Red Sea Rivalries - The Proxy War for Sudan and the Geopolitical Interests in East Africa: Josh Meservey

Under the Trump administration, they've done this pivot to commercial engagement, which I think is the correct focus. That should be the core of our relationship with African states. I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today, I'm joined by Mr. Josh Mazurvi, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute specializing in African geopolitics and counterterrorism. Mr. Mazurvi previously served as a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation and the Atlantic Council's Africa Center. Mr. Mazurvi joins us today for a discussion on Sudan's relevance to Saudi Arabia and the relationship's broader implications for Africa and the Middle East. Stay with us as we speak with Josh Mazurvi. Josh, welcome to NATSEC Matters. Thanks for having me on, Michael. Happy to be here. Well, we really need you here. We have been trying to get a little bit smarter on a variety of different issues as they pertain to the Middle East, Sudan in particular. but also just to talk a little bit about counterterrorism as well. But let me tell you what the impetus was of us tracking you down and asking you onto the podcast. When the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited President Trump recently, I think President Trump really hoped that he could nail down the Crown Prince on normalization with Israel. It's probably the biggest prize that maybe President Trump could achieve during a presidency, and it certainly would be the big deal to the Abraham Accords. So I was sort of surprised when Mohammed bin Salman, when he came to town, started talking to the president about, I could never possibly do this. It's too hot in the Middle East. But also, I'm worried about things in Sudan. And he seemed to be talking about refugees. He seemed to be talking about destabilization in general. And I think people like you probably knew the impact and the importance of this issue to the Saudis, but I had not heard it imported into the normalization discussions before. So that's why you're here. We want to understand this issue and make some sort of judgment about whether, honestly, is this a real issue that should delay the Abraham Accords or is it something that just sounds like a pretext because Saudi Arabia doesn't really want to do normalization now anyway. So that was a long windup, Josh. But why don't you start with an overview of the Sudan-Saudi relationship and tell us a little bit about Sudan's ongoing civil war? Yeah, sure. So I'll start with the last element of that first, the sort of status of the civil war. Sudan's been locked in this awful crisis for several years now. The country is effectively divided very roughly between east and west. And you have in the western parts, the Sudanese armed forces, which is the Sudanese military. And then in the east, you have the rapid support forces, the RSF, which is led by a man named General Hameti. The RSF is a, well, its origins lie with the Janjaweed militias, which were notorious, even in the United States, back in the 90s and early 2000s, as leading the genocide in Darfur under the old Omar al-Bashir Sudanese dictatorship. Now, the RSF was formalized as such, sort of graduated from its Janjaweed status into a formal part of the Sudanese security services during the Bashir reign. Bashir was trying to coup-proof his regime. Ultimately, it didn't work. He was couped by the RSF and the SAF in coordination. And then eventually, RSF and SAF started fighting. And now we have this, as I said, horrific civil war. Millions displaced. Hundreds of thousands dead. unclear, you know, the exact numbers on that. But currently SAF holds Khartoum. They had to retake it after RSF controlled much of it. And then Port Sudan, those are the two big prizes that SAF holds. Port Sudan is on the Red Sea, of course. RSF holds a lot of Darfur. They've now moved into the Kordofans, which are on the path to Khartoum. Both sides are supported quite heavily by outside powers. This is where Saudi Arabia comes in. Saudi Arabia is very clearly aligned with the SAF. They have a long relationship with Sudan. It's not hard to see why. We can picture a map. Sudan is right across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Sudan has over or well around 500 miles of Red Sea coastline. So obvious reasons for Saudi to be interested in Sudan. The UAE is the primary supporter of the RSF part of this civil war. So Sudan very much plays into this nascent, burgeoning, however you want to categorize it, rivalry between the UAE and Saudi. Yeah, Sudan is a real part of it. So in very quick and dirty overview of Sudan's civil war there. Well, we're definitely going to get to this fraying relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It was in the papers again recently about events in Yemen. But let me just sort of ask you point blank. I mean, obviously, this is a horrible civil war and terrible repercussions everywhere. But is it usually mentioned in the context of Middle East peace? And are the Saudis constantly worried about what would they be worried about? Refugees coming over in boats to seek safety in Saudi Arabia? Is this a real threat, a real problem for the kingdom? I think, so yes, I think is the answer. This is a real problem for the kingdom. It also, though, to your previous question, it doesn't have to impact on its relationship with