception, diversion, and capture. The blockade encompasses the entirety of the Iranian coastline to include, but not limited to ports and oil terminals. So that isn't just Iranian ships. That is Chinese ships. I mean, now we're in a different world. So think about how this goes. I mean, then if a Chinese ship shows up, are you actually gonna fire on them? What are you gonna do? We're gonna board a Chinese vessel. These are serious diplomatic incidents. I don't even, I don't know. I just think about it and I think, would the United States of America, would a US merchant, marine, and or flagged vessel accept boarding and inspection through the Taiwan Strait? No, like that, it's time to go at that point. Because then what does that mean? You control the strategic or the straits of Malacca. If the Chinese Navy just declares, all of a sudden we are putting a cordon over Taiwan, all of us understand that is an act of war. I'm not saying we should go, but at that point, like, okay, we are in crisis mode. You have declared literal, like basically annexation and total control of these waterways. And look, that is the purpose of the US Navy. Do we all have confidence that we can actually do it at this point? Like, are we going to escalate from that all the way up? This is a serious, serious shot across the bow at them. And yeah, with the Chinese, I mean, they've called our bluff every single time. They did, let's give them credit. They actually worked pretty hard to try and get a ceasefire. They pushed Iran to the table. The question is, is will they buckle? But the other problem is, if we have some sort of diplomatic incident, remember the Trump-Xi summit is sometime next month. We don't have a date. We really gonna blow it all up over Iran, of all places, right? Like, we don't even get much oil out of this place. That is why the whole thing is so crazy. If we just, like, think about how much better off we would be on the February 27th status quo. How may, it was so much better. It was a paradise then, comparatively. $2.90, $2.90 gasoline. Iran just didn't have a nuclear weapon. They actually had a leader who really didn't want a nuclear weapon, whereas now they really might have a leader who wants a nuclear weapon. They were very conciliatory in those negotiations. The Omani Prime Minister said, like, there was a deal. I mean, they had gone way further than they even went during the JCPOA. And Trump could have done that. It could have claimed mission accomplished. Look, I was able to get a deal. Obama never did. Our maximum pressure campaign is a success. Then they were too weak and lame to be able to do what I can do, art of the deal, onto Cuba, or whatever next nightmare he has in store for us. But instead, he decided that he needed this grand, glorious military victory, and instead it has turned into an absolute total disaster. And just zooming out, look, we're already in a proxy war with Russia by Ukraine. Now, and I wouldn't yet call this a proxy war with China, but we are very close to effectively being in that situation. It only takes a few of these incidents before you're also now in a proxy war with China. And China's been assisting the Iranians more than had previously been reported. That's part of why they were in the opposition. They were too pressured Iran to come to the negotiating table at a time when a lot of the IRGC was very opposed to even starting negotiations at this point and thought that there needed to be a lot more pain. So China, again, at a time when obviously our military supplies are very low and we need to resupply, they control a lot of the critical supply lines we would need to be able to accomplish that. And so they really have us in a bit of a chokehold here, which is what the Trump administration has already discovered. So I don't know where this thing goes, but it's hard to see any sort of resolution that is going to be positive whatsoever. The best we can hope for at this point is that the first round of negotiations was basically for show and to bluster and demonstrate how tough we are and that we'll walk away from the table, blah, blah, blah, and that they are willing to come back and get serious about making a deal with Iran that reflects the reality that the Iranians demonstrated a lot more capability than what we expected them to. That's exactly right. Last thing, let's put this warning from the IRGC A8. Let's put it on the screen. Iran's Revolutionary Guard has warned any miscalculated move will trap the enemy in the deadly whirlpool of the Straits of Hormuz after Trump ordered a US naval blockade of the strategic waterway. So you can see they continue to have that capacity. Remember, they have the small boats. Also remember this, Trump said that there were no mines in the Straits of Hormuz. And now they're like, oh, we have to do mine clearance. So there are mines in the Straits of Hormuz, just so we all understand. There were a lot of Syhops there for the weekend too. But there's so many fascinating things here. It's like, oh, so there actually are mines in the Straits of Hormuz. So they did have that capacity. All of these are in, oh, CIA