The Crucible - The JRTC Experience Podcast

128 S13 Ep 10 - Air-Ground Disconnect: Why Enablers Fail in the Brigade Fight w/JRTC Subject Matter Experts

40 min
Feb 5, 20263 months ago
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Summary

This episode examines critical communication and integration failures between aviation units and brigade combat teams during military operations. Subject matter experts from JRTC discuss how habitual relationships, early planning, proper lead times for satellite communications, and comprehensive testing at home station are essential to prevent air-ground coordination breakdowns that cascade into operational failures.

Insights
  • Aviation enabler integration failures stem primarily from lack of habitual relationships and training at home station, not structural organizational issues
  • Communications validation exercises are consistently treated as afterthoughts by brigade S-6s, creating cascading failures during actual operations
  • 90-day lead times for satellite-based communications and Link 16 keys are routinely missed because commanders don't elevate signal requirements early enough
  • LNOs must arrive fully equipped and operationally capable—sending unprepared personnel undermines the entire coordination effort
  • Testing systems before deployment (rotor stables, comms exercises, COP validation) eliminates 80-85% of integration problems before JRTC arrival
Trends
Shift toward operationalizing RSOI as a formal comms validation event rather than administrative check-inGrowing recognition that enabler integration is a commander's responsibility, not solely a signal officer's burdenIncreased emphasis on analog backup graphics and multi-platform COP distribution (Maven, CPCE, TAC) due to system interoperability gapsLegacy aviation systems (JCR, SDT) creating interoperability friction with newer brigade ITN infrastructurePost-exercise AARs underutilized as knowledge transfer mechanism for comms solutions across rotations
Topics
Air-Ground Communications PlanningBrigade Combat Team Enabler IntegrationHabitual Relationships and Home Station TrainingSatellite Communications Lead TimesLink 16 Network CoordinationCommon Operating Picture (COP) StandardizationAirspace Deconfliction and Control MeasuresLiaison Officer (LNO) Selection and PreparationCommunications Security (CompSec) Packet ExchangeMission Command Validation ExercisesInteroperability Between Legacy and Modern SystemsFLIR and Thermal Imagery Identification ChallengesDeep Attack and Close Fight CoordinationRotor Stables and Individual System TestingAfter Action Review (AAR) Implementation
People
Major Steve Yates
Signal officer discussing signal branch challenges and lead time requirements for satellite communications and Link 1...
CW-2 Henske
Unmanned aircraft systems expert discussing aviation communications and habitual relationship building with ground fo...
CW3 Deegan
Aviation mission survivability officer addressing airspace deconfliction, COP integration, and system testing require...
Captain Landrum
Attack pilot discussing close fight coordination, FLIR identification challenges, and air-ground communication during...
Mark Howell
Co-host of The Crucible podcast moderating discussion on air-ground integration failures
Dave Fultzcraft
Co-host of The Crucible podcast and moderator of Hip Pocket Training series on warfighting functions
Lieutenant General Frank
Referenced for principle that 'if the COP is not common, it's not a COP, it's an IOP'
Quotes
"If you can't talk then you can't fight, if you can't fight well you definitely can't win"
Mark HowellIntroduction
"The first time you use ciphertext, or the first time you try to use these secure communications cannot be at the Super Bowl. You've got to train these things habitually."
CW3 DeeganMid-episode
"Get up from behind the desk. Go to the training meetings, go to the command and staffs. Getting up from behind the desk and actually having a conversation like this with the people you work with is probably the best way of doing it."
Major Steve YatesMid-episode
"If your LNO doesn't hurt your organization to an extent, it's probably the wrong guy. You can send anybody for an LNO, but if it's not the right guy that knows what he's talking about, it's really not going to do anybody any sort of service."
CW-2 HenskeClosing segment
"Test what you can before you get here. It's not going to solve all. It won't make everything 100% work when you first get here, but it will get most of the gremlins out of the system."
