255. Los Hermanos Musulmanes, el motor del islam político

The Islam is going to conquer Europe without referring to the sword or the fight. The conquest will be through preaching and ideology. This was the message of the Muslims in 2007. Two decades later, in Europe, the question is cada vez more powerful. Should they assign a Muslim as a terrorist group? With his creation in 1928, the Muslim friendship opened a path to the Islam political. It has been passed by persecution, legalization, expansion and access to power, both in the European Union and in the North Africa and the European continent. And in the bottom, there has been the same debate. Decidify whether they are a enemy or a actor with whom they can use forces. What is their objective? What methods use it? What impact it has really? So today, in No is the Fin of the World, we talk about the German Muslims, the motor of the Islam political. No es el fin del mundo, el podcast semanal de El Orden Mundial. Y para este episodio, el penúltimo, creemos, en el garaje de El Orden Mundial. Se han venido Jara Monter, ¿qué tal Jara? ¿Cómo estás? Muy bien, muy contenta. Es el penúltimo y también mi primero con Blas. Es verdad, qué ilusión. Pues aquí ya no va a haber otro, básicamente. Primero y último en este zulo. Blas Moreno, ¿qué tal Blas? Mucho hay que ligarla en el siguiente estudio para que tengamos que grabar aquí más de dos episodios más. O sea, esto ya se tiene que cerrar. Este garaje desvencijado, lleno de cajas, hay que cerrarlo pronto. Hablo desde el pasado y a la vez desde el futuro. Claro. El Fernando de Rodinger. El Fernando de Rodinger. No me fío un pelo de que Estados Unidos e Israel no ataquen Irak. Surtos Estados Unidos. Desde... A lo mejor ya, cuando esto se haga publicado, ya pasa. Claro, esto se está grabando, se puede decir. Sí, sí. Abiertamente. El 18 de febrero. Sí. De aquí al fin de semana, igual hay un bombazo tonto. Sí. Sí. that we can't be able to do it that we have to be there express and have to come here to the east a Saturday, a Sunday, a Sunday, a Sunday in the end, in the end things that happen and we will talk about a little different but I think it's very interesting but if you listen it's not the end of the world and you want to understand better what happens in the world now you can find us, I remember in Podimo, all you can't only listen to, now you can see us in video that we know that many people like to follow the program with images, see us the car. Podimo is a platform dedicated exclusively to podcasts and audiobooks. It has, as well, with exclusive content, without publicity and with functions that, as well, allow more to participate in the episodes, to react, to vote in the encuestas. It is a way to expand the conversation more than the episode and form a active part of the community. 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Tuesday, March 26, March 11, as well as Eduardo said in the episode of the Vivienda, that 26, March 11, we have a direct in Madrid in the Palacio de la Prensa. I'll leave there, precisely, the trailer. We will give you details of what will happen, how you can come and come. And other presentations from the Atlas, 7 April at 7.30am in the Ateneo of Santander. In Santander, it is understood. And the 14 April in Pamplona at 7.00am in the Cata Crack. So, next citations, basically. If you want to join us, you are more than invited or more than invitada. And we will take you with a great pleasure. Then also the issue of the travel That we remember that for Japan and United States, there are very few places Or you are already Or you are already You are already getting the opportunity to travel with these two You are great to travel with these two wonderful people With these two beautiful people That you are going to tell About Japan and United States We are going to freak out What big is it? It's very cool, but you are also going to leave it in the description Where you have the link to these travel with the good people of the world, or if you go to the web of Wakaia Travel, and there you tell everything that is needed, the pre-faceted, whatever, whatever, whatever. Now, let's go to the real, which are our brothers musulmanes that we are going to today, as a own kind of name, not as a name. Why do we today talk about the brothers musulmanes? My brother Alejo, the musulman. No, no, no, no, that's a type of name, that's it. Well, well, there are several reasons, Fer. One, because there is a a kind of revival of the Muslim Muslim in the international debate. We have Trump, on the one hand, defining the Egypt, Lebanon and Jordanian as a terrorist group for their contact with Hamas, a Milley, imitating, a little bit like always, what is happening Trump. Yes. A France, pugnando, because they recognize as a terrorist group in the European Union, and a Vox, in the Congress, asking the same thing, considering the Muslim Muslim as a terrorist group, because Spain has no list, and exigiendo the cierre of the mezquitas that promote the yihadism in Spain. These three initiatives share the same rhetoric that the German Muslims are a danger to the stability of the countries. And in the case of Vox, it is that they have been cataloged directly as a threat to Spain that puts in danger the national cohesion. In any case, for now, Austria is the only European country that we consider terrorists. Austria, yes. Austria, yes, since 2021. and the rest is being a debate of if yes, if no, what to do what to do this is to offer many questions first, do you have something really the risk of what Vox or France are talking about I think that in Spain in Spain, the German Muslims no we know nothing we know I think that is the first time that many people are aware that part of Spain are asking that that people are asking to be a terrorist and this people who are the chases Well, today we are going to explain So, apart from that We are talking about this The next question is why now What is happening For that we have now Of the German Muslims And it's a moment of debate Active over the Armandad Where the answers to these questions Are simple And the data concretes Escasean If you don't have the German Muslims In Spain It's because there are no data About the German Muslims In Spain That's a big deal And it's hard to find Information that you don't see So, well, what better no que analizarlo en este episodio claro, y ese desconocimiento del público nos lleva al segundo motivo y es que el Islam político, que es un poco la rama política que maneja esta hermandad tiende a simplificarse mucho y a estereotiparse muchas veces con esa idea de que son terroristas, que son fanáticos, que son radicales y jadistas, y no se llega a entender realmente ni el qué, ni el porqué ni los matices, ni los grandes grises que hay en este gran abanico, digamos, político de Islam político, ¿no? Así que la idea es intentar entender la complejidad de la organización the oldest of the Oriente Próximo within the Islam political which is, it was already 100 years ago and it was one of the most important at the level of regional and it is, in quotes, the madre ideological of all the organizations and groups throughout the region that are key in the dynamics regional not only in the history but also in the actuality today, today, today are relevant the historical relevance is abruming that if you don't know well, at the end happens a lot of things no, no, it's not possible but they are fundamental in the history of the human being and especially of the Oriente Próximo No te culpamos, pero vas a entender después por qué esto es tan importante en la historia de la región y también todavía hoy lo es. Pensemos que más allá de la actual pugna por desfilarlos o no como terroristas, sobre todo en Occidente, también en el momento próximo, son un actor que tiene gran peso en la región, un papel fundamental, por ejemplo, en las revueltas árabes de Túnez y de Egipto en 2011, también en la posterior crisis entre Qatar y Arabia Saudí en 2017, aquel famoso bloqueo que hicieron los saudíes contra Qatar. ¿Qué tiempos? Ya, parece que fue ayer y ya han pasado ya 10 años de eso. Así que a lo largo del episodio we are going to design all aspects of this organization to understand what role they are playing in the current who are, who defiend, how they are in that context of the moment and in the political Islam in general how they are in power and how they are going to be a movement of mass more beyond Egypt, that is where they are what they are doing, what they are doing more beyond that country and in what they are now of influence regional and global and we can talk a little bit about their pressure in the prochain which is fundamental but then also how they have arrived to Europe basically, a little bit through all the diáspora to the immigration that professes the Islam. Let's go to this. Obviously, we can't start a house by the roof, so we're going to the cimientos, which is what's most important. For this name, let's hear it in your life. What are the Hermanos Musulmanes? The Society of the Hermanos Musulmanes, also called simply Hermanos Musulmanes or Hermanas Musulmanes, which are the names that we're going to use at the time of the episode, is a organization founded in 1928 in Egypt. The most ancient organization islamic is the most ancient and with the most important members of the Arab world, as well as the most important member of Islamists and the most important member of Egypt. Of course, no, it's a kind of a secta diminutive in the mountains. No, they're the most important member of the Arab world, in the Islam political. Yes, it's the main organization of Islamists with similar ideologies in different countries like Jordania, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Tunes, Marrocos or Sudan. For all the maps. Now, we can't talk about the German Muslims as a single organization homogenous with simply central or centrales in different countries. And as filiales in... No, of what we're talking about is of an Egyptian organization whose model, principles and objectives have been replicated by the map both with the German Muslims, in a direct way, as without it. So it's more than a group of groups and ramas, not necessarily coordinated or centralized. The Egypt inspirates other groups or organizations that follow their ideas. In some, it is a inspiration and a direct help to the creation. Right. Help me to put my filial here. Exactly. And in others, it is simply that you inspire that model. That's cool what does this people do. I also want to do it in my country. From there, Trump has no defined the German Muslims as a concept in their total, as a group terrorist, but simply a three of them in particular, which are the Egypt, Líbano and Jordania. That also are one of the most important ones. But well, I don't know what percentage of the brothers musulmanes has defined as a tourist, but we have a large percentage, starting by the mother, so to say. We will start by those brothers musulmanes egipcios and little by little we are going to see that expansion or the imitation that is in other countries. You have given a date and a place that is Egypt 1928. Why in this country and in this moment surge this group of people? Well, a lot of context in the region for us to situate. In that moment, at the beginning of the 20th, we came from years of protectorate britain in Egypt, which had been finished in almost two days. Egypt was independent officially in 1922, and consolidated its independence in the next year with a new constitution. And in that moment, it was the center political, social, cultural, democratic and economic of the Arabian world in general. It was the place in which the Arabian world was already lost. Then that role was already lost, but now in that moment it was already lost. But that official independence was not meant that the British had disappeared, much less. The United Kingdom controlled the international policy, the defense, the communications, and also, very importantly, the Canal of Suez, which was crucial for the global economy, and the British didn't want to lose access to that infrastructure. So, despite that the constitution of 1923 declared Egypt as a sovereign sovereign, free and independent, with all the names that you want, the British was still very present through a monarchy Egyptian, that was practically pro-occidental, was a kind of ally or subalterno. Still a couple of decades more. Yes, 40. In that context, they began to occur in the country three corrients. The socialist, the liberal and the islamist, represented by a lot of organizations, anti-systema, anti-monarquia, anti-influenza británica, that they understand, that are, as I say, opposed to the Egyptian government. And what especially the German Muslims, that is that is the motor of the Islamist of the moment, the context and the main state of the country in the name of religion. That is the main difference that they have in front of the others. To understand why in this context, the man of the brothers, that semi-islamist, because you can tell you that you have to have that context, but not necessarily to want to interpret it in a way religious. Or to interpret it in another way. Well, you have said it, liberal, liberal and Islamist. There are other concepts. Just to understand why in this context, we have to understand also where the founder of the family, which