estimate comes out, half of the Iranian missiles are still operable. They're digging them out. Iran's national media reporting this morning that they're redoing all of their railway. It's like, oh, it's not so easy, is it? It turns out, I mean, we've learned these lessons a hundred years ago. Yeah, you can bomb a railway. Unless you've got a general Sherman, this is 200 years almost, at this point, sitting there and forming the metal, the Sherman necktie. Yes, actually, it's very easily to replace if it's only under aerial bombardment, as we saw in World War II. So this is the problem that we have strategically. It's either ground invasion or it's nuclear weapon, or it is actually diplomacy at this point, which is basically surrender. I'm just not sure that anybody is there yet. And that's the unfortunate lesson of history. So we've got Treet to Parsi standing by. Let's get to it. For more on the so far failed negotiations, we are joined by Treet to Parsi of the Quincy Institute. Great to see you, sir. Good to see you. Good to be with you guys. Yeah, of course. So let's go ahead and put this first element up on the screen from Barack Revead, which claims to be the US red lines from the negotiations, according to him, from a US official. They said, ending all uranium enrichment, dismantling all major nuclear enrichment facilities, retrieve highly enriched uranium, except a broader peace, security, and de-escalation framework that includes regional allies, and funding for terrorist proxies Hamas has below the Houthis, fully open, the Strait of Hormuz, charging no tolls for passage. One gap in the talks was the amount of Iranian frozen funds that will be released per source with knowledge. Your reaction to these purported US red lines and also where we are right now in terms of any sort of resolution to the war? If these are the American red lines and if these were the actual negotiation positions of the delegation in Islamabad, then I don't think there was any need for any negotiations at all. Those are dead on arrival. The US side knows it. I don't think this is accurately reflected in the talks. I think also there's a problem in which, sir, there's a diversity of views within the administration and various people are trying to influence the final position by leaking these type of things and making them the reality. I do think also that in the talks, there were a lot of progress made, including on the nuclear issue, but at last moment there was a shift on the American side, whether that was part of a negotiation tactic or whether that is yet another example of shifting goalposts, which unfortunately has become the hallmark of this administration's negotiations with Iran, remains to be seen. Yeah, Dr. Parseet, let's talk about that because the foreign minister, Arachi, he came out and said, we had a memorandum of understanding, basically ready to go. Then the shifting goalposts started. Now, I seem to think that's an allusion to the nuclear enrichment as in a red line of zero enrichment. Let's be clear about where that came from. It appears to be in Israeli demand. Now, what's your view there of how that demand enters in the last minute? Is it Israel calling Trump saying this is unacceptable? How exactly did this go? How do the Iranians view their negotiations? So we know that in the previous negotiations, this is a shift that occurred as a result of Israelis pushing very, very hard for it and using their echo chamber in Washington, et cetera, to kind of push Trump in that direction. And that's part of the reason, a critical reason as to why the talks failed. Because the only reason why the talks even began in the first place was because Trump kept on saying, my only red line is nuclear weapons, not nuclear enrichment or nuclear capability. Had he said from the outset that his red line is nuclear capability and enrichment, I don't think the Iranians would have come to the table in the first place. But once at the table, this shifted as a result of pressure from Israel, whether that is the case here or not, again, remains to be seen. I can see a scenario in which because of progress having been made, the US side kind of pulls back, knowing very well that there's still another week or so left of the ceasefire, sees what else it can get by adding some pressure. And then if it gets something else, and even if it doesn't, it will have formed a narrative of said that the Iranians caved because the US, threatened to close the trade or the Persian Gulf as a whole with enabled blockade, et cetera. So a lot of these things, I think, should be read as tactics within and a negotiation rather than necessarily an enter negotiations because it's very important to keep two things in mind. Neither side has said that the talks are over, none of them. And neither side has gone back to firing at each other. So the ceasefire is holding. And if the ceasefire is holding, that means that the negotiations, at least nominally, may still be alive, particularly mindful of the fact that neither one of them has said this is over with and we're not gonna meet again. And even JD Vance's speech or