US-Iran Summit - Taming Mideast Volatility: Gregory Brew

This is NATSEC Matters. I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today I'm joined by Mr. Gregory Brew, a senior analyst with the Eurasia Group's Energy, Climate, and Resources team, focusing on the geopolitics of oil and gas. He also serves as the Eurasia Group's country analyst for Iran. Greg Brew joins us today to discuss the upcoming nuclear talks between the United States and Iran and the possibility of a U.S. military strike. Stay with us as we speak with Gregory Brew. Greg Brew, welcome to NATSEC Matters. Thanks so much for having me on. Well, Greg, I follow you on X, and I have for years, and I've noticed that not only are you an expert in Iran's oil business, but you are really just one of the top Iran experts around. So I'm so glad to have you here today. We are possibly on the verge of new military strikes. There's going to be some diplomatic activity by the end of the week, and I think you're the right guy for us to ask questions. Well, thanks so much. Yeah, happy to answer whatever questions. As you note, things could go in two very different directions, either strikes or talks, based on the events of this week. Yeah, let's get down to it. So here we are. By the end of the week, there will be a substantial diplomatic summit, if you will, in Istanbul. And if the papers are correct, the United States is going to meet directly with Iran. The United States has put out a document or at least said that we want maybe to get rid of Iranian enrichment altogether, some action on ballistic missiles and something on their proxy terrorist network. What's your sense of what is really going on behind these diplomatic engagements? Well, first off, I actually, I noted how you said the US has put out a document, because my mind now goes back to almost a year ago, February 2025, when the president signed a presidential memo laying out the policy framework for Iran. And I think since then, there's been relatively little, there's been some in the national security strategy, there's been some in the national defense strategy. And then of course, there's been the president's own rhetoric and the rhetoric of administration officials. What's clear right now, and I think has been clear throughout the term so far, is that the United States wants to see major Iranian concessions in three areas. The first is the nuclear program. Of course, so much of the program was destroyed in June of last year by Israel and then by the United States. But some of that program remains. Iran retains the ability, if perhaps not at the moment, the will to rebuild. And then there is the significant stock of highly enriched uranium that survived the war that Iran retains. The United States would like to see Iran hand over that enriched uranium and dismantle its program indefinitely. Then there are other two areas. The United States would like to see Iran, and this is a longstanding demand, back away or cease support for its regional proxies, most of which are, as you know, designated terrorist organizations. There's Hamas in Gaza. There's Hezbollah in Lebanon. There's the Houthis, Ansarallah in Yemen. And then there are a variety of Shia militias in Iraq. And Iran has spent years, decades backing these groups. And the United States would like to see Iran stop. And then finally, and perhaps most contentiously moving forward, the United States would like to see Iran place significant restrictions on its development and stockpiling of ballistic missiles. We've all seen what these missiles can do. Iran has fired them at Israel and also at a U.S. base, bases in Iraq and in Qatar once in 2020 and then again last year. And the United States expects to see Iran place restrictions on the development of those missiles. That's the U.S. negotiating position. Right now, this position is being pushed in the context of a major U.S. buildup in the region, right? There's a carrier group. There's as many as 10 destroyers positioned in the Middle East. There are significant air assets in Jordan and the Gulf states. And the president and other members of the administration have made it very clear that there's a strong possibility of military action against Iran if Iran does not submit to these terms. So that's the context for this upcoming summit. As you noted, it's going to be in Istanbul. We can call it a summit because it's not just going to be the United States and Iran. There's going to be regional states represented, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. But the context is military confrontation if Iran doesn't come to a deal, the U.S. pushing Iran into what can be termed a maximalist deal where it gives up maximum concessions. And then finally, the Iranians are in a particularly weak spot, you know, coming after a year of significant blows. Last month's major protests, which the regime put down with lethal force, a deteriorating economy, a leadership facing credibility crisis, you know, on the back foot, forced into a position where they might be willing to make concessions that they hadn't considered. The real question is, can Iran meet the U.S. demands and will that be enough to avoid escalation? So we have all this leverage because of the military posture that we're in. And of course, it's always best to negotiate when you have the use of force sort of out there and in your hand. But as you said, these are quite maximalist demands that the United States is trying to get out of Iran. If you listen to them, they say, we're only going to negotiate on the nuclear issue. I'd be surprised, although I have seen a couple of articles that suggest they might give up some