Pax Silica: Inside the Trump Administration’s Tech Strategy with US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg

We're not going to do government-operated supply chains because that's not how we shine as a country. Our superpower is really our private sector and our companies. The old Steve Jobs quote that American products enchant and delight users around the world by the billions. That really is our edge as a country. And so the answer has been trying to work in lockstep with our private companies and our builders to build platforms that are commercially viable and that can ultimately live outside of the government as a private service. The Dana Prize were joined by Jacob Helberg, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs. We spoke with Jacob before he was confirmed in this role and we're very excited to have him back to discuss Pax Silica, which is a multi-nation effort to secure the AI supply chain for the United States and its allies. Jacob, thanks so much for being here. Yeah, thanks for joining us. Thanks for having me. So let's get right into it. Three months ago, you announced Pax Silica, a super ambitious coalition. Can you explain what it is and where you are in it? Yeah, absolutely. So I gave a speech at the Hudson Institute that was really meant to be our blueprint for Paxilica. Paxilica is an economic security coalition that now has 14 countries. And the idea is really to have an ecosystems-based approach to our supply chains, and specifically the AI supply chain. And in my speech at Hudson, I outlined our different lines of efforts, including our policy roadmaps and our projects. And about a week and a half ago, we basically did the first big, what would be the tech equivalent of a product rollout, where we announced a forward deployed industrial base with our oldest ally in Asia, the Philippines. We made this arrangement with them where they are granting us 4,000 acres, which is obviously very substantial. It's a third of the size of Manhattan to do a very large industrial build-out that's one of a kind that helps combine the predictability and certainty of the American common law system with the industrial comparative advantages that the Philippines offers. And the goal is really to secure inputs that are vital for our supply chains. And so we're super excited to be here in San Francisco, talk to builders and see ways that we can actually accelerate supply chain security for our tech companies. Is this set up as a special economic zone in the Philippines or can you tell us more about the details beyond sort of the legal side that you mentioned? Yeah, absolutely. So right now there are two phases to the plan. The first phase is the State Department taking into custody the zone. We are referring to it as an economic security zone because it is a very unique type of arrangement. The State Department has authorities to take in land and property into custody, sort of how foreign governments gift the State Department counselors and consulates and embassies. It's very unique to do a gift of 4,000 acres, but fortunately there's no statutory limits on how big or small property can be. And so that's phase one. And so right now it's actually a diplomatic property that is effectively governed by the same laws as our embassies are. Phase two will be the long-term development and build-out of the land. And so we are going to spend, we have two years, a two-year window to negotiate the details with our Filipino counterparts on the investor protections that will apply to the land, the taxation regimes, and all of the different legal safeguards that investors will be able to benefit from for the long term. And the goal is within that two-year window to actually have a long-term framework that will be multiple decades. It's an amazing innovation. Are there specific domains that you think make sense to invest in there from a manufacturing, mineral processing, whatever it is, perspective now? Yeah, so the goal is really to actually test a concept that could potentially be replicable. I mean, right now, when we think about the AI supply chain, a lot of people just think of chips. But the reality is that the AI supply chain actually includes thousands of inputs like precision reducers and server motors and rare earth magnets and actuators. And our concentration risk as a country is incredibly high for basically all of those inputs. And so the goal is to identify key geographies that actually have industrial strengths and bring unique capabilities to the table that could actually help us move the needle meaningfully in different segments of the supply chain. So the Philippines already has a native indigenous manufacturing ecosystem that's already quite deep. It's our oldest ally in Asia, so we have a very deep values alignment with the Philippines. And so we think that the nexus between the values alignment combined with their industrial advantages actually makes for a very compelling value proposition for a lot of companies. We're talking with a number of companies focused on the robotics supply chain. As you guys know, living out here, and I'm sure you guys include robotics companies in your portfolio, but the robotics supply chain, robotics is an incredibly promising industry that really is poised to change a lot of things. in manufacturing as well as in people's daily lives. And the supply chain is right now completely dominated by China. And so that's an area where that's, you know, we're particularly interested in potentially making a bet on. When most people hear economic security policy, one of the first things they think of is the Belt and Road Initiative. How would you contrast, you know, your strategy and the State Department strategy here with that approach? Yeah, so that's such a great question. And I think, you know, one of the benefits that we've been