is Hassan Al-Banna. Albán had been born in 1906 in a small town near Alejandría, in the area of the delta of Nilo. And he was born of a local especially religious, which was born according to the teachings of traditional religions. So, since he was born in a society that sought to fight for the Islamic moral against the Christian missionaries. With all this in the back, in his class of studying in El Cairo, he began to give back the situation of the country, to a conclusion that it was necessary to bring back the Islamic youth to the Egyptian youth, which, by his perspective, was corrupted by the occidental and thought to achieve it through the preaching and teaching. It was a very conservative in that sense. Of course, that was a bit of the family of the that he was living. Yes. So, in 1927, he got a place as professor in the city of Ismailia. We have no map here. It's in the south of the canal of Suez, basically. The north is from Said. and is where there was a great military military installation and the sede of the company of the Canal de Suez, so that when he was doing classes, Albaan recorred cafeterias locales and mezquitas practicing that commitment with Islam. His reputation was growing and in 1928, when he had only 22 years old, he came to six Jewish workers from a military military camp with the idea of building a group that he leadered. Oye, colegas, juntaos un día y vamos a hacer un grupito de... Claro, iba dando la turra al personal por los bares y hasta que convenció a Seix, que dijo, venga, Albana, me has convencido. Ahora te dirían, vamos a hacer un podcast, en ese momento vamos a hacer una organización. Sí, fue un poco mentalidad entrepreneur, básicamente. Ahí tenía su garajillo. El un garaje en Ismaelía. Su garajillo. Claro, entonces, esto a lo mejor, claro, le choca al oyente. Hemos dicho que empieza con un pequeño grupo en Ismaelía, in Egypt, which was a colony, had a protective protector, evident, and they were, as we have said, one of the most important organizations of the Islamic political world. Of course, here we see that its objective is to return to Islam. I think it is important that we talk about, we talk a little bit more about that ideology and the principles that can have that concept of Islamic political. Yes, a look, Al-Banna and the recently created the Mandala Muslim They read and aborban the problems of the country from a regime religious moment and offer a very concrete action to solve the problem that they have Egypt in that moment. For them, the problems of the foreign domination abroad were also joined to the spread of the secular values occidentals, disconnected from the religious religion, from the religious tradition musulman and that alimenta the corruption and problems in the country. So the key to be able to renovate the country and the only way to free Egypt to deliver the chain of the colonial dominion was to be able to be the Islam to be able to be the cultural and religious and political reaction to the country Exactly Having that idea as the main point, and although the German people never had a very detailed vision of the Islamic order that they wanted to create, there are several key points in their ideology that we can comment and also strategic In first place, they are not as a goal but as a goal The Irmandad no buscaba adquirir poder Para sí misma, sino facilitar un proceso Más amplio de reforma social Esto es en este momento, luego vemos que va a cambiar En segundo lugar Se habían que establecer un sistema legal coherente Con la Sharia, es decir, con la ley islámica Iba a requerir sí o sí el respaldo del gobierno O sea, tú no puedes imponer la Sharia en la sociedad Si el gobierno no te respalda O no lo... Un gobierno que da títere de los británicos Claro, tú pretendes poner una ley islámica Si el gobierno no la acepta, no la apoya No la promueve, es imposible, ¿no? But it's true that they believed in that that would be a final step after a long period of social action and social action for the people of Egypt who would be the same who would be the same who would be the same who would be the same in order to start from above, with that people would be convinced of what they need and that people would be asking for the same change to the government islámico It's a little bit marxist in reality It's a revolution from above, or as Lenin said later, the revolution from above the vanguard and all that You know, you're saying that in reality, it's very good in the context geopolitical, because we're talking about the years of 20 and 30, which is just when we're talking about the Unions Soviet Union. This is the ram is the mixta, but you also have the ram comunist. Because of the law, there's a socialist in Egypt. Claro, with the same idea, right? So, well, all this that we say, to start by abajo, is key to understand their strategies and their action, both historically and now in Europe. We're talking about a long term. They don't look for immediate, they don't look for changes, they don't look for radicals, but they're working to look for decades, even a century, for that, at the end, the people, they come from what they want to do. And finally, thirdly, the application of the sharia no has to be literal. This is a very important thing. The brothers thought that to apply the same laws from the siglo VII was basically to ignore the needs of the Muslim community in modern times. It's impossible to apply to that time to the actual. So, the best in reality would be to do to do with the texts sacred of Islam but always with the context present. Always with a modern interpretation of what is happening in that text sacred. That has a form of a considerable, even reaccionable, and to return to Islam, but not to a Islam, perhaps, as integral as the one that can be applied, by then, for example, Arab Saudi with the wahhabism and other things, which is much more rigorous. In the 70s, if you were to do this, this is what is what is happening, point of pelota. This people are looking for... They look for Islam as a cultural essence, as a national source that I have and that I have to recover, and not as a code of strict that I have to fulfill. That is, the culture is the one that I have to hold for to survive to the colonial of the Britannic. Of course, the goal of the political system of the German Muslims is to again, to get a society or state based on Islam and reged by the Islamic law, but, as we say, adapted to the Islamic law to the needs and context of the moment, of the beginning of the XXX. And to reach that goal, of course, no valed to impose a Islamic law, but the idea was to make that base, that's the key to the population, It was the first population that would ask that, basically, in lieu of an imposition from above. What does this mean? I mean, how do they get it? What methods do they use for winning a lot of people? They're in the way that started Albana before founding the organization, but it's been taken to the maximum. Dar the turd. Dar the chapa. It's a revolution pacific. from the bottom, that mix social work with divulgation in public places like mezquitas, cafeterias, to increase the level of religious commitment of the society egipcia. For that, first, they gave a religious form to their members, which in this case would be for the six first ones that they would be able to get their friends, for that once they were formed, they could pass to be the ones that divulgated in all those public spaces and between friends, family, colleagues, working and and so to be able to expand the network of people. To help the society in total. A society that, as well, they were not able to schools, hospitals, fundations benefits. This is a political pillar in the political realm that is built on the basis of schools and hospitals. Like many jobs. The public service is from the bottom. Yes, and that is not only to preach, but the example also. It is to say, I'm concerned about you and precisely that I want you to be able to. I create a network of social support based on the neighborhoods, at the end. So, let's go. Remember that the Armandah saw that the Egypt state, which was corrupted by the Occidente, didn't satisfy the needs of the population. So they were involved in building schools for children, clubs deportivos, clinics sanitarias, mezquitas, a little bit. All the services... A state of parallel. Yes, a state of parallel, which would carry thousands of cities around the country. This labor of social is going to be a constant both in the time and in the different ramifications of the Armandah. And, in fact, in certain territories, like, for example, in Jordania, during many years, they considered as a charitable association. Now, we have to have very clear one thing, and it is that from the moment in which they appear, both in Egypt as in every one of the territories that they are going to expand, the development of the Hermannanian will be conditioned by its relationship with the national government of the moment. And it will be a constant tiray. So depending on the context, the represalian that they are passing, the liberties that they can access, They have been adopting different tactics to achieve their objectives, which in some cases they are from what originally they thought, which is a bit what Blas has told, or even they can look contradictory to those original ideas. What kind of tactics or things can be changed? We have two big mutations that are key in the political line of the Hermann, which are, above all, the elections, that is, participate in the electoral democracies and the yihad, the violence, which, in a priori, they were not in agreement with them, but we think it's a more thrive, it's also a thing about the elella Yeah, we have shown we've seen as Hassan Albana originally consensus the army doesn't need to be a capable of peace there was no to be an part with political this one's league Вот this no one enca snaps at Naish ele Italia what he wanted to do was, to a change between the people away fromense and Bin Laden maybe whether they could agree bothID of the Islamic although they did not, but they don't make they ask him i said that he wasองnami the Monica remained back on his opposition influencer even bribery выступties whenever he was stopped in many countries. We have seen, for example, recently, after the revolt of Arabism, in Egypt, in Libya, in Morocco, there is a lot of people who have been able to govern them. It is to say, there are cases in which they have been able to vote for the electoral, even very soon, for example, in Syria, in the 60s and 50s, they have opted for this. Now we will see how all this is happening and what has happened in that state of the Armand. Maybe if you listen to Morsi, it's the one who can sound. Yes, the president of the Armand that was derogated, later we will talk about, in that coup of state of the Maniscal al-Sisi. And then, with respect to the issue of the Yihad, the violence is a more complicated. Because to start, there is a term that Yihad is a term that no means war santa in the sense of violence. It means effort or struggle in general. And it is more than with the idea of the effort to be a good Muslim or to be a concept of Islam. It is a thing that can even be positive. In fact, this one we have told here. We have a Turkish friend who is Yihad. because in reality means the effort is to be a good person. It's a good thing in reality. A eye of an occidental is a little bit strange, but for a guy from all, no is wrong. The issue is that for the Jewish people, originally they had the Yihad as a legitimate use of the force to defend the Jewish community of external threats or to the oppression of the infieles. It's a sense of force. Or a autodefense. The objective of the Yihad for the Jewish people was the imperialism occidental, in this case, britannic, and also the sionism. the Jewish Jewish people who had decades of Palestine before the state of Israel and in absolute a way of armed armed as they will see with the Yihad or the Islamic State However, we are seeing how has been justified the violence in contexts that necessarily have to be with that defensiveness Sometimes it is not so And above all how there has been a historical ideological of the German Muslims that against the repression of the Egypt in that tiray afloat that said before Jara broke the whole thesis of Hassan Albana, of the Pacific Ascent, to promote directly the Armada, without ambages. Here we see how there is people who radicalize within the Armand and pass to opt for the way more radical. And then, that army was left in favor of a return to the pacifism, but still was the one for many other movements, and in reality it is important to understand that ambiguity and complexity of the army that today has. For example, the Semanae of the Muslim people suppose that they have rejected the violence, but they have supported Hamas and have applauded in some cases the attacks of the 7th of October against Israel, which is quite explícitas. So this also shows that this precepts can be applied to a way more strict. Or, as a minimum, as it is a great organization and with people very diverse, there is people who are not violent and who are not violent, and there is people who are violent or who, as a minimum, justifies or supports the violence. So, again, complexities and grises are a lot. Yes, of course, there is a matrix, a