CW3 DeeganClosing segment
Full Transcript
This is The Crucible, the JRTC experience. Do you have something for my hip pocket? Do you have something for my hip pocket? Do you have anything for my hip pocket? Do you have something for my hip pocket? Do you have something for my hip pocket? Okay. Hey, long-time listener, first-time caller. Love the show, but do you have something more focused for me? Yeah, do you have anything for my hip pocket? Yeah, we've got something for your hip pocket. You want something hip pocket-sized. This is Hip Pocket Training, a short-form series focused on the single-topic insights for the warfighter on the go. Quick, relevant, and ready when you are. Welcome back to another episode of the Hip Pocket series. I'm Mark Howell. And I'm still Dave Fultzcraft. So we're back at it again with another warfighting function saga, this time on integrating enablers into the C2 architecture. Now, we discussed this a little bit during our episode on Signaleers, determined it was such an important topic that we expanded our guest bench and gave its own episode. Speaking of Signaleers, you may recognize our feature guest here, Major Steve Yates, who represents one of the most abused and least nurtured branches in our army. And joining him here today are some aviation experts. We have CW-2 Henske, which is the unmanned aircraft business. business. We have CW3 Deegan, who aside from acquiring every scare me badge you can acquire in the Army, is an aviation mission survivability officer. That's correct, Chief? I didn't butcher that. All right. And then we have another scary guy, an attack pilot, Captain Landrum, joining us from the aviation team. So for our audience, what we're looking to do here in the rapidly you know, changing battlefield, controlling large formations and mission control and mission command at large, integrating integrated tactical network, not to use the same word twice for alliteration, a lot of challenges. But one of the major challenges that we see when formations come down here, particularly brigade combat teams, is being able to establish and enforce a pace with enabler units and so looking through that lens we brought in our aviation team because that's one of the most common organizations that operate in the brigade battle space on behalf of the division and typically we we find that you know they have tons of communication issues and if you can't talk then you can't fight if you can't fight well you definitely can't win so with that a couple questions that we're going to posit. Aviation units, what are we missing when we develop these air to ground communications plans? What kind of things at home station can our aviation units and our brigade combat teams work on in terms of habitual relationships and training to increase success here? And I think we got at least touch on you know what kind of specific rehearsals do we have to do down here during our SOI prior to mission execution to set us up for success. So with that, gentlemen, I'll hand it over to you. Yeah, I mean, you kind of mentioned the first one there, like what are we missing? And I think it's not necessarily what are we missing, but maybe we're lacking of training sometimes with the ground force. So establishing something that we did at our old unit was establish a habitual relationship with the ground force. And so we just every month we knew that we were going to go out and support the ground force. And we had a dedicated ground force unit that we would support. And with that, so we were always having some sort of touch point with them. And then one of the major key points was comms and so that to make sure that we can we could talk to them. So there were there were times where we would go out and do some exercises and some training opportunities where we couldn't talk to them. So we're actually already out there on the, you know, in the battle space, if you will. And we would have to land our aircraft and we would have an SKL or they'd have an SKL and they would fill us, you know, at the training site and then continue mission. So just going back, like what are we doing or what are we missing? It's just making sure that we are talking with the ground force and just prior to coming to a JROTC or some sort of CTC rotation, just make sure that you're familiar with how to low comms, how do we communicate with the ground force, and just make sure that we're practicing what we're going out and executing. I think you touched on one of the big major things is the comp sec piece and actually having, like, that conversation once we know which aviation unit is actually going to be supporting the BCT when they come down to JRTC is make a phone call and, like, hey, let's get you guys on our CompSec packet so we know that we're on the same CompSec. So we're not going to run into those things and then actually see if we have the money, can go TDY and actually work face to face. And if not, like you were saying, work with your organic division BCTs before coming down here. I think that's a huge point that I think we often overlook. Can I ask a question? So you brought up a great point about habitual relationships, about units working together at home station. As the relationship or the support relationship between aviation units and brigade combat teams has changed aviation works on behalf