able to leverage developing this strategy today is the ability to study 25 years of, you know, of China's Belt and Road Initiative, how they've done what they've done, you know, what's worked, what hasn't worked. And, you know, fundamentally— Do you want to explain what that is, too, for our audience? So the Belt and Road Initiative is a very, very large foreign policy project of the Chinese government that basically involved using state-owned enterprises that are essentially extensions of the government to carry out massive infrastructure projects overseas. And the idea is using infrastructure projects as a tool of foreign policy to achieve foreign policy outcomes. So this was the big build-outs, for example, in Africa that planted in a variety of countries there. That's right. So whether it's creating mines or, you know, processing facilities, a lot of the times it involved building out, you know, very big roads, sometimes bridges. A lot of the times it included railways. And fundamentally what it was was state-owned enterprises building government-operated railways, government, you know, built roads and bridges. and the Chinese government, by virtue of its system, really built all of this in-house, which for us, when we think about how should we want to secure supply chains, we need to make a lot of investments that touch upon these kinds of industrial capabilities. But as Americans, we're not going to do this in-house inside of the government. And the side effects of this for China was basically both building out their industrial base, but then also securing natural resources in some of these countries. Exactly. So they were able to build a network that ensured that their factories in China had all the inputs in order to actually really, you know, thrive. And, you know, Shenzhen today is really, you know, the world's factory floor because they have deep relationships with suppliers and vendors, you know, on every continent, basically. And the infrastructure that they leverage allows them to get access in a way that's very, very competitive. So the question for us is, you know, how do we compete in that landscape at a time when we want to reinvestialize? And the answer is, we're not going to do government-operated supply chains because that's not how we shine as a country. And, you know, sort of where we've landed is our superpower is really our private sector and our companies. And it's sort of the old Steve Jobs quote that, you know, American products enchant and delight users around the world by the billions. And that's how, you know, that is really is our edge as a country. And so how do we, you know, adopt a product-based, a product-centric approach to, you know, our foreign policy where we can actually use that kind of approach to achieve foreign policy outcomes? And what we've done, so that's very much sort of the lens of how we've decided to focus our economic security strategy. The answer has been trying to work in lockstep with our private companies and our builders to build platforms that are commercially viable and that can ultimately live outside of the government as a private service. And so the forward deployed industrial base is meant to be a platform for private investment that will be viable for the long term It the first of its kind We thinking about making a big play in the logistics space in partnership with large corporates. And in June, we're looking at potentially doing a broader rollout where we're going to roll out four or five different big lines of effort. You guys are both invited to Washington for it. And so, you know, having a product-based approach is very much how we're thinking about it. As somebody who's done a deep study of the pros and cons of Belt and Road, there's obviously access to infrastructure and inputs as some dimension of success here. What's been the failure point for Belt and Road? Well, the failure point is, you know, so first of all, obviously, some of the projects, you know, have been useful for China. there's a lot of waste in the Belt and Road Initiative. And mainly it's because whenever you have central planning and really government bureaucrats effectively allocating large pools of capital, there's a lot of waste because vendors massively overcharge things. There's a lot of waste because there's a lot of roads to nowhere. And what happens is China will basically deploy capital to its own companies that then, you know, basically write IOUs to the host country. And the host country realizes that, you know, they've gained a reputation for these projects, they've gained a reputation for being a debt trap because China will say, you know, we'll build a road and, you know, as a loan, except the company building the road is Chinese. And so China can basically decide what the price is. And as you guys know, when you build a house or when you do any construction project, a lot of projects run over budget a lot. And so when a host country thinks it's taking on X million dollars in liabilities, and it actually ends up being 10X that, that's when they kind of end up in quicksand. And so the Belt and Road Initiative has really garnered a reputation for really being a tool of political leverage that a lot of countries are still digging themselves out of. And so- Versus one of partnership. Exactly. Versus one where it's positive sum. I think a lot of countries don't feel like they have enough upside in it. It is Chinese workers, Chinese companies, you know, and a lot of the times it's Chinese equity because the debt converts to equity if, you know, the host country defaults. They do a lot of the times. And so, you know, we were approaching it totally differently. And because we're approaching it by putting our companies in the driver's seat, it's actually, you know, in a lot of ways, it's much more ethical because the deal is structured