presser, he said, we have made our terms clear, the Iranians need to accept that or something like that. He didn't say it's over. Yeah, that is a very important point. We talked some about the US's purported red lines, at least. What is your sense of what the Iranian red lines may be? I think on the Iranian side, it's actually quite clear that may be part of the challenge they have in their negotiations. They're not gonna give up to control the straddle or moose, but they can consider various arrangements. The US side did make some proposal on that. The Iranians rejected those. I do hope that the Iranians see a value in doing something with the US on this, because I think it will be very important for Trump as part of his narrative, but also because it may actually stabilize the situation if the US is in on it in some fashion. So you're talking about actual sort of sharing the toll with the US, that sort of proposal? It could be different. The US proposal was sharing a toll. I think it could be other things. The sharing the toll seems to be something that at least the Iranians initially rejected. It could be other things, what the currency would be in which the tolls would take place in. It could be that the Iranians would use a percentage of the toll revenues, not to give it to the US, but to buy things from the US. So I think there's various ideas, et cetera, that can be further explored on that. And I think if it ends up becoming some arrangement in which both sides are involved in it one way or another, it can help stabilize the situation because the critical thing is to make sure that the straight opens. The Iranian objective is not to close the straights. The Iranian objective is to use the control of the straights in order to reestablish economic relations with countries that have left the Iranian market. The South Koreans, I've already come to Iran. The Japanese are about to do their own negotiation. These are countries in Asia that used to have extensive economic relations with Iran, but were chased out of the market because of the sanctions because the US pressure on them was very intense. Now the Iranians are pressuring them back in through the straight of our moves. It's not to close it. Yeah, this is bad. But I think it's, there's one thing I think it's very important to understand here in which the Iranians may actually have ended up in a relatively weaker position than they were in before. See, the United States or Trump could not end the war without some sort of arrangement with Iran because the Iranians had a say in it. And this kind of forced them into a situation in which you had to ask for negotiations. But now that the Iranians have accepted a ceasefire, I think the tables have turned a little bit. The United States can now actually walk away from these talks and end up in a scenario in which the Iranians are controlling the straights, which is, from the US perspective, not good, but it's not devastating. It's much more problematic for other countries, particularly the GCC countries. The Iranians don't get any sanctions relief, but the US doesn't go back to war. And it kind of washes its hands of this whole thing, but just walks away, doesn't give anything further, doesn't get a deal, but is out of the war, which I think is Trump's critical objective. All prices would come down, et cetera. But then what does Israel do in that scenario? Let me get to that one second. But the thing is, the Iranians want more than that. They want a framework agreement on how to manage the relationship between the United States and Iran. They want to move beyond the 47 years of enmity. They think that they finally have leverage to be able to meet the US face-to-face and get that. And that would, of course, entail a dramatic amount of sanctions relief, but also concessions from their end on the nuclear issue. From the Iranian side, that would be a much more valuable outcome from this, to make sure that they actually end this situation with the United States and get some sort of agreement reestablished on economic relations. That's something the Iranians want. The US doesn't need this. The US could walk away and would end up in a still, not an ideal situation, but not a terrible situation. The Iranians could also walk away, but they would lose more if they walk away. And this, I think, has in some ways changed the dynamics because prior to the ceasefire situation was opposite. The United States could not walk away without an agreement from Iran. Right. So what does that mean then, you know, when Crystal asked about Israel, so how would it, so if they did walk away, it would seem logical then that Iran would actually have to resume firing because that would be the only thing that would draw the United States back to a situation where it had to reach this memorandum of understanding. Depends. If the Israelis go back to war with Iran without the United States, then the Iranians undoubtedly will strike at Israel and it will not be like before. They were not gonna go into a scenario in which the Israelis slowly but surely constantly increase the type of, I mean, Gaza or a Lebanese