This is The Crucible, the JRTC experience. Do you have something for my hip pocket? Do you have something for my hip pocket? Do you have something for my hip pocket? Hey, long time listener, first time caller. Love the show, but do you have something more focused for me? Yeah, do you have anything for my hip pocket? Yeah. We've got something for your hip pocket. You want something hip pocket sized. this is hip pocket training a short form series focused on the single topic insights for the warfighter on the go quick relevant and ready when you are welcome back to another episode of hip pocket series i'm mark howell and i'm dave faltschraf aloha and aloha indeed so we are on location here the island of oahu uh if you're watching this instead of listening to this in your car you may notice that we've brought our sound stage outside to the beautiful island of Oahu. We are here in support of the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center and their rotational exercise. Oh, hey, team. I'm going to introduce you to our guest here. I have six of my best friends. I hope it's six. Public math is scary. But we had Steve Yates here, signal expert. We got Mike Stewart, Mike the maven, not the cop, but he's really good at infantry stuff. We got Ed Piccaro, the intelligence expert. We have 8A Diro, logistics and sustainment extraordinaire. We got Chief Horace. He's our fires representative. And then we have Sergeant First Class Peeler, the all scary SEMA guy. And basically what we want to talk about is, you know, LISCO and the, and maneuver, combined arms maneuver in LISCO, like essentially the same task, But the environment is very different when you're fighting archipelagic, fighting on islands, fighting in mountains. So we want to talk about some of the unique challenges across warfighting functions in our in our new environment. Yeah. So to kick us off, I guess the first thing for our panel here is who here has been who's been here before. And by that, I mean, you've you've been stationed here. I think I'm the only one, Mark. So I was as well. A day. Oh, yeah. OK, so so we'll hold off on y'all. I want to open it up to the other group or to those who haven't been stationed here before. You haven't had to fight continuously in this environment. And I want you to think, and we'll just kind of go around the horn with whoever's ready. What have you learned about fighting in this environment, specifically from your warfighting function? So archipelagic, jungle, mountains. What is something that you kind of surprised you, something you didn't know? I would say the military aspects of terrain. with the jungle are a lot different here on the island of Oahu and Hawaii than they are at JRTC. Some of the couple things that I learned specifically is as you're looking at, you're doing your maku and you're developing avenues of approach and mobility corridors, that you may be able to see what looks like on a map, that there are trails or corridors or those types of things, but because of the dense vegetation and a lot of times very steep terrain, the vertical danger areas that are present here, that you may not necessarily be able to have cross-wability corridors between where you're going to have platoons or squads operating. So a lot of those terrain considerations are going to be very important. Also, the very dense canopy in the jungle is really going to limit aerial observation and satellite imagery. So you're not going to necessarily be able to rely on those as much. you're going to have to really rely on your dismounted infantry, your light infantry, in those routes in the jungle to be able to provide you information. Interesting. Right. So you can't be overly reliant on things that fly. Absolutely. Interesting. Okay. I think that's a great point, Ed. And one of the things that I noticed, also first time to the island, just like there's different weather pockets and like completely different terrain, you know just a few miles difference like it's super windy in one area it's raining in another area and you know it's like like the temperature differences like it's like a bunch of of little worlds all on on one island right yeah absolutely yeah and and y'all can't see it but behind us it's obviously blue skies in front of us on the other side of the camera it's overcast in gray and i think raining off in the distance probably back where we just were 24 hours ago all right Yeah, kind of going off of what Ed was talking about of the terrain, like something I've noticed here is the comms planning has to be even more deliberate, especially as we start looking at the ITN units who have become very, very reliant on MUOS. MUOS is a great waveform for that beyond line of sight capability. But once you start getting into that dense terrain of that triple canopy, Yeah nothing getting out And the TTPs that the units here have actually implemented with tsm have like changed my mind a lot on like the implement implementation of tsm and like how to communicate back since they're in files and it's actually setting up the mesh network for them yeah and actually having reliable voice communications back to their cps it was it was really good to watch would I'm a big fan of like what's old is new again with the the the army's high-speed cup phone variants be something that would actually work here where you're running like physical cable is that is that something that could work here is that yeah that that would actually work it would take a lot of like training for a lot of the soldiers to go back to yeah and set up and it'd be a very deliberate implementation as you were moving through the jungle yeah it would definitely slow down our rate of march a little bit um where that mesh network allows them to keep mobile and they're just hanging ghost radios and then the next group coming through is changing the batteries on them like four six hours later um is it really cool to watch yeah yeah i would say that uh it's really important that during ipo that they're doing the proper uh electromagnetic operating analysis because that's going to set up both for for SEMA operations but also for for the comms piece yes you do have those little little almost like small shapes of different space that the the PMS is being broken up and so each one of those needs its own analysis and then the other piece is that stepping away from the island slightly the sea that surrounds the island Yeah. It has no floor at all with EMS. So it's very different than fighting in a continental type situation because then you have other things that you can look up. So maybe the best way to sense would be with some standoff from the island itself. Interesting. Okay. From the fire's perspective, obviously the train being more restrictive as far as mountains and jungle, it's hard to find positions