The Lurking Escalation with Iran & the Future of the Mideast: Tamir Hayman

In the peak of the riots, if you are conducting a surgical strike, let's say you eliminate the supreme leader, you are creating a perfect storm. I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today I'm joined by Israel's retired Major General Tamir Heyman, Executive Director of the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel. He previously served as the Chief of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Directorate from 2018 to 2021. In this episode, Major General Heyman shares his perspective on the latest in U.S.-Iran tensions, including whether the United States and Israel may strike Iran militarily. We also discuss the Gaza peace process and other potential flashpoints in the Middle East. Stay with us as we speak with Major General Tamir Heyman. General Heyman, welcome back to NATSEC Matters. Thank you so much, Michael. It's always a pleasure being here. Thank you again for joining us. Last time we talked about many intelligence issues, especially arising from October 7th and those events. One of the things we talked about last time was Iran, and that's where I want to begin today. Here we are, we believe, on the precipice of U.S. military action, probably with Israel to join. There have been some diplomatic talks of late, and your prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is on his way here to Washington very soon to visit with President Trump, presumably about where the diplomacy is and where the war or where the strikes might go if indeed they occur. Do you agree with that, Reid? And kind of just generally tell me what the mood is in Israel and how's Israel seeing this new Iran issue? The general notion here in Israel that we are anticipating some form of military action, most Israelis accepting the necessity of military action against the missiles project of the Iranians. Having aware of its potential damage in the last 12 days' war, the fact that Iran rebuilt its manufacturing sites of those missiles created the legitimacy inside Israel for next session or next round of violence against Iran. So most Israelis do not reject and on the contrary approve and support military action. And if that action will be conducted or led by the United States, it's even for the better because of the power, potential military power that the United States can bring into the scene. But there is a tension, okay? It's not a walk in the park confronting Iran. There will be casualties. We will be in secure rooms and shelters during this for how long that it will take. because the assumption is that Iran will retaliate against Israel, no matter if Israel participates or not, because it considers Israel as a part of the general presence of the U.S. in the region. So that's where the sentiment lies between general approval and legitimacy and worrying of the consequences of that kind of struggle. Well, Israel, I think, was definitely green-lighted by President Trump and Mar-a-Lago at the very end of last year. But I think you all expressed that you really needed to go after some of the ballistic missile sites across Iran, that they had either reconstituted faster than they anticipated or we hadn't hit as many as we thought. Is that generally accurate? Was Israel going to hit Iran in this calendar year anyway? That depends on the pace of them rebuilding their stockpiles. There is a general notion in Israel professional arena that if they will reach their target number, that is 8,000 advanced ballistic missiles, it will be a sort of an unacceptable situation. some may call it as an even existential threat. I'm not using that term existential threat, but I approve and I believe that 8,000 ballistic missiles with heavy warheads are severe strategic threats that cannot be tolerated by the Israel defense concept. We are far away from that number, very far. There's less than 2,000 warheads right now that are capable of reaching Israel. But the problem is, it's the manufacturing line. You are absolutely right when you are describing the reconstitution of those sites that were destroyed in the 12 days war. And that troubles the Israeli defense establishment. Whether it will be this year or the next year or when, that's not determined yet. But there is a cross interests or merged interests developed through the circumstances of what happens in Iran. We are in the situation right now because of the dire economic situation of Iran that led eventually that the backbone of the Iranian economy revolt rejected protests against Iran, which is unprecedented. It's not students' rights. It's not women, liberty, freedom. It's not over political corruption. It's the backbone of the economy that says clearly enough is enough. And moreover, the Iranian regime cannot solve the problem without external help. There's zero potential of economic recovery from this situation. And put above it the fact that they have pushed back against the riots using violence and atrocity that created the scar that will endure in the tissue of the resilience of the Iranian people. and the fact that Israel is becoming regionally a different player after October 7 and its retaliation