scenario, which the Israelis gradually increase their attacks on Lebanon or on Gaza while the ceasefire is still in place. They will not accept that. So slightest thing from the Israelis, the Iranians are gonna strike back very, very hard. Then the question is, if the war between Israel and Iran resumed, first of all, can the Israelis manage that without the United States being involved? I have my severe doubts about that. Both from a military standpoint, from an intelligence standpoint, the amount of help the Israelis need, but also from a public opinion standpoint, will the Israeli public go along with further war with Iran in which they do take a lot of hits themselves but without the US being part of the war? And I think that can change dramatically. It could also create a scenario in which the Israelis will of course do their utmost to get the US back into the war. And that will be a real test. If Trump has managed to pull out of this war, cuts his losses on the streets, but then he goes back in because the Israelis wanted. Again, I have a hard time seeing that happening, but then again, I was wrong about him going into this war in the first place because it was so utterly clear in my view that it would be a disaster, yet he did it. But you can also see a scenario in which the US doesn't go back in and then the Iranians have managed to achieve something else, which is they have truly separated the US from Israel. That would be a huge strategic win for the Iranians, which may be part of the reason why the Israelis actually won't go into the war again with the Iranians knowing very well that that might be an outcome from that. That's interesting. Let's talk a little bit about China's role in this. We have a B3 up on the screen. This is some reporting for the New York Times showing that China was taking more active role than previously known in Iran. American intelligence agencies have obtained information. China in recent weeks may have sent a shipment of shoulder-fired missiles to Iran for its conflicts. They say it's not definitive that the shipment was sent. There's no evidence the Chinese missiles have yet been used, but even a debate in Beijing over sending missiles to Iran suggests the degree that China sees itself as having a stake in the conflict. Intelligence agencies have assessed that China is secretly taking an active stance in the war allowing some companies to ship chemicals, fuel and components that can be used in military production to Iran for the war. Obviously we take with a grain of salt anything that any intelligence agency says, but there's no doubt China has vested interest in the resolution of this conflict. There's also reporting that China was involved in pushing Iran to the negotiating table. So how do you think that they're viewing where we are right now? So first of all, as you said, we have to take all of these different intelligence reports leaking to media without much scrutiny, with a pinch of salt. But I think also we have to take the definition of China helping Iran somewhat carefully. For the Chinese to continue to sell stuff to Iran, including chemical things, is not from the Chinese perspective in any way, shape or form, them actually helping Iran in the war. Similar to the fact that the United States keeps on selling a lot of things, even short of weapons to Israel, even it's selling of the weapons, it doesn't necessarily view as a provocative move. Imagine accusations that just because the United States were to sell other type of things to Israel during a war, that that would be active support for the war from the US side. So I think the definitional issue is quite important to understand here. Having said that, I do believe that the Chinese have provided Iranians with intelligence and other measures without getting directly involved in this, is still way below any threshold that would really justify the US doing anything in particular. The Chinese have an interest in getting this resolved ASAP. There is this view in Washington that as soon as the US shoots itself in the foot that benefits China. There is truth to that undoubtedly, but it is a simplistic black and white view of the Chinese. The Chinese more than anything else want to make sure that there is stability in the Persian Gulf. They are much more affected by high oil prices and by the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf than the US is. And if this continues to become a real debacle on the energy markets, the Chinese are gonna suffer tremendously from that and there's no win and that for them, even if the US itself is also hurting itself through that process. So I'm not surprised that the Chinese potentially have played a role in the background trying to get an agreement. I think they would want to keep their fingerprints off of it. They don't want any responsibility for what is going on. There's one thing to help. There's another thing to actually become a partner openly in this and then suddenly you shared a responsibility for the outcome instead of Trump who started this war. So I think the Chinese are gonna be very careful about that. But behind the