Israel. That seems to be somewhat, to me, an artificial link that the Saudis are drawing here. I don't know why the situation in Sudan would prevent the Saudis from normalizing with Israel. Now, there are some esoteric Israel-Saudi issues vis-a-vis the Horn of Africa, which would include Sudan. Israel just recognized Somali land, which is an autonomous self-governing enclave of Somalia. It also has a Gulf of Aden coastline, which is important because that leads up into the Red Sea, obviously. Whereas Saudi Arabia is very close to the Modishu government, the government of Somalia. So tensions there, because the UAE and Israel, obviously, do have a normalized relationship, UAE, very active in Somali land. So there is some Saudi-Israel elements in the Horn of Africa issue, but they're a bit ancillary, I would say. So again, And I think the answer is twofold. Yes, Sudan absolutely is a problem for Saudi Arabia. But also, I don't think it should. I don't see any real reasons for it to affect the Israel-Saudi relationship. Because the Somaliland thing is, I don't want to minimize it because it is important, but it's smaller potatoes, let's say, compared to other Middle East issues. Well, I was skeptical, having never heard it raised in this context before. By the way, have you ever heard it raised, Sudan in general, raised in the Saudi Middle East peace construct? No. No, I haven't. So Sudan was part of the Abraham Accords back when it was sort of a functioning state. But vis-a-vis Saudi, I don't see any strong links there. All right. So let's just stay at the basics here. What is the U.S. policy towards Sudan? Good question. Well, it is varied over the years of this conflict. So initially, during the Biden administration, the United States with the Saudis was running what was called the Jeddah process. So this was essentially a process that was trying to bring the warring sides together in Jeddah. as the name suggests, to weak some sort of accommodation. That was always a bit of a fool's errand, if you ask me, just because the sine qua non for successful negotiations is that both sides have to actually be invested in them succeeding and be participating in good faith. That was never the case. Neither the SAF nor the RSF were particularly motivated to negotiate. So that was always fruitless. Since President Trump retook office, the U.S. has, I think, took a period of assessment, trying to figure out exactly what is going on. And then more recently, starting last year, toward the end of last year, it started working on what was called the Quad Process. So bringing Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE together with the U.S. to discuss this and try to reach some sort of accommodation among those, that group of countries. It makes sense. Those three countries I referenced besides the U.S. are the main outside actors in Sudan. So you do have to reach some sort of agreement among those before you can even begin to address the actual problems on the ground in Sudan itself. I'm always at pains. This is a bit of a hobby horse for me or a soapbox position, but I do try to remind people while outside powers are very important to this conflict, I think they've lengthened it. They've intensified it for sure. Fundamentally, this is a Sudanese war though. Sudan is in civil war because these factions that I've described, the RSF and the SAF, decided to fight. That's the bottom line. So even if you get the quad process going, which is absolutely necessary, it's still not going to solve this issue. So I think that's useful to always bear in mind. Well what are the fundamental differences among the Sudanese that keeping this going In regards to the SAF and the RSF fundamentally both are led by men who want to control Sudan I don want to be simplistic about it but that is my bottom line assessment. They just have decided that each of them should be the ruler of this country. Now, there's all sorts of other dynamics at play here, of course. There's a long history. Sudan is a deeply troubled country. It has been since independence. It's been at war for much of its existence. South Sudan, the world's newest country, was carved off of Sudan after decades of war between northern Sudan and then southern Sudan. So this is a deeply troubled country. The RSF is from the Darfur region, as I mentioned, whereas traditionally the elites of Sudan are from the center, right around the Khartoum, the Nile, these Nile tribes that are sort of the elite tribes, the economic and political and even social elites of the country are traditionally from the interior or the center. whereas the RSF is much more of a periphery organization. So there are those dynamics, vast dynamics, tribal dynamics, etc. But fundamentally, this is about power. These two men want supreme power in Sudan, and they are fighting for it and appear to be willing to continue fighting for it no matter how many Sudanese have to die. Well, it sort of sounds like Russia's behavior in Russia-Ukraine. They're not very excited about or motivated to have a sincere conversation either. So I get this question a lot, which is, why should America care? And I'm usually talking about Russia, Ukraine or any number of different places, frankly. So take that question and apply it to Sudan. Yeah, well, it's the relevant question, right, that you have to start from when you're thinking about American foreign policy. So Sudan matters. One, it's a very