all across the Shiite axis, proven to be a strategic player that has no boundaries, that can even strike in broad daylight the negotiators over a hostage deal in Qatar in plain Deila. and the Trump effect that hubbers across all the Middle East, which is unpredictable, uses force in order to promote his interest or US interest worldwide. All of that situation creates very unique circumstances that are or should be exploited, or we are supposed to see that exploited in the next round of military campaign. That's fascinating. So I appreciate your view of the Iranian protests, and we might try to go a little deeper on that, but what is the view of the Israeli defense establishment? If the United States hits and tries to hit some of these instruments of regime repression, are we going to be able to spark another popular uprising or is this just some way for us to express solidarity with the protesters? I don't believe that you can externally engage or increase the riots inside Iran or create some renewed energy to embed new renewed energy into the protest by military action. military action can eventually create a ripple effect after concluded that may end up with another waves of riots of protest but during the operational pressure low probability of that igniting something that will alter the regime from inside okay right military might can be used in order to change regime, if that's the mission, through massive aerial campaign and ground operation. And the only entity worldwide capable of doing that is the United States. A huge question is whether Trump will issue that mission. And I'm not sure that that's the case, considering the history of Trump decision making and how he perceives powerful, decisive, clear, clean operations. If you were advising the president at this state, first of all, I take it you don't believe that we really missed a critical opportunity by not being able to bomb while the protesters were on the streets then? I think we've missed something. I do too. Okay. I think we missed something. But in the peak of the riots, if you are conducting a surgical strike, let's say for the sake of example, you eliminate the supreme leader. And in that case, you are creating a perfect storm. a single accurate strike, not a general campaign that will probably diminish the riots in the street, but a single strike in a very, very sensitive period of time, that might help. But we have lost that crucial potential point. And by the way, maybe after, I don't know, next week, 40 days, this will be the 40 days after the event of January 8th, maybe another cycle of violence will occur, and that would create an additional opportunity. I going to ask you here in a second if you were advising the Supreme Leader I sorry the President of the United States what your target set would be But in the 12 war many many press accounts said the Israelis knew where the Supreme Leader was were interested in hitting him but President Trump said don do that Is that an established fact? Can you shed any more light on all of those stories? I can say that it's highly not accurate. There was no restrictions done by the American president over the eliminating of the Supreme Leader, but there was not an operational chance to do that, an opportunity to do that. It was beyond the back then circumstances, and for that reason, it was not carried on. I don't know whether if we would have this opportunity, valid and available, whether we would have considered doing that. But that was not on the agenda. It was irrelevant. The discussion was irrelevant back then. Okay. That's interesting. Then it's still out there. Then it's an urban myth. So let's say you're the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and you're advising President Trump on what targets he ought to hit in Iran. Would you go for instruments of regime repression, including IRGC? Would you also go for IRGC Navy and other things that I keep hearing here in the United States or on our target list? would you go also with ballistic missiles would you go for economic targets or all of the above i would first of all ask the president what do you want to achieve what's the goal what's your what's the mission okay state the mission and i'll tell you what the method do you want to change the regime to remove the regime that's one do you want to degrade the regime just to destabilize That's two. Do you want to eliminate specific strategic essence? That's third. And according to those three very different mission statements, I can recommend. if it was the first I would say to the president it would take a very long time we need to mobilize more capabilities on the region and it will not be efficient without a ground operation eventually and I cannot guarantee the length of the operation and how much will it cost in all of the essence to the United States. Right. If you would say degrading, well, I would recommend a group of targets related to the IRGC, to the Parala establishment, which is responsible on law and order, symbols of the regime, basage headquarters and officials, senior commanders, I would recommend that all of the generation, the senior generation of the ILGC should be eliminated because