scenes, I'm sure they're gonna do things to try to make sure that it goes in a direction that benefits them, which is for this issue to be resolved. Right, and then my question here is on the blockade. So let's say that the scenario that you laid out happens. Trump walks, but he keeps a naval blockade. Is that a tolerable situation for Iran? How long could they really survive without doing something radical to try and change the status quo? You know, the Iranians are actually prepared themselves for this scenario, including having a lot of oil outside of the purgatory Gulf already. Moreover, I think it's important to recognize that in this scenario I'm talking about in which the US walks away, there would likely be more economic pressure on Iran, but I'm not so sure it would be that naval blockade. Not necessarily at least in its full form, perhaps a nominal one. But just think about it. The Iranians are selling oil to India and to China. What is the US gonna do? They're gonna stop those shipments. They think that's a punishment of Iran. That's a punishment of China and India. That's a direct confrontation with the Chinese and the Indians and other countries in Asia that are buying this oil. So it is not as simple as to believe that this is just some sort of a pressure on Iran. It will be pressure on Iran, but more than anything else, it will be pressure on other countries that actually have strong relations with the US and on the energy market. Anything that right now takes energy off of markets will push up oil prices. That will lead to higher gas prices in the United States, which dramatically backfires on Trump and on the Republican Party in the midterms. On top of that, if the US goes really hard on this issue, then there's a high likelihood that the Houthis will step in and they will close off the Gulf of Aden and there won't be any ships going through there either. That suddenly means that another 12%, in addition to the 20% of the flow of oil that has been compromised because of Iran's current control of the straits, would also then go off the market. And that will dramatically push up oil prices. Moreover, in order for this to be workable for the US, even if the US is capable of absorbing those hits, it would require that this goes on for some time. This is not a quick thing. This is not something in which you do it and suddenly the Iranians came. And then that raises the question, who has most tolerance for this? The United States and not just the United States, but Donald Trump in his political situation or the Iranians? I think this is yet another one of these examples in which yes, the US can escalate, but the Iranian counter-escalation is far more painful to the US than the US's own escalation against Iran. And that initially is against Iran. My last question for you, Triton, you've set us up well for our next block, which is an oil analyst is gonna join us to talk about what he's seeing in the markets right now. But what about the role of Saudi Arabia and UAE who have signaled they want the war to continue? All the indications are that they're pushing in that direction. UAE has even potentially already, but certainly signaled their willingness to join the war as a combatant themselves. What sort of messages do you think they'll be sending to President Trump? So there's a lot of conflicting reporting about Saudi Arabia in which it is at times pushing for this. And then there's a reporting that says that it is not. I think the UAE is a little bit more clear, but I think it's stunningly clear. If the US pulls itself out of the war, what is the UAE gonna do? The UAE is in a very, very dire situation. It has made a huge mistake in my view, making itself a frontline state against Iran within Israel's enmity with Iran because of it signing onto the Abrams Accord. Its own problems with Iran were far more resolvable than the problems between Israel and Iran. But now it is beholden to Israel's enmity with Iran. While it itself is only 50 or so kilometers away from Iran at its closest point to one of the Iranian islands, whereas Israel is 1,200 or whatever kilometers away from Iran. So I think this was a huge mistake, but it should also be said there's huge differences within the GCC. And some of the GCC countries are privately very happy to see that the UAE has been hit very hard in this war and that this has really set back the UAE's influence within the region and within the GCC itself. Very interesting. Well, everyone should take note of the fact at a time when the Abraham Accords were being praised as this landmark peace deal. You were sounding the alarm and saying this could actually increase tension and division. And it was far from the sort of utopia that it was being portrayed as a very large country to party. It's always great to have you. Thank you so much. Thank you so much for having me. Appreciate it. Joining us now is great friend of the show, Rory Johnson. He's the founder of Commodity Context, a fantastic sub-stack which we'll have a link down in the description. Thanks for joining us again, Rory. We appreciate your time. Thanks for having me this