of their low-enriched uranium, which is apparently buried at one of the sites that was bombed. I can't see them doing much on their proxy terrorist networks, and it's also hard to believe that they would deconstruct or turn over any of their ballistic missiles. So is this set up to fail for Friday? And then I want to get in with you on how did we get back to negotiating on all these issues when I thought the whole point was that we were trying to express solidarity with a military strike for the protesters. It's almost a bait and switch. But first, please address the maximalist demands. Sure. So on this question, are talks doomed to fail? I lean towards yes, at least right now, given the gaps between the U.S. and Iranian positions. The maximum of what Iran would be willing to offer does not meet the minimum of what the United States needs to see. And as long as that remains the case, there's not going to be a deal. There's not going to be an agreement. On top of that, the U.S., as you know, does have tremendous leverage, is in a very, very strong position. And that suggests to me that President Trump, as was the case last spring, isn't going to be willing to take a limited deal. Right. Maybe something where Iran gives minor concessions, receives minor incentives or at least a reprieve from U.S. military action in the short term. That doesn't really fit the profile of what the president has done in the past. This is also an administration that has pulled off an incredibly successful operation in Venezuela only last month. Right. Successfully removing the head of state and completely reconfiguring U.S.-Venezuela relations in the U.S. favor. That suggests that the administration's appetite right now is much bigger than a limited deal along the lines of what Iran might be willing to offer. I don't know if that's the intent of the talks. I think it's more likely that the U.S. sees an opportunity here. All right. The U.S. has built up military leverage, has built up pressure on Iran, has the option to use military force. But there's a logic in attempting a deal initially, at least to see what the Iranians might be willing to give up via pressure alone before taking recourse to strikes, both to take advantage of a potential opportunity and also, and this gets to your other point, to present a stronger pretext or justification for the use of force. I don't know if the administration is too hung up on this question, but there is some question as to why the United States feels justified to use force against Iran in the current context. And there could be a justification presented if Iran is offered a deal and declines it. And the deal includes the nuclear issue, the missile program, and the proxies. On the pretext or context for strikes, you're absolutely right. Several weeks ago, the president was expressing solidarity for Iran's protesters. These were protests that were very large, that initially suggested or illustrated an existential threat to the Islamic Republic, as these protesters were calling for the regime's collapse, and they were coming out in large numbers. And the president initially was positioning U.S. military action in the context of supporting protests. In other words, aiming towards regime change in Iran, or perhaps regime collapse. The protests were quelled, were crushed very quickly by the Islamic Republic. The president demurred from using military action, I think in large part because there were not sufficient assets positioned to both launch a strike and absorb a possible Iranian retaliation. So we're now in a different context where there are no protests ongoing, where the justification to support the protesters doesn't really seem to exist. And at the same time, I think the administration is at least somewhat hesitant around vocally expressing a regime change policy. Again, they're worried, as are regional states, that if the regime feels its survival is being threatened, then it will launch a more significant and escalatory retaliation than I think the United States is prepared to absorb. So let's talk about the bottom line here. I mean, my base case has been that since President Trump put America's prestige on the line by saying we were locked and loaded and that we are coming to help you, that he had to move forward. And let's just lay policy aside For just a second On the sheer politics of it all Because Obama hadn enforced His own red line And he doesn want to be seen as weak like there And he also is cognizant many are that President Obama didn do anything for the green movement, and he doesn't want to be seen in the light of abandoning an opportunity. So my base case is that he has to strike them, and I still believe that, and that maybe they're taking advantage of this period through which they need to transfer more military assets to the region. They asked for something incredibly hard for the Iranians to give. They're not going to be able to give it. They have more of a justification for a strike than they did beforehand, and that we're going to end up striking them relatively soon. Does that sound plausible to you? I think that sounds very plausible. I think – Is that your base case though? Is that what's your tell me? Tell me what else it could be. Sure. No, my my base case right now is for strikes. To your point, I think the president has put himself in a position where not acting carries more downside politically than acting. He has, as you say, put his reputation, his credibility, his prestige on the line by promising to act. The context for action is fairly attractive. The United States, he's bombed Iran once before. He killed Qasem Soleimani in his first term. The