large African country. I think it's 10th or 12th in population. I don't remember off the top of my head. I was once the largest by landmass, and then I referenced South Sudan being carved off, so it lost its perch in that way. But more particularly for the U.S. is this Red Sea issue that you and I have already discussed. Sudan, again, has about 500 miles of coastline on the Red Sea. This is a major global shipping choke point. We saw the disruptions. We saw the economic harm that can come when that choke point gets disrupted, in this case by the Houthis not long ago when they started lobbing missiles and drones into that waterway. and because this waterway is the major artery for Asia-Europe trade back and forth between the two. This is why Israel is very interested in the Somaliland issue because they're so dependent on trade up through here. And then so global trade, very important to the United States. Also, Sudan has a long history of hosting Islamist, even terrorist organizations. So let's remember, Osama bin Laden was in Sudan when he planned 9-11. Eventually, he was forced out by the Sudanese at the behest of the Americans. He went to Afghanistan, the attack was launched, but he was in Sudan. There's a long history here of Islamists, as I say, and even outright terrorists operating in Sudan. The longer you have instability of the type that Sudan is experiencing right now, the more fertile the territory becomes for Islamist terrorists and Islamists more generally. So the Emiratis will say, look, we're in there, we're supporting the RSF because the SAF is totally penetrated and even co-opted by Islamists. And there's some truth to that. Like SAF does have an Islamist problem, absolutely. So that's another element here that the U.S. needs to care about is that we don't want Islamists taking over that government again. that Bashir ran Sudan as an Islamist enterprise, and it caused untold problems for the U.S. in that region. Well, there are some Islamists there, but they're not harboring ISIS or any external terrorists, are they? Not right now. Okay. No. So this is the fear, right? Like, again, the longer this goes, the more opportunities there are for entities like terrorist organizations to regain a foothold in Sudan. The other element is our adversaries take advantage of these types of situations. Russia, Iran being two of the chief examples here in the Sudan context. So Russia has struck a deal with the SAF to build a base in Port Sudan. That's an obvious problem for the United States and a bunch of other countries to envision a Russian naval base right in the heart of the Red Sea, essentially. Sudan had cut ties with Iran at the behest of the Saudis and the Emiratis some years ago during the Qatar embargo years. But then it normalized its relations with Iran and is seeking weapons from Iran and what forms of help it can get. Now, I don't think that's because SAF is actually ideologically aligned with Iran. SAF is trying to survive. Burhan's trying to win a war. He will go anywhere. He will make deals with anybody to do so. Um, so, so that's the dynamic that has obtained in Sudan. That's so damaging to the U S because it, it allows our competitors, uh, to gain influence in a really, really important country. That's on a very sensitive, uh, maritime route. And then there's the humanitarian suffering is horrific. Uh, refugee flows all over, um, the region, which are fundamentally destabilizing. Um, so a lot of reasons here, the U S needs to care. Okay. So also, I mean, talk a little bit about the United States' interest in the Horn of Africa. You know, I think as everyone knows, we have a presence in Djibouti. We have conducted counterterrorism operations across Somalia for many, many years. just sort of, you know, put Sudan in that context, but in the broader context of what's going on counterterrorism-wise in the Horn of Africa and why. I mean, sometimes that's like at the top of the list of, you know, quote-unquote ungoverned spaces that we need to worry about. Yeah, Somalia has a long and tragic history, obviously going back, I mean, my goodness, to the 80s. Well, even before, if you want to count the coup in the 60s. But Um, uh, so there's a, uh, Al Qaeda is, uh, one of its, uh, deadliest affiliates. It operates in Somalia. It's called Al Shabaab. It controls and has controlled, uh, swaths of Somalia for around 15 years. Um, and it's killed Americans in the region. It attacked Camp Simba, which is an American military outpost in Kenya, killed, uh, some Americans in that attack. It's killed American civilians in attacks in places like Kenya and et cetera. So this is a nasty and unfortunately quite capable organization that recently has also established ties with the Houthis, who we talked about in Yemen. The Houthis, the real danger here is the Houthis are more technically sophisticated than Al-Shabaab. And so they have access to drones, for instance, that are much more capable than anything Shabaab has right now. and supposedly the the houthis even have an indigenous drone manufacturing capability so if there's skills transfer of that type or even just equipment transfer of that type that's that's a huge problem for surrounding countries and then in addition to al-shabab you have a an islamic state affiliate also operating in somalia the caliph the leader of of the is affiliate in Somalia was rumored even to be the leader of the global organization. Now, my sense