morning. So you were reposted by the presidents of the United States, seemingly bragging about policy. Maybe we can turn the tables here a little bit. We'll see you'll feel repost this segment. The president announcing a full naval blockade of Iran. Let's put this up here on the screen, effectively announcing that they will not allow any vessel to enter an Iranian port. So SENTCOM clarifying this morning that any vessel that is headed for Iran is subject to, and I wanna get this language correct, interception, diversion and capture, literally any vessel, not just an Iranian vessel. So Rory, you're our resident oil analyst. What does this mean for the global oil markets? Yeah, so just for context here, one of the things that I think is important to keep in mind and one of the weird things about this crisis thus far is that if you had asked any oil analyst, myself included three months ago, if Iran was going to close the Strait of Hormuz, would Iran still be exporting oil? And the answer would have been obviously no, right? That would have been something that obviously in such a situation, the United States or whatever kind of opposing party would have blockaded those shipments. And the strange thing is that throughout the crisis, Iran has continued to export its oil. Not only export its oil, but at higher prices and thanks to US treasury sanctions repeal to more and more consumers at lower and lower discounts. So they've actually been making kind of great money out of this process thus far. And one of the things, and now Trump is trying to remediate that and saying, okay, now we're gonna cut off the flow of oil after six weeks. So I think the question here now is, the first Iranian tanker or the first Iranian ship, either direction to test this blockade is going to set up this next step for escalation because thus far Iran has generally withheld or held back from attacking production assets across the Middle East or export and loading infrastructure. If they now can't export their oil, maybe that's the next thing up for grabs. Should let's say the United States fire on or seize an Iranian tanker. Let me go ahead and put guys C7 up on the screen. I wanted to get your reaction to this and this was written up by Dropsite from publicly available information. They say Iran has about 174 million barrels of oil in floating storage that a blockade would not touch. And you can see all of the details there. They say over 90% is bound for China, carried largely by ghost fleet tankers running dark, 129 tankers linked to Iranian crude, currently sailing dark according to windward. US naval blockade of Iranian ports won't intercept oil that is already at sea. And then it goes through a list of where these tankers are located. How does this factor into your calculation? Cause it seems that Iran has somewhat prepared or a scenario similar to this. That's exactly right. And I follow a group called tanker trackers. And what they've noted for a couple of days now is that if this should happen, Iran has basically positioned a large kind of flotilla of floating storage just outside the Gulf of Oman, specifically that would allow it to continue servicing these clients, at least for some time, should the actual strait be blockaded. Now, obviously the United States Navy is quite sophisticated, quite large and quite capable. We saw this during January of this past year or earlier this year, time flies. But when they were kind of blockading Venezuelan exports and chasing down Venezuelan tankers across the Atlantic, clearly it's a question of how intense they're planning on enforcing this. They're able to, again, but this question of, is this just the latest kind of jaw-boning or kind of threat from Trump? Or are they actually going to follow through with us? At this stage, six weeks into the war, it's very, very difficult to kind of handicap that. Because, yeah, it seems like yes, but who knows? We could be an hour away from Trump posting that peace has been found in the Middle East and oil is gonna drop another kind of 15 bucks a barrel. And this is the challenge we face. As no one actually knows what's going to happen next. All the while, 13 million barrels a day of production remain shut in the Gulf. And the world hemorrhages that volume of crude every day the strait remains closed. And thus far, the strait is not only closed, but now it's even more closed than it was at the beginning of the weekend. Yes, that's what I wanted to focus on with you, is you were warning to us a couple of weeks ago, if we're in this scenario, the amount of destruction, just inevitably in terms, will lead to demand destruction. Now, the strait, like you said, is not just closed, it's even more closed. If we take some Iranian oil offline and there's not any Persian Gulf oil that continues to move through, what, you know, let's put the market just general aside, because maybe they will catch up to supply. Supply-wise, what are we talking about? Are all the shortage conversations, jet fuel, et cetera? Is that back on now? Is that still a reality? Like what's that start gonna start to look like? It's normally still on it, it