Iranians, of course, are promising retaliation, but with every new asset deployed, with every new Patriot or THAAD battery positioned in the region, with every new destroyer positioned in the Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the U.S. and Israel are in a stronger position to manage potential Iranian retaliation. And I also think there's an understanding that the Iranians will still want to avoid regional escalation if they are struck. There is the concern, the fear that the regime will feel its survival is at stake and will launch a more irrational or escalatory response. But I think the U.S. and Israel perceive Iran as fairly deterred against a broader, prolonged military conflict. At the same time, I think the president also wants to avoid a prolonged campaign. He wants decisive action, both to enforce his red line that he laid out and also to deliver a win. And I think there's scope for military force achieving something against Iran. Before this crisis, before the protests, before the U.S. red line, there was considerable evidence to suggest that a continued Israeli military operation against Iran was likely in 2026, with the focus being Iran's rebuilt missile program. It's stockpile of ballistic missiles that was used up in part in June, but that Iran was taking steps to replenish. So if these talks fail and the U.S. takes recourse to military action, there are nuclear facilities that could be targeted, but there are also missile facilities, missile production, missile storage, missile launch that the U.S. and Israel could target and could deliver a strategic win in that way. The bigger question for me is how much further Trump is prepared to go. Is he prepared to significantly destabilize the regime? Is he prepared to try to create the context for new protests? Is this in fact an operation that will try to move towards regime change or move towards regime collapse? I'm less confident that that is the base case. But I do think that given the number of assets deployed, given the scope, given the potential upside and the relatively little downside, I think whatever the United States does against Iran in the event that talks fail will be fairly significant. And another thing, you know, it's not like the president has had any notable military failures. I mean, many presidents have. I'm surprised the Maduro raid works so well. I mean, if you're President Trump, you're thinking, wow, I got Qasem Soleimani, I did Maduro, I bombed Iran, and then in the first term, I also bombed Syria. I mean, nothing really bad has happened when the president has engaged in the use of force, so I don't know that he has any natural governor on here. All right, you handled one of my questions there. It's implicit in your answer that Israel would join a U.S. strike. You believe that, right? I think so. I think I'm not entirely sure if it's assumed base case, given that the Israelis might be happy to let the United States lead in this operation, right? Given that it's it's the US is steering the ship. Trump is really in the decision seat here. He was to a certain extent in June, but the operation in June was really driven by Israeli incentives and an Israeli timeline. Netanyahu wanted to act and Trump either gave him a green light or at least acquiesced to Israel launching their strikes in June. Here, Israel is somewhat more in a supporting position. I do think that the Americans, the Israelis have an understanding and expectation that even if it is a U.S.-led operation, the Iranians are likely to retaliate against Israel directly. The Iranians, in their public rhetoric, have linked, continuously linked the United States and Israel together. There's also something of an opening here for the Iranians in that the parameters for Iranian-Israeli exchanges have been fairly well set. The Iranians launch medium-range ballistic missiles and drones. The Israelis shoot most of those drones down. They get support from the U.S., fighter squadrons in Jordan, destroyers in the Mediterranean, bolster air defense. Israel is something of a convenient target for Iran, given that the escalatory risk appears to be fairly well contained. as opposed to U.S. bases, U.S. ships, or energy infrastructure in the Gulf where the escalation risk is more significant, the risk of continual U.S. action following Iranian retaliation is more significant, and the spillover to affect other regional states is possibly greater. I think that is what is informing the U.S. and Israeli posture here. Not so much that Israel is likely to join U.S. strikes, but very likely that Israel would be a target for Iranian retaliation. And also, at the end of last year, when Netanyahu visited Mar-a-Lago, I mean, they all but said in the press conference that Trump was greenlighting Israel to go after the ballistic missile programs. So this was before the protests. But to me, at first I was thinking, well, it maybe messes up the messaging of trying to help the protesters if the evil Zionist regime joins with the great Satan. But I think they're over that. It sounds like Israel would join altogether. I want to go back to what you said on the question of what Iran would do if and when they're hit. And you said they're pretty well deterred. And I agree with you that in the previous two strikes, they have telegraphed their punches and more or less purposefully not tried to – they hit our bases but hit a non-populated part of the base. in part because they didn't want to cause real casualties or damage or else the United States would come after them big time. But I wonder if you really think they're deterred in this time around because if the strikes are in fact