Venezuela with David Shedd & One Million Downloads

This is NatSec Matters. I'm your host Jeremy Bash with Beacon Global Strategies. Before we begin our discussion today, we wanted to take a moment to share that NatSec Matters, our podcast, recently surpassed 1 million downloads. This milestone would not have been possible without our incredible listeners. Thank you for tuning into the show in 2025, and we look forward to another terrific year of national security discussions in 2026. Today on our podcast, I am joined by David Shed, former Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, former Chief of Station for the CIA in a Western Hemisphere Capital, former leader of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and former Special Assistant to President George W. Bush for intelligence programs at the National Security Council. David is a senior advisor to Beacon Global Strategies and a longtime friend, and he joins us today to discuss the recent US military strikes in Venezuela, as well as the capture and indictment of Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores. Together, we will examine that operation and its implications for regional security and US strategic interests. Stay with us as we speak with David Shed. David, welcome. Thank you, Jeremy. Delighted to be here and to join your audience. Well, let's first start with this extraordinary and consequential operation that unfolded on the morning of January 3, 2026, when US Army Special Operations Forces from the first Special Operational Forces Detachment Delta, also known as Delta Force, flew into Caracas, Venezuela with the night stalkers from the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky to conduct an extraordinary rendition of the leader of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro and his wife, so that they could stand federal charges for drug trafficking, Marco trafficking. David, first, in terms of the operation itself, an unprecedented military effort to take out the leader of another country. What do you make of the military's actions here and the president's decision to conduct this strike? What appears to me in keeping it all at the unclassified level is that this was an enormous operation that was weeks in the planning. We saw the preparation really underway in terms of the pre-staging since about August, early September, in terms of the deployment of the US fleet ships. Then when the Gerald Ford came in in terms of the mega message of force is that the preparation was underway for a pathway forward that would ultimately result in the Nicolas Maduro and maybe even beyond that in terms of the regime members being brought to justice, of which a good number of them, including Maduro, of course, been under indictment for a number of years. The planning for something like this cannot be overstated in terms of the complexities, the security required. I think as importantly for your audience to understand the codependencies of intelligence, whether it was human sources on the ground, the signals intelligence, the cyber capabilities, and the ability then to operationalize that as we saw in 2011 against Susama bin Laden at Abbottabad and the compound there, that it required an enormous amount of effort in advance of doing this. The other message that I want to leave with the audience is it could have gone terribly badly and it did not. In other words, all that planning paid off from all evidence that we see 72 hours later or so in a manner that really is breathtaking in terms of that operation to think of going into a capital of a country like Caracas and Venezuela and be able to arrest as a law enforcement operation. This really required the FBI, the DEA, the CIA, and those elements along with the National Geospatial Agency and all of those to collaborate and undertake this operation with meticulous planning on the part of the Department of War, Department of Defense. Yeah, I couldn't agree more. The incredible professionalism of our military and intelligence teams were on full display. Of course, one thing that struck me and I wanted just to ask you about, it seemed like Maduro was completely caught by surprise. His own security forces mounted little to no opposition. I mean, were that good or were they not that good? I mean, what do you make of the fact that we just flew into a country and grabbed the leader and brought him back to lower Manhattan? Well, it starts with the air defense suppression that undoubtedly took place and we saw the flash and bangs around the city. There was also deception operations in terms of mounting some of that in the countryside and other cities so that there was a distraction as well. The element of surprise cannot be overstated as well. Now, the protective detail and all of that that he had, I don't think we have the details of who might have been taken out, but what is really evident is that the Venezuelan Army certainly did not put up the kind of resistance. Again, I think because of the element of surprise, and we even see that in the recounting of Maduro and his wife trying to get into their safe space with the steel door and all of that is it's been recounted that it totally took him by surprise. The fact is that after he had been in his, what now is widespread, the video of him in the car making the offer on oil that he probably thought that was still something that might