in a way that's really meant to be, you know, a true joint venture and one that will be optimized for commercial viability, not just, you know, for political purposes. When you think about the 14 countries that are already part of PAC, Silica, or, you know, this as a potential blueprint for others to be involved in American for deployed industrial bases, like what's the value prop for them? So the value prop is one of the amazing things that we're seeing is obviously the AI revolution is leading to huge growth. I mean, despite the volatility and the energy markets, you know, the American economy has been proven incredibly resilient. And a big part of that is AI being this incredibly strong economic force that is already fueling over a third of our economic GDP growth right here in the U.S. Overseas, we're seeing that growth translate to record demands for copper, record demands for cobalt, record demands for lots of different inputs that go into data centers, and record demand for electricians and all the rest. And so the takeaway for a lot of these countries is if they find ways of actually having a bigger part and a bigger stake in that supply chain at different layers, layers that make sense for their companies and their economy, they can actually derive a lot of economic growth from that revolution. Because, you know, the amazing thing about the tech industry, especially when we go through these inflection points, as you guys know, is the pie grows really fast. And so it's really not zero sum, which actually makes it incredibly conducive to forge very mutually beneficial partnerships because we're not approaching it as, you know, what I gain, someone else loses. It's actually because the pie is growing, we're partnering together. and this is very much part of the ethos of how we're partnering with the Philippines. We are developing a partnership where we both have skin in the game and we both share in the upside of success. And so, you know, risk is evenly allocated and so is upside. And so ultimately it's very much a win-win proposition. How do you think about the areas where you want to partner with other countries versus have things happen in the US? I know, for example, there's been a longstanding effort to bring back fabs and the ability to manufacture semiconductors, a sort of state-of-the-art line widths and everything else in the U.S. That hasn't quite happened yet. I know there's active efforts to do that. What do you think is important to do in the U.S. itself versus to partner with other countries? And how do you figure out what goes where? Yeah, so that is such a great question. And I think, you know, I would answer that question in a few different parts, but the first part is maybe starting with some stats. And America consumes, accounts for, you know, somewhere in the neighborhood between 20 and 30% of global consumption on any given quarter. It's obviously huge because we're 4% of the world's population, but we're basically a fourth to a third of the world's total consumption. Our production levels- Is that the Celsius or other things like that? It's other things than Celsius or no-name company, you know. Yeah. We consume a lot of stuff. I mean, Americans like to consume. We're a risk-taking culture. We're a high-consumption society. And our production levels are not 20 or 30 percent. We produce a lot less than that. And so part of what we're seeing is if we narrow the gap between what we consume and what we produce, we will re-industrialize America because that will be a massive re-industrialization plan that will inevitably include a lot of, you know, semi-autonomy or full autonomy. And because if we industrialize in an economy where unemployment's already at 4%, it will have to be, you know, very, very autonomous, which is possible. Singapore has proven that's possible. They have highly autonomous ports, you know, factories. And so that, you know, so that's number one. then there's a question of, you know, what happens with the other 70% of the world's consumption that is currently, you know, mostly concentrated in China. And so the idea is if we want to have a supply chain system where America and its allies and the global economy has access to suppliers that are, you know, more evenly distributed, that are reliable, trustworthy, you know, transparent, I think a lot of countries actually really see that as a business opportunity for them to also be able to have more production in their respective regions. And so part of the idea for the forward deployed industrial base and these economic security zones is actually to have a hub-based approach where we can leverage the industrial attributes. So for example, if regions have a lot of rare earth minerals, or for example, in the case of the Philippines, a very deep indigenous manufacturing ecosystem, things that they're really good at or have unique advantages in, we can leverage that to really help capitalize on that and make sure that they can actually contribute to their supply chains for areas that they're really good in. And ultimately, help foster regional hubs because the population of Africa, for example, is growing massively. South America is also growing very, very quickly, places like Brazil, Argentina. And so I think having a hub-based approach is very promising. And ultimately, America remains the economic engine of the global economy. And so I think the parts that we re-industrialize here will definitely be the biggest driving forces. And you're totally right. The effort to bring back semiconductor fat production here is already well underway. And so that will continue. It's already in flight. And there's a whole host of reasons why it wouldn't necessarily make sense to try to replicate that elsewhere because it's highly technical. The global supply of talent available in that area is very finite