of the division going through the division, but operating typically in a brigade battle space or maybe in some form of support role for, like, lift support for air assaults and whatnot. Do you think that's what's kind of contributed to, you know, lack of exchanging CompSec and those habitual relationships? Or do you think it's unrelated? In my opinion, probably a little bit unrelated and related at the same time, so it depends, like everything. So, yes, the cab is a division asset, right? You're the you're the div cav now you're going out and support the divisions missions typically and oftentimes in the deep now as we talk about let's go But that that capability still exists of supporting the BCT and what is aviation? What are we here to do is to support the ground force And you know whether that's in the deep to shape the close or in the close in support of the BCT so Oftentimes each of their you know each unit has its own training objectives and that you could You know, they get caught up and wrapped up in the mundane, everyday-isms of Motorpool Mondays. We've got to train our tasks. But also, and, you know, Mr. Deegan, you can expand upon this as well for your experience. But it's really a lot of times you just get wrapped up in your own training calendar. But just put it on the calendar and make sure that you have time for it. Well, that's what I was almost going to ask. I have, during my career, spent a lot of times at small installations. I was here as a young lieutenant. there wasn't a cab here at the time. It was just, you know, we were a standalone brigade. I was up in Alaska where we were kind of a standalone brigade. There's those instances where you're not co-located with the cab proper. So how do you go about developing those habitual relationships and getting the training time in if you're geographically separated? Have any of y'all seen a method of working through that? Good answer. Sir, so one of my prior roles was as the BAO for 310 Mountain. Nice. So we did our rotation throughout Europe, and we had our culminating event in January where we had Task Force Spearhead supporting us. Yeah. We got our LNOs about a month and a half prior to that rotation. Yeah. So they started working with us, getting used to each other and building that trust, and then identifying where the friction points are even before that rotation started. It's building that stuff months out and identifying, hey, how are we going to talk from this place to this place? Or, you know, my expertise on manned aviation isn't as dialed in. So I have another captain or their AMSO that they sent over coaching us through how we're going to plan these routes and plan these aerosols. You're talking current 310, not old 310. Because when I was here, it was 410 and 310 was with everybody else up in drum. Current 310. Current 310. Okay. Showing my age. Okay. Okay. All right. Anybody else? What else are we missing? I would say what Captain Landon was talking about earlier, it's finding that time on the training calendar and establishing these events where you guys can come together and train, exercise TTPs, make sure that you can talk to each other. When you do train, and even before you come together as a unit, individually as a cab, you need to be training the systems in your aircraft. The first time you use ciphertext, or the first time you try to use these secure communications cannot be at the Super Bowl. You've got to train these things habitually, even if it's little tasks every time you're going out to train. That needs to be happening. Say you're staying current with your systems, you're understanding how to use them, your maintainers are understanding how to use them, your support personnel are understanding the keys that they need to request for these types of training events that you're doing. But that's kind of more the individual stuff that we need to be doing as units, you know, even before we talk about coming together. If I don't know how to use my systems by myself, how am I expected to then integrate with the ground force and use their systems as well It may seem like a dumb question Do aviation units have like a motor pool Monday or a time because I been in units where we try and layer on that sort of training Hey you down the motor pool anyways everybody focused on fixing their vehicles Let do a comics Communication exercise real quick. Let's turn the stuff on Do you all have something like that to where and is that when you're thinking hey We can do these individual tasks like you like you're talking about. Yeah, so in the aviation world we have we call them rotor stables Okay, it's essentially pilots getting up in the aircraft running the APU or cranking cranking the blades and you you pick a system hey today we're gonna run up our link 16 we're gonna log into the the network and we're gonna try to get you know some icons on our on our screen so we do those things as well but you know as as things happen as things we've all seen it things stack up on the calendar those those start to slip off maybe you're not testing all the systems that you'd like to and that's usually one of the first things that falls off when we start getting pressed for time. I think that's really helpful. What I'm hearing, a lot of it, a lot of what can help us here at the Super Bowl, as you say, or in the