be under consideration. Now we know that it was weather that might have delayed actually this operation by a few days in any case. I think it's really a combination of surprise capabilities by the US, the absence of capabilities by the Venezuelans to respond. We don't know the story of the inner circle of his protective detail and what has happened to them. The rumors are that a number of his Cuban protector guards and all of that were killed in the operation, but that speaks to the, again, the professionalism of our forces of Delta coming in and doing what they did. Let's now turn to the rationale for the operation. Of course, the foundational rationale is this indictment on drug trafficking, but when President Trump spoke about this, he spoke a lot about oil and a lot about the energy reserves within Venezuela. Of course, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others have talked about the importance of democracy and ending the autocratic rule of Maduro. There are other interests of the United States in Venezuela. Let's just unpack some of those. What do you think was the main reason for this operation from the perspective of the Trump administration? I believe that when all is said and done, and I think we need some more time to see this unfold, it was ultimately about regime change. I'm not going to say that there is a fiction behind the drug trafficking buildup in terms of the counterattacks to the trafficking on the high seas. Over 35 vessels allegedly have been that were involved in narco trafficking. That's the allegedly part. The allegedly part is not that they were taken out. They were taken out. We're all part of this. I think clear-eyed view today, I would say, was a manifestation of a regime change under the parameters of a law enforcement operation that has rendered Maduro and his wife to the Southern District of New York as you noted in your opener. When I try to unpack it further, yes, it's about oil, but it's also about restoring the democracy of the elections of July 2024 in which Edmundo González, who by proxy ran when Maria Corina Machado, the Nobel Prize winner, was forbidden from being able to run and certainly taken off the ballot. A proxy at Mundo González, who by the way is still in exile in Madrid, is that it's really about restoring a government of democracy of which Venezuela had a long history before the arrival in 1999 of Hugo Chavez. For really 26 years or so, you have seen and then the succession of Nicolás Maduro in 2013 in the passing away through cancer that Chavez departed the scene is that Maduro has ruled for the past 12, 13 years in an increasing decline of the economy, freedom of expression and all of that. It's telling in 10 years the GDP of Venezuela has fallen by three quarters. It is mind-numbing that this country that is so resource rich and so prosperous before 1999 is in the abysmal state that it is in today. Back to your question, there are a number of strands to this story in terms of what the objectives are, but in the end, I think it's the restoration of democracy over the longer term. The pathway of that, and I'm sure you're going to get into that in this conversation, is a bit murky because as we all know when we have been involved with national security issues, the day after is actually the more complicated piece than the victory sign going up on day one or at zero day in terms of the activities that we saw. That's not to take anything away from the events of January 3rd because as we've said, it's stellar performance and all of that, but I think there's a lot more to this story now that the day after is upon us. It should be said that Maduro has been ruling in an autocratic fashion, squelching and arresting and trying to destroy the opposition in his country and destroying the economy of his country. So there are no shortage of grievances against Maduro's rule. The president, when he spoke about this, did talk about energy and oil, and I know we want to turn to that. But first, under the rubric of Colin Powell's famous pottery barn rule, you break it, you buy it. We've taken out Maduro. Who is running Venezuela today? I would make the case that Delcey Rodriguez, the presumed sort of follow on as the vice president is still running the country. There are three other key players and now the question becomes what is their trustworthiness toward one another. But these three players for your audience is minister of defense, Vladimir Padrino. Then the head of their national security or ministry of interior is Dioz d'Ardo Mccabejo. And then Delcey's brother, Jorge Rodriguez, who is the head of the National Assembly. Each and every one of these have been part and parcel of that kind of suppression of liberty and the economic morass and mismanagement of Venezuela going back to the Chavez days. And they are a cabal that are probably still running the country under the scenario of Maduro's in the wake of his departure. And they are a force to be reckoned with because they control the apparatus for security, defense, and the economy from where they sit. And that's really the challenges now of the break it, you own it, Powell refrained that you used in terms of running Venezuela as the president stated a couple of times, if not more, on Saturday morning at his press conference is that running Venezuela is going to be the challenge because these additional four