existential to the regime, won't they take off any natural governors and really target our bases around the region or do as they say, which has hit our Gulf allies, UAE and Saudi. So assess that for me. Sure. I think when I say deterred, I think the US and Israelis likely think that Iran is deterred from seeking a regional conflict. I think Iran can be expected to retaliate in a more significant way in the aftermath of a US strike. It won't be a symbolic, prearranged, preorchestrated attack on Qatar, it will be something more significant. It will be aimed at US bases and US ships. And it will be launched with at least an outward desire to do damage and cause casualties. That's my base case. I think the Iranians are deterred from taking deliberate escalatory action that creates a longer, broader conflict. But at the same time, they do see their missiles, and they've been clear about this publicly, they see their missiles as providing a source of deterrence. And they have seen previous actions as being insufficient to restore deterrence. The strike on the Qatar base was not sufficient to deter the United States. That's been clear for the Iranians. So whatever they do in retaliation will be bigger than it was in 2025. At the same time, I don't think they're likely to escalate against Gulf states. They want to preserve those relationships. I don't think they're likely to escalate against energy targets. This is the big market concern is that a US-Iran-Israel conflict will create spillover risks, will put upper pressure on oil prices, things like that. I don't think any of the actors involved seek that scenario. I think it's an evident risk. But I think the Iranians will be keen to keep it focused on military targets rather than civilian targets, at least where the United States is concerned. Where Israel is concerned, there's already ample precedent to suggest that the Iranians will be shooting at Israeli cities as well as Israeli military bases. With the US, I think they'll focus on keeping it military. Interesting. Okay. Well, I think you just answered this and you alluded to it earlier. Last time the Israelis wanted to hit the Supreme Leader, we apparently told them no. So you don't think that's part of – well, let me get back to the larger question. If we're going back to the – let's just say we're going to hit a nuclear site and we're going to hit some kind of base for the terrorist networks. But are we still going to hit the instruments of regime repression, the besiege, the IRGC headquarters? Because we want to say these are more along the lines of support the people in your campaign, go back to the streets. And then maybe a part of that would be take out the Supreme Leader, but it sounds like you're not quite there on that one. So I think on the first question, will they target, let's call them instruments of regime security. I see that as not base case at this time, given how the administration is posturing itself around these issues, given how there's renewed focus on the nuclear program, given that the missile program is a more important strategic priority for certainly for Israel, but also likely for the United States. I also think there's been an understanding that pushing the regime towards collapse creates a lot of negative downside. Delivering regime change is difficult, perhaps even impossible, through airstrikes alone. That said and here the big caveat I don think that means Khamenei won be on the target list for the big reason that is Venezuela I think the United States is probably exploring the possibility of eliminating Khamenei delivering a regime decapitation and then attempting to reach a new agreement or at least try to create space with whatever regime forms in his way. Khamenei is, I think, acknowledged as an obstacle on all of the issues that the Americans would like to see the Iranians make progress on, nuclear proxies and missiles. Khamenei has also been broadly discredited inside Iran. There has been a long period of anticipation of his death leading to a succession. And I think eliminating Khamenei would deliver the president the win that he's looking for, the decisive blow that wouldn't theoretically drag the Americans into a prolonged conflict with the Iranians. Now, the caveat there is that will the Iranians restrain their response? Will they absorb the loss of the supreme leader through an American attack? I don't know if anyone can say with strong confidence if that is the case, but I would note that the loss of Khamenei does not mean the collapse of the regime. There has been rhetoric, and this goes back years, saying that even the supreme leader's death would not shake the revolutionary ardor of the republic. And I think there's enough scholarship, there's enough expert understanding now to know that what kind of government would form in the wake of Khamenei. It would be one that would be dominated by the Revolutionary Guard. It would be one that would likely be led by the senior security and military leadership. There would be a new supreme leader. He likely wouldn't have the same status or influence as Khamenei, but the regime would continue in an altered form. And I can see that as being a potentially attractive scenario for the Trump administration. So long as they have assessed the risks of Iranian retaliation, And so long as they have, I think, some degree of confidence that Iran's new leaders will prove more pliable than Khamenei. And I think the Venezuela example is illustrative of the opportunity that that presents. That said, there are obviously massive risks to undertaking that kind of operation. OK, fascinating. That was a great clarification. We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Gregory Brew. Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm. Beacon works side-by-side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy, and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage. Founded in 2013, Beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk, drive growth, and navigate a complex geopolitical environment. With a bipartisan team and decades of experience, Beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. I want to get to the nature of the protest movements and whether they're going to come back in just a second, but it's been a fascinating series of commentators more or less saying the same thing, although it was all in one place last night, and I tweeted it out. I retweeted it from at Michael Allen, JMA. But essentially what they're saying is that the Iranian regime structurally is unable to reform itself because it would change its very nature, and it would cease to be sort of this revolutionary Islamic type of event or type of regime and it would be seen as a secularization of the regime if they were able to reform either constitutionally or electorally and therefore it has no ability to evolve therefore it's probably going to collapse sooner or later anyway because it's brittle and has no capacity to change can you expound upon that a little bit and do you think there's a lot to that so i accept the premise, in fact, I think I've written this myself, that without change, the Islamic Republic is likely to collapse. It may not take months, it may not even take years, but the current trajectory is unsustainable. There is not sufficient public support for the regime as it exists. The economic trajectory is further disintegration and deterioration, suggesting that the quality of life inside Iran will continue to degrade and erode, and that creates environment for instability, that creates environment for insecurity. And given the resources that the regime has, they're unlikely to keep it all bottled up forever. So a regime collapse can come in a variety of different ways. My view, if we enter that kind of scenario, is not a sudden fall, but a gradual disintegration, where control over certain provinces weakens to the point where the regime isn't really present. Perhaps expanded separatism in places like Iranian Kurdistan, the Ilham province around Iraq, Sistambaluchistan in the far southeast, and then continual unrest popping up in the cities. The thing is, is that the Islamic Republic, as currently organized, is, well, I won't say perfectly positioned, but is quite capable of managing that level of unrest through lethal force, as it has demonstrated. Not just last month, but at many times in its history. And a regime that is, you know, comfortable killing its own people in large numbers, historically, those regimes tend to stick around. without any kind of outside intervention. On where the regime goes from here, I think Khamenei's departure is the key signpost. I don't think the system is likely to move against him. I don't anticipate an internal coup, in other words. I think Khamenei remains the glue holding the system together. He's been the decision maker. He's been the consensus builder. He's not always a very decisive leader, but he allows Iran's various elite factions to rally around a single point. And that has been useful for these factions, because in many cases, they disagree with one another. In many cases, they're led by dominant personalities who would like to be in charge, but who perceive a personal security risk in attempting to move against Khamenei. It's kind of a death of Stalin situation where everyone is waiting for the dictator to die, but no one's really willing to move against him independently. When Khamenei does die, by whatever means that happens, it will create space for change within the regime. I don't think that change is likely to be sweeping or dramatic or particularly democratic. But if we look at the trajectory that's been clear over the last several years, the military is having an increasingly large role, both in day-to-day decision-making, but also in the management of the economy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is tied to the ideology of the revolution, but it's also a conglomerate that is, I think, at this point largely exists to shower material benefits on its members and on its leadership. And those kinds of organizations tend to be a little bit less ideologically disposed and a little bit more pragmatic when it comes to how best to maintain hold over power. So my sense of how things might change, I think you would see relaxing of certain social laws. Mandatory hijab is already effectively no longer the law of the land, even though it remains law. I think a regime post-Khamenei would likely relax restrictions on various social laws. I think there would be an attempt to reach a deal with the United States because everybody understands obtaining sanctions relief is the way to deliver benefits. The question of, you know, once Khamenei goes, where will they be willing to make concessions or show flexibility. I don't think there's sufficient force within the system to deliver democratic reform, like constant surrender or anything like that. Tell me a little bit more about this moment here with the protests. I mean, they came out, obviously, many thousands were murdered. And understandably, They've gone back in. There are people on every street corner. You have to get escorted to the grocery store. So it's not an ideal situation for protests now. But can you foresee any – and I know this is by its very nature unforeseeable – but other than the Supreme