fight, happens at home station. Exchange of L&Os, tying together for planning processes, so we're speaking the same language to include across our command signal annex, and then specific training on our equipment, and then you talked about establishing habitual relationships. I think that's key and it's really critical. What about once we're here? Like we're in RSOI, we've drawn our equipment. What kind of things can we do with the brigade and the aviation unit to be successful? Yeah, I mean, what better time because you're about to go in for 14 days to do it. So during that period, priority one is establishing comms. And so after doing so with, you know, not only just your battalion task force headquarters, but your companies, you have an LNO, use them, reach out to the ground force and go ahead. And once you're here, you get the task organization probably quite a few months in advance of being here. So you can start reaching out. And then once you're on ground, hey, take a Humvee, go link up with the ground force, and let's make sure that we're all on the same page and doing some rehearsals. yeah i i think one of the big things um talking to a lot of the counterparts as i've oced the brigade s6s is coming through here is they're very honed in on their brigade and their organic brigade assets and the enablers are the afterthought um and that ends up i it hurts it hurts the aviation i think the most because oh the the airfield's just so far away for us to go and do a comics over to and then we don't want to just send like a couple of like 25 views over there in a humvee to actually test the radios before we go into the box for 14 days yeah i think that's one of the biggest things i've seen on the ground force side working with the brigade sixes that have come through is the aviation comics we always talk about operationalizing rsoi and making the comics valix like an actual thing where the threes and the xos are involved i think we actually need to like add that with the aviation side to it so it doesn't become an afterthought and then we can actually talk um because yes being a division asset they're not going to be direct they could be direct support we don't know what the division commander is actually thinking but we need in case they do end up directly supporting the ground force we need to actually know that we can communicate especially if we're going to be doing an air assault or something so we know beforehand and then we're not trying to figure that during the a and b if we can actually talk we can actually focus on the air mission and getting things actually planned it it's a interesting thing you you kind of alluded to um is that you know while we're talking this from the aviation perspective. This is not just tied to, this discussion is not just aviation. This is anybody who's a tack-on or a bolt-on type organization coming to me. So we've sort of talked about habitual relationships. Sometimes we get the opportunity to actually work together. Sometimes we don't. Sometimes we're that, we find out a month or maybe two ahead of coming here that, hey this is who's going to be with us when do we start planning and what's different if anything planning for enabler integration than just stuff i do particularly from the c2 side stuff i do just organic so the biggest thing i did um especially when i was the aviation brigade s6 over at one id yeah um and supporting multiple ntc rotations was as soon as i found out what bct we were going to support, I'm making a phone call over to that Brigade S6. Yeah. Because a lot of – it happens a lot in 18th Airborne Corps. 18th Airborne Corps always ends up getting the newest and greatest communications assets first. Yeah. So a lot of them are ITN, and a lot of the aviation brigades haven't caught up to that. They're still running legacy systems, and a lot of the airframes are not on MMCS. I don't know if the 47s have officially switched over, but a lot of them, when I left, were still running on JCR. Okay. And knowing the, like, issues and the interoperability of our systems. A lot of the aviation task forces have to beg, borrow, and steal to try and get a star shield to come down here, and they're running SDTs. Yeah. And being able to on the S6 side, knowing, like, I need to make a phone call over to the RHN before getting down here. So we know that they're going to actually make the route at the hub to make the two missions talk. So as we're trying to pass the op orders or our cop over there, like, we can actually do that. whether it be on Maven, CPCE, or whatever flavor of COP that we're actually trying to do. So right away? Yes. I did it as soon as I found out, like, what unit we were going to be supporting. Yeah. Because the lead time on comms things is, like, not a quick flash to bang. It is very much a, as soon as you know, it's better to put it in. especially if we're looking at like taxat or satellite time for like scts it's easier to adjust time once the mission is approved instead of trying to request it late because now we're jumping in jumping through hoops because if you're trying to put an etp in it's the first 06 in your chain of command to sign that etp and then if we're getting down within 30 days it starts going above that and then it's up to the SAC controllers to actually let you like onto the bird. Hey Steve do you