criteria, super unified and clear. Obviously, it does piece that other factions or groups interpret it as a way. That is, as a way. Yes, as a way. As you mentioned, these changes are happening during the expansion of specific contexts. So let's see it little bit later, so we can see it a little bit clear how comes the issue of the issue of the Muslim Armand. We start from that originally in Egypt what they promueven is that social social-pacific movement that is the base of the divulgation and public services, which is something that many organizations have done in history. And I understand that this is a little bit of a meal house, It's been seven members, to say, Hassan Albana and the six colleagues, to a mass. This change, how does it produce? In two decades, the truth. It has a merit. Yes, yes, thanks to that intense labor social, providing the services that the state has been given, both for capacities as for corruption. And also the charisma that had Albana as divulged. The Armand has expanded quickly, to become a national national much greater than any other, as such as civic and religious as there were at the moment, and they had to have four delegations or sucursales in 1929, we're talking about in Egypt, to 2.000 in 1949. Bastante bien. And of those seven members original, they have to have between 300.000 and 600.000 in the decade of the 40th. So, the growth is exponential. Like the world with the subscribers. We have a lot of ways of doing that. Yes, that is. In fact, in that same period, between the years 40's and the years they start to the international plan and start to appear in Palestine, Syria and Jordan, although through different methods in Palestine they come between the years 30's and 40's when we have said that we identified the sionism as a enemy against the enemy and there they created in Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem and Gaza four main cities this is before that is created Israel but we have told in some episode that before that creation of Israel and there is a civil war, basically, in the mandato of the palestines. There are tensions between palestinos, britannic and judyos, and there is a conflict that later will be with the 1948. So, with the arrival of the 1948, after the creation of the Israel, there are two things. First, that the palestine is part, like the territory, you divide it in two. You have one in Cisjordania and another in Gaza. And second, that the brothers of Egypt put directly in practice that idea of yihad and send them to combat. Okay. These are not battles that are created specifically for combat in Palestine, but they came from a unit within the Armand of Egypt called Sección Especial, encarged by applying that vision defensively of the Yihad against military military and military objectives and political and governmental targets. That was also seen as a opression, like the sionism. And in this case, the military support was not very numerous or very effective, but it was not to be able to see that since 1948, the violence was not rejected in the Palestinian context. And it's going to be an extra-egip to say that it's not that they're entering your country or whatever, but... You know, here it's a little bit of a threat. You have to leave a different territory with other people who are not going to be a different territory. It's a little more delicate. No it's only a defense of the musulman, but of the musulmanes. Of the musulmanes, of course. I understand that the idea of the UMA and your own territory, the national front, is like a bit of a bit. But from then, we started to see a little bit of the criteria. the criteria. Claro, the veían justificada, what we call the Yihad, as a lucha against the opresors, in this case, it's the sionism, which also also and the britannic, but I understand that in the context sirio and jordano, which you have said that also appears in those years, it occurs in another way, and there is no such a movement sionist, or a britannic, there are no sionists in Syria, nor in Jordanian, the similitude between Jordanian and Palestina is that in both territories, the German Egyptians active a time to create the national ram, the sucursal, the the filial of Misahab, well, of the brothers. But that is, let's say, no have more influence. All the other differs radically, both of Palestina, as of the government of Egypt. And in fact, that's the end of the floor with the governments that occur in practically the region, in Jordanian it takes a lot to appear. I mentioned before Jara, that there is a much more closer relationship between Jordanian and the local hermandate. This, evidently, will go changing, because the jordana is one of the that Trump has been assigned as terroristists, or something happened there, so that this can be done radical. But while for decades, in all the regions of the region, apart from Jordanian, the Irmandad has been against the government and has been faced with repression, legalization and persecution policial, in Jordanian, directly, they were looking for a society with the approval of the monarchy, it is to say, here the strategy is different, it is to collaborate with the government instead of being persecuted and combat. So, his agenda was only based on They can't cover the local needs with much incapacity in education. In that sense, they call less attention, they are less aggressive and more political. Exactly. More caritative. That is. In Syria, what happens is that many societies islámic locales, which exist in the country, they unite under the paraguas ideological of the German Muslims. It is to say, hey, there is a lot of people in Egypt, I love what they do, here we are going to do something like that, inspired by them, but we are sirians and we are in Syria. Here we are not, therefore, a direct coordination with the Irlandate of Egypt, but as I said, they are more autónomas. In this case, there is another difference in the region of Egypt and the rest of the countries of the region, which is that in the first period of the existence of the German in Syria, even before even the Ba'ath of the power, the Ba'ath is a socialistic party of the Arabian dynasty, the one that comes after the dynasty of the Assad. The Assad's father and the father of Assad are from this party, for understand. before the party of the Bazaar in the 1960s the Irlandate in Syria has an important role within the system of the democratic democratic in Syria, very precarious, very unstable but already incipient in that era of independence of the 50's and 60's and here we have what we have said at the beginning that in certain contexts the Irlandate changes in tactic and opt for the electoral here is a contest propitious to the people who present the elections no the way I take advantage I am going to a party to present the elections and it is something that, for example, in Egypt it will take much more time in verse Allí iban a tardar muchas más décadas Y además con mucho debate interno entre miembros Porque hay mucha discrepancia Entonces si es buena idea o no presentarse a las elecciones En Siria no, en Siria hace ya mucho tiempo que se hizo Bueno, y que no están ligados a la filial O al grupo egipcio Que decís un poco, pues haz lo que quieras, chico Nosotros marcamos unas ideas de Albana Pero bueno No hay un jefe en Egipto que tiene que probar lo que todo el mundo haga Los sirios han montado su hermandad Inspirada en la egipcia, pero hacen lo que quieren Y aquí se empieza ya a ver como hay bastantes diferencias Incluso estratégicas, ¿no? Although the main focus of action and the level of coordination varies between a place and another, the expansion of these territories has been more than voluntary. But there are cases in which it is not so, as we have told you, because in the streets of the Gulf, they come not because they were looking for implantation there, or because there was already a field of social food disposed to organize the style of the Hermann, but because they expulsed from Egypt. So, let's talk a little bit more about this story because it's important in the topic that we have today. Yes, to understand the expansion, no voluntaria, by saying it in some way. No, if you're expulsed, voluntaria no is. Of the German Muslims we have to go back to that idea of the tirayafloja. It's to say, the Hermannad is understood as a enemy or as a ally in different moments of the history. They are replying or they are accepted according to the system as disruptives or not. And there is to have in mind one thing. The consideration of the friend or friend, no only has depend on whether it's good or not to the government of the moment, but of the great events that are molding the politics and society of the moment. In that sense, we can identify the great events or catalysers that have been taken from the region, reconfiguring that perception of the brothers as a enemy or as a ally. Or, like a force against the regime, or that can help the regime to fight against a third enemy. And then the cooptation, and then, I'm going to approach this people and then. So, in that sense, those great catalysers that have been conditioned to all are four. The first is the rise of the pan-arabism and the Arab socialism, then the 90's invasion of Kuwait, then the war against terrorism, from 2001, and, in the end, the Arab Spring. In this case, what is the arrival of the German Muslims to the Gulf, as it also is what is the arrival of Europe and other African countries, like Argelia or Tunis, even Libya, Sudan and Somalia, is the rise of the pan-arabism. Of course, this is, again, not the episode about the panarabism. I think it's true. I hope in a moment we can dedicate something to the panarabism, the Arabism, and all this. But why affect the panarabism to these Muslims Muslims? I think that, although really, not we're going to put it on a lot of explain it, but the roots of the panarabism are more ancient and really date from the 19th century. But it's in the 40's when they end up defining their postulats ideologically. We are almost at the same time period that when they start expanding the German Muslims. There is a very ideological ideology that there are many corrients competing. And that really have that objective of fighting against the colonialism, but each one with a different foot. So, if you share with the political Islam of the German Muslims that fight against the colonialism, there is a question that they convert in opposites and irreconciliables. Because for the pan-arabists, the solution to the social and political problems of the moment no era la vuelta a la religión, que sí que promulgaban los hermanos musulmanes, sino lo contrario, un nacionalismo árabe secular. O sea, que toca directamente con los intereses de los hermanos. Así, en las primeras décadas en Egipto, hemos visto que los hermanos ya eran de por sí un actor de oposición al régimen, pero será a partir de la llegada de Nasser, el icono del panarabismo, al poder en los años 50, cuando se les ilegaliza y se machaca de manera intensísima. And the same happens in Syria when the party of Ba'ath comes to power with a coup of state in 1963 What happens in these years? First, as there is no hueco for the brothers in the Egypt-Nasarist or in Syria, they have to exiliar themselves And the exit is mainly to the countries of the Gulf, especially Arabia Saudis and Qatar Además of Europe and Maghreb, which we will talk later That's true, that we have told that the Syria of Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, although they are persecuted, they still exist in a way more or less occult. They even try to take the power of Hafez al-Assad in the year 82, and Hafez al-Assad, the massacre of Hama in the 82, basically, they turn the city and turn to the fire and leave thousands of dead. It's a murder, it's the moment, perhaps, more violent, of the fact that it's more explicit between the government of the region and the hermandate, because, in fact, Hafez al-Assad no se las cogía como papel de fumar el tío entró a saco y dejó muchísima gente muerta pero todavía aunque estuvieran prohibidos seguían siendo un movimiento oculto de base que seguían intentando tomar el poder por debajo, ¿no? Tanto en Egipto como en Siria Sí, que vemos un poco su importancia, ¿no? Aunque no fuesen legales en la sociedad siguen teniendo una influencia muchísimos adeptos y, por tanto, eran una amenaza para muchísimos regímenes políticos que tenían una aspiración dictatorial Una aspiración, ¿no? O sea, tal cual Sí, pero en serio que querían, o sea, que no podían permitirse ese nivel de rivalidad política, básicamente. Es como, mira, o mando yo o no... Y menoscraw a todos y punto. Efectivamente. ¿Y por qué afecta... O sea, ¿por qué a estos países, precisamente? ¿Por qué hemos dicho que se exilen Arabia Saudí y Qatar? ¿Por qué se van aquí? Precisamente porque son los países donde no triunfa esta ideología. O sea, en ellos, en los países del Golfo, se aceptan los hermanos musulmanes por ser precisamente esa fuerza de oposición al panarabismo que no quieren para sí mismos. O sea, el enemigo de mi enemigo es mi amigo. Exactamente. Es esa dinámica. Encaja perfectamente que los hermanos expulsados de Egipto fuesen a parar a los países del Golfo, donde el nacerismo, el vaticismo, el comunismo eran percibidos como amenazas ideológicas al sistema monárquico wahabista. Eran amigos de la monarquía