and limited. And it's also extremely capital intensive. So it wouldn't make sense to replicate that elsewhere before it's finished here. But the unfortunate and good news is the supply chain is vast and there a lot of things that still need to be built And so the world I think is actually really really ripe with opportunity in that sense How do you think about other inputs into what you're talking about? So, for example, you mentioned rare earth magnets. And my sense, and I haven't verified this, so please correct me if it's wrong, is that, you know, A, rare earths are not actually rare. B, the total market size is in a few billion dollars a year and C, that market is heavily subsidized by China in order to basically control supply. It's sort of a lever from a political basis. And so are there considerations around other mechanisms that the government can use? I know there have been, but I'd love to hear how you all are thinking about other aspects of the supply chain that may be raw materials, that may be heavily subsidized or propped up by foreign governments, et cetera, and how we should address those areas in addition. Absolutely. And so you're exactly right. The total, you know, the really interesting thing about rare earths is obviously, as you point out, they're not that rare. I think, you know, some people have said that they're everywhere. It's not totally true either. I mean, they're not everywhere, but they're in lots of different places. I think the sort of key thing is that really drives, you know, the economics of those industries is how much energy do you need to pump into the ground in order to extract a given mineral at a given quality grade. And then what's actually really rare is the refining process because the number of processing facilities for these minerals is very, very limited outside of China. They exist, but in very limited quantities. And you're right, and China obviously subsidizes the hell out of them. And so it's very exciting to be able to share with you on that, that the Trump administration has actually really had a very, very comprehensive approach. I mean, we've been really focused on the mineral security issue pretty much since day one of the administration. We did the largest critical minerals summit in the history of the State Department in February, on February 4th, with over 55 countries that participated. We signed critical mineral MOU deals with dozens of countries who have lots of different kinds of minerals. And now one of the things that we're doing and have been aggressively pursued across the administration is allocating capital and investments into a lot of these projects to make sure that they have access to the resources to expand production. So that's on the supply side. On the demand side, the administration is hard at work at negotiating deals with countries to address the pricing issue. Because as you guys know from the business that you invest in, you can invest a lot of money in a startup, but ultimately a lot of the economics of, you know, whether a company can be viable is really based on the price, you know, that, that company is able to provide a service for. And so the pricing mechanism is really, really central to unlocking long-term commercial viability. And I'm incredibly confident that we actually will resolve the pricing issue for the minerals market before the end of this administration. You mentioned that you are directly investing in domains of importance where you're trying to like trigger better supply capability with us and allies. Like, how do you think of the role of asking for a friend, private capital in these initiatives? Yeah. So I think, I mean, you guys have such an important role to play, Mainly because, you know, so much of, you know, whether a project materializes or not, as you guys know, it hinges on execution capacity. Can a company really execute on a very aggressive, ambitious plan? And one of the amazing superpowers of the venture capital business is, you know, you guys are kind of hardwired to be able to assess a lot of the personality attributes of founders and operators to tell, you know, some of the things that are harder to read from a deck or spreadsheet on, does this person really have, you know, what it takes to be able to execute, you know, and address execution risk, you know, underlying scientific risk, you know, all the different risks that inevitably exist in any way. company. And so the feedback, and so we actually would really love for the venture capital ecosystem to help be part of the solution because I think, you know, you guys are better positioned to assess, you know, who are the best players in the space. And we can take that, you know, as an important signal to help inform, you know, capital allocations that we make on the government side to make sure that we allocate money in the right places and in the most efficient way possible, especially as good stewards of taxpayer money. The other thing is, I think beyond sort of assessing who the best players are, I think on the innovation side, I mean, there's a number of really great companies, especially out here in the Bay Area who are working on new materials and rare earth free magnets and lots of other kinds of innovations. And I think that's where we have, you know, there's a lot of room and potential for potentially coming out with, you know, a rabbit out of a hat situation where we somehow end up solving this issue in a way that was completely unanticipated through innovation. And so, and that will ultimately be a solution that will really be born out of the tech industry, not the government. And so, you know, those are things that we obviously want to be attuned to and help be supportive in any way we can. When you think about, you mentioned limited bandwidth, of course, and economic security and the AI supply chain