mind elaborating on some of those like lead time requirements for some of those specific requests for folks that are less nerdy than you which is most of us? Yeah so when we're looking at things basically anything that touches the satellite we're looking at 90 days out. So that's not an insignificant window, but the sooner the better. You can request it well ahead of that 90 days. And every time I talk to anyone else that's not like a signaler, and I'm trying to work with them to, hey, let's make training happen, is as soon as you have a thought that we want to use a satellite-based communications platform, Hey, let's put the request in now. Yeah. Because there's no hurt in putting it in early. And then once we get it and we have to adjust a couple of, like, the window for it, it's easier to do it once the actual mission's approved instead of, like, jumping through hoops 30 days out to try and get that done. Like I said, Steve, I'm sorry to cut me off, but one of the most abused and least nurtured branches. How successful have you seen our signal officers in being able to elevate, like, hey, these lead times are no joke, we need this, we need that, versus, like, finding out when we get here and it's like, I told you. I've seen it a lot on the latter part. It's being actually able to sit down with your commander and actually have that conversation with your commander and, like, your battalion commanders. Because as the Brigade of Six, you're supporting their training. It's, you've got to think of, like, we always say that the brigade is the first level that has professional staff. And that brigade S-6 might just not know. And things get lost as we're getting busy. And it's your job as the brigade to help support the training of the battalions. So talking to the S-3s, the XOs, the battalion commanders, the brigade commander, and like, hey, this is what I need to actually be able to support your training. And continually have that conversation. And the biggest thing I tell a lot of S-6s is get up from behind the desk. We find ourselves a lot. I have to keep reminding myself of doing this, is get up from behind the desk, go to the training meetings, go to the command and staffs, especially when I was in the aviation world, was going to the aviation maintenance meetings. It's huge to actually understand how you work with the aviation units and like the differences. Like I had no idea until I actually started doing things. But like getting up from behind the desk and actually having a conversation like this with the people you work with is probably the best way of doing it. So what I think I heard is in one start as early as you can in the planning process and where it varies from planning something for an organic organization Mostly when I planning for my organization, it's I control everything. Sounds like inside the C2 world, you don't control a lot of it. You have to go outside and request and there's a lot of coordination. And if it's between, It's not just between you and maybe one other entity. It's you and one other entity plus every other enabler that's being tacked on. So I think I may know the answer to this, but from y'all's perspective, whose responsibility is it? Who's actually responsible for ensuring that we're talking to each other, that enablers are integrated into the support team or integrated into the supported plan? yeah i mean i i would say it's the commanders at echelon so okay both both your battalion commanders making sure that you know this company commanders are you know um doing what they're supposed to so that the battalion or task force can can win so for me whenever i came through jerry tc you know each company will have a comp tech rec so it's at the battalion level you have your s6 you know and he's making sure that each of his companies have the right keys and everything they and draw on their SKLs. And then at the company level, before we do any mission, before every mission, they have to go load the aircraft and make sure that they have the right keys. Everything is on time and ready to go. So making sure that, you know, starts with your commander, making sure that his subordinates are doing what they're supposed to be doing so that, you know, it enables the task force at the battalion level. I would like to add on that too. So for some of that stuff, like you mentioned lead times on things like satellite keys and requesting those allocations within the aviation, especially within the TAC community for the Link 16 network, that needs to be requested the same 90 days out. You can't just show up somewhere and expect to use that system. And it happens time and time again. You know, until we get here, hey, you guys, you know, use Link 16? No, we didn't request it. That's a huge ask. I'm glad you brought that up, Chief. uh the link 16 key has been like one of the banes is because it's not like an organic army key it's owned and run by the air force so here we're now crossing branches and i've i've had to jump through hoots before because like balls get dropped sometimes but like sometimes you just get told no and then now we're out like link 16 is a powerful communications platform especially for the attack aircraft. And like not being able to enable that, that's a huge detriment on their side, especially when we start looking at LISCO and deep attack. I