Saúl, pues al ser enemigos de sus enemigos. Y no solo, digamos, yo diría que no solamente son un enemigo de mis enemigos, sino que incluso son un aliado más, porque se les permite, por ejemplo, formar parte del entramado social y político nacional. O sea, no solamente se les tolera a escondidas, es que se les fomenta, ¿no? Sí. Que participen, ¿no? Hombre, para el wahabismo los hermanos musulmanes son, tío, no está un poco progres. Yes, then they will have division, then we will have to do it But in their moment, when your enemy is the main enemy That you have to do a Egypt or a Syria Gobernados by a secular regime And allied with the Soviet Union I am a religious I am a religious I am a liar with who I am That is those demoniacs with cola One of the things that is political Is that is like a party Yes So, that's the amount of people Super qualified That is, for example, a Qatar And the Gulf That comes from Egypt That comes from Syria That is a student That has studied That has a head That has a head That has a head But that has been persecuted In their countries se exigna al Golfo, por ejemplo, o a Qatar, y se van a integrar en su sistema político y educativo, produciendo una simbiosis que es muy interesante entre la doctrina religiosa dominante, que es lo que mencionabais del wahabismo, que es esa doctrina, digamos, tradicionalista del Golfo, de Arabia Saudí, y la línea de los hermanos musulmanes, ¿no? La tradición y el Islam político juntos. Vemos que la relación entre Qatar y la hermandad, en ese sentido, ha sido desde el principio positiva, hasta el punto de que el pequeño Estado del Golfo, pequeño pero muy poderoso, gracias al gas, por cierto, has continued economically, military and politically and the German Muslims both in Egypt and in the region from then to today to today which is a principal an alliance strategic here exactly here I'm going to say no think we can't think that Qatar is the only actor that supports of any way or other to the German today because the other main actor that is Turkey which has a role very important in this balance geopolitical and in the 60's in the 69's German Muslims have founded in Istanbul the Federated Islamian International of student organizations, I always put names very long and very very long. You will see that there are more examples of this. But well, they have a federated to coordinate the organizations of student organizations of Turkey and support the cause of the Irmandad. There is a question and this is a topic for another podcast that Turkey in the 60s and 70s is a country governed by the military and very represor against the Muslim movement. So, again, in Egypt or Syria, here also... military, secular, whatever thing that is Islam, no, in your case. Republicanos in the Islam, in the OTAN, in the US, in the Contra of the International Izquierda, and, we're giving a lot of people who are revered, both from the left and from the Islamist, so here, the German government has an interesting strategy, which is, in order to go from above, to convince people a little bit of a hideous. After the years of repression, 60-70, and thanks in good measure to that social social Islamism, which is created in good measure thanks to the German government, in the 96, the power of the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic in that century that took the Republic of Turkey, since the Empire of Humanity, there is a leader of Islamist, which is Nechmetin Erbakan, which is the leader of Erdogan, the current president of Turkey. We see the connection between Emmanuel Muslims, Erbakan, the first leader of Islamist of Turkey, and then Erdogan, which is the one that is now. Well, the AKP, we can say, has many similarities or many elements integrated into the Islam political. I would say just that. The AKP, which is the party of Erdogan, is a kind of a political way that he will have a political party of relationship to the услов 있는데 his marketing network even because he doesn't have his a Umverdough What's inspired by an INTER scripture Erdakhan that a mentor that was the impulses with torictly create to be um those leaders the whole region cum guilty yourselves his you Oye, os dejo sitio para que os juntéis aquí, una salita que tengo vacía. Entonces, hoy en día, tanto Turquía como Qatar son los países donde se les ofrece asilo político, para reunirse, difusión mediática, desde la prensa, por ejemplo, al-Yasida, que es qatarí, hace mucha cultura positiva de la hermandad, y son en realidad los mayores apoyos de la hermandad a nivel político en la región de Oriente Próximo. En los países están o perseguidos, o ilegalizados, o mal vistos. No hay medidas distintas, o te quiero mucho, o te persigo y te reprimo. Me encantas o te odio. And another factor that appears in this repressive period, also the exile with Nasser in Egypt and the Ba'ath in Syria, is that they start producing internal divisions that will mark the political realm of the brothers in the next few years. And this is what we have talked about, the Yihad and all that that they start interpreting. Just. In those same years of repression in Egypt, a manos of Nasser, and after the death of Albana, which is in 1949, He began a role in a figure in the movement, Saeed Khutub. Very important to this. Very important. Khutub represented... Ya hablaremos de él. Este es otro que merece un episode. Sí. Tremendo person. Sí. Él representaba a una postura más radical que la de Albana, para sorpresa de nadie a partir de este momento, y pensaba que la Revolución Pacífica había fracasado. Así que la alternativa era la lucha armada y una suerte de totalitarismo islámico. Khutub no se exiliaría a Arabia Saudí, sino que sería encarcelado en Egipto and executed in 1966. But his work has been fundamental for the radicals of the brothers and also has influenced much in the yihadism, as we will see later. One of the key ideas of Qutb is the of Yahiliya, which means ignorance of knowledge about God. And with this, Qutb criticated the desviation of the musulmanes towards political systems or values that give the back to Allah. That is, that they were based on the human rights in the human rights, in the will of God and in the Islamic law. Of course, this includes many things. It includes the individualism, the materialism, the democracy of Occidente, the communism, the pan-arabism of Nasir, which for Qutb, in fact, was the evil of the Yajiliyya, because the suffering and the suffering that caused was, in his head, a consequence of giving the shield to Islam. So, the proposal of Qutb to combat the Yajiliyya was the Yihad. As we have told, Qutb was He was condemned to death, accused of trying to orchestrate a coup of state and ahorcated in Egypt in 1966. And he created a bit of a martyr. Exactly. And his lectures are still spreading to the yihadism. For that people know, the yihadism is Peck. It's like the theoretical basis of the yihadism modern. Yes. And even if he's a pagan, who is exiled was his brother, who is named Muhammad. and he became a influence in Saudi Arabia, imparting classes in the University of Reyes Abdulaziz and divulging ideas of his brotherhood. You can kill the man but not the idea, basically. Exactly. And no matar the idea. No, no, no, no, no. Como hemos anticipated at the beginning, the hermanos musulmanes like tal, then, a partir of the 70's, they would rechazate this vía armada revolucionary. But this violent sector was already a motor for the development of new movements within the Islam political, which began to be in Saudi Arabia, thanks to that divulged of the hermano. So that, as they are in themselves a key actor within the Islam political, they are also a semilla, a motor, for that other corrients, in this case more radicals, they expand and grow. Of course, Kutub takes the idea of the Islam political and the Islam political, and says, let's put in one more. And those are the hardliners, basically. It's the man that's in the head. Claro. Basically. Y gente muy chunga. Y es verdad que la hermandad, perdón, Afer, no es salafista ni es yihadista como tal. No, no, no. Pero sí que va a ser clave esas ideas de Qudub en la expansión de dos tipos de salafismo, que luego explicaremos qué son, que es el político y el salafismo yihadista. Es decir, el yihadismo. Pero eso creo que va a ser después de algo que viene ahora. Sí, porque toca nuestro querido testimonio. Testimonio. Testimonio. Me encanta cómo se ha establecido esto ya como una traición, vamos, de base. Tal cual, tal cual. Here we have written Iñigo That tells me Hello Very good, thank you I have to say We discovered I have two years On Spotify And as they say The emails that you read in the podcast I was going to I am one of those That every week I have published your episode And I have to share Some of my episodes With friends Like, look Your explications On the Zionism And Palestine It's a very hard Ilao With the of today And we have to say Lo gracioso es que como a veces me va el café para cafeteros y se me hace larga la espera, después de escuchar vuestro podcast desde los dos últimos años, empecé a escucharlo desde el origen de los tiempos para ver cómo han envejecido esos temas. Buen talibán, ¿eh? Como mejor dicho. No, hombre, nosotros siempre recomendamos que, más allá de que vas a ver nuestra evolución a mejor, muchos de los temas ya los hemos tocado. Hay gente que nos pide temas nuevos. A ver si habláis de ellos como, es que ya lo hemos hecho en 250 y pico episodios que llevamos. We've talked about many topics, so if you've heard it, you can see it back, because you can find it. And then Iñigo tells us, in fact, it's time to support us, so you can continue your work, because I think it's important that you can continue with it. Who knows, in the future, my son of three years old, and you'll hear it and learn how the world works. Ponselo ya, Iñigo, ponselo ya. There's a lot of people who listen to it from the age of. There are a lot of people who listen to it from the age of. Claro, de su madre. Ya va tarde el niño, ya con tres años. Apúntalo ya a clases extra de No se Fue en el Mundo. Claro, fíjate. O uno con cinco. Eso es, eso es. Se tiene que poner desde el primer libro. Pero qué guay, qué ilusión que nos escriba, hombre. Sí, nos hace mucha ilusión que nos escuchéis, que nos leáis, que nos sigáis, que en fin, que os suscribáis. Desde luego que, de hecho, estamos intentando una cosa, nuestra pequeña yihad. Expandirnos como los hermanos de su madre. Eres el Shazán Albana del Orde Mundial. Eso es, eso es. because in April, this is published in February, we have 8 years, we have llovido, we are not young, we are not young yet, we have 8 years in April and we have put a little goal interno that is to celebrate those 8 years having reached 8000 subscribers. Now we are 7600, something like that. If we would like to arrive with those 8000, would be the first time that we would have reached so high, evidentemente, pero sobre todo una cifra tan redonda tan pronto desde que conseguimos el último hito porque los 7000 también fueron hace poquito en octubre del 25 y creo que los 6000 fue un poco en enero también del 25 con el tema del sprint que hicimos de las elecciones de Estados Unidos y demás, entonces bueno que si te gusta lo que hacemos si quieres apoyar nuestro trabajo de verdad que es fundamental que te suscribas y nos apoyes, o sea que si quieres ayudarnos a llegar a esos 8000, de verdad que nos da ilusión llegar a esa aniversaria finales de abril con ese número redondo de los 8.000 suscriptores si llegamos vamos a pensar aquí, veas, a lo mejor hacemos algo para celebrarlo, alguna cosita preparada celebration, se vienen cositas algo chulo, con jara pinchando música pero bueno que ahí queda, ahí te dejamos la idea, suscríbete a la orden mundial.com, suscríbete y nos apoyas, que es maravilloso y muy necesario esto es no es el fin del mundo We will back with the brothers of Muslims. We will also make a little parenthesis because Islam has many streams and corrients. It may be a little bit of a lie I think we have put some episodes where we have some of them But as it has been released and has a lot of confusion a lot of information interesting we can explain what is this of the salafism and what is how it is or what is its relationship or separation between the brothers musulman. The relationship with the jihadists, is what we are going to do now. What can you do? It's what can you do, Jara. In the fiesta. But, guys, I don't know what song is Isaac. I've never heard this in the duch. Then the last one. Demazo de reggaeton. Well, let's see. A serious. The salafism is a radical radical of Islamism, for understanding. The Islamism is the version politicized of Islam. It's to take the Islam to the political. So, the salafism what he does is that abogues for a return to the Islam as it was understood in the religion during the first three generations of Muslims, in the era of Mahoma, in the era of the 7th. It's what we know as Salaf. There comes the name of the salafism. Why do they do this? Well, because from their point of view only there is a real Islam true, that is Islam primordial, and never has been more close to reach that Islam good than during the first generations after Mahoma. Then the rest of the songs were a trupper. A me liked Islam at the beginning, when they were indies. So what they want is a strict and literal word of the Koran and reject any