individuals, which I categorize as really the cabal that does really govern or run Venezuela today are very much there in place. And control the instruments of Venezuelan national power in terms of a country of 20 million citizens of which 8 million have departed since the early 2000s into exile. And so you have a country being run still by this cabal. We're talking to David Shed, the former acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. So David, you talked about vice president and acting interim president Rodriguez, Delcey Rodriguez. She said over the weekend that Nicolas Maduro is still the president of Venezuela and that nothing has changed. Has there been regime change in Venezuela? I mean, if Rodriguez is in charge, are we going to be working with Rodriguez as the new leader? Are we going to try to get her out? What is the U.S. policy now towards the Rodriguez government? Well, I would say that that's the murkiest piece of the U.S. policy now is what is the way forward. She is clearly in charge. Now I've heard pundits say, well, of course, Delcey Rodriguez had to give that speech because that's the internal audience. But on the channels that undoubtedly are open with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others, she is saying or singing a different tune in terms of cooperation. Now, I know that she's most recently posted messages that she has prepared to work for the peaceful resolution and so forth of this because no one wants war and words to that effect. However, we have to recognize that Delcey Rodriguez along with her brother and these two other characters that I've mentioned in terms of defense and security are individuals who are longtime veterans of the oppression that we have seen and all of that. And that they would have no interest and certainly no motivation to now recognize the legitimate electoral results of July 2024 in which the estimate is somewhere between the 70% victory by Mundo Gonzales that I mentioned again as a proxy for Maria Corina Machado and the outcome for Maduro, which then he went on to steal and then inaugurate himself in January of 2024, which is interesting. We're about one year into the new six-year administration if you were to have a normal place of what Maduro would have been fulfilling at this point in the calendar. And so she will take over. Now the question and this is what remains murky is what's the U.S. role in seeing a pathway to the restoration of the legitimate, the legitimacy of the opposition in terms of running Venezuela? Yeah, I mean President Trump sort of poured cold water on the idea that Maria Corina Machado would take over Venezuela. What are you hearing from your sources about Machado, about Mundo Gonzales as you said now in exile in Spain, efforts by Canada and France and other international players to build support for Machado? What are you hearing about an effort to bring the elected opposition into leadership in Venezuela? My sources are telling me that they are somewhat confused and these are senior exiled Venezuelans who would have name recognition to your audience and to you of course and they're confused in terms of the way forward. They have not been consulted for the most part, although I do understand that there has been an outreach to Gonzales for a conversation in Madrid by the administration and I don't know that to be true of Maria Corina, but we might surmise that there is a conversation about that. I think the confusion and the fog of the day after includes this whole idea what's the pathway for the restoration of democracy, freedom, liberty and economic prosperity for Venezuela and so the argument might be made and I think the administration is making this argument that is through leveraging under real clear parameters and guardrails a transition period that may call for new elections or the restoration of the election results of 2024 using the power brokers that are in Caracas today because to do otherwise could result in sort of the collapse of the entire system. When you think it's a society now that for some 25, 26 years has relied on paramilitary elements known as colectivos, the security situation I would say is on par with the humanitarian crisis in terms of the dire security situation there and so the argument can be made Jeremy that the pathway is to work with the remaining I call them the cabal, a top of the Venezuelan regime of today with a pathway forward then for a transition but so far the opposition hasn't been included in a material way in those conversations as far as I know and that's what they're telling me as well so I'm basing it on what I'm hearing back from them. Yeah I would think David and tell me if you agree that before we can really analyze the opportunities for US companies to go in and develop the oil proven oil reserves in Venezuela which is of course what President Trump said he wanted to be the outcome of this before that there has to be security and before there can be security there has to be governance and a political pathway towards stability in the government I think right now as you lay out very clearly there are a lot of questions about who will be in charge of Venezuela does that is that sort of the basic syllogism that you see this through? Yes that syllogism applies in spades and the fact is that you know any foreign direct investment is going to want to address or have addressed those