think that's helpful, Steve. So you talked about not having requests in, lead times for satellite equipment for Link 16. You talked about not incorporating or having kind of visibility on the aviation-specific mission command validation exercise and focusing more on the brigade, which, you know, you need both parts to be able to talk to be successful. And they talked about mission-specific communications rehearsals for, like, air assaults or, you know, attack and support, you know, attack and support a division, but to set conditions for a brigade operation. One of the other problems that we typically see is our brigade graphics, you know, for their airspace. They have an idea of what it looks like and then the aviation brigade has an idea of what it looks like. Well, I'd like to unpack, if we can, with your help, Steve, and then with our gentleman here, what should that look like? Is brigade submitting airspace to division and then division's giving it to attack and giving it to lift? Is it lateral? What is the best practice you see and what should it look like? And then what system? Is it Maven? Is it analog? So I think the, like, how we are doing it is very dependent on, like, where in which division, like, looking specifically at aviation, where that aviation task force is coming from, and knowing what they are actually running as a COP. because not everyone currently is running Maven. Some are still running CPCE. Some might be running TAC down in their CPs. And knowing that ahead of time is huge, actually, knowing how are we going to actually send the cop over there. And I think the one thing we always do end up forgetting, especially with the aviation task forces over here, is actually sending an analog cop. actually as we're producing that brigade order having those guys after we've like we've written out the op order and we're getting ready to actually brief the op order to the commanders is drawing out all the graphics on top of the map and making those multiple copies and okay so we have we have all of our copies for our organic battalions if we have a a foreign partner coming in that's a battalion uh like we've seen in some of the rotations coming through and then like actually making one for like the aviation task force and actually submitting that up because we're submitting our graphics up to division as brigade so they have an idea of what we're looking at is our graphics and then division knows okay so i'm going to be planning a deep attack that's going through 1st Brigade's AO. Like, they should probably know where the ground unit actually is and what their face lines and everything are looking at. And so we're all, I don't know, Lieutenant General Frank said, if the cop is not common, it's not a cop, it's an IOP, it's an individual operation. But so we actually need to make it common across everybody. Yeah. Yeah. And this is something that Mr. Deegan and I have spoke about a few times already about the airspace, you know, requests and how that goes. And so a lot of times units will get here and they'll they'll submit that airspace request. But when we specifically on the attack side, when we when we talk about LISCO and the deep fight and deep fight, when an attack company is given a mission, really, it starts with the mission from the division commander, you know, and what his goal is for that mission. And then you look at, you know, the battle space, or what unit is where on the battlefield. And then as we talked about communication, enabler integration, if they can't talk to the ground force and they're doing a forged passage of lines somewhere, you know, then it comes back to timing. But, like, as far as the airspace request goes, they're pretty much going to be controlled from the point, from the time they take off on some sort of control routing structure from the brigade and division all the way up into the ACA. And then it's on the companies, you know, to their fighting positions or OPs or whatever it be. But as far as the airspace request goes, you know, it probably starts at the brigade for those guys, you know, being the subject matter experts on aviation, then pushing that up to division, letting them, you know, finalize and pushing it out. And then, yeah, Mr. Duggan, you got anything on that? Yeah, so on that, you know, it's kind of in line with the cop, but, you know, when we're understanding that common air picture that we're all fighting from off of, you know, systems like Efe, Tads, and Teos, are they integrated, are they linked? Did we do those checks before we left? You know, all of these tools that build common understanding of the battlefield. That's another thing that we consistently see units falling short on is, hey, do these systems work? Are they talking? Can I send my information where it needs to go, and can I receive information on the back side? I love how there's been this little push that it's not all on one person's shoulders. It's not just the brigade S-6 of the landowning unit. Everybody has a responsibility to ensure that they're able to receive and send information to them, whether it's for a short period of time just during this one phase of the operation that division's cut in an aviation unit or they're tying in for the duration of the operation, that it's not just sitting around waiting for a brigade to tell us what