type of interpretation modern of the text. Everything is done as they did in the era of Mahoma. In the era of Mahoma. Literalism. Yes, exactly. Punto por punto. So here is where the difference is with the Islam musulman. because the Irlander yes, as we said, as we said at the beginning, the interpretation of the texts, and they are of course, for example, in adapt to the sacred laws to the epoch of the political context. In the 17th century, evidently, there were things that today are, so it doesn't have to be able to live that strict. From there, for the Salaam Muslim, the Salaam Muslim, the Salaam Muslim, basically, are those anticuados and those radicals, and for the Salaam Muslim, the Irlander, are those revisionists moderns that have been a real Islam. It's a bit of the base of the war, right? Yes. Exactly. That's what we see even in the vestiment, because the salafists don't leave the barbara long, it's the typical of the man with barbara long, with a black, traditional, etc. The bin Laden, which has the barbara there. That's a salafist. The man musulman, in general, has a way of wearing a more occidental, more modern, they have to wear with American, for example, with barbara recortable. We see even the way of wearing, that's different. At first, what we're doing in Arabia Saudis is a type of salafism, which we call salafism quietist, that is, it's a people who don't try to, no hace afán de proselitismo, de convencer a mucha gente de manera muy rápida, no critican al gobierno de Arabia Saudí, sino que buscan más bien es observar las costumbres de Mahoma, predicar y hacer rezo. O sea, son gente que... Un poco a su bola. Radicales, pero un poco a su bola, no llaman la atención, no molestan. Vale. Pero cuando llega la hermandad de Egipto y Siria al Golfo, Arabia Saudí, y van introduciendo poco a poco sus ideas más políticas, se produce una simbiosis, una especie de Goku y Vegeta de repente, que se transforma en un salafismo que ya no es cristiano, sino que es político. It's a more active, more active with the government It's a demand for a more active In the public In the state And it's a very important thing The regime is to be a Saudi One thing is that you are a type of guy who is a lot and you leave the bar And the other thing is that you want to govern in lieu of you And then we have a problem And that's what would be the political But, of course The influence and expansion of the German Muslims No, it's not that there is where the chicha Recordemos that the brother of Said Qutb was in this country divulging ideas of the armed army. Yes. This presence of the ideas of Qutb in Arabia Saudis were the semillas that allowed the appearance of a current even more radical of the salafism, which is the salafism yihadist. You see, sorry, this idea, which in a prior to sound very well in your head, it has torcido quickly. You bring to Saudi Arabia, a people who are from the terrible regime of the terrible Arabian Arabian Arabian of Egypt and Syria to protect them and to kill them and to kill them. And what does that happen? You start to kill the yerba under the feet. Yes. Cuidado también con quién te tienes la casa Los radicales de tu país pillan ideas de esa gente Y dicen, ah, pues esto de convencer a la gente para que la lie Está bien, pues venga, justo Exactamente, y aquí es donde nos encontramos Dentro de lo que es el salafismo yihadista Al-Qaeda o al Daesh Que son un poco los que nos van a sonar Si nos suena la idea del salafismo Esta gente es la que nos suena Tendremos que hacer, no sé si está en el calendario Una visión sobre el yihadismo Y explicarlo bien Pues ahora también un poquito de repetición con lo de Saikutub We're putting a little bit of the semillas. Yes, but well. The shalafism yihadist, or simply yihadism, is marginal until the 90s. Remember that Cutub lo killed in 1966. The hermano is in the 70s, but at the beginning are three tíos... Yes, yes. It's a very marginal until the 90s. But now they have a much more conocido and they are for serious. They are a ideology shalafist that uses the violence, sometimes extreme. All the leaders of the jihadism have a Qutb as a base theory, and in fact, Osama Bin Laden was one of the students of Muhammad Qutb, the brother, being a member of the brothers of the Muslim, until he decided to form Al Qaeda in 1988. I don't know what I was thinking, I was fliping when I read this, that Bin Laden was a Muslim, before going to be the version of the Islamism. Well, a ver, it's not common that someone is radicalized and... Yeah, yeah. Se echa el monte, nunca mejor dicho. Además, que aquí, me estaba acordando, no sé en qué año es esta peña, es la que intenta tomar la meca. Ah, la mezquita de... no sé si es la meca o Medina. Hay una aparición terrorista gordísima porque hay unos tipos que se meten en una mezquita en Arabia Saudí y tienen que entrar ahí... En los santos lugares, en cualquier ciudad de Arabia Saudí, en los santos lugares. Sí, y también con una reivindicación de, quiero tomar el poder porque estos gobiernos del Golfo and the Saudi's not doing what I think is the right islam is adequate. The Saudi says, no, I'm going to kill you. And they're going to kill you. And they're going to kill you. Yes, I know what is that. But there is something. There is something. There is something. But well, this happens. It's a point in the end of the Saudi's own monarch is harta of this peice. Yes, yes. And you say, no, I'm going to lie. You're going to go. It's that we're going to see. There is a back. The ideology of the Islam political comes from Egypt and the Arabian world. Then it comes to the Islam chií in the revolution of Iran. And then when in Iran the chiites Consiguen with Islam political To take power Dicen the sunies Of the rest of the countries Of the world Of the Oriente Próximo Oye, that igual this Funciona And I can take power With Islamism And then you have That replica That comes from Iran Of the rebote For example In Arabia Saudí Of the Algerian Then later Yes Cabe to say That later Those German Muslims Mantienen a discussion That's a moderate And they don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't They don't No son lo mismo, no me equivoco. Vengan de lo mismo, no son lo mismo. Y de hecho están enfrentados, como hemos dicho. Pero esta relación, esto de que sean primos lejanos, siempre ha sido un poquito incómodo para ellos. Bueno, yo entiendo que para Al-Qaeda o Daes, los hermanos de forma de son herejes. Sí. Entonces es como... Claro, pero para un hermano musulmán que va de moderado, que va de buen rollo, de solamente quiero convencer a la gente desde abajo y tal, tener a un tipo que viene de tu misma familia ideológica, que se dedica a rebanar cuellos, pues es súper incómodo, porque dices, es que yo no soy esto. Sí. Bueno, yo qué sé, los Jedi también tenían a Anakin, ¿sabes? What do we do? We can't do this. You can't do this. But, well, this is interesting, and for us to be a little bit like the family of the Islam political. The Yihadism is coming from the German Muslims to adopt that line of the sector more radical, and then they will separate themselves because, evidently, they don't share the vision or the methods and say, well, I'm going for free. But the German Muslims are not only inspired Al Qaeda or Daesh, because there are other places, other places where we can see their influence ideological or their way to see the world. It's just what I said, what I was going to say. It's also an inspiration for Iran's revolution in 1979. There is a lot of thought that even the Iran's revolution is a country, Islam-chi, and has its own characteristics, there are many differences, but it's true that it has part of the influence of Hassan Al-Ban and Isai Khutub and in general, of that vision of the necessary return to religion ante la decadencia de un país muy influido por Occidente. En Irán en aquel momento, eso también da para otro podcast, gobernaba el Shah, que era un tipo claramente visto como... Tenemos un episodio de Irán. Un aliado de Estados Unidos y de la CIA. Claro, y un episodio también en la mente de Hamenei, que estaba por aquí lanzando. Pues oye, ante un régimen que es dictatorial y que encima está aliado y vendido a Estados Unidos y la CIA, la mejor solución es volver a la religión, ¿no? Sí, nos hemos corrompido, occidentalizado además, vamos para atrás. Y también la parte de organización popular de las masas musulmanas para tomar el poder. No solamente es que yo quiera dar un golpe de Estado, So I think that people in the street Pida a change of regime To a regime islamist That is very relevant And also that Hamas Which is the reason for the fact Trump has designated A the brothers musulmanes As terrorists What relationship Exactly the brothers The brothers musulman With this people of Hamas The group of the destino Bastante fair Because originalmente Hamas was formed Like the militant Of the brothers of Gaza It is the rama armada Of the brothers musulman In the border of Gaza Mark Jacobs by Mark Jacobs. The destilación armada de la hermandad. Surgen en la primera entifada, en el año 87, y el caso es que poco a poco se fueron haciendo más fuertes que la organización civil, por así decir, hasta pasar incluso a representar en sí mismos a la hermandad en Palestina, en Gaza. Y siendo ya efectivamente una versión mucho más nacionalista y mucho más politizada y radicalizada de lo que había sido hasta ese momento. Vemos cómo ya se van también separando y radicalizando de la hermandad original. Jamás va a ir evolucionando poco a poco de manera independiente and its independence is also reflected in the links that the group has maintained, for example, with the hermandate as a result. In fact, in its case, it never refers to itself as, and I say it's textually, to a rama of the German Muslims in Palestine. In the memorandum that they prepare in the 2000, with the second intifada, they don't talk about rama, but that they are, again, the quote, the sucesors intellectuals and dynamic of the German Muslims in Palestine. Or, you know, we are not the rama, we are their children. Or their heroes. And in the recent article that they published, in the last 10 years, in 2017, they never even talk about their relationship with the Hermandad. They come from that, but they have broken those ties, they have broken their relationship with them. They have been extended progressively to... Yes. ...to re-excriber a little bit of history. Here's another article, perhaps more well-thinkable or more critical, that is, in reality, the Hermandad and Jamás are still being friends, but as it is not convenient to see the Hermandad. to see it in the Zaba with Hamas Hamas has decided to take that public eye to make it to make it a picture of the brothers. This is a way of seeing it a little less more cynical if you want, but also it is a possibility that is there. And if it is the reality it doesn't work, because no, not the designation of Trump, like for example the parliamentary proposal of Vox they talk precisely of the fundational, they ignore that later they have been in rotolazos or something like that. They say that in the fundational they say that they are the rama of the brothers in Palestine. And then, from there, you get the connection. But, well, that in the 2017, no mention the relationship with the Al-Mandab, it doesn't mean that they have a lot of relations and they don't guard any relationship. A difference of the posturing of the brothers respecto to Al-Qaeda or Daesh, which is a profound negative support or a vínculo, with Hamas, there is no just a support, but not just a they, but in general, a Palestinian, a resistance palestine, in this case, personificada. We have seen that from very early origin there is a relationship. Remember that for the moderate level of the Armand, the Yihad is justified in the case palestine because they live under a constant opression by the Israel's side. In any case, the German Muslims were cataloged as terrorists by some countries in a decade, without mention of their relationship with Hamas. This is more of a thing of the moment. It is recent, of course. Hamas has never been involved in this history, in the history. no he made a relationship to follow them and actually, I mean, it's true that the Trump what he did when he was in the Casa Blanca no, I know what countries they consider they already as terrorists and then also why, one thing is that it is that it is or not and the other thing is the reason for that you what you call it as the Gulf those who already considered terrorists are the countries of the Gulf everything always, except for Qatar that, as we have said, are the ones that put the money we have seen that in the 90's It's a bit of a relationship with the Gulf. And even the brothers collaborated with the authorities during the war against terror, which is interesting because in Arabia Saudis are illegalized during the 90's, then they say, well, let's leave the prison, but you have to collaborate with us against the other terrorists. And they say, okay, okay. So they cooperate with the authorities during the war against terror. but the good amistad has already broken this is definitely with the past we are in a moment of great efervescencia social with massive protests against the brutal police and the corruption of the regimes and the brothers musulmanes with their thousands of followers pronto they