issues that you just laid out I would go a little bit further maybe a little deeper the brain drain cannot be overestimated and overstated in terms of Venezuela your your engineers and your professional class are a major part of those who have departed Venezuela over the last 20 plus years and so the restoration not only of security and the the rule of law and the judiciary aspect for that are required for investments that will call for billions and billions of dollars to take a very dilapidated petevesa the state-owned oil sector and energy sector for Venezuela and restoring it that it could go back to producing and drawing the other thing is you look at the oil markets today the incentive to go back in at under 60 a barrel would might might cause some oil companies and I'm thinking of the Exxon mobiles and and others such as themselves in conical phillips and chevron to invest more in Venezuela second thoughts as well and so there there's a I would venture to guess there's very much of a wait-and-see on the part of the external investors that that that president trump talked about thinking that this would be so attractive in terms of the the oil glut but also in domestically the absence of security and the absence of rule of law is is going to be vital to to making those decisions and given this political uncertainty it's not like the united states can relax sanctions on Venezuela overnight secretary of state marker rubio was discussing this in in several interviews over this past weekend and he basically described our policy as not running Venezuela pivoting a little bit away from where president trump described the situation secretary rubio said that we're going to keep an oil quarantine on Venezuela we're going to be able to intercept oil tankers leaving the country using law enforcement and sanctions authorities to do so and use that mechanism to continue to put pressure on delcy rodriguez and the leadership of venezuela and so it seems like for the time being there's a there's going to be a long there's a long pathway between an oil quarantine or an oil embargo to pressure the current venezuelan regime to the moment where we can see the relaxation of sanctions the the analysis the technical analysis of field assessments surveys a negotiation of lease agreements creation of taxation regimes that would allow u.s. companies to operate in venezuela and and help that country rebuild its energy infrastructure is that right david that that's absolutely correct but i'll raise you one i think there's an added dimension that the administration is focused on and that's cuba so if you cut off the oil supply is clearly it will be in terms of venezuelan oil subsidies are gifted oil to cuba that will add pressure on the regime there now i am not suggesting that the administration has plans and intentions of doing a similar operation in cuba because i think they look at it and economically it will fall of its own weight now they have to deal with president shine bomb of of mexico claudia shine bomb i think that's it's upwards around 8 000 barrels that are going from pemex the the peristatal from mexico to cuba but that shut off of the oil is there the other one is a message to china the the oil the petroleum taken out of as i said somewhere in the 700 80000 barrels a day about half to three quarters of that goes to china it's a heavy crude that requires a very unique refining and and china has been doing that so that cut off is has has a sort of knock on or knock off effect on cuba on china as well as of course the the issue on the indictments and and the kinds of sanctions that are in place i don't see any of those being lifted until there's a trajectory toward the the the government change in the regime uh being uh moving on into into democratic mode how they get there as i've already said is uh is an area where we can have different views on on that pathway and just to put a bow on this david so again venezuela is believed to have about 20 of the world's proven oil reserves it pumps only about 850 000 barrels a day correct which really is less than 1 i think of the global oil market so you know it's not like there's going to be a big impact to global oil markets overnight the price of crude as you referenced is is below 60 there may be a disincentive for us majors to to go in there certainly with the security and political situation uncertain this is going to take billions and billions tens of billions of dollars of investment and we might not see the proceeds of this until 2030 2031 or beyond so this is going to require years-long focus on venezuela i mean one thing that's kind of become so clearer over the last several days is that the us is going to have to play a major long-term role in venezuela whether we like it or not whether we think the policy was wise or not to take out maduro this is going to herald a a major new uh era of intervention and engagement between the us and venezuela no question about that but here's the good news or maybe it's the the glass half full you have venezuelans and i know them quite well uh who are anxious both to return to venezuela and you have venezuelans who are anxious to lead their own country uh this the the the receptivity is overwhelming is as many of of the listeners of this uh can attest and seeing doral the the epicenter of venezuelan exiles uh just a few miles from where i live uh