Leader's death, can you see an opportunity for them to come to the streets again in large numbers? Could it be with the United States strikes with Israel? Or do you think that the regime pretty much has this well in hand for now? I think for now it does. And I think the two signposts to watch are elite solidarity or elite unity. And that has been very strong in the wake of these protests. The point of contrast is the 2022-2023 Masa Amini protests, where there was actually quite a bit of, I would call it measured dissent. among the elite over the wisdom of enforcing mandatory hijab. In other words, there were some publicly saying, you know, these protesters have a point. Mandatory hijab is a policy that doesn't make any sense. There has been none of that with these protests, right? Prominent reformists, prominent figures who have advocated for change have aligned fully with the regime's official propaganda that these were foreign-backed efforts to essentially overthrow the state from within. There has been some criticism of the violence, but it's always directed towards the rioters, the protesters themselves being responsible for the casualties, for the deaths. I think the difficulty with anticipating a bottom-up, oh, I should also note, apart from regime solidarity at the top, continued loyalty of the security forces. And, you know, obviously, there's been a lot written about this. But I think it's notable that these protests were put down with shocking speed and violence across the entire country. They were protests in dozens of towns and cities before they grew to a very very large size on January 8th at which point the internet was shut down and the security forces moved in By January 10th the protests were over It took the regime 48 to 72 hours to completely clear the streets. As far as we know, right, the internet was deactivated. We can't be completely confident. But the evidence would suggest that the regime security forces, the military, the basij, the police moved in a fairly well-coordinated way to put the protests down. That suggests very few cracks. That suggests there's relatively little dissent among those ranks. If that dissent emerges, and here economic conditions could be critical, if the regime struggles to pay its security forces, then that creates an environment where protests, bottom-up protests might be more successful. But right now, what Iran has is a revolutionary populace in search of a revolution. And so far, they haven't been able to find it. And that speaks to the final point. The opposition is fairly divided, right? There are some who support the return of the monarchy. There are some who continue to support the idea of reform from within, although they are a minority. There are others who want a constitutional referendum, free and fair elections. There's lots of different demands, but relatively little cohesion except around the idea that the current situation is unacceptable and unsustainable. Greg, when the stand down occurred a couple of weeks ago, when the United States was supposedly poised to hit, there were many reports that our allies in the region, UAE, Saudi, others, had warned the United States that they weren't excited about the idea of a new strike on Israel. And this just sort of raises the question, what is the posture of the regional allies of the United States? Where are the UAE and Saudi Arabia and others on de-escalation? Or do they just say that publicly and they secretly want the regime to collapse? Give us some sense of the regional dynamics. Sure. So I think the position of regional states, allies, partners to the United States has shifted. over the last, I would say, six months to a year. Prior to this, they saw Iran as a key threat, as a threat to their security, as a threat to the security of the region. And they, I think, were largely aligned with US and Israeli policy to weaken Iran. So long as that in the progress, in the course of weakening Iran, their own stability, security wasn't threatened in any significant way. I think the position, particularly of a state like Turkey, has changed in the last six months. Turkey is now very concerned that U.S. strikes on Iran will produce a regime collapse or will produce the ingredients for instability that will then threaten Turkey's own security. I think states, regional states, have gone from seeing Iran as a threat through its own policies as being a threat through the potential that it loses control, that it slips towards collapse and then exports instability. And they want to manage that risk. It's not necessarily that they see the US or Israel as the source of that risk, but they fear renewed intense conflict with Iran will push the Iranians towards uncontrolled or aggressive retaliation or will create instability that is then exported. What they're trying to do now is manage escalation, create a space for de-escalation, I don't think they're trying to come to the Iranians' rescue. There's no love lost for Tehran among the regional states, Turkey, the Gulf states, and otherwise. But there is a concern that pushing Iran from a weakened state into a state of near collapse would be very bad for the region. At the same time, it's possible, I think, that these states, like the United States, seize an opportunity in this situation. Iran is weak. Iran is under pressure. The U.S. has a lot of leverage. Now might be the time to get the Iranians into a deal that restricts their nuclear program, that pulls back their support for proxies, and that maybe puts some limits to their missiles. And I think regional states are more conscious than the United States that a deal can't just be extracting concessions