being an enormous topic. How do you think about prioritizing 27, 28 versus five years out? Because this is something we think about as well. Or if you look at next-gen lithography and robotics and, let's say, chip new semis designs, for example, there are some longer-term plays that are more capital-intensive. And so we balance our views on that and nuclear and such with software that is going to ship this year. Yeah, one of the approaches that we, so I think, I mean, one of the approaches that the administration's taken that, you know, hopefully will really be the foundation for a lot of, you know, short-term change as well as just provide long-term support is helping shape the environment. You know, creating a macro environment that basically makes innovation, iteration of innovations as well as deployment of innovations a lot easier and less expensive. So the administration's approach to expanding our domestic energy supply is obviously part of that, expanding nuclear. The administration's really undertaking a lot of efforts to basically cut red tape, accelerate the deployment of American nuclear energy. And from memory, it was actually one of the first executive orders that the president signed where they said they wanted to quadruple our domestic nuclear supply, as well as a lot of actions to deregulate. The one big beautiful bill included a lot of tax incentives. And through the State Department, we're looking to help play a constructive part in shaping that environment by creating these evergreen systems, basically, like the forward-deployed industrial base that will be a long-term platform and hopefully a replicable one that we could pursue in other geographies. And the idea is that for the long term, our technology companies will have these platforms to operate in that will really be a competitive strategic edge that they can use to build very, very quickly and actually get to market faster. How do you think about in general this transitioning through administration? So you mentioned a number of executive orders. Typically, when an administration shifts, you end up with a lot of those executive orders undone in both directions, right? Somebody comes in and they kind of cancel a bunch of the executive orders that were passed or signed by the prior administration, and they write a bunch of other ones that may be at odds with them. And so often the key is legislation or other approaches. How do you view making this stick if you think it's so important for our country's future? Well, there are some things that I think will be hard to undo. I mean, it's, you know, tax reform is very sticky. And so, you know, one of the interesting attributes about my role of the State Department is we're actually not allowed to comment on electoral politics. So it's kind of this interesting, you know, statutory limitation that we're subject to. Thank you. When you, we have the audience of a lot of folks in the AI ecosystem, but also a lot of folks in the general business and investing ecosystem of companies of different scale. What do you think like American business people and entrepreneurs should know about these policies in terms of how they affect them The goal for Paxilica is we want to use it as a platform to expand market access for our companies Because even amongst our allies sometimes our companies face a lot of hurdles with exporting their products and services. So we want to hear feedback from them on what's working and what's not working in places like Japan, South Korea, India, and things that we could do better in the policymaking space to make sure that we can actually make, you know, provide some support for our companies to be more competitive in those markets. We also want to hear, you know, it's been great to already get a lot of feedback from a number of different companies on partnerships that are already in flight and opportunities that they see on the table on the supply chain security side. So there's a lot of cross-pollination and partnerships that are already being forged between American companies and companies in India and Japan and South Korea, even in Singapore. And so understanding those partnerships helps us really understand how executives are thinking about their supply chain strategy. Everyone uniformly is obviously thinking about ways of being much more deliberate about their supply chain decisions in ways that factor in the realities of the need to not be overexposed to China because of the political dynamics at work. And so understanding where they see opportunities for what segments of their supply chain helps us get a better understanding of what's working and what can we help grow as quickly as possible and scale. And so that part is very useful. So I would say expanded market access, strategic partnership opportunities on the supply chain side. And then we also want to make sure that we actually create a space where we can talk about important intellectual property conversations. You guys are obviously very involved in the AI industry. And so I'm sure you've been spending a lot of time thinking about the whole model distillation debate, which is super important to actually protect the economic value of these hundreds of billions of dollars in investments and AI companies. And so we, you know, that remains a really important, unresolved area of policy where I think, you know, getting the input from the builders who are the closest to the development of this technology is super important. When we last spoke to you on NoPriors, you were just beginning your tenure at the State Department. What has the biggest surprise been? You've been very active since you started? Well, the biggest surprise is honestly how entrepreneurial the Trump administration has been because I think the stereotype for people who work outside of the government is usually really focuses