is, even if he was, it was probably more of a figurehead role. I don't think he was maybe the operational head, let's say, but there were really credible reports that this was a very important figure within the global ISIS terrorist organization. Now, fortunately, the Islamic State has taken a real beating up in the north of Somalia recently because there's a pretty capable federal member state up there, Puntland, which has capable military that is supported by the Emiratis. And that really did damage recently to IS with American support. So these are the two main terrorist organizations that concern the U.S., particularly under President Trump, but also under Biden and going further back under President Obama. The U.S. has carried a lot of airstrikes in Somalia trying to degrade these groups. Yeah. All right. So we have a big counterterrorism interest that's still there. We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Josh Mazurvi. beacon global strategies is the premier national security advisory firm beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy geopolitical risk global technology policy and federal procurement trends beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage founded in 2013 beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk, drive growth, and navigate a complex geopolitical environment. With a bipartisan team and decades of experience, Beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. So let's get back to this schism between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For the longest time here in Washington, all we did was hear about their amazing partnerships and how they saw the world the same. They together conspired against Qatar to freeze them out for several years and sort of labeled them as supporters of Islamic extremism and everything else. They were both operating, as I understand it, on the same side in Yemen. And then after a time, the Saudis, I think, were performing so poorly there. They began to back away, although they still do have a lot of interests there. Talk a little bit, if you can, about Sudan's impact on the schism between these two states and any other factors that you recognize from what's going on across the Red Sea in the Middle East. Yeah. So you gave the background well there. We used to think of, for good reason, the UAE and the Saudis as being sort of in lockstep in both the Middle East and Africa But real schisms have emerged recently although I think you could look back years ago and start seeing the seeds of this You mentioned Yemen. I was in Aden, I don't know, like six years ago or something, just very, very briefly with the Emiratis. And they were already talking about how they were stepping back from the Houthi fights, and they're only going to concentrate on AQAP, the Al-Qaeda affiliate there, because those tensions had already started with the Saudis. And so, yeah, this goes back a ways, but now it's on full display. And Sudan is part of that. I referenced that UAE and Saudi are supporting separate sides, and they are really supporting them. This isn't just sort of a casual endeavor for them. The Emiratis have poured, who knows, but many millions of dollars, I would say, into the RSF. They send weapons all the time, materiel, they support them diplomatically. They've sort of rallied some regional states to support the RSF in various ways. So they are very, very deeply invested in the RSF, whereas the Saudis, as I mentioned, They stage themselves as interlocutors, as sort of neutral interlocutors and mediators, but they've always been disposed towards the SAF. And recently, there's been rumors that they may start providing fighter jets to the SAF, for instance. So it looks like the Saudis are really ramping up their engagements potentially. So I think this Sudan thing is both a manifestation of this UAE-Saudi rift and also an accelerant of it because they are so heavily entrenched on different sides of a very bitter war that is clearly really important to both of them. Now, maybe there's a path here where, you know, if the Quad process can bear some fruit, it's been very difficult so far. But if that can happen, then maybe that can facilitate a little bit of mending offenses between the Emiratis and the Saudis if it removes that major exacerbant. maybe but there's still very deep divisions on yemen uh like like you referenced and and even recently uh the saudis accused the emiratis of of spiriting off a a uh what they would call secessionist leader you know and and helping him escape uh from from yemen uh interestingly they probably use somalia to do that um the uh a military base that the emiratis have in northern Somalia. So, you know, it looks a bit grim, honestly, for the Saudi UAE relationship, at least for the foreseeable future or in the near term. But again, maybe if there's progress on the Sudan, that can be, you know, help a little bit here. Well, let me ask just another innocent question. And I am well, I'm very familiar with the UAE always talking about and warning of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic extremism, well short of al-Qaeda and, you know, along the spectrum. But the Saudis have been in the same boat, mostly. I mean, they're not exactly on board with Islamic extremism either. And I understand, and you mentioned the institutional interests that the Saudis have with the, let's call it the original Sudanese government, But I mean, shouldn't