of the generation cliff inside the ILGC. They have massive problems in regenerating and conducting, carrying on this very religious, radical atmosphere in the next generation, in the Gen Zs of the IRGCs who really are different than the old god. All of those are destabilizing mechanisms that will not ensure the collapse of the regime, but it might promote a ripple effect as I said before an after action effect that will probably promote the chances that this regime will collapse but moving back to a broader perspective of recommendation I would probably say to the president there is another option which is not violently acting towards Iran, there is a kind of a blockade, maybe not 100% blockade, but a partial blockade that we can do that will prevent Iran from exporting oil, that with additional sanctions and long presence in the Arabian Gulf, can increase tensions inside Iran that may eventually get the same effect you want to achieve during a full-scale direct operation. That's another option available to the United States Army, kind of a blockade or partial blockade. And the last thing I would say, and I bring here my Israeli interests, things like that, giving this regime lifeline by relieving sanctions without any concessions or profound concessions from them is a huge strategic mistake because there's no ongoing nuclear projects right now. So if it's just for the sake of nuclear they are giving nothing in return, they are getting the lifeline that will help them get away from the hole that they are inside. All right, you're wise. I like that. Asking the president what he wants to achieve. General, so let's assume the United States strikes Iran. Let's assume Israel is part of that strike. we assume that, of course, even if Israel wasn't a part of it, that the Iranians would target Israel. But the Iranians have also warned of a regional war. First of all, do you think that they'll come after Israel with more than they did last time? And what do you think the chances are that the Iranians hit the Saudis and the UAE? All of those statements right now are part of the negotiation and are part of deterrence statements and strategic messages. I won't really give too much attention to what's being told publicly. But yeah, according to the working assumption in Israel, Israel will be a part of the retaliation, and the Iranian retaliation depends on the scale of the U.S. strike. If it will be a symbolical strike, we might not be included in the retaliation. But most definitely, if there is an elaborate campaign or very extended aerial campaign conducted by the United States, and certainly if in some context Israel will be a part of the aggression, it will be part of the offensive, Israel will be definitely in the target. and it will be similar to the events we saw on the 12 days war but maybe due to the fact that Iran need to retaliate not just against Israel but need to retaliate on the rest of the presence of the US in the Middle East it will be less intensive but they have enough stockpiles to engage with both with the presence of U.S. in the Middle East and Israel. As for the targets, it's very interesting to see whether the Saudis will be attacked because of the close connections recently established between Saudi and Iran. And it seems like Saudi has removed Iran from its primary national security concept threats. Iran is no longer prioritized as an enemy. It was replaced by Israel, by the way, moving to the previous discussion of Saudi. Israel is being perceived as a threat to the stability of Saudi Arabia. See how it distanced ourselves from the normalization. UAE, there is a presence of US in the UAE. UAE is not a part of the former alliances between Saudi and UAE, so they will probably be part of the retaliation target. And the Iranian foreign minister clarified that striking U.S. bases in a country does not mean that we are striking or violating the sovereignty of a country. We are just retaliating against the U.S. presence. I think he wanted to say that directly to Qatar and to the UAE. If they will strike against bases in Qatar, bases in UAE, they want to clarify that they are not engaging in a war against Qatar and UAE. Jordan is very, very interesting. There is a huge deployment of American Air Force in Jordan. And it seems like Jordan is the weak sheep in the bunch because they have no retaliation measure. and it can be considered as a legitimate target because it was used as a base for launching strikes. Again, it will be used as a launching pad for striking against Iran. And so along that structure, we will see a retaliation, of course, against the ships, the vessels of the U.S., by using UAVs, using ground-to-maritime missiles that they had. So by the way, last time when they targeted Israel with drones and ballistic missiles, a tentative conclusion was the ballistic missiles were not as accurate as we had assumed because they seem to have missed, sometimes by hundreds of yards, what they were aiming at. Is that accurate? And two, do you or do the Israelis believe that the Iranian shots at Israel last time were symbolic? Because they were in the many hundreds, and that doesn't seem really symbolic to me. As for the first