are uniting to this mobilization juvenile that we have in Túnez that we have in Egypt and it was an opportunity of them to pass from the power to the center of political political. The crash of Mubarak in Egypt in 2011, was the direct ascension of the brothers of Muslims in the power, because in June of 2012, Mohammed Morsi, which is the one we have mentioned before, and the candidate of the Partido of the Libertad and the Justicia, political brazo of the brothers of Muslims in Egypt, won with a 51,8% of the votes in the second round. In Túnez, after the... The president, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, we have an election legítimas. In Túnez, after the crash of Ben Ali, The party of NAJDA, which is the political version of the German Muslims in Tunis, also received the 40% of the seat in the parliament. We're talking about post-primavera Arabian. Yes, yes, yes. And obviously the war of Libya, Syria. Yes. And then in Morocco, Justice and Development, which is this party that we have said that has a certain influence of the German Muslims, although after the crash of Morsi, they would have to break the whole world. No, they would have known. No, they would have known. No, no. also also 107 of the 395 Escaños in Marruecos So, the countries of the Gulf that at that time had a similar process to the egipto in their own land they were considered enemies to the German Muslims So, it's the opposite of what happened with the pan-arabism Of course, the issue of Marruecos is interesting because there is a local or something like the German Muslims but that is also something that is very important because the regime is the head of the the church of the cúpula religiosa of Marrocos that's the comendador of the creyentes that's the name it's the cargo for example to have a organization in your country that wants to influence on the population of Marrocos above or without considering what the king is super comfortable then there is a tirada of floja of you don't want to you don't want to but you don't want to you to pass the rosca because I'm the who manda that there is a tension as there is an autonomy very ample to interpret this you can always renegar a little more and say well The good thing is that society has to move on a bit more from the Islam. Again, like you have your own proportion, basically. But they are always very ambiguous and the relationship with the power is always a little difficult. In the case of Morsi was very difficult because the president of Egypt no aguantó casi nada in the power. It was derrobed by a coup of state on the 3rd of July of 2013. That was the leader of the then minister of defense, the Mariscal Adel Fatah Al-Sisi, a military military. The that is still there, right? The that is still being dictator of Egypt. One time Al-Sisi comes to the power, it's a brutal Like the 50's with Nasser And one of the measures adopted in that moment is The of designating us as a terrorist group No, not only do you do a coup of state and you're persiding But also I'm going to legalize and I'm going to be a terrorist group Arabia Saudis, Bahrain and Emirates of the United States That are key to Al-Sisi, even today today They also follow the example egipto They did the same in March 2014 We see how there is a radical regression in contra of the Irmandate after the Arab Revolution. As the Arab Monarchies of the Gulf define a Muslim as terrorists, that also has become a point of friction very important with its vecinos Qatar, which is also a Arab Monarchies of the Gulf, but as we have said several times, it is the main financial and mediatic of the German. In fact, this is one of the reasons that the bloke of Qatar, as we have mentioned before, in the moment in which all the Council of Cooperative of the Gulf, those countries of the region, block a Qatar, there is a brutal crisis, with the country and between 2017 and 2021 they have relations with Qatar. It's like they have completely broken with that country because they are being able to support a terrorist group that is the German Muslim. So Saudi was being able to do with an intervention military, in the end, it was a very delicate thing. That was a very serious idea, that in the end of the end, it was not as bad as it seemed, because they are countries that, they have to be liated, they are much more than what they are saying, but with this issue there was a lot of problems. Yes, there was a lot of problems. the deal in the moment in which we entered Saudi and Iran had much tension, in the end, in a complicated context, the Oriental Próximo. Now that we have clear who is this people who want how they want, who they want, who will be able to play in the Oriental Próximo, and basically because they criminalize in the region, they persigue, they illegalize, we also have to look to what we have to talk about, which is Europe. How do the brothers of Muslims come to Europe? Because we have said that it happens more or less to the par that the exiles of the Gulf, the Gulf or north of Africa, but I don't know if they are like in Europe or also like that a little bit of connection and atomization that occurs in other parts. I've said that the German Muslims began to appear in Europe in the decades of the 60s, more or less, a bit of the invasion of Egypt and Syria. This is similar to Saudi Arabia, for example. But we see that there are substantial differences regarding their activity in the Oriental Próximo. First, because at the beginning they were not even seen as permanent ram. They were in exile, but the idea was to return to their origin and continue to their activity there. So it was a temporal presence, which was a permanent or not, of the regimes that had been expulsed in their origin. So, at a beginning, the local organizations that the brothers were creating, for example, in Spain or in Germany, were meres extensions of the organizations in Egypt and in Syria, of which they were already members. With the time, these organizations were acquired a menos temporal character and gradually they are involved in the European society, helping, for example, to build mezquitas, community communities for the workers, migrants, musulmanes, that are coming from other countries, like Turkey, Morocco, Algeria... But it would be until the 80s, 90s, when we started to see a national network more afianzated in the entire continent. A partir of these years, we see how the European organizations are losing that contact that they were maintaining to now with the countries of origin, apostate now, for a construction of an European islam, cuyos objetivos a corto plazo eran diferentes de los egipcios. Pensemos, por un lado, que la hermandad en Egipto ha estado ilegalizada en buena parte de su historia, encima ha estado vinculada con la aparición del terrorismo, así que los grupos europeos no tienen ninguna intención de decir sí, sí, somos colegas. Somos bestis. Lo que querían era distanciarse, por lo menos públicamente, lo máximo posible para no manchar la imagen moderada e integradora que querían mostrar al público europeo. Sí, porque el más mínimo fallo, vamos, les juzgaba. This doesn't mean that although there is no formal entity, homogenous and hierarchical, very closely with Egypt, there is no organization like this. No we are talking about that there is simply a ideological line of the German Muslims pulping around there, where there are many separate organizations and autonomous organizations. No. Yes, there are lots and vínculos, sometimes informal, between the different European groups that have adopted the line of the German. Claro. Well, it is a sense that they don't have much publicity of themselves if they have gone through persecution and terrorism. Or, at the end, no, no, no, not being discreated, it is important. And what is what is looking for this people in Europe? I don't know if they have the same objectives that the German Muslims, put in Egypt or in the Orient próximo, but they try to be a little bit of aparent that they have nothing to do with it, that they have no bad things. A ver, the European long term is the same, very long term, which is the return of Islam to society and its role in the central form of social organization. It's a manual of Albana, of Piquet Pala It's a different context in which it's minority in lieu of majority But at a long term what you want is the same Yes, but you have already communities Related, sustanciosas Of creyentes or afines where to go And in Spain, but especially in France In Germany, or in particular in the United States Because it's in London where it's The coordination jerárquica The most important thing in Europe There's a lot of people of origin musulman So it's important So what they want is basically to make Islam the referent to the public, private and political of where they are, whether later or later. The way of achieving that is true is true to what happens in the Oriental Próximo. There is a point that in Europe, there are no difficulties in the repressive difficulties, for example, in Syria or Egypt, which you can't find, you can't kill, you can't kill, you can't kill, you can't kill, etc. So, here, however, they have a great advantage, which is that they have the freedom that offers the European democracy. You can have your rights of expression, of religion, etc. and in that sense, that allows you to develop your activities without any impediment. No, no is the series of the Sassah, the Iraq, the Saddam or something like that. No, we can go to the sand and fire in a city to matate, you can do whatever you want and do whatever you want, basically, while you do whatever you want, you can do whatever you want. So, from their origins, the Hermann has opted for the political participation with the way to get to the society, to give their message, and to have something to say regarding the decisions that are taken by the authorities. always from the point of view discreto, social, and of the above. It's a liecity that they participate in the life of public. Of course, they have their own rights. So, little by little, the idea is to introduce reformas that casen with their ideals, always that they are accepted by the social, in this case, the no-musulman, it's to say, well, Christian and the laic, etc. So that the method is not to be done by the impositions of a dictatorship, or much less, nobody says that, or that anyone who listens to that idea, but to be able to achieve little, little, little, little, little, or little, little, that they're approaching their objective. In France, which is a big concern with this, because there is a big population of musulmanes and the authorities are very worried about this, the government talks about a strategy of Islamization cultural, which would be a kind of entrism, that is, infiltration ideologically at the level of social, first of all the musulmanes and then also the non-musulmanes, to increase the needs of religious and in public spaces, influencing the public policies. Oye, pues que me dejen, que no haya problema, por ejemplo, para llevar el velo en la calle, que es una cosa que está fantástica, tienes derecho a llevar tu velo si quieres, ¿no? Pero a veces pasan de eso a también querer imponer cosas a los demás, que es la parte un poquito más delicada que tiene esta historia, ¿no? Sí, o a veces incluso crear comunidades un poco paralelas para ganar poder en esa comunidad, ¿no? Que en el caso de Francia es muy evidente, en tanto que es una sociedad que, yo qué sé, tenemos ahí los guetos, todas las periferias de las ciudades, It's to say that there's no good policies for that people participate in a way much more integrated and participative of the state. That's what they have been parked there outside. So, the first idea is good because what contributes to integrate and help more to the population musulman that is in those countries and that also suffers in good measure discrimination and lack of opportunities. Yeah,ophobia, racism, in fact, a lot of things. But, of course, it's very complicated to identify the presence of the Muslims in Europe and identify what they're dedicated, how they operate, who they are. First, we have said that they try to do not make publicity of themselves too much with the man of musulman The people say, I'm a man of musulman But, on the contrary, they may neg it even And even have organizations that they put different names that even go on to change from every time For example, the Association of Muslims of France It changed the name twice to the actual It was created in 1983 with the name Union of Organizations Islámicas in France then it changes to the Union of the United Nations of the French and it seems to be that it is the same and in the 17th, the other is the actual name it is a way also, you know, persiguen a the Union of the French because I put the name of the other and so I am I am a type of incognito, with the bigot exactly, type of incognito 2, well, so France is the political popular, etc Perry, Perry, the unitorrinco, well, so the same with musulmanes of the French exactly, and then, as well as their speech no is abertemente problematic, nor does not have anything ilegal, sino que se mueven mucho en la línea de integración social y lucha contra la xenofobia europea, es muy difícil pillarles porque no hacen nada ilegal. Es que a lo mejor lo que quieren es simplemente un ejemplo arquetípico es conseguir