for artillery. Yeah. The smaller systems are a lot more easy to do. Once you start getting bigger, it's difficult to find places to put them at. Yeah. And kind of touching on everybody else, FOs, you know, being able to identify where it is when it's dense vegetation. You can't see 10 feet. You know, is that friend or foe, especially start talking about working with multinationals. Yeah. Languages. And then you have to stay in it. Like, once we're on these islands, how do we get the class 5 to us? Yeah. It's a big problem, especially when you talk about getting the guns to the island in the first place, getting the position. and that's it as a state yeah i hadn't really thought about that you're right because when we got here they gave us a class and they said you know whereas typically you deal with like meters and and uh you know kilometers or you're you're bringing that in a lot closer like people are feet apart uh so so yeah i hadn't really thought about that the fires which is typically a standoff type system right we have to be able to shoot up and out um that's got to change too because you know you everything might be a knife fight i think another thing mark that my chief kind of hit on he hit on multinational partners but if you look at like a lot of times we we fall in love with our own brand especially when army's playing navy uh but here here in the island like you you the army like you can't even get here without you know joint you know joint service support so like you know fighting as part of a joint team you know with with navy aspects air force space like it's it's like very clear and very eye-opening here versus some of the other environments that we're in and also the problem the headquarters perspective is probably multiple islands yeah yeah like what's your primary support like cfl is always christian so there are multiple cfl's of different islands yeah let's figure out like that piece of it because it's really challenging yeah okay so for our two former residents of the island um looking at it from the same perspective but y'all have a different viewpoint of this y'all have actually had to go out and operate on this island um i would say what what has changed at least in your mind um from when you had to operate versus where you are now because i'm assuming both of y'all uh were operating at a you know at the captain level at the company grade level uh and now you're here at the field grade level looking at the problem a bit more macro so what's the difference um in terms of like how you have to have to apply uh your war fighting function approach uh at this like new echelon so i'll go for it i was here as the captain um for sustainment it's the trend is always consistent what i mean by that is is improvisation, which is one of the fiscal or sustainable. It doesn't change. That's applied all the time. Doesn't matter how many years ago I was here or currently. So improvisation is key. We need sustainable and fight here. You have to adapt sustainable solutions, existing plants, resources, or systems that are now insufficient because of weather because of the enemy. So, whether it's the supply from island to island, whether it airlift or even grand lock pack with all these restrictive road networks this contiguous environment there always a challenge We have to be able to adapt quickly consistently We have to have redundancy Whether it a pace plan whether it your transmission plan area ground we have to be able to adapt quickly, consistently. Otherwise, if you're stuck on a plan, and things are going to work, surprise. If the enemy has a vote, the weather has a vote. So as a sustainer, prioritization is key in everything you do. nuts. Yeah, I mean, we're talking about sustainment, right? Talking about a joint fight in the middle of the Pacific. Getting everything here is harder. If we thought getting stuff in Europe and stuff where we have an infrastructure is difficult. Getting something on an undeveloped island that's not the NATO standards for weight capacity, sustainment assets, artillery, anything. It's going to make it increasingly difficult so from a maneuver perspective versus where at jrtc where you have a a continuous battlefield that's linear yeah you kind of have to start thinking more more non-continuous yeah so how do you preserve combat power how do you maximize sustainment and then how do you maximize the effect you want to achieve at the right place at the right time so does that mean which means you have to rely on more reconnaissance which takes more time so you have to instead of just lunting into the enemy and like taking them on with a massive combat power at your choosing you might have to do more reconnaissance choose a form of maneuver more like infiltration versus an development uh identify a weak point and go after that node first to then reduce the main body's capacity to fight and then you mask what limited assets you have on it so you have to think through the entire a a to b to a to a to b to c with the other branches identify a weak point within that system and then destroy that or attack that to throw the enemy off and then you mass on where you can to meet your decisive point there's a lot a little bit more integrated it's a little bit more difficult to do yeah and there's a lot more independence at the junior leader level that has to understand you know what are the pirs why are they important what are the indicators what are my actual sustainment when can i mass fires and how do i find things outside of my visual spectrum because so i'm so limited on what i can see and then how do i communicate this all back it's it's a very complex question as we go forward with these things so complex but it really drives home the need for a simple plan detail like you got to get into detail detail graphics yeah uh because you might be working with joint partners and down to the lowest echelon they need to understand their task and purpose so they can operate you know with limited guidance depending on if they're able to talk to anybody else like you know just just taking the ball across the uh uh the goal line there yeah i mean you can't again it comes back to you have what you have here yeah right so you better make it count yep to achieve the unsafe there's no repeats so um you know like maybe like i said maybe in europe you have someone behind you you might be the only force on this island yeah if you if you lose during an operation it might completely unhinge the larger operational operational framework that either the core of the JTF has laid out. If you squander resources here, you may not be getting them. If you're going to look for a comparison, I look for the Solomon Islands campaign, where there's a lot of parity, like island hopping or arpelegic operations, where you can only achieve