for the Iranians, that the Iranians need to get something out of it too. That it can't just be, you know, do this or we'll bomb you. It has to be do this and, you know, something good will come your way. Maybe sanctions relief or maybe improved trading ties with regional states. Maybe the long promised but so far never delivered Gulf investment in Iranian energy infrastructure. I wouldn't be surprised if regional representatives are telling the Iranians, look, make some concessions. We'll get the U.S. to stand down. And at the end of the day, this will keep your regime in place. And it just goes back to your point earlier, Michael, about how the goalposts have shifted, how a few weeks ago the U.S. was expressing solidarity for protesters in Iran. And now we are in an environment where many states – well, the United States is willing to talk to Iran, but many states appear quite focused on keeping the regime in power. It's quite a remarkable turnaround in the span of just a couple weeks. Yeah, it sure is. Greg, you're also a renowned expert on oil and particularly Iranian oil. We've appropriately talked about the use of military force so far. But as we begin to wind up here, let's talk a little bit about whether the United States could do more to sanction the Iranian oil trade. What's left for us to do? Well, on that, there's not a whole lot left that the United States can do that it hasn't already done in some level, in some way, shape or form as far as increasing sanctions pressure around the flow of Iranian oil to China. There are still tankers involved in carrying Iranian oil that have not yet been sanctioned formally by the United States. That's kind of the lowest hanging fruit. But even sanctioning tankers wouldn't shut down the trade. You know, it's been extensively written about. and I'm sure your listeners are familiar, but oil is moved from Iran to China through a complex web of intermediaries. Tankers transmit the oil via ship-to-ship transfers. There are intermediaries in the UAE, Malaysia, Singapore, who manage the flow of funds to and from China. And it's developed over the course of nearly half a decade. It's become very complex. And the U.S. lacks tools of economic statecraft to shut it down without cooperation from other states. And the key state that the U.S. would need to have cooperation from in shutting down the Iranian flow of oil to China is China. And China is not interested in giving that cooperation. So I've always put it this way. The question of sanctioning Iranian crude or shutting down Iranian oil to China is more of a China policy question than it is an Iranian policy question. And unless the U.S. is ready and willing to get a lot tougher on China over this issue, I don't see a significant change or significant decrease in Iran's oil exports to China anytime soon. All right. Well said. Last question. A quarantine. The president thinks he is having tremendous success in Venezuela or was by literally boarding shadow to shadow vessels and more or less confiscating Venezuelan oil. Can you see the United States doing that with its armada that's aligned across the Middle East? I think the U.S. will be tempted to go after tankers carrying Iranian crude for precisely that reason. It was successful in the context of Venezuela. I don't see it being equally successful for really two reasons. One, the Iranians are capable of retaliating. The Venezuelans were not. The Iranians have shown in the past that actions against their tankers will bring a reciprocal response against tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf more generally. I don't think the Iranians are deterred if the U.S. starts going after tankers. I do think we can expect Iran to retaliate in kind. And this doesn't suggest there's a whole lot of upside for the United States in attempting to interdict or blockade Iranian oil exports. The economic financial hit to the regime wouldn't come quickly enough to deliver the kind of gains that the president is looking for. And the risk would come directly at the area that I think the president is most anxious to avoid risk, and that's the price of oil and the flow of oil through the Gulf. Those are the reasons why I don't think the U.S. is likely to approach a blockade on Iran's oil exports in the same way as they approached Venezuela. The final reason would be the one that I mentioned, and that's China. I think the Chinese were willing to brush off or shrug off the loss of Venezuelan crude. I think they would be much more responsive to any U.S. attempt to cut off the flow of Iranian crude, both because Iranian crude flows to China in a much larger quantity, and also because the Chinese place a greater premium on the security of Iranian crude flowing to their refineries than they did to the Venezuelans. They would treat it as a much sharper provocation. And they get it at such a discount. They do. Who wants to lose that? It's a good deal. Greg, thank you so much. You've been terrific. We'd love to have you back another time. This is a volatile situation in the Middle East, and you've really helped us understand it. So thank you so much for coming on NatSec Matters. Thank you so much for having me on. That was Greg Brew. I'm Michael Allen. If you enjoy listening to NatSec Matters, please leave us a rating and review. We'd love to hear from you. If you're interested in becoming a sponsor, please email our team at bgs at bgzdc.com. You can also find this email in the show notes. Please join us next week for another episode of NatSec Matters. NatSec Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry. NatSec Matters is a production of Beacon Global Strategies. you