question, according to Iranian perception, it was accurate and it was efficient. In fact, there were a few hits in Israel that were very accurate. in the Weizmann Institute, for example, and other places in the refinery near Haifa, there were a few very very accurate hits But generally they Iranians perceived the accuracy as efficient and that line of effort as a successful one that they need to emphasize in the next round. As for the concept of operation, I think that the Iranian didn't hold back their punches back then. They tried to do their best in order to inflict as much damage as possible inside Israel. It was far away from a symbolical retaliation. They tried their best in order to inflict as much pain as possible to Israelis across Israel. That's the situation. let's talk a bit about the news of the last few days the united states sat down in oman with iran and discussed several issues of course the nuclear program being at the top of the list apparently what's going to go on this week is primarily maybe additional talks but certainly Netanyahu's coming here. What do you think he, and he's moved his trip up by a week, what do you think he's rushing here to say to the president? Apparently, I deduct that the first round of negotiation was positive from both parties involved. Positive that it means that we will have a second round of discussions. And from the Israeli perspective, it is bad. Because any form of a deal that does not include full solutions to all the strategic threats that Iran poses to Israel in the current context is a bad deal. and I think that was and Netanyahu is rushing to explain the Israeli interest in that aspect that is don't go to a deal unless you are ensuring that the ballistic missiles and the regional terror network and of course all of the nuclear project is being part of the deal and of course the cynics may say that it's good for Netanyahu to push forward the visit not to be in the inauguration Board of Peace meeting, which creates a photo op of Netanyahu with Erdogan and other members of the Board of Peace that he does not want to be pictured alongside of them. Yeah, I understand. Okay, so he's heard that the talks went better than expected, And so Israel's getting a little nervous about it. Okay. Well, let's also talk a little bit about the other developments in Israel. You mentioned the Board of Peace. We haven't spoken to you since the return of the hostages. I remember one of the themes we discussed was just the Israeli psyche had changed after October 7th, that you had to rethink your deterrent strategy. You had to be more forward-leaning to eliminate threats before they gathered. Tell us a little bit just in general, how are Israelis feeling about their security posture? How are things changing, and where has Israel settled? On the one hand, Israelis are satisfied of the fact that Israel is taking control over its security interest by itself, using enforcement all through the region, from Lebanon to Syria to Gaza, maybe Iran. This being absorbed in the Israeli community, as lessons learned from the mistake of October 7, that's on the positive side. And the negative side, every file is open. We haven't really closed any arena. Hezbollah, a ceasefire, but we know that Hezbollah is returning, is rebuilding its former capabilities, smuggling weapons from Syria, building the units that were destroyed, and regaining its former position in front and deterring the Lebanese formal government. In Syria, it's fragile. We don't know where Ashara heads to. And there are growing tactical threats on the Syrian-Israeli border. In Iran, we've talked elaborately about that. And in Gaza, although we control half of Gaza, but Hamas controls the other half. Hamas taxes the humanitarian aid and the trade with Gaza with 30% stevies, which creates additional income that afford him to recruit new recruitments to the lines of the organization. It is using shells that were not exploded in order to build an explosive device, preparing for the next round of cycles against Israel. So that's really frustrating Israel. How come we ended up after two years of war and Hamas is on its feet and Qatar and Turkey are involved in its reconstruction, potential reconstruction that creates frustration? Nobody knows if there is a viable or credible means to disarm Hamas as promised in the 20 points plans of Trump. So there's a huge lack of trust that we have achieved something fundamental during that war. Of course, pleased of the fact that there's no hostages in Gaza for the first time since 2007. And that's a very good situation. That's how things are. It's so interesting. You're right. I mean, every file is still open. I guess we always talk about Israel has whatever, six or seven fronts. And the Houthi, Hezbollah, Hamas, everyone is still at it. We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Major General Tamir Heyman. Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm. Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage. Founded in 2013, Beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk, drive growth, and navigate a complex geopolitical environment. With a bipartisan team and decades of experience, Beacon provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. So, on the situation in Gaza, we have a green zone. And then, as you said, we have where Hamas still controls Gaza. We read that the plan apparently is to rebuild the green zone, maybe expand the green zone after long periods of time. Is that the gist of what the plan is going forward? And do you have any confidence that that's going to be successful? First of all, there's a huge confusion between red and green. let's get things cleared. In our discussion, there is a yellow line that divides Gaza Strip into two. 53% of Gaza is under the control of IDF. Let's, for the sake of discussion, let's call that the green area. That is or in that area, Hamas has no presence. There is a freedom of action, no real threat to Israeli forces, and it consists of four families that cooperate with Israel, a few thousands, a thousand, a thousand, a tenth of thousands of civilians, but most of the civilians of Gaza are located in the other half of Gaza Strip, 47% under the control of Hamas. And let's, for the sake of discussion, let's call that the red, the dangerous area. The red area is controlled by Hamas. In that, that's the situation right now. Second, we are in the twilight zone. The first stage of the Trump plan is concluded successfully after the returning of all of the hostages. Second phase has begun by opening the Rafah crossing and should be followed up by the administration or the deployment of the Technocratic Committee of Gaza, which is, for the sake of simplicity, let's call it the new government of Gaza. that has full authority on all aspects of daily life of Gazans, it should enter Gaza in the next few days or week. They are currently in Cairo, training, preparing themselves. They will enter Gaza through the Rafah crossing and they will be located in the red zone, in the area controlled by Hamas. Next stage that should be decided by the Board of Peace inauguration meeting next week is the construction. The reconstruction and the demilitarization. Reconstruction will begin in the area controlled by Israel. A new neighborhood, let's call it the UAE neighborhood, because most of the money for that neighborhood comes from the United Arab Emirates. it will be in the area controlled by Israel as a model, as something that can be duplicated in terms of logistics. In the meanwhile, while construction is going on on the Israel-controlled area, in the red area, the demilitarization should begin. Huge question how it will be operated. according to the knowledge we have Hamas will voluntarily disarm itself after being forced to do that by Turkey and Qatar they will give up they will hand over to the government of Gaza the tunnels the heavy weaponry and there is a debate regarding the AK whether it is considered to be heavy weapon or side weapon. Israel insists that AK-47, Kalashnikov, is a heavy weapon that should be transmitted, transformed, or given to the government of Gaza. Secondly, they will give up all of the manufacturing sides of rockets. And if that happens, miraculously, and all of them hand over the weapons, the factories, the tunnels, the missiles, And the AK-47, that is the disarmament of Hamas. And then we can move on to duplicate the UAE project in neighborhoods all across the red zone in Gaza Strip. That's the Kushner-Witkov plan that the Israelis are very skeptic about it. But that's what they are trying to achieve right now. So, the disarmament of Hamas really seems to be the most difficult part of this. Can we really see that happening? What does your gut say? I'm skeptic. Hamas is a resistance organization. All essence of its existence is resistance, and there's an armed resistance, and you can't be Hamas without a weapon. so I'll think that they will play games they might consider handing over 100 rockets left in Gaza they don't use it in any way, anyhow they might give the myth of the underground tunnels that can be destroyed by the international committee whatever, okay, no problem because they don't really use it anymore they will not have to use it, they are above ground if there's no threat to their life. But handing over all of the weapons seems to be a low probability scenario. They will hide them. They will maybe create some ceremonial transition of a number of weapons, symbolical, but they will maintain the weapons in order for their future self-security and, more importantly, to challenge the new government and to convince the new government that the only solution of law and order enforcement in Gaza is by asking Hamas to do that for them. That's their ambitions, that the international platform, the Board of Peace and the government will ask Hamas, please help us maintain law and order in order for us to rebuild Gaza. And by doing that, they were rebuilding themselves. That's how I see it, I think. On the technocratic government, Hamas signed off on the Palestinians who will serve on it, is that right? The list of 15 officials was approved by everyone, including the Israeli government, including Hamas. And do we think Hamas is going to accept them? Is there anyone worried that they're going to murder them? How do you think it's going to go? No, no. They