in north miami uh that that they will uh step up to this in a way that is very positive in my view there's talent there's an educated class uh that's prepared to to return i'm not minimizing the challenges by any means i'm not suggesting this will be an easy or short term uh fixed to the to the problem but you know we use that old expression the old adage it's the people stupid we have capabilities in the venezuelan people to lead their country out of this in ways that is very promising to me and i think that will we have to be engaged of course we will i think the security apparatus alone will require us assistants i was trying to think of an analogy to what we would be doing and i think back to the early 2000s 2003 when i was in the white house in the nsc staff of the creation of the plan colombia and plan colombia which uh you know ran through about 2016 when the fark the uh the the insurgency the largest insurgency of of uh colombia came in and there was the the amnesty and all the rest that came with it but a real opportunity to uh build the plan venezuela which because of what we've been talking about in the long term would be very well resourced by venezuela and by venezuelans therein lies the answer it is not about us running and putting in you know a a u.s leadership in caracas to do this there are venezuelans ready to do this we're going to take a quick break and we will be right back with more of our discussion with david shed beacon global strategies is the premier national security advisory firm beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy geopolitical risk global technology policy and federal procurement trends beacons insight gives business leaders the decision advantage founded in 2013 beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk drive growth and navigate a complex geopolitical environment with a bipartisan team in decades of experience beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges well you mentioned david some of the other countries in the region i want to quickly uh go through those president trump uh has said this is should serve as a warning to cuba even to columbia where leaders there are under sanction um he's even talked about greenland and i think really laid out or tried to sketch out a modern version of the of the minn row doctrine talking about the trump corollary to the minn row doctrine of u.s dominance of the western hemisphere uh promotion of democracy do you think that the united states will get involved militarily in some of those places i've referenced in cuba in columbia in greenland i i doubt it will do so militarily but as we've seen in the case of panama and the panama canal and the two uh ends of the canal where the chinese presence uh is uh in in terms of the port services uh is is something that kind of was the opening salvo if we all look back about a year ago uh in terms of the trump administration talking about panama is that i think we're going to see far more pressure on the governments of latin america central and south america to uh to really align themselves to to the u.s policy objectives in the region which would include of course uh if not cutting out certainly curtailing the influence of china and we're seeing that effort underway with javiet mille in in uh in argentina you've seen now uh the rise of a center right government in chili you have no boa in in ecuador you have peru you have paraguay um my prediction is that next year's october elections in brazil will not go lula's way i think it will go back to center right not a bolsana or win but uh certainly a center right uh pro-private sector uh government emerging from from that election and so you have an impetro in columbia that you mentioned of course is in in deep political uh deep waters uh in in terms of his popularity with many elections uh of this year now that that uh you know are and i fully suspect that the center right will will again emerge from in an uriba like style in in columbia so i i think that the winds are certainly going in that direction that i think would curtail the inclination to intervene militarily in any of these other places and i think in the case of cuba as i said previously i think it would be the downfall of a regime of its own weight when it happens as opposed to um you know military intervention yeah and and david i think you know one of the things we love about you is is your humility and i think that's born of your experience um as it as an operations officer and as an analyst uh you know it's very difficult to predict i think if if anyone would have looked back at the last year and said would the trump administration uh conduct an airstrike with um seven b2s against natanz isfahan and fordo in iran you know few of us would have predicted exactly how large that operation would have been and if i think if anyone of us would have predicted um even weeks ago that you know delta force would sweep into caracas and arrest maduro i think some of us would have said probably not you know maybe land strikes maybe covert operations against some ports certainly an escalation of the both strikes so you know in both of those cases iran and venezuelan i feel like the president chose the big option the kind of the the of all the courses of action presented to him and so i think sitting here today you you probably would agree it's very difficult to predict where