never changed, right? I think that's the issue is that right now, so again, just for context, roughly of the 20 million barrels a day of previously, kind of previous flow that was traveling through our humus every day, roughly seven million barrels of that has been offset by rerouting, the Saudi East-West pipeline, kind of Iran's flow continuing, et cetera, et cetera, but I mean, 13 million barrels can't exit the Gulf, it has been forcibly shut in. That's the barrels that we're losing kind of every single day, and right now, thus far in the crisis, we've lost roughly more than 400 million barrels, barrels that were going to be produced this year that now just aren't. The longer this goes on, you quickly approach a billion barrels, particularly with the necessary ramp back up. So yeah, this is going to continue, the longer this goes on, you're going to need to fill that hole because 13 million barrels a day, now 15 actually, if you block Iranian flow, because that was one of the offsets previously, so 15 million barrels a day, there's no supply source in the world that can fill that. So if the straight remains closed, if this is again, a month or two more of what we're talking about, you're going to need to see prices skyrocket in order to forcibly destroy demand. We're already beginning to see shortages across a bunch of different regions of the world. Asian airlines are canceling flights. You've seen talk of rationing jet fuel in Southern Italy, the EU broadly, European jet fuel suppliers have basically said that they can't commit to supply jet fuel into May, that probably through April, this is going to be good. Like there's buffer here, this is what the inventories are for, but as we get into May, and again, into kind of peak travel season, June and July, that's when these suppliers can no longer guarantee shipments, which means that airlines that are trying to book flights, or trying to plan flights, they're not going to be able to have a bunch of friends that are trying to plan European vacations, and they're like, Rory, will we have jet fuel? Will there be flights to get back? And I'm like, I don't know. And you never would have pictured a moment where I'm like, I don't know if Europe would have jet fuel. That's the kind of situation we're now in right now. Yeah, absolutely. Well, it's 9, 10 a.m. right now, I'm looking at the oil prices, just above $100 a barrel. And what's your sense of whether that reflects reality, or whether these markets are still somewhat delusional, or pricing in, okay, we expect Trump to somehow magically resolve this in the next short period? I would say definitely, I don't know if I was go so far as delusional, but certainly sanguine, overly optimistic relative to where I see the situation now. One thing that's kind of been a hallmark of this crisis throughout, given this kind of chronic expectation, this persistent expectation, that this will end any day now, and that the flow through the straight forward moves will resume tomorrow, is that most of the kind of pricing pain, the pricing pressure is being felt at the very, very front of the curve, in what we call like extreme backwardation, or term structure at the front of the curve, the shape of the futures curve. And that extends into the physical and spot market. So right now, even though Brent crude right now is trading at just over $100 a barrel for June delivery futures, WTI, which is trading in for May, is actually trading at a premium to that, which is weird at the front of the curve, and dated Brent, which is the spot benchmark, is trading north of 130, and then the physical delivery of these various actual crude cargoes is something at $20, $25 at a premium to dated Brent. So many of these physical crews are trading at over $150 delivered. And that's the kind of thing that eventually futures need to recognize that, but thus far, the way has been very successful in kind of managing expectations that this conflict is going to end any moment. Who's to blame traders that can't get too long, because then they're gonna get blown out of their positions with a $15 a barrel tweet. It's a very strange market to trade. Rory, can you just transfer some of that into gas prices? What is that? So let's say if we caught up, what did you say, $150 a barrel, what does that look like at the pump nationally for the US? Well, what's interesting actually is that physically, well, US consumers are basically going to be paying spot prices for gas. So they actually will be paying these prices rather than June delivery, right? We all consume in physical spot markets, even though the futures price is trying to continue to hand you get this forward. So yeah, you're going to see national average prices at this pace easily outstrip $5 a gallon, en route to $6 a gallon should this continue by June easily. And I think that's just gasoline. Diesel at this stage is trading at a decent premium to that. So you're gonna see, you've already seen kind of all time highs reached in California. You're gonna see that across the entire continent to the United States. Yeah, where this morning it looks like $4.13 is the national