que haya menús halal en los colegios para los niños. Oye, pues yo tengo, mi hijo es musulmán y quiero que el colegio que vaya tenga un menú halal. Fantástico. Pero, por ejemplo, en Melilla, donde la mayor parte de la población ya es musulmana y hay colegios donde el 100% o tres cuartas partes de los niños son musulmanes, lo que están intentando hacer ahora ya es no que haya opción halal, que sería fantástico para todo el mundo quiere men halal A priori es una... Razonable y lógico, pero en realidad lo que estaba escondiendo es una idea de solamente aceptamos el menú halal. Claro, esto es la única opción ya. Discriminas ya a quien no quiera menú halal, sea uno musulmán. Si el día de mañana llega un niño o no musulmán, pues el menú halal, o sea, lentejas. Exactamente, ¿no? También, por ejemplo, It's complicated to say, we want to establish a number of people's spaces only for women. Because women should not be able to go in front of a man. So, it's better to protect them, that's the discurso that they do, with a separate number of people. Maybe you can go in front of a man, like a man, like a man, like a man. Like a man, like a man. And you're done. So, according to discourses that are apparently of acceptance, and tolerance, and of rights, they also find messages that are a little more perverses and more complicated to identify. What happens? evidentemente Europa es islamófoba y se puede hacer muchísimo más por la integración de la población inmigrante y en particular la musulmana y efectivamente ellos lo que hacen es aprovecharse de ese discurso entonces es muy complicado determinar en qué momentos los hermanos están detrás de ciertas demandas que son justas o si también en realidad lo que hacen es aprovecharse de esa islamofobia para victimizarse y decir oye, como la población musulmana siempre va a estar perseguida en Europa tenemos que unirnos todos en torno al islam y aprovechar todos juntos para demandar cosas que además esto ocurre que es un círculo vicioso It's to say, when they propose this type of things The first ones that come out They always come from the radical To say, well, my God, I don't know what There's a lot of people who have to put it on the ground What happens? That here comes the rule of If you want, you can victimize And then again It's a rule of which They win all in that sense Because of course, one's guilty of others And they're in their communities The one that loses the democratic The one that loses in a democratic country can be Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or whatever you want, and live in peace. Or the Betis. But in fact, what is the radicality? Another very typical example is the issue of the Burkini. That we leave with Burkini in the streets or public spaces. The extremist of the right says, impossible, this is not possible. So they say, well, you're not replying to me, you're not obligated to put Burkini, but I want to put a Burkini if I want. So that's the discourse becomes more radical, more complicated. I understand that, well, for those reasons that we have exposed, Of course, it's difficult to have a register where the brothers are in Europe Of course, no there is carnage And there are no organizations that are brothers and brothers in Valencia No works like that But of course, I don't know if there is any kind of nucleus or space identified That you say, well, I have to say, I'm a bottle of milk, I'm a brother of the brothers In fact, if you look at Google, brothers and sisters, France or Spain You'll see a lot of articles of people who accuse them of being a brother Or who say that they are not a brother There is a lot of debate in Google, in the press, about whether this is or not. Because they are deliberately at the despise, changing the names and avoiding that brand so that is not a national label. And negating the relationship directly. Let's say, we have a conversation, a space, a organization, where you look at your past and you say, well, Kari, you are a Muslim, but if you look at your institutional information, you say, no, no, no, no, a politicians, independent, autónomos, no relation con nadie entonces bueno es un poco complicado entonces como decíamos Francia es el país que va por delante en este sentido porque tiene una población mucho mayor de musulmanes y estiman por ejemplo que la hermandad cuenta en este país con 200 mezquitas 300 asociaciones entre sectores religiosos de caridad educativos o profesionales y 20 escuelas privadas es decir que ya tienen una red más o menos nutrida Francia es un país muy grande pero bueno eso es lo que ellos han conseguido identificar en España por su parte no hay ningún registro tal cual ni cifras numéricas concretas oficiales no hemos encontrado nada que sea bastante fiable but there are various organizations or centers associated with the brothers and brothers that, as I said, no have that name, but they can relate. For example, the president of the Islamic Center Cultural of Valencia which is one of those places that they say that they are independent. That has changed the name of the brothers and brothers. He came from the party of Nagda, which is that rama tunecina of the brothers and brothers. Another example, the Islamic Republic for the Dialogue and the Convivency in Spain has also had a lot of members involved with that rama tunecina of the brothers and also is the only Spanish entity that is officially adscrita to the Federated Organizations Islámicas of Europe, which is a institution created in 1989 for integrating European organizations in the European Union of the European Union. You are on the club, that club is mounted to promote the idea of the hermanos, but you are not your brother. Only entered to ask how to get out of all. Exactly. This European Union has always subrayed its independence and autonomy with the herman, but his actual president, Abd al-Abid Masur, said in 2022 that the majority of individuals that participated in the foundation of the Federations were members of the Hermann Day and that the organization keeps maintaining the Hermann Day Muslim as a school ideologically refer to. Amigo, no eres hermano, pero... Somos members of the Hermann Day, but if you ask, no soy member of the Hermann Day. You have a cat, a cat, a cat, a cat, but not a cat. Well, no, no, no. Luego, también, dentro del contexto español, mantienen vínculos con la Federación. the Mezquita Boubaker of Madrid and the Comisión Islámica of Spain that until 2020 was president by Riay Tatari which came from Syria in the 70s and died during the pandemic he was a member of the country he was a icon within the Islamism here in Spain and in the Muslim community or a important figure within the Muslim community and he was a member of the Spanish and he was a member of the country and he was a member of the Spanish in the Comisión Islámica of Spain and also the occupation of Aiman Adelbi, also of origin sirio, and with a very similar position of Tatari. Both were linked with the Banguardy Islamic, which is a Syrian Syrian, which is a Syrian Syrian, but this here they were radical. One had a mobile, the other no responded to the calls, so it was like... They have said that they are not brothers, and they have nothing to do with their own. However, they come from there. Well, it's like, Well, then there have been several cases over the years of imanes that predicaban the line of the hermanos musulmanes and that have ended up being a little for example, in 2018 in Logroño identified a Alam Mohammed Said which was a iman that was looking to establish a center of difusión of the message more radical of the hermanos musulmanes in the north of Spain or in 2022 when he detested to Yajia Ben Aouda in Cáceres for his links with the hermandad and for inviting the community to have a more strict view of Islam and apartarse from the Spanish It's a bit what you've said you can also say that you can pass in France that they can be in communities more isolated that they're in themselves can be there are people who have people who come to take more from a line more radical this is what they call in France separatism no only that you make a centrist that you want to involve yourself with your propuestas in the public of France but that you want to separate from the public in the sense that you govern over your community that you abogues because that you allow to allow to that you have to poligamia. O que te juzguen tribunales musulmanes. Eso es, claro. Que eso, de nuevo, no es un derecho ni una protección de una minoría discriminada, sino que es ya salirte del esquema legal del país. Sí. Entonces, ahí se llama... Un estado paralelo, ¿no? Normas propias para esa comunidad, que no son las normas generales del país. Es esa línea muy fina entre proteger a una comunidad minoritaria, incluso que a lo mejor está discriminada... Que parte perseguida y discriminada. Claro, con justicia se puede decir que es así. Ah, de repente, yo soy una entidad separada que se gobierna por sí misma al margen de las leyes del Estado, ¿no? So, for example, in France, there is a law to protect what they call values of the Republic, which is to persevere this kind of things. No can't have a Muslim tribunal in France. No, I'm sorry, no can't. Right, right. All by the same norms, basically. And these European groups that are associated with the Muslim tribes, are, for example, where they take the pasta? Because for this type of stuff, they need to be monitored. Well, we're going to the issue of the data that is in general, in Europe. No, you have practically numbers of where you are, of the person, of the way they take the money. But, well, a large rasgos, there have been identified several ways of financing. One, that is a bit more evident, is the direct investment in the group by countries like Qatar. We're talking about this, which has been identified in a few countries. I don't remember what year it was. It was like a kind of a range between 2008 and 2012, but the Dutch authorities had identified that Qatar had put a million euros in associations affine to the German Muslims in Vegas. That are for Qatar, they are for Cacahuetes. But you're saying, you're receiving a strong chute for a lot of construction in Belgium or to dedicate it to your mezquitas, to your centers, to your things. For other than you have the same amount of voluntary of the Fieles. For example, in the case of Liman de Logroño, which we have mentioned, he also received even more than a million and a half of euros between the Fieles, among other communities the people of Noronho, how many? the people of this people the people of Riojana, other communities related to the brothers who said, okay, I'm here I'm here, I'm here, I'm here and investors from the Gulf or something, we always have a little bit of hand and then also through indirect indirects that they would be thanks to their intervention in organizations like Islamic Relief because they have a part of the supervision of the issue of the budget and so, so no necessarily you have to You have to declare everything if you do it. And you do it a little for the bag. And also, for example, Islamist Relief also says that they are brothers. It is a ONG that helps the population musulman in Europe and in the Orient Próximo. In Gaza they are very active, but they are brothers. In fact, you have to say that yes, but there are. And this, as far as indirect as a certain participation, occurs also with the halal comercio. That, by the way, the consumer and consumption of the halal is one of the points that French authorities include in that idea of Islamization cultural and enterism. That here, what you said, Fer, how that also radicalizes the right, the right islamic-dreams of Europe. There's a lot of discussion... For the EPE, CIA, and, let's go. Exactly. There's a lot of discussion that, for example, in the United States, and also in the United States, that is the supuesta alliance, that is like a mantra, a cliche, a myth of the extreme right, a supuesta alliance between the Islam political and the extreme left, to take the power in the country of the values of the country. The agenda woke. Yes, but for example, here in the United States, Jeremy Corbyn came out of the Labor Party, he had a party in the Labor Party, and it was difficult. And he has a lot of people who are musulman, there is a lot of musulman in the United States. He is saying that Corbyn has been liated with the anti-semitas, and the Islamo-comunist. Another example of that obsession with this story is a novel Michel Jouretbeck, a French, called Sumission, which is a dystopia. What he imagina is that in the election, well, imagine that there is a party musulman in France, very popular, because there is a lot of population musulman in France, and that in the election presidencials, hypotetic, llega a second round, a party of the extreme right and a party, and the party of the musulman. So, what he expect would happen is that the left, in the way of supporting a a government islamist, a a government of the extreme right, would support the Islamism, and would win the Islamism. So it's the novel of a man profundly conservative, who is a man who is a Muslim in France. The man, in a way, I don't like it much, but he writes fantastic. So the novel is a great thing, because it's like, how does this man, that the man has the fear of the French to that Islam is a country? That's right, that's