on this idea that the government is super bureaucratic. And obviously, that's not to say that the government is a massive enterprise and lots and lots of people involved, lots of processes. But the really extraordinary thing is we have a president who also spent most of his life in the private sector and who really likes speed. I mean, the running joke, especially with our counterparts overseas that deal with the Trump administration, is that we like to move in Trump time because the president, when he likes something, he wants it yesterday. And so that part's really been amazing because the appetite to try new things and the appetite for risk and to move really, really fast is highly unusual by government standards and really speak for the philosophy that President Trump brings to bear in the Oval Office. And so that part's really been extraordinary. That combined with the really great leadership that we've been able to benefit from at the cabinet level from Secretary Besant, Secretary Lutnik, Secretary Rubio, Secretary Burgum, who, you know, it's an incredibly collegial team. And they really, you know, operate with a level of professionalism that's been incredibly inspiring for people like me in the subcabinet to be able to benefit from and also, you know, work very constructively with our bureaus. One thing that you've said recently surprised me just in phrasing, you referred to America as a global underdog, I believe. That's not the way I think of America. Can you explain yourself? Yeah, so I think, you know, it's interesting because I think the U.S. often thinks of itself as the Navy and, you know— Versus a pirate. Versus a pirate. And so, you know, Alison Graham wrote this book years ago called The Thucydides Trapped, where he kind of characterized America as the established power. And he characterized China as the rising power. and and actually think you know one of the really big flaws in that whole line of thinking is i really wouldn't say we're an established power because i think for most of our history i mean one of the things that really makes america quite unique and and very different is from the earliest days of our founding we've always been a nation of underdogs we started out as 13 you know uh you know, disorganized, you know, unruly colonies, you know, rebelling against an empire of polite society and, you know, the educated expert class. And who said that, you know, we, our project as a republic would never succeed. And if there really is one through line across our history is almost any decade in, you know, the history of our country, there have been, you know, a class of experts that predicted, you know, our decline, our, you know, that we've reached the limits of our power, whether it was the great financial crash, whether it was the Iraq war, the first and second oil crisis, you know, the Vietnam war, you name it. And, you know, the amazing thing is Americans perform really, really well when, you know, we feel like our backs are against the wall and it's crunch time. I mean, I'm sure you'll remember during COVID, there were these very dramatic, you know, Atlantic magazine covers about the great unraveling of America. And against the odds of, you know, everyone in the mainstream press, we came out with a vaccine in under a year that actually performed much, much better than every other alternative out there and came out of COVID much earlier. China obviously was bogged down in its zero COVID policy, the effects of which it's still feeling today. And so the reason I say this is because I think, you know, culturally, it's something that makes America very, very unique. And I think it's something that really hits close to home for Silicon Valley because it really, Silicon Valley embodies, you know, the quintessence of the underdog mentality. Every founder- Feel this in my soul. Yes. Every founder started out, you know, as having a contrarian idea that was kind of seen as heretical by, you know, the expert class, you know, the sort of polished Harvard professors of the world that think that, you know, they sort of have these well-founded, you know, sciences. is. And, you know, you have people who, you know, some of them are dropouts, they sort of, you know, dare to question, you know, old orthodoxies and, you know, they hear no 45 times before getting to a yes and they keep going. And so it really is, you know, part of the DNA of, you know, what makes a founder a really great founder. And so, and I think it's, it really is that kind of spirit, that new frontier mentality that makes Silicon Valley unique, but that has really, you know, characterized America as a nation that's allowed us to always bounce back whenever we've experienced a setback. And so it makes me really, you know, optimistic about the future of our country. And I think, you know, my message to founders, you know, executives in Silicon Valley, as well as our partners overseas is, I think that's the kind of spirit we want and are looking for when we wanna partner with people. And it's also the kind of ethos that people should expect from us when they ask themselves, what can I expect from Americans versus executives from another country, say China? And I think the answer is, with America, a lot of the times, it's very positive some because our companies already work on positive sum partnerships all around the world. And, you know, it will involve a lot of tenacity and creative thinking. And that's how American founders work. Thanks so much for joining us today. No, no, thank you. Thanks for doing this follow-up. Find us on Twitter at NoPriorsPod. Subscribe to our YouTube channel if you want to see our faces. Follow the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen. That way you get a new episode every week. and sign up for emails or find transcripts for every episode at no-friors.com.