a superiority for a very short amount of time, and then you have to exploit it with a plan that's well thought out. Fantastic. All right. Well, does anybody else have any other thoughts? Something that's maybe been milling around in their mind, doesn't necessarily pertain to the question we asked, but just something interesting. I have a couple of things. Sorry, Peeler, go. I was going to jump on Major Stewart's point from a staff perspective, and that's that But MA, the MA products, the laying out the battlefield and the detail of granularity that you can get there is super important. And then we talk about mission command, right? Allowing those lower level commanders to attack the battlefield as they see it. yeah and from a sensor perspective or an mcon perspective if that if we do that that also limits the amount of uh emissions that we're creating or let commanders or we'll have to report at some point they're not always going to the the top for answers yeah nice on the the mcon piece and the the electromagnetic signatures right in the jungle in the jungle environment that we see here you're not going to have a lot of um i guess natural em symmetries it's not very populated yeah so even if you get a faint electromagnetic signature that indicates that something is there yeah right so so your sensors are extremely important and able to be able to detect that because if you see something that means that is the end interesting right and that other thing is that you know fighting in the jungle is a very light infantry fight right and going back to the communications. How are we able to receive reports from the scouts that are out there, you know, conducting the infiltration Or how are we able to push you know information about what the enemy is is doing or providing them situational awareness of the threat when their light infantry forces deep in the jungle may not necessarily have the best communications back to wherever we're doing the analysis back to. Just a lot of those types of considerations to think about as you're operating here. That's an awesome point. Yeah. I also add for systemic as well, you mentioned mission analysis that's that's critical here yeah because of detailed planning was was be what you're looking for detailed planning you can't wing it you can't and wave it you have to go to the details and know exactly what your plan is of course you have to do it detailed rigorous rehearsal consistently through every phase of the operation yeah because it's gonna change your plans will change you have to adapt you have to be creative in what you do so detailed planning and consistent work is key as well for systemic. Fantastic. Also for fire is like when you're doing your training analysis there's only so many places you can't put the guns at a level so many places you can actually get them there. Yeah. So the enemy's also able to do that analysis and be like well they can only put the guns in like five or six places so it kind of narrows down on both sides. Yeah yeah on that part Mark before you take it like the The interesting part I was telling Major Fultzcraft this, as I was driving through the Kahukus, I was finding spots that we used when I was a company commander here that were cut out for my heavy weapons company. I was like, that's exactly where I put my vehicle. And guess what? It's still cut out today. Yeah. So being able to go out there and carve your way through the jungle, whether you're doing an infiltration as an infantry company, rifle platoon, whatever, or if you're installing 119-er, it's small enough to scoop back in um those are actually pretty critical i remember three seven bought a bunch of chainsaws and like machetes to like cut down so they could back the 119er in and actually be able to get it in there because there is so few places and every time you look on a map or sat imagery you can tell where it's going you can measure it you know what's happening and the only other thing you could possibly do is say okay well if i can't use my 119ers where can I distribute myself and now I need longer range so the problem the problem becomes one or the other right so there's there is a tough time of understanding like where you need to take specific terrain first on an island based off of we talked about these little micro climates or micro areas because the western part of the island it's actually much more arid it's open yeah it's much more suitable to PAAs but that distance does not suit the capabilities of 3.7 more early to 11, right? Because they're high marks. So like it comes at, what are you putting on this Island? And again, you're part of a larger task force as you fight through these, this, the Pacific AOR. Yeah. Great points. All right. Well, Hey, appreciate y'all taking the time. It's been a kind of hectic schedule for those who haven't been here. It's, it's quick time getting on, it's quick time getting off. So really appreciate your time sitting down with us and just talking this, providing the lessons that you learned as an individual focused on your warfighting function. So thank you all for coming. As always, we thank our audience for listening in and giving us the opportunity. Continue to drive the interest in this podcast allows us to come out and do stuff like this. So thank you. Aloha. And this time we will not see you in Torbjord. Thank you for joining us on The Crucible, the JRTC experience. The Joint Readiness Training Center is the premier crucible training experience. We prepare units to fight and win in the most complex environments against world-class opposing forces. We are America's Leadership Laboratory. Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. This podcast was created and produced by Mr. John Mabes. Executive producer is Lieutenant Colonel Drew Zabriskie. It was recorded by Captain Jermaine Branch and edited by Mr. Travis Boyle. Series intros were built by Chief Thomas Rich and vocals were done by Mr. Robert Chopper. Special thanks to Mr. Jeff England and the Fort Johnson Public Affairs Office. Be sure to like and follow us on social media to keep up with the latest warfighting TTPs learned through the crucible that is the Joint Readiness Training Center. Follow us by going to HTTPS colon forward slash forward slash L-I-N-K-T-R dot E-E forward slash J-R-T-C. We'd like to thank our partners at the Center for Army Lessons Learned of the Combined Arms Center, especially the J-R-T-C Call Observations Detachment. Be sure to follow them on social media as well. Follow them at https colon forward slash forward slash www.army.mil forward slash C-A-L-L. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts. And be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future. The Crucible, the JRTC experience, is a product of the Joint Readiness Training Center. Thank you.