to do. It's what is our piece of the puzzle and how do we integrate into that? So with that in mind, what would you all say? And I know we talked a little bit about stuff we could be doing at home station, but what is something that the units we support, aviation or the ground unit, can do? Like what's the one thing that they could do before they come here to really set them up for success? particularly stuff you see that doesn't happen and it has cascading effects set a com-ex or valex up more than once a year during your battalion ftx you know especially if nothing else you got to do it before you get here during rsoi you know whether that be everybody's out in front of their their main cps and the brigade level and you have a set up your your own company and brigade cps and you just run through it one more time and if you have the luxury of having a ground force bct something nearby you know make sure that you you train that at least you know right if nothing else right before you come here to kind of get one more rep at it so that everybody's on the same page you know how to use your systems and if not you've identified that and it gives you a starting point to train it i think that's really prudent while i have you as a as a captive here i think something would be helpful for the audience a lot of the folks you know like ground force we don't have an understanding of what it like for you to enter a brigade battle space en route to like a division mission Just like if you don mind kind of painting the picture for us how disorienting is it for you in terms of like trying to understand friendly disposition under FLIR, trying to make it to you know where the divisions asking you go when friendly and foe look probably similar under thermal and then you know limited communication or you know second-order coordination through division with with latent you know cop updates from brigade. What's that like? man it's a it it all comes back down to that that cop right so if we know where the in the you know control measures for the battle space so if we know if everybody's on the same page we probably some sometimes most time would have the same control graphic control measures if a phase line of dogwood that's gonna be our flight or whatever it had be but for us in the cockpit we generally have a good understanding what the battle space looks like just because we our area of of operation is so big it's vast compared to sometimes you know an infantry company where you know they're focused on a you know it's a it's a big operation but and geographically it's small so for us going out over a division battle space in the division deep past the you know CFL or something like that it can get pretty convoluted and especially with now with the you know SUAS operations and and you know great point the the airspace and that that goes back to where we were talking about earlier of hey from from the time that these guys take off on a approved routing structure to some to some degree all the way up into their ACA it should be a controlled environment and so whether or not they can talk if you can't that's another thing and maybe you practice blackout comms and you know that's part of the pace plan but hopefully that's not the primary in it and that you can use some sort of tax ad or over the horizon comms to have x check calls like we had talked about maybe it's just a pro word and you have to drop down that single channel playing tech freak but when you're talking about passes points it's pretty crucial because under FLIR at night degraded visual environment things can look very similar to each other but that's where it comes back down to to being the professional that you are and practicing and you know we do CVID in the cockpit trying to identify friendly versus foe but yeah it can get convoluted but for for the most part it's battle space wise we generally have a good understanding of you know what the battle space is of flying through it mr diggin yeah i would i would say the caveat on that just where things can you know exponentially become more difficult is when you do leave and you don't have that that clear understanding of the the picture that you're about to fly into and then i can't get communications with the unit on the ground to clarify what i need to and then i'm seeing icons on the map on my you know my jbcp where i didn't expect to see icons so So we generally have a clear picture when we leave, but when things start going wrong and you don't have those systems established and in place, that's when things can start snowballing rapidly. Yeah, and kind of what he talked on, that's like for the close fight. So, yeah, close fight, especially what you're going to face here in JROTC or, you know, any sort of operations in the close next to the ground force, it can get very muddy because in a deep fight, You're not necessarily going to be most of the time probably operating right next to your friendlies And it's generally permissive as far as the enemy is concerned But during the close fight if you're operating anywhere near friendlies and you don't have a good understanding Which can happen often because you get an s2, you know your own I brief prior to going out on the mission Hey, this is where our friendlies are located and you get out there at grid X and There's nobody there. Well, then