this administration could go next particularly with respect to cuba and columbia um where the president's already making noise you know there's the old adage if someone tells you who they are believe them and so i think it's it's a buckle your your chin strap moment for the for the hemisphere and for the world i want to turn david quickly just to the issue of narcotics and then come back to the larger geopolitical dynamics most of the fentanyl coming into the united states that has poisoned sickened and even killed tens of thousands of americans have come from chinese precursors assembled in factories in mexico run by the sena loa and and jalee skullboys cartel cj ng cartel into the united states um fentanyl does not principally come from venezuela venezuela as a cocaine exporter primarily to europe and other markets um is there a narcotics rationale for this operation that you can discern and what do you think about the next steps with respect to mexico and what shinebaum has said and the implications for us mexico relations there is a a proper predicate given on the the 2020 indictment against maduro pertaining to the drug trafficking charges so i think you have a a legal pylon much akin to 1989 with uh no riega and panama that will uh make it never say an airtight case entirely but in terms of the prosecution now of maduro on the basis of drug charges that said when you unpack it and peel back the layers associated with the overall uh drug trafficking and production and then uh the the delivery of that into the united states you're absolutely correct in your characterization of where the the fundamental area and challenge exists for the united states when it comes to the supply side in the demand conversations a whole different conversation in terms of that but on the supply side it's mexico and it is these cartels and i would argue that from my knowledge these cartels had the reach even into venezuela as they do into colombian ecuador in other words in other uh places in the in the region bolivia and uh and and so forth in peru where these cartels are so powerful and so vertically integrated that they have capabilities for uh really their uh their activities and and the center of that is mexico and you've mentioned a couple of the cartels i count about 10 to 12 um of those cartels of of lesser renown but you know the gulfill cartel and others that are all part of the fentanyl trafficking and that really was not coming out of venezuela by and large and in the case of cocaine that cocaine was transiting from colombia through venezuela enabled by the other uh this sort of counter or insurgency group eln the liberation national liberation army from colombia through venezuela to uh to west africa and then on up to europe so it wasn't even transiting primarily for the united states it doesn't mean there wasn't any but that wasn't the natural flow of of the cocaine trade but your your fentanyl and and other aspects of it in the precursors as you know having a china origin are really into mexico and then and on up to the united states and so yeah i mean i i i mentioned this david and i think you're you're pointing this out as well which is that again if the administration's central prebs for this operation in caracas is to deal with the drug problem then there's going to be i think an increasing focus on mexico because that is where the drug problem principally emanates from and this is mexico is obviously critically important to the united states we share this massive 2000 mile land border with mexico our our economies are incredibly interdependent i mean you know people think of a border as a hermetically sealed wall it's not there are thousands of of people and trucks and movement of goods that cross between the united states in mexico many cars that are part of the american car industry are actually manufactured partially built in mexico we have enormous trade there are implications for us mca which president trump has talked about changing or maybe even pulling out of if we're going to get really serious about the stopping the drug flow with mexico it could have enormous economic implications for a number of industries in the united states and i just think it's really critical that companies and and folks that are advising these companies keep their eye on this no question about that because when i look at mexico where i serve for five years i can tell you that and i was there at the uh at the establishment of nafta uh which is the predecessor to us mca as the as the trilateral trade deal with canada and of course the united states that mexico has has only led to greater integration of our economies in terms of the supply chain and all of that and as we look at and my book points out and in the great heist is this dependency on the chinese portion of the supply chain is something that we want to see reversed in terms of of bringing it into into the hemisphere and in in that regard so the issue of security for mexico is is a fascinating one and one that i'm watching very carefully because i think shine bomb unlike his predecessor uh lopez obrador affectionately known as amlo uh for his six years kind of embraced uh the not not the narco trafficking itself but that the way to deal with it was to integrate them into society that did not work out well there are still somewhere between 30 to 40 000 uh deaths caused by violent