have the assurance of Turkey and Qatar for their own survival, and it's against the Hamas interest right now to disrupt the civilian element, because practically they are handing over all of the chaos of Gaza to the technocratic committee hands. All of the death, all of the problems, all of the enormous challenge of Gaza is being handed over to them. Let them build Hamas, build Gaza. As long as Hamas maintaining its potential future military might or military capabilities works along their interests to have some other entity take control of those very chaotic situations in Gaza. So I think the first stage will be approved, even backed by Hamas. We know that they've already assured that to Qatar and Turkey, the negotiator, to Egypt also. Second base, full disarmament, I'm skeptical. Okay. So earlier you mentioned Israel's strategic concept, and you mentioned it with regard to, of course, Iran and how many ballistic missiles they might have. But I wonder if you just might speak generally of the strategic concept. Is it to constantly go after your adversaries? What was it before October 7th, and what is it now? Well, we didn't really sit on our hands before October 7th. We were very much proactive. But we back then accepted the situation that a conventional forced generation of militias, of terror organization along our border is acceptable as long as they don't act against Israel. And that's no longer the case. any terror organization or guerrilla presence along the borders of Israel will be crushed, will be destroyed, and there's zero tolerance of that aspect. The message to do that is what we call by enforcement or preemptive strikes. The problem is, and here I'm putting my personal point of view, that if you extend that too much, you are losing grip on the principles of agreements, rules against the basic notion that war ends with an agreement, that this new agreement creates the stable situation situation of a different and improved security status. And I'm worried about the fact that we will extend that. We will expand this idea to that level, which will risk us in ending with endless wars without any stable situation eventually that we aspire to achieve. Yeah. As we begin to wrap up a little bit, I want to talk briefly about Israel's relationship with the Gulf Arabs. First, your relationship with the UAE. Is it still, of course, Abraham Accords and you recognize each other? also on saudi arabia it really feels like muhammad bin salman has put off normalization for the me at least the medium term i was a little surprised when he came to washington and he really cited sudan as one of his many reasons why he couldn't move forward he talked about the instability there, the possibility of refugees coming across and disrupting. He talked about just generally the security situation that he didn't feel comfortable in. And of course, he needs something out of Israel. What's the Israeli view on the Gulf Arabs and the prospects for some sort of normalization with Saudi Arabia? Well, Saudi Arabia is distancing itself. Yeah. Thank you, from normalization. And it's very interesting what happens there. It's a bunch of reasons. One of it relates to arrogancy driven by the very close connection with Trump. It seems like Saudi can get the 2030 vision without Israel as a necessity. It's not a crucial factor. They are aspiring to increase their economic situation and become a hegemon in the region. And the fact that Trump is highly supportive of NBS creates this arrogancy statement or feeling. Secondly, the most important development is the confrontation against UAE. And because of the fact that UAE is in very close connections with Israel, they are constantly criticizing UAE for that connection as collaborators with Israel against the Arab world, statements that we thought that will be forgotten, but still are now present in the Saudi arena against UAE and against Israel. Third, there is a very unique cooperation between the Wahhabi, that is the Saudi, and the Islamic Brotherhood with Qatar and Turkey and other sections. fourth Egypt turned over from being supported by the UAE owing them a lot practically the UAE saved the Sisi and now they've shifted their loyalty and they are much more involved with the Saudi Arabia aspects so all of that and of course Saudi Arabia is also in a rapprochement with Iran Saudi is now fortifying its position in the Middle East, away from Israel, away from the UAE, supporting sections and elements that are affiliated to the Islamic Brotherhood, like in Somalia, like in Libya, like in other places in the Middle East. very unique, very dangerous. Normalization is far away from achievement in this current context. Fascinating. Sir, you were terrific. Thank you so much for joining NATSEC Matters. We really enjoy it. And you've given us an important view from Israel, view from the region. And I know our many, many listeners appreciate it. So thank you again. Thank you, Michael. That was Major General Heyman. I'm Michael Allen. Please join us next week for another episode of NatSec Matters. NatSec Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry. NatSec Matters is a production of Beacon Global Strategies. Thank you.