they more or less see the world the same when it comes to Sudan? It's a great question because it is one of the really interesting and frustrating elements of the Sudan conflict. Because to your point, the Saudis have no love for the Muslim Brotherhood. They see it as a threat to their own monarchy, their own form of government. So in that sense, it's even an existential threat. one of the things that cemented sort of the Saudis and the Emiratis together was the Arab Spring, those uprisings that toppled governments all across North Africa and in the Middle East and brought to power the brotherhood, the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt. That was the big one until it was replaced by a coup. But also Libya had very strong Islamist influences and continues So that shared concern really helped galvanize the Emiratis and the Saudis. So traditionally, they have been more aligned on that specific issue. In the Sudan context, the other interesting element is that we've already discussed how the South has Islamist elements. But the RSF is not a principled—in my analysis, there are probably people who disagree with me— But my sense is it's not a principled anti-Islamist force. It's totally opportunistic. The RSF, again, it was formalized under Omar al-Bashir, who was an Islamist president. So it was very happy to work and do the bidding of this Islamist regime in Khartoum. So it gets very confused and fuzzy on this question of the brotherhood. Now, I think the Emiratis, I take them at their word. I think they're sincere about their concerns about the brotherhood in Sudan. But it seems a little less clear cut of an anti-Islamist, anti-brotherhood campaign than you might expect. Again, given that the Saudis are on the other side, they have deep concerns about the brotherhood. And oh, by the way, also on the other side, also supportive of the SAF are the Egyptians. And the Egyptians are deeply worried about the brotherhood. So, again, it's a bit confused. And I think, obviously, to me, that suggests that this is about more than just the Brotherhood issue, more than just the Islamist issue. There are other things going on here, which I think is absolutely the case. And probably some of that's just the rivalry. Who's going to be the head of the new Middle East? Yeah, I think that's right. I think clearly MBS and MBZ maybe even have a personal issues. I don't know. I don't like to try to, you know, read the TVs on those things because it's so opaque. But you also you wonder, right? They're both ambitious. They both have grand visions for what they want to achieve, both in their countries, but also regionally. So you could see where they might start to have some friction there. And then I think there's other things at stake in Sudan. Both countries had big agricultural investments in Sudan, for instance. So this is one of the things I think most, probably most people when they think about Sudan, sort of picture a semi-arid or even total desert landscape. But the Nile goes right through Sudan. It's immensely fertile, especially around the Nile region. uh interestingly there's a there's a sesame seed trade i only learned about this a year or so ago and and apparently that's hugely lucrative uh and then there's gold that comes out of sudan and uh you know the uae is is is especially in that region the the capital for um moving gold and and unfortunately especially illicit gold so uh so there's that element uh in play as well I don't know how significant of an element that is, but I'm sure there's some key people who are benefiting, let's say, from the Sudanese gold trade. So there are other things going on beyond just the brotherhood issue. So let's go. We talked a little bit about Yemen, and it seems to me that, well, we know, right? It was MBS at the beginning of his reign, let's call it, where he thought he wanted to make a name for himself in Yemen by, you know, roughing up those who had rebelled against the central government. And UAE was right there with him, but I think the United States was even advocating a pullout or to become less involved in the war over time. Talk a little bit about what's been going on in Yemen and the dispute, the split that occurred over time about UAE and Saudi and what they were going to do. So Saudi has obvious concerns in Yemen. They really feared that the Houthis were going to become a Hezbollah-style problem on their border. And I think there's some legitimacy to that concern, actually. Um, so they, they launched a large scale incursion. Uh, it was initially, I think it was, it was very air power dependent, but you, you can't win a war like that with just air power. Eventually it started to involve infantry. And here's another Sudan link, interestingly. Uh, so a lot of the mercenaries, um, that fought on behalf of the, especially the UAE, but even some with the Saudis were Sudanese, specifically from the RSF. So the RSF supplied a lot of mercenaries to Yemen. I think that's where the UAE-Sudan relationship probably really cemented. But the SAF also had some fighters there fighting with the Emiratis and the Saudis. That war went terribly. There was all the stories, I still remember them well, of the humanitarian suffering that was going on, et cetera. And the Saudis really suffered, specifically the Saudis, I think. The Emiratis were heavily involved, but it seems like they weren't held as accountable maybe for what was going on. But the