right. And it's a little bit on all parts. Now, the data that we have given about France come from a report that has been presented to the government, but if you look at the data that had previous to this report, that is from 2024 to 2025, all the data that I've been looking for are of figures especially conservators very within, not in the secularism, but also of Christian values that talk about that the brothers of Muslims, that the Muslims in general to break the family, to break the national cohesion and of course, that is the people that are giving a little bit of a lot of inflation of what is the reality of the presence of this people in France. There are also many cases, which are paid by Emirates or Israel. It's a very difficult to distinguish the objective of the one who is interested in one part or the other. And it's very difficult to analyze. And having in mind all this, and going back to the origin, that is the design of Trump as a group of the terrorist, is it is the meaning, what is the point in Europe, to design them as a group of terrorists? No, I don't know until the friendship encaja in this type of definition. At least in Europe, let's go. Honestly, no at all. First, because, on the one hand, in the Oriental Próximo, we are in a moment in which the brothers in general, have years of batacazo. If you were saying, they are in auge, no, they have years of batacazo. The triumph of the Arab Revolution has not been done much, we have already mentioned, and not only in Egypt with the coup of Al-Sisi, but in Túnez, it has also been a process of caída in disgrace after the coup of Saïd in 2021, and now they are passing by a process of repression al ser uno de los principales partidos de oposición. Se han dictado penas de prisión contra los líderes de ENAGDA bajo pretexto de conspiración contra la seguridad del Estado, a pesar de que la oposición, tanto por parte de ENAGDA como de otros grupos políticos, es en general pacífica. O sea, no tiene mucho sentido. Pero bueno, y en Europa es que la información es ambigua y poco precisa. ¿Se está dando un crecimiento de la hermandad en los países europeos? ¿Está calando más ese mensaje? Vox dice que sí en su propuesta. But no has aportado Anya prueba Que demuestre Que sí En su intento De impulsar La designación Y en el caso francés Por ejemplo El informe que venía A decir todo esto También afirmaba Que no hay pruebas Que demuestren Que la comunidad musulmana En Francia Tenga intención alguna De instalar Un estado islámico Ni de imponer La opacidad De los hermanos También provoca eso Que tú no tengas Ni idea de Dónde sacan la pasta Cuánta gente son Cuántas organizaciones Afines tienen No sabes nada Básicamente Entonces So this fear that they are growing, or that there is a more implantation in this message, for example, in the French case, is based on factors cultural factors that are identifying a higher use of the veil, a higher presence of the barbara, that can indicate a cultural change, but are necessarily related to the German German? Well, not. And then, what you said, Fer, that they are opacous and ambiguous, deliberately, there is the problem that the activities that they do in Europe are illegal. So you know how to pursue a group that no has nothing illegal, that no has a priori nothing that is punible or perseguible by the police? How we have said, we focus more on even reform or organizing activities perfectly legal, like, for example, public books of theology or of ideologies of Islam, in the Arabian Arabian public, which then maybe in the Arabian Arabian you can find some messages. Well, but it's a Arabian Arabian, a priori. But if you have a Niman radicalizing Peña, that's illegal. You can go to the Arabian Civil and you can go to the Arabian Arabian. Claro, but you have a lot of Arabian people in which you also see a little bit of the message of Islam, at first it is illegal, it is a way of radicalizing people. Of course, what illegal would be to be a person who is terrorist, a person who clearly is not terrorist, who is illegal. Exactly. In fact, to remit against the Irmandad with these accusations of terrorism is problematic in Europe, because you can't get out of those intent of integration that are real. It is that a lot of people are asking reform to limit the discriminatory of the Muslim population, And when you respond Like a baby Chinese What you Angebisch Share What you know Is We're see We're gonna We're What could Do We're Had to Will Yeah We'res You What? I'd OK I'd Good Right Good He's And also it is a retórica That will also be used people from abroad to attack us Erdogan, for example, the president of Turkey It does all the time When it has a campaign electoral Like there are many millions of voters of European turcs That vote in the elections in Turkey They make an argument for Germany, Bases Bajos, Bélgica Dating meetings Diciendo Fijate the turcs in Europe That you are not living because you are not being opined And then that you are not going to be like this So if you are not going to be like this way It may be even more dangerous And also you have mentioned that the European groups also tried to leave these relations with the terrorism of the Armand of the Orient Próximo, also to present themselves as impulsors, defensors of an Islam more moderated. So that, technically, no have a relationship with violence, I understand. Well, this is another of the aspects of the tramping, because officially no, no support the violence, nor use it as method, a little bit what we've been saying at the end of the last chapter, which is a version more moderated, more pacific, of the Islamic political, but that they just do it in certain cases. That is why the support Hamas and the attacks of the 7th of October, which is what has taken Trump for the design. Yes, yes, yes. This ambigüedad regarding the violence, adopting a official of us, but not, but behind, supporting groups that can use violent methods for their purpose, has been done since years ago. For example, the German Muslim in Argelia no se alía with the rebels islamistas during the Civil War of the 90s because, technically, they are not violent but they are not violent but they are they are not violent but they are there is a very cool novel that I read the month ago that is called Uriyes of Kamel Daud that is that is focused on a little bit of the development of the Civil War of the 90s that is a very much more forgettable than the independence and very chunga very violent in which the Islamism more violent and it's a very cool thing, I recommend it. So, in result, I like it. It's a novel, it's a essay, so it doesn't tell you the story of the Civil War, but from a character that gets to a girl and suffers the consequences of being tortured in that moment, It tells you how it's a war that has been trying to hide from the authorities, how it's been given a reconciliation process, which is not necessarily a reconciliation, but rather a kind of silence in general. It talks about the role of the woman, how she pardoned certain Islamists, but not the women who fled with these Islamists. So, it's very good because it's a lot of themes. It's a lot of memory, it's a lot of war, it's a lot of women in the Argelia actual and in the Argelia of that moment. So, it's a cool thing, but it's very good. I think, and if you want to leave it with that, but that fiction is a fantastic thing to understand the reality of the world. Or, no only essayes, but also novels, because sometimes are a much better tool for understanding something that a essay of sesudicists. And series, and series. Exactly, right? But, well, to go a little bit of the issue of the legalization and the persecution, With the case of Hamas and the designation that Trump has as a terrorist as a hermandate, the British portavoz of the hermandate egipcia has done a case in case of that they are involved in any terror and that they are not able to accept the letter. You call this, but I don't buy this, I don't buy this. However, the hermandate in Syria published a comunicative directly, celebrating October 7th, calling the glory of the muyahidines that have attacked Israel and that kind of things, and calling all the musulmanes of the world to give material and moral to Hamas. Lo mismo, por ejemplo, pasó con Enagda en Túnez Entonces, de nuevo, lo que dice Jara No es que ellos tomen las armas No es que ellos abiertamente tiran Pero haces comunicado de vez en cuando Si celebras la barbaridad que hizo Hamas el 7 de octubre Es que como, chico Además de ser tontísimo porque van a ir a por ti Es que no puedes justificar eso Y luego no puedes decir No, yo es que en realidad quería decir otra cosa No, chico, te has puesto a celebrar eso Justo No seas bruto What I don't know is if this designation is going to be useful for something, is it a question nominal, to maybe reforzar the argument of certain countries. Yes, well, a ver, what is the designation of terrorists, at least at the same time in the United States, in the way of Egypt, Jordan and Palestine, is that it is illegal to give up material support to these groups, that impose economic sanctions to try to get their sources of income, and that they prohibit the entry to the United States of its members. Now, we are talking about an organization that, at least in the próximo Oriental Organization, has lived decades and decades and decades of illegalization, persecution, and this has not meant that they disappear or that they don't have to be in their own society. They are not that they are not that they are in their own society, not that they are in their own organization. In fact, this illegalization, in many occasions, as we have seen in Egypt and Syria, has given place to violent and radicalized decisions in reaction to those prohibitions that the state was put in. Además, las designaciones como terroristas por parte de las monarquías del Golfo, que ya hemos visto que se pusieron en 2014, tampoco disuadieron a Qatar o a Turquía de seguir dando apoyo a los hermanos musulmanes. Con lo cual, que ahora Milley en Argentina haya decidido desigrarlos como terroristas, tampoco va a hacer que Qatar diga, bueno, vale, ya paro. Me lo pienso. Gracias, Javier Milley. A pesar de eso, lo que respecta a Europa, es verdad que Europa es una región prioritaria para la hermandad, because they have a great critic of the population musulman that can come to their own and convert to their own faith and of course the police and general police and the judges of all the continent are paying attention to what happens here to see what they do the Senate as a terrorist what we said before is contraproducente because they give arguments of victimization or that not is interesting but of course there is a way to look at that line very fine between being very restrictive, very problematic, and not to do anything, because then you allow it to expand. So the challenge is there, to find those points in which you pursue a organization that no has anything illegal, that no has a name official, that no has a role in orgánic or jerarquías, but that is more influenced by the population of Europe. The solution is not what it is, but from the end of the challenge is more important in that sense. Yes, from the part it is like persevere a phantasm, but a phantasm that has influence, also is what we have talked about. There are certain things with which they try to influence, that maybe they don't... They don't. They don't. They don't have a connection with their system. They don't have a legal system. So, well, they don't have a terroristic thing, but they don't have a light. And they also play a lot with that. We have a minority of this because we are a minority of this. And then you take a message from that. A veces sí, a veces it's just, a veces no. And you have to see that. It's very complicated. Well, with this episode, you know something else. of a group that maybe you know not, maybe you know a little bit of the history of the brothers musulmanes, that also, again, not only the history of a group, but all the influence, that you have seen, from Bin Laden, to the political municipal in Europe, or that at the end it's a much more influence and with a much more profound to the social and cultural, and political, of course, of what a priori can appear. Well, nothing, here is been the, perhaps, the last episode in the garage trash of the world so much more thanks Jara for telling us this story and much more thanks thank you in reality there is a vindication of this garage because it's the place where we have won the glory the glory we won the little we won the small mess that is true it's true it's a place it's a place lamentable we're going to grow like a market and space but this was the phase 2 the of this and we're going to Good recuerdo, Céjala. Eso es, eso es. Pues nada, que hasta aquí el episodio de hoy. Muchísimas gracias por acompañarnos, por vernos en Spotify, en Apple, en Amazon, en Evox, en Podimo, donde sea. Y nada, que nos vemos aquí muy pronto, de nuevo, en No es el fin del mundo. No es el fin del mundo. El podcast semanal del orden mundial. Producido por The Voice Village. Dirección Eduardo Saldaña. Conducido por Fernando Arancón. Y guión de David Gómez. Alba Leiva. Jara Monter. Blas Moreno. Eduardo Saldaña y Fernando Arancón Producción Ejecutiva Ricardo Villa Edición de Sonido y Sintonía Original Pablo de Diego