violent deaths uh related to the cartels in mexico and so there's swaths of of mexico that are ungoverned so now shine bomb has an opportunity and i think she is trying to uh make the best of that opportunity to in part maybe perversely but but uh very real to her prevent the us from doing uh kinetic operations and by that i mean hellfire missiles and that sort of thing on targets inside mexico uh here's the problem for her and i and i sense this from the mexicans that i speak to is that the administration always appears to have a moving target it's not clear what good is good enough um and again i'm not defending the fact that these cartels still operate everything we've just said about the cartels and their ability to move their illicit drugs across the border by all kinds of means uh even though the uh the there's been a a border closure in terms of the immigration aspect of it there really hasn't been a significant downturn that i know of uh pertaining to the illicit drug flow from from mexico despite enormous cooperation with uh the united states on security which i can't go go into in any detail but the the security is added in terms of cooperation at at an all-time high under shine bomb the problem is is that when you try to define what's good enough i i don't know what that is and i'm sure that she struggles with knowing what good enough is while still having the rule a very uh you know 130 million people country that is very proud and and clearly has a uh we we have a history with Mexico as you well know that uh that uh she needs to protect in terms of the uh the the nationalistic view of of letting them do what they need to do David let me get quickly uh before we get a wrap up on on a couple of more items um we've gotten some questions from from listeners russia and china you know what lessons quickly will will putin and shijian ping learn from this i mean under some analysis has said well putin might feel emboldened to to take more aggressive action against zolonski in ukraine china might feel more emboldened to take action against taiwan will they be in any way deterred by this action in venezuela will they be emboldened what's your kind of quick take on that quickly i think that the first takeaway will be that uh we're moving into much more of spheres of influence uh construct and i would say you you mentioned the Monroe doctrine and some have have tongue in cheek called it the donro doctrine of of moving into the hemisphere in terms of supporting our national interests in terms of of our interests in venezuela would clearly fall into that category that would signal to latin mere putin and jijing ping respectively on on russia ukraine and and taiwan then in fact the the the willingness of the united states to sort of see an end state in either place uh is diminished because of this this operation but the message that the operation sends uh on the other hand of course uh it would send a message that the president is is decisive when he needs to be uh but it always has to be in the self interest of the united states and you see this playing out even in in the zelensky negotiations with russia in the u.s. on you know everything east of the of the nipper river in donbas be there or even in the messaging with with taiwan and g so what i'm watching very carefully and encourage your audience and yourself to watch very carefully is both the preparation and then the the outtake of uh president's trump plan visit to beijing this spring uh how to how is what what is sort of the the intended outcome on that where we have a jijing ping making it very clear that 2027 is sort of his his timeline for taiwan in terms of of the build-up that they see and is that going to be you know a a full out invasion or is it a stranglehold economically or both that sort of thing and so they look at uh events like this now the other thing that i would suggest is that probably they're getting a message that if cuba starts to fall stay out of it it's and that's particularly to the russians but also the chinese have a large listening base there that has been publicly acknowledged in terms of presence there and so you know it might be that it's messaging this this is in our near abroad stay out of it and that of course has the other side of the coin their near abroad's respectively again or something that uh they they may take away as a message that we won't be there when you know we we said we would be in the case of taiwan or in the case of the ultimate direction of of whatever a peace settlement looks like in in ukraine that that we won't be there to see it and we've seen this in the messaging to the europeans that this is really your problem yep david i want to conclude with kind of the big question about regime change and about uh u.s interests um i want to quote from secretary of state margarubio who of course served in the united states senate where later this week a privileged resolution will be brought to the floor under the war powers act that directs the president to remove u.s forces from hostilities within or against venezuela that have not been authorized by congress this is going to be sort of a test vote this week um in the congress where there's been a lot of concerns raised about the failure to brief congress the failure to discuss the operation in advance with congressional leadership and the gang of eight um and where