Saudis suffered real reputational damage. And I think they decided that they needed to be a little less expeditionary maybe and um try to uh reset um its its relation or its its reputation and i wonder if that has thus far informed its approach in sudan where they tried to take more of a mediator role and tried to be seen as less of a of a supporter of an armed group even though you know they have been doing that um so uh yemen uh i'm not at all yemen expert it's it's a total mess you could study it your whole life and barely scratch the surface, it seems to me. But they, again, initially, the Saudis and the Emiratis were aligned. They were fighting the Houthis and AQAP. The split began, as I already referenced, UAE started saying, we're not into the Houthi fight anymore. We're just going to focus on AQAP. And now the situation is you have them, both the The Saudis and the Emiratis are backing different elements of the Southern Transition Council, which is sort of a secessionist movement within Yemen. There's been a split within the STC with the Saudis supporting one side and the Emiratis supporting another. It's gotten very messy. I don't know how you cobble it back together. And then overall this again you have the Houthi threat which is not at all going away It remains potent Now its Iranian benefactor is in big trouble Let hope that those troubles continue for the Iranians And so that will impact the level of support the Houthis get from Iran. But even without that, they have a pretty fearsome capability, unfortunately, and is going to be a long-term problem. Well, I know this is of U.S. interest. I don't think we think it's a great idea for the UAE and Saudi to be on the opposite sides of so many different issues. I know just this weekend, Saudi was asking certain things of UAE inside of Yemen, and they were not helping, which caused another round of irritation. So this is something we're going to just maybe have another podcast on down the road and begin to focus on the repercussions. But let me skip back over to Africa, your area of expertise. And as we begin to wind up a little bit here, talk about just the geopolitical significance. We've talked a little bit about counterterrorism and the horn of Africa. I guess Trump's national security strategy didn't say much other than we ought to see Africa as sort of a commercial place to do business. You know, update us. What's the geopolitical significance of Africa? What are what are we doing and what should we be doing? What bothers you the most? What do you urge on different administrations in this regard? yeah um well i could i could rant for hours here on that question but i'll restrain myself um yeah so as as far as the geopolitical significance um there's a bunch of things you can point to we've already talked about sea lanes and maritime choke points so red sea is a big one but africa dominates several other you know the the strait of gibraltar for instance um it's it's just across the med from europe it's europe's southern flank is sort of the overused um assessment but it's accurate. And even, you know, the Cape of Good Hope is a type of maritime shipping choke point, especially as the Red Sea gets more fraught. We have seen more traffic around the Cape. And you could even talk about the Mozambique Channel, which sits between Mozambique and Madagascar. And then it has a long Indian Ocean coastline. Indian Ocean increasingly contested. India, very interested in it. And China would be the other one. By 2100, every third person on the planet will be African. So whether or not you want to deal with Africa, you're just going to have to, right, one way or the other. But I want to talk a little bit about the great power competition element of this, because I think this is key. China has truly prioritized Africa for decades. They view it as hugely important to everything they're trying to achieve, including those goals that are expressly antagonistic to the United States. So China believes that developing countries, of which Africa is 54, are natural allies in their quest to reorder the international system, which is a euphemism for reorienting it away from the United States and the West to itself. that's the ultimate sort of foreign policy goal for the CCP or the Chinese Communist Party. And they really rely on African diplomatic support at places like the United Nations to help them achieve their diplomatic goals at international organizations. And African countries have largely been really happy to do that. The Africa is extraordinarily well endowed with critical minerals, including many of those that the united states is heavily export or excuse me import dependent on these things are called critical for a reason they're key and i know you know all this they're key to our defense um tech they are key to the economies of the present and the future these things are critical and africa has a bunch of them china moving very aggressively to corner and with great success to corner the supply chains for some of these minerals. So basically, as soon as a rock comes out of the ground in Africa for certain minerals like cobalt or rare earths, they enter a Chinese-dominated supply chain. China refines something like 98% of the world's rare earths. Just a massive problem for the United States. Yeah, it's wild when you look at the charts. And I mean, it's almost mind-blowing. So Africa is going to have to be part of the solution for