average per AAA. And I wanted to talk to you, obviously you focus on oil, but I'm sure you've thought quite a lot about the way this repos around the economy. Let's put C5 up on the screen. This was some reporting from the Wall Street Journal about the warnings that the Trump White House is fielding about the Iran Wars economic hit. Some of these warnings coming from oil executives. And we can put C6 up on the screen as well. We had a relatively hot inflation report last Friday, US inflation tripled last month based on record spike in gas prices. Obviously, it's not just at the pump where we feel the increase of these prices, this flows throughout the entire economy. So talk to us a little bit about what you expect there. Yeah, so consumers are gonna feel this primarily through gasoline pump prices, but the kind of stealthier way that this is going to continue to juice inflation is through diesel, is through jet fuel, is through these fuels that kind of, these middle distillates, diesel and gasoline in particular are effectively the fuels that drive the industrial economy. These are the prices that unless you have like a diesel, hemi truck, you might not be paying for diesel at the pump, but you're going to be start paying surchargers on Amazon deliveries. You started to see flights that started charging surcharges on long haul flights. All of these things are going to begin to be incorporated because otherwise corporate margins are going to get obliterated. And I think the longer this goes on, the more this is going to go from special surcharges to just new high prices. And that's the thing we saw through 2022 is the longer this goes on, that's when those inflationary expectations begin to mount. And that's when you begin to see companies have more of this kind of space and kind of flexibility to raise prices even if they would have hesitated historically. That also I think bears on central banks and the fact that many central banks would have been wanting to be cutting interest rates during this period to kind of support the economy, which looks like it could be flagging into a couple of different areas, that I think is also now going to be on hold given the very recent experience in 2022 of runaway inflation and how unpopular that was for consumers. All of this, of course, is just deeply, deeply bizarre and ironic coming from an administration that was brought into the White House to end forever wars in the Middle East and increase and kind of better the cost of living for American consumers. And so far we're going in the polar opposite direction. Last question for you, Rory. Our next segment is going to be about Asia. There's been significant unrest in these Asian countries over their reliance here on Iranian oil. The Korean president is openly feuding with the nation of Israel. He's obviously very upset. 50,000 Japanese people actually took to the streets a couple of days ago to protest the Iran war. This doesn't really happen all that often. So can you break down? We just talked here about US economies. The situation seems way more dire for them where the vast majority of their oil comes through the straight. What shortages and other prices can we see in the Asian economies in the coming months? So everything that I was talking about for North America or Europe about jet fuel is kind of doubled or tripled for Asia. The vast majority of oil from the straight form goes to Asia. While not as much as let's say the direct diesel and jet fuel that goes to the European continent, the vast majority of the crude oil. So you've seen European or sorry Asian refineries pull back their operations considerably. And you saw Asian or Singaporean jet fuel jump above $200 a barrel equivalent in the first week of this war. And then it's continued to mount higher. You've seen the steepest service cuts to airlines. Everything that's gonna be coming across Asia. And you've also seen Asian economies coming out of the very recent experience of COVID also being far heavier handed than kind of Western counterparts on forcible reductions in kind of policies meant to reduce mobility. But you've seen governments talking from work from home. You've talked, you've already heard people talking about like the odd even license plate days of who can drive into cities. And I think for a lot of these economies you also see heavy government subsidies or kind of support in these prices. Which if that level of support persists through a price shock shifts this from a consumer shock to a fiscal shock which kind of has all of these kind of government bankruptcy concerns that begin to mount. So at the same time these consumers are used to very stable prices. And if this continues you're going to need to see governments rapidly and kind of abruptly pull back support. So that price shock is going to be doubly painful for those consumers that are used to prices that really don't move around nearly as much as we see them at the pump. Very true. Thank you for, oh sorry, go ahead. Oh, I was just gonna say thank you. That's all, thank you very much. Always appreciate your analysis. It's always great to see you.