senators will have to go on record talking about how to use military force against venezuela secretary rubio said this weekend on face the nation quote i still think that a lot of people analyze everything that happens in foreign policy through the lens of what happened from 2001 through you know 2015 or 2016 the whole you know foreign policy apparatus thinks everything is libya everything is iraq everything is afghanistan this is not the middle east and our mission here is very different this is the western hemisphere within the western hemisphere we have a country potentially a very rich country that has cosy it itself up under the control of this regime has cosyed up to iran has cosyed up to hezbollah has cosyed to narco trafficking gangs to operate with impunity from their own territory allows boats with drugs to traffic from their territory and we are addressing that and so secretary of state rubio is sort of i think sounds like diverging a little bit from the maga principle of of no foreign intervention no regime change which of course president trump campaigned on very aggressively and said but this is different this is the western hemisphere and then i also want to read a quick quote from jack reid the senator from rhod island the west point graduate who serves as the ranking democrat on the senate armed services committee who i think we would all agree as a serious national security thinker and he said of of the venezuela operation quote no serious plan has been presented for how such an extraordinary undertaking would work or what it will cost the american people history offers no shortage of warnings about the costs human strategic and moral of assuming we can govern another nation by force david i want to give you the last word on this big question about regime change in the the ability the capability of the united states to run venezuela for the short medium and long term well as we've already heard secretary rubio sort of read readjust if i want to be careful there in terms of what the president really meant to say about run venezuela the question and i come back to the talent the the ability of the venezuelans to to really chart their their own future and working with them to do so i'm a huge believer that that is really the way forward the other thing that i think would be a terrible mistake is undertake something akin to the debathification that took place in the in the late 2003 2004 period in iraq and they gave rise to the sons of iraq and ambar as you and i both know jeremy was a was a terrible period uh and and at risk in terms of of what we had gone into iraq in march of 2003 to do so he's absolutely he rubio is absolutely right to say that venezuela is not iraq libya and and uh and afghanistan in that in that regard uh in terms of this fear of influence i cannot underscore enough that i think that that's what we're seeing what will i think historically become known as the trump doctrine which is in your near abroad you take care of what you need for your national security we can quibble over whether that's worth it or the means for doing it and of course the military often talks about means and ends uh the end is you have a more stable venezuela uh ideally coming out of this in terms of the regime change and one could argue that the basis for that and i'm not sure why the administration hasn't used this uh with a clear resounding message to the country that this is really the outcome of the july 2024 elections in venezuela the the people did speak and and that this would be the way to characterize this and that then you know this truly was a law enforcement uh operation so in the end i i think that you know regime change in venezuela is probably the first and only one that they will do in the in the hemisphere but the message has been sent loud and clear to those who would challenge that that uh this president's not shy about using force if that's what's required being global strategies is of course advising our clients u.s companies companies from key allies and partners that are concerned about and watching and and interested in these developments whether they are defense or technology companies that are providing capabilities to the u.s government um in this new era of geopolitical competition or focus on our near abroad as david laid out um or whether there are companies that are interested in understanding sanctions and economic policies and the the changing nature of our policy towards venezuela or the countries in our hemisphere where we are we are so grateful to our senior advisors like david shed a former acting director of the dia and the author of the great heist china's epic campaign to steal america secrets and truly one of our country's foremost experts on the western hemisphere on latin america uh david thank you so much for joining us today and thank you all for listening thank you for the opportunity that was david shed i'm jeremy bash if you enjoy listening to natsek matters please leave us a rating and a review we'd love to hear from you and if you're interested in becoming a sponsor of our program please email our team at bgs at bgs dc dot com you can also find that email in the show notes please join us next week for another episode of natsek matters natsek matters is produced by steve dorsey with assistance from ashley barry natsek matters is a production of beacon global strategies