the United States to de-risk its supply chain and to secure its critical mineral supply chain. It's unavoidable that Africa will be part of this. But as I said, Africa is way out in front of the United States here. So, you know, going back to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, the U.S. was by far the most influential country on the continent, no question. The Chinese had been all over it during the Cold War, the Cubans, the Soviets. It had been a major front in the Cold War, but USSR crumbles. U.S. is supreme. But really ever since then, almost immediately, the Chinese started chipping away and with great success. And now they are by far the largest trading partner with virtually every African country. They are by far the largest lender traditionally to virtually every African country. And they build infrastructure all over the continent. you know roads and etc but also really strategic pieces of infrastructure like ports that that very much fit into this dual use uh uh principle that that china has this this civil military fusion dual use principle uh they are actively seeking an atlantic ocean uh base so they have one in djibouti their first overseas base was was put in djibouti It's large enough. They built a quai that's large enough to host a Chinese aircraft carrier as well as nuclear submarines. If they can get an Atlantic Ocean base, they could much more effectively hold the U.S. homeland under continuous nuclear threat if they put nuclear submarines in that base. So I could go on and on. Well, just on that, I mean, aren't we actively fighting that idea? Where is it exactly? And aren't they denying that they've said yes to the Chinese? Yeah, so Equatorial Guinea is one country that I've mentioned a lot, and I was told by someone who should know that the intelligence was really good on that, that the Chinese had made an offer. Um, uh, you hear other countries as well, uh, will, will come up in this conversation. Uh, nothing has materialized, thank goodness thus far, because the U.S. has been, uh, you know, somewhat rarely for the African portfolio has been pretty vigilant on this issue. Yeah. Just because it's such an obvious problem. Yeah. Um, but it is, it's way behind the eight ball on sort of longer term strategic, uh, uh, engagement with the continent, um, for way too long, the U S approach to the continent has been overweighted to, uh, development assistance, to democracy promotion, to, um, you know, trying to browbeat countries into protecting human rights. I support all those goals. Sure. Absolutely. Like, um, but I don't see any evidence that we were effective at achieving those goals. And in some contexts, the idea that a Jeffersonian democracy is going to sprout in Somalia, for instance, is, I think, crazy, because it just absolutely ignores the history and the culture and the society of that country. So I believe all people want a say in their government. I think democracy is by far the best political system ever devised to promote human flourishing. But on top of that impulse for self-government is many deep layers of culture and history and society that you can't just wish away. So I think pursuing, you know, democracy promotion in some of these places is just, is totally unachievable and in an antagonized African governments as well. So, you know, under the Trump administration, they've done this pivot to commercial engagement, which I think is the correct focus. That should be the core of our relationship with African states. The U.S. has been talking about trade, not aid for decades. So it's easy to say, really, really hard to implement. But I do think the Trump administration has the right impulse on this, that, you know, trade, investment, that should really be the core of their relationship? Well, you know, this is a theme across many regions that while we were appropriately distracted by the global war on terrorism, China was stealing a march all over the world. And we're catching up. We're a country that obviously has interests everywhere. Now Trump's added the Western Hemisphere to the normal three, and Africa, I think, is always, unfortunately, playing catch-up, but I think you've got the right argument there, which is that we're in a geopolitical competition with China, and this is an important battlefield for U.S. influence and ultimately African prosperity and U.S. prosperity. But Josh, thank you so much. You have just really enlightened us. You, I think, were able to sort of help us look with a little skepticism towards the import of Sudan as a reason why the Saudis can't recognize Israel, but putting everything in the context in which it belongs, I think, does a great service. So thank you so much, and we'll have you back on the Africa issues in the future. Yeah, thank you, Michael. Really appreciate your interest to the topic. I don't think it gets enough attention. And so pleased that you're giving it some here. Well, you're compelling on the topic. So thanks so much. That was Josh Mazervi. I'm Michael Allen. If you enjoy listening to NatSec Matters, please leave us a rating and review. We'd love to hear from you. If you're interested in becoming a sponsor, please email our team at bgs at bgstc.com. You can find this email in the show notes. Please join us next week for another episode of NatSec Matters. NatSec Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry. 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