okay now we don't have comms with the ground force and where are they? Okay, so now you need to take a step back, maybe take a tactical pause, develop the situation, do some reconnaissance, and then find out, you know, who you're operating in support of or near. Any additional parting thoughts on comms training prior to getting here? It just has to happen. Or you can go ahead. So one that's been pretty important is selecting and preparing the correct LNOs. So you can have someone who can be great at planning and benefit the unit, but you should be sending them with a truck that has some type of internal comms to talk back to the aviation task force that they know works. Send them with a laptop. Because I've had LNOs that showed up, and they had their assault pack and their sleep gear, and they said, I'm here. And it's like, what did you bring? And they're like, nothing. So I've got to find you a laptop, take it from someone else. The LNOs should show up ready to go. operate as their own command post and it just benefits both sides significantly. And one thing on the LNO piece, sorry, to one more point, was that if your LNO doesn't hurt your organization to an extent, it's probably the wrong guy because you can send anybody for an LNO, but if it's not the right guy that knows what he's talking about and that can, you know, support both sides, it's really not going to do anybody, you know, any sort of service. Yeah. I think the one thing I could say before they come here is above all of us, and I think Chief had mentioned it, is test what you can before you, like, get here. It's not going to solve all. It won't make everything 100% work when you first get here, but it will get most of the gremlins out of the system. So you're at, like, that 80%, 85% solution. I think it's easier now than before with the advent of gate and being actually able to have our systems outside of like being able to be on sat time. Because we can figure that part out when we get here. But that TAYUS, AMDEUS, and trying to get those things beforehand. um you just like if i'm that ground s6 i can reach out to their s6 ahead of time most installations are up on gate now so we can just have our systems plugged into regular like neck internet and be able to like work those things out ahead of time but it's making that phone call and like making it a point to actually get those systems like up and running like if we don't have like make it a point to do it something's going to get piled on top of it because training time is very very very limited before coming to JRTC and things are just not going to get done before coming here and it's making it a point to get it done if you have to stay just a little bit late anything that can like happen before here it just helps significantly during our so I so I is a very very short time especially when comms equipment do not come on our one and they come on like our four or sometimes we've seen it show up on our seven and then we're significantly rushed great point see what do they say you can't win in our swat but you can sure lose yeah anything else gentlemen what's one thing that we do after every exercise or mission it's an AR yeah it And so what better way to learn maybe from a sister company that comes here is maybe review the AAR from the last time and implement some of those comms, difficulty plans that they had there that they overcame to your rotation. That is a great point. Very underutilized, I'm sure. Yep. All right. Well, with nothing else, I want to thank you guys for coming here and being here with us. You know, time in between rotations is few and far between. I think we violated like the warrant officer work burden today. So I appreciate you guys come here. And then for the rest of our crew, stay tuned for future episodes of the of the Hip Pocket series where we dive in on other warfighting functions. Thank you for listening. We'll see you in Torbia. Thank you for joining us on the Crucible, the JRTC experience. The Joint Readiness Training Center is the premier Crucible training experience. We prepare units to fight and win in the most complex environments against world-class opposing forces. We are America's Leadership Laboratory. Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. This podcast was created and produced by Mr. John Mabes. Executive producer is Lieutenant Colonel Drew Zabriskie. It was recorded by Captain Jermaine Branch and edited by Mr. Travis Boyle. series intros were built by chief thomas rich and vocals were done by mr robert chopper special thanks to mr jeff england and the fort johnson public affairs office be sure to like and follow us on social media to keep up with the latest war fighting ttps learn through the crucible that is the joint readiness training center follow us by going to https colon ford slash ford slash l-i-n-k-t-r dot e-e forward slash j-r-t-c We'd like to thank our partners at the Center for Army lessons learned of the Combined Arms Center, especially the JRTC Call Observations Detachment. Be sure to follow them on social media as well. Follow them at https colon forward slash forward slash www.army.mil forward slash C-A-L-L. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts. And be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future. 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